

# *The New Natural Law and the Problem of Equality*

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AN APPEAL to the condition of man in the state of nature has always been among the most powerful arguments pro or con concerning equality. "Doing what comes naturally" is the conclusive argument in support of all human behavior. For theists the argument from nature has usually borne the stamp of divine approval for such behavior has its origin "in nature and nature's God." To prove that an action is natural is to demonstrate that it is licit. All of the great theoretical formulations of the idea of human equality or inequality from the Greeks to Freud have appealed to the condition of man in the state of nature as their ultimate justification.

It is important to note too that all the classic formulations of the "state of nature" with the exception of Freud's stem from the pre-Darwinian era. They are often formulated in terms of the myth of the age of gold when, as Virgil predicts in the *Golden Eclogue*, "the goats, unshepherded, will make for home with udders full of milk, and the ox will not be frightened of the lion, for all his might." Alternatively, they are imperfect inductions based on faulty or incomplete ethnological evidence. Even after the discovery of the New World the image of man in the state of nature continues to be heavily idealized and romanticized.<sup>1</sup> When, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, primitive man was closely observed, the sources of his behavior were ill understood and faulty interpretation of the evidence often produced a picture as inaccurate as that produced by idealization and romanticism.

Most of these theoretical reconstructions of the condition of man in the state of nature posited a benevolent and nonaggressive human nature living in a state of equality, virtue and abundance. Even when the equality was a negative equality, that is mankind was equally degraded, depraved or sinful, these inherent weaknesses of condition in primitive man gave no man a real advantage over another.

Darwinism, from the date of the publication of *On the Origin of Species* on November 24, 1859 to the present, has transformed both our conception of man in the state of nature and our knowledge of what "human nature" is and how it came to be. The easy simplicities of earlier views were contested and abandoned and although "Darwinism" in its many formulations was from the outset filled with scientific controversy a new conception of human nature and of "natural law" gradually emerged.

Although the theory of evolution through natural selection is over a century old the earlier ideas of a harmonious and non-aggressive human nature not only remained intact but continued to dominate the social sciences. As late as the 1960's, Donald Symons remarks,<sup>2</sup> "the chimpanzee (the customary model for early man) was a peace-loving, promiscuous, Rousseauian ape, and students of human evolution emphasized tool-use, cooperation, hunting, language and 'innate' needs for long-lasting, intimate relationships. Today, however, the chimpanzee is a murderous, cannibalistic, territorial, sexually jealous, Hobbesian ape;

sociobiologists promote a cynical view of human life; and an evolutionary perspective on human beings as well as the concept of human nature are intensely controversial." This fundamental shift in conceptions of "human nature" is of the greatest importance for the debate concerning equality.

When Darwin published *On the Origin of Species* he dealt with the evolution of organic forms generally and except for a few cryptic allusions he made no reference to the evolution of man. Nonetheless, the essay, *On the Origin of Species*, would have had a tremendous impact on the idea of equality even had Darwin not followed its publication with a second essay, *The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex*, on February 24, 1871. The earlier book, taken by itself, would have been important because it accounted for the development of animal species in terms of variation and the impact of the environment in sorting out those biological differences which in a particular environment gave a particular animal an advantage in the struggle for survival. The theoretical emphasis in Darwin's explanation of organic development lay not with the group, or harmony, cooperation and a fixed and for all time determined nature characterized by a rough equality of abilities and predispositions. Rather, Darwin emphasized surprising and sometimes extraordinary differences in biological makeup; differences which made for important inequalities between individuals and groups. His emphasis on struggle and conflict flew in the face of the theories of natural harmony and goodness, of cooperation and balance which dominated the thought of most previous biological and social theorists. After Darwin conceptions of an equality rooted in "human nature" lose their commanding position in Western thought.

The revolution, however, did not halt with the general application of evolutionary theory to organic development. In

his second essay, *The Descent of Man*, Darwin applied his evolutionary theories to man in an effort to explain human origins and development. Darwin himself explained his objectives in the introduction he wrote for his essay.<sup>3</sup>

The sole object of this work is to consider, firstly, whether man, like every other species, is descended from some pre-existing form; secondly, the manner of his development; and thirdly, the value of the differences between the so-called races of man. . . .

