

## *The Religion of Academia*

*Peter Ochs*

FOR TWO WEEKS in May of 1970, the spring of Cambodia and the Black Panthers trial, Yale had to send home its women and children. The student rebellions of the 60s had climaxed in a small war in New Haven. The New Left, the SDS, the Yippies, and most liberal-minded students of good conscience had decided that enough is enough. The Black Panthers could not get a fair trial in New Haven; the military-industrial complex was crushing freedom and humanity in Southeast Asia; and all the while Yale kept churning out future judges and business leaders, political bosses and perhaps another Secretary of State. Posters in the University of Massachusetts and most other Northeast academies declared "Fight Oppression, March to New Haven and Trash Yale!"

After three years of fighting my undergraduate peers verbally, I decided to give in. No more attacks against premature activism, no more defensiveness against upperclass counselors chiding me for "studying when there is so much work to be done!" I became active. As future AT&T executives turned the university overnight into a sophisticated communications network, complete with red telephones, and future doctors transformed each residential college dining hall into a medic center, I became a college defense chairman. My friends were amazed I'd finally gotten with it. While they prepared

granola to feed the invading hundreds about to camp on our manicured lawns, I stood by the residential college library to make sure no books were "liberated."

To my surprise, I felt more at home with the granola crew than with most of the other library guards. If the one group seemed premature in its activism, the other seemed premature in its conservatism. As they stood watch over shelves of unused editions of Coppleston someone once donated to the residential college, I could not help thinking they were more concerned to preserve decorum than knowledge. The granola crew seemed to have its heart, if not its mind, in the right place.

Soon, the students and National Guardsmen tired of acting out their mock war, the tear gas fumes had dissolved into the light spring air and unfulfilled Freedom Fighters drifted home, grumbling about how "Kingman Brewster co-opted us." He had closed most of the university, offered bed and natural foods to the protesters, and made some public mumblings about "injustice in America." Enough to defuse, not enough to please.

I am more a child of those 60s than I thought I would be. As Hegel said, in so many words, "You are a part of what you react against." I have spent more of my post-graduate years than I'd like to admit trying to understand my college peers:

why there was so little balance between the many who believed that "relevance," reverence for human life, and passion for social justice were not fostered by their traditional programs of study and the few who defended such programs as bulwarks against social action of any kind.

In 1971 I graduated from Yale and from what I considered the misguided secular liberalism it represented. While it had successfully withstood the pressures of both radical and conservative extremes, I was not ready to forgive it for nurturing them in the first place. I recognized Yale's riches: sherry, roast beef, and Mozart; gala balls; the best athletics; scholarships for South Seas travel; and, of course, all those gifted teachers, exposing us to what seemed like every conceivable subject of human inquiry. Yet, among all the delights for mind and body, one crucial thing seemed missing. In its very dedication to protecting the freedoms of individual inquiry, Yale abstained from imposing on us any valuational limitations. It offered us riches, but no wisdom about what to do with them. Yale stood for Yale. God and country were private concerns.

Had the class of 1971 entered Yale from more parochial backgrounds, the effect may have been different. We might have brought with us commitments to various traditions of wisdom, that is, ways of transforming Yale's riches into morally sound programs of action. But, on the whole, we had come from systems of early schooling as free from parochial limitations as Yale. We were intellectually sophisticated and morally underdirected. Right or wrong, we came to Yale looking for guidance.

In response, Yale offered us intelligence. Intelligence took the form of the two methods of study which preoccupied the faculty at that time. Briefly put, one method was positivist, one subjectivist. The positivist faculty urged us to reduce our subjects of study, works of Stendhal or rituals of the Ndembu, to increasingly simple, unified, and therefore "meaningful" descriptions, following some purportedly reliable criteria for retrieving knowledge

out of a universe of raw data. Thus, *The Red and The Black* had meaning, for example, as a means of restructuring political status relations. The subjectivist faculty urged us to let our subjects of study disclose themselves to us as they would, realizing that, eventually, we would tend to interpret them in terms of our several interests and prejudices. We would thus read Marcuse's *One Dimensional Man* holistically, which meant observing the total impact it had on our understanding of the world.

