

very little happened until the late autumn of 1946. I am inclined to think that the outbreak of the civil war was a more haphazard and less carefully planned process than it was later made to appear. This accords with the reminiscence of Vlandas, a leading Communist who was present at the meeting on February 12th. He recorded that the discussion of military action was very cursory and revealed only an almost total lack of preparation.

There can be no argument, however, with the author's analysis of the circumstances in which the rebellion was defeated. He gives first place to the determination of the general mass of the Greek people not to succumb. In contrast with that was the decline of the will to win on the part of the rebels, especially as they became increasingly dependent on the Slavo-Macedonian minority for manpower, and were consequently forced once more to concede the principle of Macedonian autonomy. Among the secondary factors were the quarrel between Tito and Stalin, which led to the closure of the frontier between Greece and Yugoslavia; the incompatibility of the two leading Communists, Zakhariadis and Markos Vaphiadis, which was tactical and political as well as personal; and the scale of American support after the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947. That foreign aid without an indignant will to win would have been insufficient is well illustrated by the contrasting experience of Vietnam twenty years later.

The Greek civil war was indeed a paradigm of the early years of the international conflict known as the Cold War. It is therefore necessary to see it in its international setting, which Averoff-Tossizza was eminently qualified to do. As foreign minister, he participated in the negotiations which led to the independence of Cyprus in 1960; as minister of defense he had had to handle both the aftermath of the military dictatorship and the renewed quarrel with Turkey. He is a familiar figure in the corridors of power in foreign capitals as well as in Athens. Only a Greek of international stature could have written this book. That he has also gifts of style and imagination makes it a pleasure to read.

Reviewed by C. M. WOODHOUSE

The Faces of Freedom

On Being Free, by Frithjof Bergmann, *South Bend, Indiana: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1977. 238 pp. \$10.00.*

PROFESSOR BERGMANN has written an eminently readable, wise, and provocative book. It is unusual for other reasons: it is scholarly without being narrowly "academic" (it has no footnotes and no index, and yet it is closely argued and aware of its debt to philosophical tradition); it attacks a host of popular myths and penetrates the fog that surrounds many a learned discussion about human freedom; and it ventures to make practical suggestions about how society can increase the possibilities of freedom among its members. True, some of this praise must be qualified and some of the virtues of the book are studied—one suspects that Bergmann delights in setting off firecrackers in the hallowed halls of academic philosophy—but these flaws can be forgiven because (1) the book is excellent, and (2) *something* needs to be done to get the attention of professional philosophers and to bring their special skills to bear on the problems that confront human beings. One hopes that Bergmann's book marks the beginning of a trend.

The apparent death of several popular myths about freedom results from Bergmann's notion that freedom is essentially a function of the attainment of self-hood. Unfortunately, this notion is rather vague, and the reader leaves the book with the feeling that something has been left unsaid: namely, what freedom is. What it is not is license, or the removal of barriers (negative freedom); nor is it conformity to reason (positive freedom). Bergmann spends much of his time defending the first thrust of this attack, and his argument is an effective critique of traditional libertarianism. However, he is less convincing in his attack on the view that considers freedom to be conformity to reason. Briefly stated, his argument is that because reason is a part of man his freedom cannot be a function of that part, but is rather correspondence with "the self, which is all the various characteristics" that comprise the person-

ality. "Freedom for us is the expression of what we are . . ." As noted, this formula is vague; but, more importantly, it suggests a descriptive rather than a normative view of freedom. Bergmann attempts to raise the view to the prescriptive level by insisting that "what we are" is not determined by what we want or what we take ourselves to be at the present moment, but by what we need or might be. Thus, with a neat Aristotelian twist, he argues that "what we are" is an ideal type variously applied to specific persons. However, his language about a "genuine self," "my own authentic self," and "what I truly am" shrouds this concept in a mist; the suggestion of something hidden with which one "identifies" in becoming free puts one in mind of Eastern mysticism. The reader demands more.

Unfortunately, when his thesis calls for extended analysis Bergmann often relies on analogies, several of which he belabors. In his discussion of education, for example, he repeatedly likens the student to a juggler to whom the teacher must hand a new plate without disturbing the six that are already in the air. "If it is done at the wrong moment either before the juggler's skill is far enough advanced, or clumsily, off by a split second, the result will be that with a crash all of the plates will fall to the ground." How, though, does such an analogy suffice to aid instruction?

On the other hand, the author rightly eschews formulae. Although he is sympathetic with Neill's experiments with Summerhill, for example, he does not espouse "free schools" (most of which were set up on a misreading of Neill, Bergmann carefully points out), and he disagrees with Neill's blind commitment to freedom as the paramount human value. As Bergmann says, "whether and to what extent education should aim at freedom is for us a genuine and problematic question." The entire thrust of his argument suggests that indeed freedom is the aim of education, but apparently the author does not want us to take anything for granted. Thus, with persistent curiosity and sound critical acumen Bergmann forces the reader to rethink some of his most treasured convictions. As Bergmann would have it, the myth of the absolute value of freedom lies dor-

mant alongside several companions.