By emphasizing the continuum which existed between man and the other animal species Darwin made possible a genuine science of man based upon empirical rather than wholly theoretical material. The implication is clear that the same dynamics which shaped and transformed the lower animals were also causative forces in man's development.

Because Darwin observed, reported and even emphasized the role of cooperation and what some sociobiologists have come to call "altruism" in evolutionary development it has been argued that Darwin was no "Social Darwinist," that, in short, Darwin refused to apply the principles of human biological evolution to the development of society. Ashley Montagu, among many others, has argued that Darwin was "not a muscular Darwinist" (whatever that imprecise description means).<sup>4</sup> Montagu argues that Darwin's theory had the misfortune of being born at the wrong time; that Tennyson had already colored "Nature, red in tooth and claw" and that in a world filled with conflict and in which the "dog eat dog" philosophy was widely held it was easy to misunderstand Darwin's key phrases, "the warfare of nature," "the struggle for survival," "competition" and "the survival of the fittest," when they appear so frequently in the *Origin of Species*. But Montagu goes on to argue that in *The Descent of Man*<sup>5</sup>

... Darwin endeavors to show that cooperation, the "social instincts," love, the emotion of sympathy, of community, were principal factors in the evolution of man as a human being. It is this important aspect of his argument that has been so widely overlooked . . .

Any close reading of Darwin will not permit the total acceptance of Montagu's views. While not entirely incorrect they must be qualified and footnoted for they obscure the issues and questions which had arisen in the mind of Darwin himself. While Darwin, to be sure, did stress such elements in man's social behavior as cooperation, love, morality and patriotism he also wrote in *The Descent of Man*:<sup>6</sup>

... With savages, the weak in body and mind are soon eliminated; and those that survive commonly exhibit a vigorous state of health. We civilized men, on the other hand, do our utmost to check the process of elimination; we build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed, and the sick; we institute poor laws; and our medical men exert their utmost skill to save the life of everyone to the last moment. There is reason to believe that vaccination has preserved thousands, who from a weak constitution would formerly have succumbed to small-pox. Thus the weak members of civilized societies propagate their kind. No one who has attended to the breeding of domestic animals will doubt that this must be highly injurious to the race of man. It is surprising how soon a want of care, or care wrongly directed, leads to the degeneration of a domestic race; but excepting in the case of man himself, hardly anyone is so ignorant as to allow his worst animals to breed.

A catalogue might be made of Darwin's smug but worried concerns with inferior races, inferior morals, inferior religions and the absence in many groups of any enthusiasm for the evolutionary upward

path. To be sure, Darwin's observations are more guarded and different in kind from those made by his contemporary, Herbert Spencer. That, perhaps, is due chiefly to the fact that Spencer was a sociologist rather than a biologist.

For Darwin there was an implicit difficulty in his evolutionary theory. The mechanisms of natural selection as he understood them seemed to point in the direction of selfish individualism (survival and reproductive success), while much of the evidence from the observation of animal and human behavior seemed to point in the direction of self-sacrifice for the benefit of the group. Darwin himself was puzzled by the appearance of altruistic behaviors when, in fact, these behaviors might lead to the death of the individual and reproductive failure.

Darwin first encountered this problem with respect to colonial insects. In *The Origin of Species* he writes:<sup>7</sup>

... I will not here enter on these several cases, but will confine myself to one special difficulty, which at first appeared to me insuperable, and actually fatal to the whole theory. I allude to the neuters of sterile females in insect-communities; for these neuters often differ widely in instinct and in structure from both the males and fertile females, and yet from being sterile, they cannot propagate their kind.