We were not necessarily aware at the time that these were distinct methods, nor that each subtly influenced our value judgments. The positivist approach, predominant in Yale of the 60s, led us to compartmentalize our minds and the world we observed into regions of certainty and uncertainty, activity and passivity, authority and meaninglessness. In an age of the New Left, it was a remarkably "colonialist" approach to knowledge: in which subject matters of all kinds became raw material for our favored forms of productivity. Despite its concern for holism, the subjectivist approach reinforced our mental compartmentalization: it simply reversed the way we valued each compartment. Here, the uncertain was termed "human" (that is, meaningful), the certain "dehumanizing." Presented as a foil to scientism, subjectivism encouraged us to romanticize the value of the foreign and the unknown, both in the world and in ourselves. In the world, this meant the Third World; in ourselves, it meant the emotive and the unconscious.

Rationality and human subjectivity appeared to us to be mutually exclusive. We were left to decide for ourselves which of the two held the key to moral understanding. Since morality could not possibly exclude the human subject, we had to assume morality was a subjective affair. The battle plan for May 1970 was set. The "conservatives" among us chose to suspend moral judgment, rather than subject themselves to naked emotionalism. The "radical" majority chose to suspend rationality, rather than absolve themselves

from moral responsibility. Morality, it seemed, lay in championing the cause of the irrational subject, the unknown and the exotic.

In short, Yale offered us intelligence instead of wisdom. Conservative or radical, we left Yale without any developed sense of belonging to reliable traditions of moral wisdom: traditions which may take years to master but which, in the end, offer concrete guidance about how to act in the world.

On the following pages, I offer the fruits of a decade of wondering why Yale did what it did to us in the 60s. I've found that Yale wasn't unique, that the 60s weren't unique, and that, in fact, the reduction of wisdom to intelligence has been the project of Academia since the Renaissance and the apparent destiny of Western thought since the days of the Early Church Fathers. It remains to be seen whether or not this destiny is reversible.

The prehistory of Yale's faculty begins with the Early Church Fathers of Alexandria, principally Clement and Origen. These Christian Hellenists enunciated a revolutionary program for human self-betterment which we may call, with hindsight, the blueprint for Western or European civilization. To understand its ultimate issue in the methods of modern Academia, we might call this program, oversimply, the European Revolution, or "Europe."

Like all revolutions, the European one seeks to transform extant social institutions by training a society's youth in previously unknown or little practiced patterns of social behavior. All revolutions therefore have as their backdrop non-revolutionary, or conservative, systems of behavior. Conservative systems enculturate a society's youth in established social practices, presuming that extant social institutions succeed at least in part in embodying ultimate societal values. In practice, revolutionary systems of education are utopian, since they recommend patterns of life not yet lived. Conservative systems are pragmatic, since they reproduce patterns of behavior which,

perfect or imperfect, have already fulfilled the minimal requirements of maintaining human life.

While promoting a Christian faith in the universal applicability of their revolutionary ideals, the Church Fathers also retained a Hellenic sense of the distinction between civilized and barbaric peoples. In this case, the barbarians, now "pagans," are those who have not yet entered into the revolutionary programs of the Church. In our oversimplified language of analysis, we may say that the European Revolution has paganism as its conservative backdrop: the social practices of an as yet unredeemed Europe.

Unique among the world's revolutionary movements, Europe is an attempted synthesis of two previously distinct and competing revolutionary programs. Retaining these two as complementary ideals, Europe calls one Athens, the program of revolutionary reason, and one Jerusalem, the program of revolutionary obedience.

Athens represents the revolutionary program of the Hellenic philosophers, who have challenged the hegemony of the gods and of established social tradition over extant social practice. In place of the gods, Athens respects the rule of a universal social-natural order, or logos. Athenians gain access to this logos through a power cultivated in the individual human mind: reason. Only few Athenians are capable of cultivating this power, and therefore only few are able to teach the proper rules of life to the many.

Jerusalem represents the revolutionary program of the biblical prophets, who have challenged the hegemony both of the gods and of any order, social or natural, over the lives of their people. Jerusalem respects the power only of one Lord, who creates worlds by will. This Lord has created the natural order, which Jerusalemites may comprehend by way of observation and reasoning. But the Lord's will on this earth is to guide the progressive transformation of Jerusalem's and all humanity's social life according to the rules of social practice which the Lord

has dictated to at least some of Jerusalem's citizens. These citizens — prophets, priests, and law-givers — have been instructed gradually to win control of the society's educational programs from representatives of Jerusalem's conservative social order.