First among these companions is the traditional conception of freedom, including the apparently self-evident maxim that freedom is a matter of choice. It cannot be, insists Bergmann, since we make hundreds of choices daily that are clearly unfree. Undisturbed by the apparent *petitio principii*, Bergmann concludes boldly that "choice is not juxtaposed to coercion," since coercion, in the form of "forces outside the ego, can be liberating." Choice "is not a condition that suffices" for freedom; what matters is that I "identify with the making of a choice."

The second would-be victim is the Rousseauian conviction that freedom is the best argument for democracy since only in a democracy is it possible to attain freedom. For Bergmann this is not so, since in fact one finds much greater freedom in (some) primitive non-democratic societies such as the Pygmies and the Balinese. If freedom were a function of democratic rule, moreover, hardly anyone would ever have been free because "hardly anyone was ever literally governed by himself." The best argument for democracies, says Bergmann, is that "as systems they are more intelligent," that is to say, "more responsive, more flexible, and therefore more efficient . . ."

Third in our list of dead or missing myths is our treasured conviction that work is somehow "holy" and something no self-respecting person would be without. Bergmann would revise our conception of work after the model of Yugoslavia under pre-Communist rule, a model of "self-management" in which "a great many jobs might be engaging, and even fun" if they only had to be taken on for "three to six months." Our commitment to the notion that work is sacred is relatively recent, and Bergmann regards it as an aberration to be displaced by the view that work should be "integrated with life" and reduced to that which is essential for healthy functioning of society. He is convinced that this could be done without seriously affecting the G.N.P. or the balance of trade.

Along the way, the author leaves many questions in the air. Moreover, one is troubled by

the occasional stirring in the limbs of the presumably-dead myths about human freedom, by the author's penchant for blackwashing the opposition in derisive adjectives, and by his occasional oversimplifications and hasty generalizations. But these are small matters when weighed against the value of a book that provokes as much thought as this one does, and lets as much fresh air into the musty chambers of perennial problems.

Reviewed by HUGH MERCER CURTLER

Of Dilemmas and Confusions

The Moral Choice, by Daniel C. Maguire, Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1978. 477 pp. \$10.95.

Right and Wrong, by Charles Fried, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1978. 226 pp. \$15.00.

IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT to imagine two books dealing with the same general subject of moral values more different than the two brought together in this review. The first is encyclopaedic in nature, ranging over wide fields of literature and human experience, vividly aware of dilemmas in ordinary life, intent on providing guide-lines for conduct amidst the vast complexities of our contemporary world. The second is cool, restrained, probing a severely limited range of issues, seeking to establish certain basic principles which can govern the behavior of, for example, the lawyer and the doctor in the pursuit of their professional duties. The first is geared to the interests and questions of students of all kinds: the second is very much the product of the Harvard Law School.

One is inclined to wonder whether ethical issues have ever presented greater problems than they do today. Yet as far as the ordinary

individual is concerned it often seems that he has no choice any longer: the immense systems of control made possible by modern technological developments leave him powerless in face of what are crucial moral issues—armaments, human rights, methods of diplomacy, economic strategies. A few individuals are burdened with the responsibility of making major decisions: the multitude, it appears, must bear the consequences. How, then, can the individual any longer enjoy the freedom to make decisions at all?

Fortunately we are not yet held fast within a totalitarian technological system, and in home and college and business the individual is still confronted daily by alternative possibilities of behavior. Can he be supplied with normative, guiding principles? Mr. Charles Fried believes that he can and seeks to establish a moral system in which certain acts must be regarded as right or wrong in themselves, whatever the consequences may turn out to be. It is a bold claim in face of the pervading climate of relativism and the widespread hostility to authority of any kind. "In the view I shall elaborate," he writes, "right and wrong have an independent and overriding status because they establish our basic position as freely choosing entities . . . "Right and wrong are the expressions of respect for persons—respect for others and self-respect."

I have spoken of guiding lines. Perhaps for Fried's system it would be better to speak of a guiding star which, as it were, hovers over his whole exposition. This is the star of "personhood" or "moral personality": respect for persons may not be compromised in any way for the value of personhood is "the presupposition and substrate of the very concept of choice." It is not sufficient to allow our actions to be determined by what are likely to be good or bad consequences. Rather it is necessary to recognize that there are certain actions which are plainly *wrong* and must not be done at any cost. The two primary examples treated at some length are doing bodily harm and lying. Each is regarded as a form of deliberate disrespect to the person and therefore as wrong in all circumstances.

Fried grants that the questions of what is