Darwin's clarification, while it points in the direction of "group selection," is not very satisfactory. The problem of forms and behaviors which benefit the group rather than obtaining the reproductive success of the individual reappear in Darwin's account of human evolutionary development. Darwin was puzzled by the rise of social and moral qualities which seemingly could not be explained in terms of individual survival. "It is extremely doubtful," Darwin noted,<sup>8</sup> "whether the offspring of the more sympathetic and benevolent parents, or of those who were most faithful to their comrades, would be

reared in greater numbers than the children of selfish and treacherous parents belonging to the same tribe. He who was ready to sacrifice his life, as many a savage has been, rather than betray his comrades, would often leave no offspring to inherit his noble nature. . . . Therefore it hardly seems probable, that the number of men gifted with such virtues, or that the standard of their excellence could be increased through natural selection, that is, by the survival of the fittest; for we are not here speaking of one tribe being victorious over another."

These difficulties in Darwin's theory were smoothed over by Darwin rather than resolved. Indeed, in Darwin's day they could not be resolved in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of the nature of heredity and in the absence of important new bodies of empirical evidence. Darwin and later evolutionary theorists who argued that "group selection" explained the appearance of altruistic behavior did so by ignoring the imperatives of evolutionary biology. Since Darwin the most important problem in evolutionary biology has been the creation of an hypothesis which will harmonize natural selection with the appearance of seemingly "altruistic" behaviors.

In the 1930's Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen, both of whom recently received the Nobel Prize in Biology, pioneered the new science of ethology. Perhaps this new scientific discipline was poorly named for "ethology" conveys very inadequately the fact that the new science concerned itself with the careful examination of innate patterns of animal behavior. The development of ethology would have been impossible had it not been for the revolution which took place in genetics and the growing volume of careful work and observation in the field of ecology. As the field of ethology developed it became apparent that a great deal of animal behavior which had previously been assumed to be learned behavior was, in fact, genetic in its origin

and was a response by the species to environmental circumstance. Ethology, moreover, threw important new light on the question of "instinctual behavior" and its sources. It became clear that innate behavior was an adaptive response by the animal to the environment and that these responses had developed from more rudimentary ancestral behaviors. It was also obvious that there were certain unifying strategies and behaviors which characterized life generally and which were not peculiar to specific species.

The fact that these behaviors and strategies characterized life generally was an observation of the utmost importance. It was not only tempting but essential to fit human behaviors into the ethological framework. It was also necessary to resolve, in the case of social animals, the seeming contradiction between the evolutionary selfishness of the survival of the fittest and the seeming "altruism" of social behaviors. The discipline of Sociobiology advanced both new empirical data and new theoretical formulations which sought to resolve this contradiction.

Edward O. Wilson, the leading exponent of Sociobiology defines the discipline in the following fashion:<sup>9</sup>

. . . Sociobiology is defined as the systematic study of the biological basis of all social behavior. For the present it focuses on animal societies, their population structure, castes and communication, together with all the physiology underlying the social adaptations. But the discipline is also concerned with the social behavior of early man and the adaptive features of organization in more primitive contemporary human societies . . .

If the argument of the sociobiologists is correct then it is apparent that a close scrutiny of animal behaviors and animal societies can tell us much that is both revealing and of value concerning human societies. Sociobiology has the capacity of

transforming the social sciences and providing a unifying theoretical framework for sociology, anthropology, political science and economics. As a life-science sociobiology is no more or no less deterministic than the life sciences in the past have been. It denies neither the existence nor the importance of culture and free will. It does establish the boundaries of social behavior. Sociobiology need not be thought of as determining the moves in the chess game of social development. It does establish the pattern within which those moves can be made. Such a theoretical situation is not new either to ethics or the social sciences. Sociobiology does not destroy human responsibility. It does, however, clearly demarcate what the limits of our social expectation ought to be.

As with all life the evolutionary key to human behavior is the attempt by the organism to assure reproductive success. The formation of cooperative groups, the communication of alarm, hostility, hunger, status and rank, kinship and the division of labor all aim at the achievement of the paramount objective of reproductive success. Genetic continuity seems to be the first and outstanding objective of life.