For the Church Fathers, Europe must respect both the power of the one Lord and the rule of natural law, believing that the Lord who created the natural order is also incarnate in its logos. By way of the incarnation, the Lord has made its will known to those whose reason, perfected through obedience to the Lord's will, achieves access to the divine logos. This elite alone has the power to guide the transformation of unredeemed Europe from a pagan to a rational and obedient society.

I believe we can understand the heritage of modern Academia in terms of the ideological dialectic which accompanied Europe's actual attempts to realize the ideal Europe on earth. These attempts were marked by four trends, which gradually transformed the ideal into something other than was originally conceived: an increasing division of the European elite between those who favored reason in the form of autonomous intellectual inquiry and those who favored religious obedience in the form of ecclesiastical authority; a gradual redefinition of the ideal in the direction of rational autonomy; an increasing expansion of the community of the elite and an increasing popularization of revolutionary education; and an increasing isolation of the elite community from both obedience to archaic social traditions and interest in the extant social practices of those outside the community. We may then note four representative stages in the evolution of embodied Europe, from Alexandria to Yale.

The first stage is represented by the cathedral schools of Gaul after Charlemagne and of Germany after Otto. Here, basic skills of reasoning are taught in the context of obedience to ecclesiastical authority. Clerics live, after all,

in worlds of nature and society and can obey the Lord's Word only if they survive earthly discomforts long enough to read it. Means of survival are learned mostly outside the schools, which teach the seven liberal arts as skills put to the service of religious study. The seven include the *trivium* of grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic and the *quadrivium* of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music. Students are unlikely to derive from such basic training the sense of rational autonomy that led occasional medieval minds to imagine reason's superiority to revealed moral instruction. But conflicts could arise between those who favor either literary or scientific skills.

The second stage is represented by the scholastic universities of twelfth- through fourteenth-century Paris, Bologna, Oxford, and, by 1500, more than seventy other cities. Here, enriched by revivals of classical learning first stimulated by the tenth-century Crusades, rational studies begin to exert their inherent obduracy to ecclesiastical authority. The cathedral school of Notre Dame, for example, gave birth to the University of Paris, whose faculty won independence from the area's bishopric. The university's curriculum expanded, from the seven liberal arts, to include major programs in theology, medicine, and law (canon and civil). While still an exponent of Catholic doctrine, the school sent increasingly few of its graduates into the clergy and continually widened its definition of what kinds of inquiry served the interests of the Church.

Once the university won independence from ecclesiastical authority, it was bound to refer problems in theology and canon law to norms that are independent of institutional authority and of inherited social traditions. These are the norms of the Athenian revolution, located by thirteenth-century scholars in Aristotelian philosophy. At this time Aristotelians came to dominate the faculty of liberal arts, and the arts dominated the university: in sum, a kind of scientific rationalism emerged in Europe as an autonomous force beside the Church and the State.

Scholasticism may represent Europe's closest approximation to its revolutionary ideal: a balance of forces, if not a synthesis, between Athens and Jerusalem. But the balance was not stable. The spirit of autonomy is infectious and was bound to increase the polarities between Church and university, and university and established social tradition, and to encourage polarities within the university itself. Aristotelians assumed power at the expense of the other faculties of liberal arts and pursued their scholarship with decreasing attention to existent political and social concerns.

The third stage in Yale's prehistory is thus a dialectical response to the second. It is represented by the rebellion of fourteenth-century liberal artisans against scholastic neglect of the literary arts. The rebellion began among humanists of the Italian Renaissance, who promoted new *studia humanitatis* within the university curriculum. These "humanistic studies" gave a new name to the neglected *trivium* of literary arts, now enriched with studies of poetry, history, and moral philosophy. Once intellectual revolutionaries, scholastic philosophers were dubbed reactionaries by the new humanists, who rejected scientific esotericism in favor of teaching arts and morals to an educated elite and writing vernacular works for the populace.

While principally a reform in style and taste, Renaissance humanism was accompanied by a philosophic adventurism that would have profound effects on post-Renaissance thought. Among the revitalized alternatives to Aristotelian philosophy which appeared in the Renaissance, neo-Platonism and gnosticism are the most significant. From Cusanus to Ficino to Bruno, Renaissance thinkers entertained metaphysical dualisms which gradually transform the meaning of their scholastic studies. Their Aristotelian science was no longer the privileged means of disclosing a single logos, but rather an exoteric science, which orders the mundane and transient phenomena of everyday experience.