One of the most important ways of reconciling the selfishness of the "survival of the fittest" with the "altruism" of behavior conducive to the welfare of the group is the process known as kin selection and nepotism. It has been repeatedly observed, see particularly the work of Richard D. Alexander of the University of Michigan and W. D. Hamilton,<sup>10</sup> that genetic tendencies evolve so as to foster assistance to one's kin and that the measure of helpfulness is related to the nearness of kinship. Put quite simply animals assist their kin. They do so, sociobiologists argue because of the degree of genetic identity which exists within kinship groups. It has been argued that an uncle who shares one quarter of his genes with a nephew or a niece will be as willing to

help two nephews or nieces as he will be willing to assist one of his own children. Genetic continuity thus applies to the kinship group as a whole rather than direct descendents alone. Nepotism is a determined tendency of animal and human behavior.

The self-sacrificing call of danger which may result in the animal's death will save, if the kinship group escapes, nearly the whole of the self-sacrificing animals' genetic material as it is embodied in other members of the group. Moreover reciprocity within the kinship group reinforces nepotism. Consequently what appears to be altruism is genetic selfishness, allowing for the fact that it is inappropriate to apply either the term "altruism" or "selfishness" to a process which is nonethical.

The human adaptive strategies whose aims are genetic continuity and reproductive success are patterns of behavior developed by big-brained hominid tool-makers and users over the past million years. In the relatively great length of time from the advent of *Homo erectus* to *Homo sapiens* the basic genetic patterns for contemporary men and their societies were laid down. The invention of agriculture, the smelting and smithing of metals, the development of urban life and complex political systems are events of the recent past which have, as yet, left behind no evolutionary residues. The genetics and the behaviors of modern man are those of paleolithic hunters and gatherers. Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox put the matter well when they write,<sup>11</sup>

... We remain Upper Paleolithic hunters, fine-honed machines designed for the efficient pursuit of game. Nothing worth noting has happened in our evolutionary history since we left off hunting and took to the fields and towns—nothing except perhaps a little selection for immunity to epidemics, and probably not even that. "Man the hunter" is not an episode in



our distant past: we are still man the hunter, incarcerated, domesticated, polluted, crowded, and bemused.

What, precisely, were the characteristics of these early human societies, how is their genetic content manifested in contemporary societies and what light does this information throw on the debate concerning equality?

We know a great deal about the societies of paleolithic hunters who have survived into the present.<sup>12</sup> The testimony of ethnology and anthropology generally, together with the sociobiological analysis and explanation of animal and human behavior, permits us to describe these behaviors with some confidence. Even were we to reject the theories of sociobiologists altogether we would have to take cognizance of the great weight of evidence which is now available concerning animal and human behavior, past and present, as it bears on the issue of human equality.

One of the most obvious and widely observed behaviors in animal and human societies is what ethologists call the "pecking order," "hierarchy," dominance systems or more simply, "the peck order." Edward O. Wilson<sup>13</sup> defines hierarchy in sociobiological usage as "the dominance of one member of a group over another, as measured by superiority in aggressive encounters and order of access to food, mates, resting sites, and other objects promoting survivorship and reproductive fitness."

In one of the early ethological classics, *Social Behaviour in Animals*, Niko Tinbergen describes the movement from aggression to the establishment of a hierarchically ordered society in which dominance actually reduces rather than increases fighting:<sup>14</sup>

Animal species living in groups sometimes fight over other issues than females or territories. Individuals may clash over food, over a favorite perch, or possibly for other reasons. In such

cases, learning often reduces the amount of fighting. Each individual learns, by pleasant or bitter experience, which of its companions are stronger and must be avoided, and which are weaker and can be intimidated. In this way the 'peck-order' originates, in which each individual in the group knows its own place. One individual is the tyrant; it dominates all the others. One is subordinate to nobody but the tyrant. Number three dominates all except the two above it, and so on. This has been found in various birds, mammals, and fish. It can easily be seen in the hen-pen.

The peck-order is another means of reducing the amount of actual fighting. Individuals that do not learn quickly to avoid their 'superiors' are at a disadvantage both because they receive more beatings and because they are an easier prey to predators during fights.

Aggression and self-interested cunning bravado, bluff and elaborate signaling behaviors enable certain animals within the group to establish dominance over others. The establishment of dominance is the key to reproductive success and while dominance may appear to be simply a quest for status, it is linked indissolubly with access to mates and those other factors which will result in genetic continuity for the dominant animal.<sup>15</sup> On the basis of this established order in societies a political system emerges. Its source is not altruistic cooperation or rationalistic contract making but rather aggression and coercion. The Marxist assertion, based on ideology and faulty nineteenth century anthropological thinking, that in his primitive state man was non-competitive, non-aggressive and practiced a form of "primitive communism" is simply wishful thinking. The universal presence of the dominant male is the most startling fact to emerge from the study and comparison of primitive societies.

The impact of intergroup aggression

and the drive for dominance is mitigated by the fact that the group faces outward on a predatory world as well as inward on the group. Cooperation and reciprocity as well as competition are essential to survival and reproductive success. It is in the achieved balance between the interests of the individual and the success of the group as it ministers to the needs of the individual that politics take their rise.

Tiger and Fox describe the genesis of politics eloquently when they write:<sup>16</sup>

Competition for scarce resources—food, nest sites, mates—is the basis of society and the stuff of politics. But the simple nest-site competition is not very complex; no really ingenious political system can be seen to come out of it. The basic processes, however, are there—competition, inequality, exclusion, bonding. In any competition, someone wins and someone loses; a relationship of dominance and subordination is set up. If the subordinate is excluded, the matter quickly loses interest as far as the forging of political systems is concerned. But if the dominant and subordinate animals remain in some relationship to each other, and if dominance and subordination continue to be recognized, and if, further, the subordinate animal is itself dominant over yet another animal, then the rudiments of hierarchy emerge and a political system now exists. It is a system of inequalities in that those at the top get more than those lower down (including such intangibles as freedom of movement); it is a system of politics in that changes in status can take place—indeed, this is what political systems are about.

The determinants of dominance are numerous and all of them are associated with reproductive fitness.<sup>17</sup> Adults are dominant over juveniles and males are usually dominant over females. Size, aggressiveness, and hormone levels all play an important role and in the more com-

plex animal societies experience and cunning are of great importance. Human females are almost universally attracted to high status males<sup>18</sup> and this attraction can be explained “because such males are more likely than low-ranking males to produce reproductively successful sons.” Moreover, much female and juvenile status is a reflection of connection with a high status male. “Lorenz found in Jackdaws that when a female of low ‘rank’ got engaged to a male high up in the scale, this female immediately rose to the same rank as the male, that is to say that all the individuals inferior to the male avoided her though several of them had been of higher rank than she before.”<sup>19</sup> Status in childhood often relates to the mother’s rank.

Dominance is overwhelmingly a male attribute. Males on the average are simply bigger and fiercer than females. They are the hunters, the fighters, the choosers. Now of course it will be said that up to this point there has been much talk of animal societies and very little discussion of human societies. Does the evidence suggest that human societies are innately non-aggressive, cooperative, and equalitarian as theorists from Rousseau to Marx have argued? Is there evidence of a stage of matriarchical dominance in early society as Johann Bachofen and Lewis Henry Morgan argued and Marx-Engels popularized? The biggest, the strongest, the most clever and the most aggressive dominate the chicken-pen and the buffalo range. Is what is true of chicken-pens and buffalo ranges also true of human behavior and human societies?

Casual observation, scientific empirical evidence and sociobiological theory all suggest that what is true of animals in general with respect to aggression, territoriality and status hierarchies is also true of man.<sup>20</sup> To be sure, the manifestation of these behaviors differs from the manifestation of status and dominance, for example, in the buffalo herd or among

Paleolithic men. In modern human societies demonstrations of physical strength, for the most part, have been replaced by what Desmond Morris describes as "inherited power, manipulative power and creative power."<sup>21</sup> "Instead of showing off his bulging muscles," Morris adds, "the inheritor shows off his ancestry, the fixer his influence, and the talent his works." Status displays are among the commonest and most easily observed of human behaviors. Indeed, human beings like animals have developed an elaborate repertoire of signals which reveal, even when we wish to suppress the evidence of our feelings, the inherited impulses of the old Adam. Not only are the behaviors characteristic of the Paleolithic hunters manifested on every hand but even our secret inclinations are overtly signaled in the symbolic language of physiognomy and gesture. Those who, for example, attend leading business schools are shown slow-motion moving pictures which reveal the tell-tale gestures which accompany confidence, anger, deceit, bluffing and submission in negotiating sessions.