Other sciences (and arts) disclose the enduring manifestations of God in this world. This means that the world is itself divided in two: between what later reformation thinkers will call a "fallen" nature, bereft of intrinsic moral worth, and a divine nature, the exclusive embodiment of an infinitely good divine logos. The emergent dichotomy in the university curriculum, between scholastic and humanistic studies, does not necessarily represent a philosophic dichotomy, between studies of outer and inner worlds, or of a neutral environment and a value-laden human subjectivity. But the new dualistic philosophies set the stage for just that-kind of polarization in the centuries to follow.

As is now apparent, I believe the internal life of the Renaissance university prefigures that of twentieth-century Yale. Along with the Church, the university belongs to the European revolution against the social life of pagan Europe. Opposed to the Jerusalemite ideal within the Church, the university does not respect that social life as the means through which it will advance its revolution. Obeying the Athenian ideal, it seeks to transform society by reforming minds rather than reforming social law. The norm governing such reform is rational autonomy, rather than religious/moral obedience. Thus, whether or not its scholars debated theological issues, the university owes its allegiance only to itself and not to the Church or to any other established tradition interpreting divine revelation. The Scholastic university, a model for contemporary Thomistic colleges, adopts the rules of an established philosophic canon to control this autonomy. The Renaissance university liberalizes these rules. For it, Aristotle remains a god among gods, but no longer all-powerful; now the many gods of Aristotelian, neo-Platonic, Stoic, and other philosophic traditions compete for influence among university scholars. As a result, reasoning cannot provide its adherents with any unique guide for moral practice. While scholars debate the relative merits of various rational systems, the care of the social body is left to the



Church or to the unreformed traditions of pagan Europe. Within the university, scholastics plead for a scientific precision which increasingly diverts their attention away from quotidian social concerns; humanists plead for sensitivity to the needs of the human spirit, whose life resists scientific explanation. Both groups plead for scholarly independence — from ecclesiastical, political, and social authorities.

Modernity — the final stage in Yale's prehistory — is defined by the social and intellectual developments which brought us from Alexandria to the Renaissance university. The complex developments which bring us from the Renaissance to Yale merely set the stage for the particular manner in which we enact the program of modernity. To understand our manner of acting, we must, for example, consider the role of the French rationalists in opening up the life of the human spirit as a subject for scientific explanation. This sets the stage for the desacralization of moral inquiry in the modern university. We must consider the rebellion of English liberals against the revolutionary centralization of political and economic authority that accompanied the ascendancy of Europe's bourgeoisie. This sets the stage for the modern university's synthesizing ideals of liberal individualism and rational autonomy. We must consider the role of the German idealists in defining the human subject as the unique focus of rational freedom and moral worth. This completes the setting for modern university debates about social practice and ethical norms. Both sides in such debates presume that human subjectivity and human productivity are self-defining and self-legitimizing. Almost no one in the modern university insists that the scholar, or what scholars like to call "the human being," owes obedience to extra-individual, or extra-societal, or extra-human authority. The university knows only the authority of human reason or the authority of unreason, and it interprets the life of the Church and of the archaic social order in terms of this restrictive

dichotomy. We must, finally, consider the role of the United States' democratized standards for educational opportunity in exposing an increasing proportion of its population to university life. This has meant that, by the 1960s, a considerable proportion of our electorate has been trained to adopt a style of thinking that sets itself in opposition to the practices of both Church and what I have called pagan Europe. In other words, for this population, the great debates of revolutionary thought remain largely what they were in the Renaissance university: between science and the arts, but no longer between autonomy and obedience, or between revolutionary ideals and established social practice.

Within European society the modern university is therefore essentially adversarial. Its purpose is to oppose the forces of both paganism and the Church: to seek to transform the one and to counterbalance the other. To transform paganism, the university presents itself as critic of all institutions which function to preserve existent patterns of social behavior: the various economic, political, social, and familial institutions which merely sustain, rather than transform human life. To counterbalance the Church, the university presents itself as the exclusive representative of Europe's revolutionary program, championing revolutionary autonomy to the exclusion of revolutionary obedience. Retaining the bare form of dialectic integral to the Church Fathers' program, the university now administers an intellectual dialogue between two forms of autonomy, rational and irrational, expressed in the competing methodologies of positivism and subjectivism.

It's a glorious battle. But what if the university were to win it? What if the university succeeded in demoralizing its adversaries to such an extent that pagans and clergy alike began to imitate its educational practices and emulate its ideals? I believe the university has achieved just this kind of damning success during the five hundred years that con-

nect the Renaissance university to Yale. Rationalism, liberalism, and idealism have not changed the basic practices of the university as much as they have accompanied massive changes in its enviroing society. Yale's faculty of positivists and subjectivists are not so different from earlier faculties of rationalists and irrationalists or scholastics and humanists. The significant difference is in the student body. Students that entered Yale in the 1960s already lacked the rigidity of religious discipline or the narrowness of social custom that the university curriculum was designed to combat. They were nurtured in social traditions which had for generations already paid respects to the ideal of individual autonomy and had long since lost the conservative closure which characterized pagan society. Many had received no religious education, and most belonged to churches which had long since substituted ideals of rational autonomy for practices of obedience to religious authority. In these students the modern university was instructing its own children.

Instructing its own, the university ceases to fulfill its revolutionary purpose. It becomes the conservator of institutionalized practices which, willy-nilly, its students will adopt as substitutes for the displaced practices of paganism and Church. What the professor teaches for use in the laboratory or writer's alcove, the student will adopt as a guide for managing social relations. It does not work. The university has only one form of guidance to offer its students: seek autonomy and, therefore, beware of restrictive institutions, practices, and belief. If untempered by countervailing participation in well-formed social and religious traditions, this is dangerous counsel. It encourages the student to construct an entire program of social practice out of methods of thinking designed only to bring extant programs to task. In other words, it encourages the student to make a religion out of the critique of religion. This is the *Religion of Academia*, which has become the unacknowledged faith of

a growing number of university faculty and former students. Its gods are the geniuses of European history; its priests are university professors; and its creed, if explicated, would sound something like this:

1. *Humanity is self-creating.* The radical freedom of Jerusalem's Lord is identified with the power of human reason. This belief is true to neither Jerusalem nor Athens, but owes its pretensions to a selective synthesis of aspects of both ideals.

2. *Humanity is embodied only in the activity of individual human beings.* When humanity is considered apart from the barbaric social order, the polis, or the religious community, the individual remains its only representative. Reason is identified with an activity whose locus is the human neural system.

3. *Individual human beings achieve dignity and moral worth to the extent that they realize their humanity, that is, by becoming self-creating beings.* As in the Athenian ideal, autonomy is an achievement of only the gifted few. Here, autonomy has acquired the sense of radical freedom associated with Jerusalem's Lord. The self-creating human being is the Lord incarnate.

4. *All individual human beings have the right to pursue dignity and moral worth, therefore, the right to pursue self-creativity.* This is the contribution post-Renaissance rationalism and liberalism make to the religion of academia. The location of reason in a neural faculty possessed by all human beings has opened up Pandora's box.

5. *Social organizations are formed for the sake of the individual human beings in them, which means to enable individual human beings to achieve dignity and worth. Social organizations, therefore, have instrumental value, to the extent that they foster the self-creativity of their members.* Once the individual human being becomes the medium of the Athenian/Jerusalemite revolution, the social order loses intrinsic worth. Autonomous individuals regard the social order as barbaric: a relic of an archaic age, of use only

for its contribution to fulfilling individual human needs.

I believe this is the creed which informed the social behavior in my Yale peers in 1970. It convinced them that they had the moral duty to fight for every individual human being's right to self-determination. In the absence of any scholastic criterion of what autonomy means, it empowered them to decide for themselves what was worth fighting for and how. Removed from its own incarnation in the complex social laws of Jerusalem, in the scientific discipline of Athens, or in the subtle reasonings of the Church Fathers, the ideal of autonomy seemed immediately accessible. The human body was no impediment, since it was the very locus of human self-creativity. The only obstacle was society: the social relations, social obligations, social traditions, and social institutions which seemed to intrude on personal freedoms the way parents seemed to intrude on adolescent privacy, or the way barbaric customs once intruded on the higher civilization of Rome.