As in animal societies, so in human societies, there is the widest variety of means available for, on the one hand ordering and ranking the society while, on the other hand holding competition and aggression within allowable bounds so that community and cooperation will not be destroyed or even impaired. These behaviors are universally present and readily recognized in contemporary primitive societies. In our technological, scientific, bureaucratic society they have their equivalents in virtually all our day to day dealings including the board meeting of the local YMCA and a cabinet meeting of the executive officers of the United States. In every contemporary situation in which power is exercised status considerations are of primary importance. The contest for status is as pronounced, if not more pronounced, among the men in the Kremlin or the members of university faculties as it is in Eskimo

society, though alas! we seem to have taken most of the fun out of the contest. Henry Kissinger is said to have observed with respect to the intense status conflicts which rend university faculties (and I quote him freely), "The rivalry is so intense and the manners so bad among university faculty members because the prizes are so petty."

And so it turns out that neither ethology nor sociobiology produce evidence of any equality in animal or human societies. In fact, just the opposite is the case. Animal and human societies can survive and prosper only so long as major inequalities and differences are preserved. These inequalities are the essential building blocks of biological and socio-cultural advance. Lionel Tiger has correctly called dominance "the spinal cord of human society."

All of which is not to say that competition is more important than cooperation and that the individual is more important than the group. The race, the species, seems to be the thing which interests the anthropomorphosed entity we call "nature." Obviously "nature" does not exist and when men speak of "mother nature" or say that "nature" does this or that, we can depend on it that they are describing a mysterious process which they do not fully understand or understand not at all. They are simply substituting "nature" for God as a covering word to describe the mysterious. Competition and cooperation, individualism and group benefit are held in tension in all biological and social processes. However, the existence of inequality, an inequality which redounds to the benefit of the group is one of the pre-eminent facts of animal and human societies.

Inequality enters into every major social or biological activity; competition for mates and in pair bonding and finally in competition which results in dominance hierarchies; all of these are based upon inequalities and result in dominance and submission. The idea of a non-



competitive golden age characterized by total equality and prelapsarian innocence is a fantasy, a kind of social and political pornotopia whose correspondence with biological and historical reality is nil. Similarly the myth of matriarchy and female promiscuity is simply not borne out by the evidence. Evolution has favored male dominance and female chastity.<sup>22</sup>

Assuming that the contest for dominance is the single most striking aspect of human societies, how, we are forced to ask, does this essentially inequalitarian ethos accord with the ideals and the mechanisms of democratic government? Are tyranny and aristocracy the natural constitutional forms for political systems? Are the fragility and rarity of democratic governments due to the fact that they are essentially unnatural?

The question is worth considering for it may provide an important insight into the "natural" values of a democratic polity. Aristocracy is based upon the translation of physical strength and cunning, aptitude for aggression, reproductive vigor and capacity for cooperation and leadership into an inherited status which does not regard biological and mental endowment. Galton's famous law of filial regression, that the children of distinguished parents are apt to be less distinguished than their parents, is particularly applicable to aristocracies. The biological and intellectual road aristocracies travel seems to be downhill all the way. It is for this reason that aristocracies must be propped up and held in place by the symbols of divine approval and the trappings and dramaturgy of authority and power. Even so aristocracies are fragile constructions constantly threatened by envy, interior decay and the challenges which arise from the strong and the capable in the social order at large. Thersites always challenges Agamemnon and when Agamemnon is named Nicholas II Thersites, in spite of his limitations, usually is the victor. Aristocracies are especially vulnerable to the process which Max Weber

described as "demystification" through which the symbolic props of aristocratic power and authority are dissolved by unbelief, the substitution of new forms of political order such as bureaucracy and the growth of the power of money. Moreover, the internal quest for dominance within an aristocratic system leads to political anarchy and the destruction of the weak. Even marriage alliances cannot wholly mitigate the rivalry of aristocratic magnates. That the hereditary principle is an inadequate basis for monarchy has been widely recognized in the past and elective monarchy was the constitutional form of both the Holy Roman Empire and the Papacy. Hereditary aristocracy does often achieve the long term stability characteristic of the dominance hierarchy because there is enough fitness in the system as a whole to outweigh its peculiar and particular weaknesses. Finally hereditary aristocracy survives in the circumstances which characterize feudal ages and the societies which developed from protracted feudal periods.

Democratic policies overcome many of the weaknesses of hereditary aristocracy by opening up the competition for dominance to all comers.<sup>23</sup> Hereditary aristocracy effectively reduces competition by limiting the field and by denying access. Restriction of entry into the arena of power and the substitution of the symbolic trappings of authority for the actualities of power are methods of aristocratic self-preservation. There is in this right of entry a measure of equality, of what we have come to call "equality of opportunity." But note that "equality of opportunity" can achieve its objectives only because men do not generally believe that equality exists. As Tiger and Fox put it,<sup>24</sup> "In theory, the perfect system would be a true democracy, not because it renders all men equal, but because it gives them an equal chance to become unequal." "Equality of opportunity" is a method by which society recruits greatness, energy, vitality and talent. It is a method by which

the maintenance of the dominance hierarchy is ensured.

The problems which arise from democratic polities are not due, as some have observed, to an increase in instability. It is rather the fact that once having achieved dominance the democratic politician always seeks to close off the entry ways to the arena of power. He achieves this not by appealing to his achievements but by substituting for them the symbols of authority and the appeals of ideology. "Don't debate the issues but have the band strike up 'Hail to the Chief!'"

But what of the assertion that "all men are created equal?" Surely its meaning must be attenuated and diluted by the facts of life as described by the ethologists and sociobiologists. The facts of the matter are never nearly as important as what men have thought these facts to be. The visions of what primal man, man in the primitive state, was have been far

more important in determining human conduct and political behavior than the actual facts of primitive existence. Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Marx-Engels all held elaborate theories of man's condition in the state of nature. These theories were not based on empirical evidence but were in a very real sense wish-projections and rationalizations of ideological positions. Nonetheless it is these theories that have dominated human behavior for the past three centuries.

Finally, to say "is" is not to say "ought." It may well be that there is no sanction for radical equality in the "state of nature." It may also be that there are very good reasons why equalitarianism is essential to the survival of contemporary society. However, our knowledge of the past will help us to understand why the achievement of equality is so extraordinarily difficult.

<sup>1</sup>Hugh Honor, *The New Golden Land: European Images of America from the Discoveries to the Present Time* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975). Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., *The White Man's Indian, Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978). <sup>2</sup>Donald Symons, *The Evolution of Human Sexuality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. v. <sup>3</sup>Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex*, with a Preface by Ashley Montagu and Drawings by Fritz Kredel (New York, The Heritage Press, 1972), p. xvi. <sup>4</sup>Preface by Ashley Montagu to Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man* (Heritage Press), p. viii. <sup>5</sup>*Ibid.* <sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 117. <sup>7</sup>Charles Darwin, *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection of the Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life* (New York: The Heritage Press, 1963), p. 236. <sup>8</sup>Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man* (Heritage Press), p. 114. <sup>9</sup>Edward O. Wilson, *Sociobiology, The New Synthesis* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 4. <sup>10</sup>Richard D. Alexander, "The Evolution of Social Behavior" in *Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics*, Vol. 6, 1974, and W. D. Hamilton, "The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior" in *The*

*Journal of Theoretical Biology*, Vol. 7, 1964, reprinted in Arthur L. Caplan, ed. *The Sociobiology Debate, Readings on Ethical and Scientific Issues* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 191-209. <sup>11</sup>Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox, *The Imperial Animal* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1974), p. 39. <sup>12</sup>Carleton S. Coon, *The Hunting Peoples* (Boston: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1971). <sup>13</sup>Edward O. Wilson, *Sociobiology*, p. 11. <sup>14</sup>Niko Tinbergen, *Social Behaviour in Animals with Special Reference to Vertebrates* (London: Methuen and Co., 1953), p. 71. <sup>15</sup>Konrad Lorenz, *On Aggression* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966). <sup>16</sup>Tiger and Fox, *The Imperial Animal*, pp. 44-45. <sup>17</sup>Edward O. Wilson, *Sociobiology*, pp. 291-295. <sup>18</sup>Symons, *The Evolution of Human Sexuality*, p. 191. <sup>19</sup>Niko Tinbergen, *Social Behavior in Animals*, p. 71. <sup>20</sup>George Maclay and Humphry Knipe, *The Dominant Man, The Pecking Order in Human Society* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1974). <sup>21</sup>Desmond Morris, *Manwatching, A Field Guide to Human Behavior* (New York: Abrams Publishers, 1977), p. 121. <sup>22</sup>Donald Symons, *The Evolution of Human Sexuality*. <sup>23</sup>Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox, *The Imperial Animal*, p. 63. <sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*

# The Neoconservatives: Liberal View, Conservative Response

GEORGE W. CAREY

BEYOND ANY DOUBT Peter Steinfels' investigation of neoconservatism raises more questions than it answers.\* Equally beyond dispute, the unanswered questions are the more important and significant for an understanding of the intellectual climate and landscape of a very troubled republic. To see why this is so, as well as to do justice to Steinfels' efforts (which are not inconsiderable by any means), let us first look at the major themes and contentions which he advances. In this undertaking I will have necessarily to touch upon his mode of argumentation and the manner in which he marshals and organizes his evidence.

## I

THE BOOK consists of eleven chapters that deal with essential questions regarding neoconservatism. The significance and "why" of neoconservatism, concerns which do permeate the book, are the principal topics of chapters one and two. The "what" is the concern of chapter three ("What Neoconservatives Believe"); the "how," of chapter four ("The Neoconservative Style"); the "who," chapters five, six, and seven (devoted respectively to Irving Kristol, Patrick Moynihan, and Daniel Bell); the "message" or "theory" chapters eight, nine, and ten (concerned principally with the "new class," equality, democracy, expertise and their interrelationship); and a final chapter ("Conclusion: The War for the 'New Class'") in which, understandably enough, Steinfels summarizes and focuses upon those characteristics of neoconservatism, both substantive and procedural, emphasizing its *raison d'être*, overall strategy, contradictions, as well as its "virtues and vices."

Throughout his exposition Steinfels concentrates on five principles, tenets, or perceptions which he argues "convey the animating spirit of neoconservatism, its paramount concern [and] the standpoint from which it poses almost all its questions." (53) Three of these animating convictions or tenets stem from a shared perception of what is wrong with American society and, to a greater or lesser degree, with the Western world:

1. Because "*a crisis of authority*" has arisen in the United States and the Western world, governing institutions and ordered liberty as well as "*the legacy of liberal civilization*" are in grave danger. (53)

2. The cultural-social crisis which afflicts the United States is not the product of the political-economic superstructure. Rather, "*The problem is that our convictions have gone slack, our morals loose, our manner corrupt.*" (55) Stated another way, and what is clearly disturbing to Steinfels, the neoconservatives do not point an accusing finger at either the capitalist-free enterprise system or our political institutions and processes for the malaise that has overtaken the United States and the better part of the Western world. Nor, as seems puzzling to Steinfels, do neoconservatives believe the causes of the crisis, even when it comes down to such matters as "racial conflict and the war in Vietnam," can be attributed to the "governing elites." (55) Rather, they maintain, the basic cause is the rise of an "adversary culture" that both fuels and is fueled by the "new class."

Steinfels, through no real fault of his own, has great difficulties in giving his