Both student reactionaries and radicals of 1970 belonged to an intellectual culture which knew no mediation between the needs of conservative education and the ideals of Academia. The reactionaries sought to preserve the separation between reason and social practice. The radicals sought to effect social change without reason. Neither respected the subtleties in Europe's revolutionary experiment. But the problem would not have been solved by simply exhorting these students to study Europe's intellectual history more carefully. Only autonomous individuals respond successfully to intellectual exhortation, and contemporary students enter the university without the disciplined training necessary for autonomous thought. In order to supply the training missing in its students, the university would have to reaffirm canons of obedience it has long since abandoned. To reaffirm these canons, the university would have to restrict the autonomy it has for so long granted its faculty. An unlikely

development. This would require the faculty's not only choosing to restrict its own freedoms, but also coming to agreement on the kind of authority which would replace those freedoms. It is a truism in mathematics that a collection of discrete points cannot meld themselves into a continuous line. It is a truism in higher education that a collection of autonomous professors cannot meld themselves into a community of opinion on any issue, let alone one that threatens autonomy. Change in the university will come only from outside: from pagan society or the Church.

Changes imposed on the university by pagan society are generally mechanical or administrative. This is not because pagan society lacks intellectual significance, but because, in its adversarial relationship, the university interprets pagan social traditions only according to predetermined categories. This is evident, for example, in the two pagan invasions of the 1960s and 1980s. Student radicalism in the 60s overstepped the bounds of autonomous self-expression tolerated, and often fostered, by the university. But the antinomian demands of the student rebellion effected only cosmetic changes in the university curriculum: less structured programs of study, more courses designed for individual self-expression or self-help. Positivists on the faculty continued their work undisturbed by the social turmoil. Subjectivists laid claim to the rebellions as vindications of their own anarchic arguments. The illiberalism of the present decade is reactionary, rather than radical. Students now appear to reject liberal arts learning in favor of preprofessional training in the natural and social sciences. This is accompanied by student demands for more moral instruction and what is called fundamentalist religious training. The university is responding with new cosmetic adjustments in its curriculum: offering more courses in pre-medicine, pre-law and pre-business and mildly restructured programs of general education. While eliciting faculty protests against its economic and moral barbarianism, this



most recent student movement has had little effect on the work of the university. Positivists find their pre-professional courses overenrolled, and subjectivists redescribe their curricula as programs in moral and religious discovery.

Throughout the 60s, 70s, and 80s, the long-range trends of university development have continued. The faculty persists in its defense of autonomy and continues revolutionary education while repudiating direct involvement in the general society's program of conservative education. I can imagine significant changes in this development coming only from the Church.

Contemporary faculty err in identifying the Church with the various reactionary movements which oppose academic humanism in the name of Christianity. These movements express pagan society's defensive reaction against years of abuse from the university, but they do not necessarily participate in the Church's ideal of revolutionary obedience. That ideal represents an absolute standard of social criticism, which remains an endur-

ing threat to university autonomy because it resists subsumption under the university's own absolute standard. The ideals of autonomy and obedience belong uniquely to a European experiment conceived in the Church and nurtured in the university; they have meaning and purpose only in dialectical opposition to each other. The contemporary university fails to appreciate the richness of this dialectic. As a result, it fails increasingly in its own efforts to nurture autonomy in its students. It is the responsibility of the Church to help the university regain a lost balance, by increasing its participation in the university and reasserting the ideal of obedience from within the faculty. Only an assertive and self-confident Church will re-establish the balance of forces appropriate to the European ideal.

I offer no judgment, in the end, on the validity of the European ideal. It is, quite simply, the ideal that has governed Europe's intellectual history and within which, alone, the university finds its purpose.

*A way of life, an order of things,  
the wisdom of generations*

# *Toryism*

*John W. Osborne*

THE WORD TORY originated as a political term in the late seventeenth century to designate a faction composed of nobles, gentry, and Church of England clergy who believed in a wide royal prerogative and the power of the Anglican church. Tories were opposed to Whigs, who consisted of a minority of nobles plus urban merchants and who favored the supremacy of Parliament and rather more religious toleration. But the issues which absorbed the attention of politically-minded people at that time are now almost forgotten, save to historians. Still, Tory appears in the dictionaries, often as a synonym for reactionary or to designate an extreme conservative.

I submit that Toryism has a different meaning, that it is not necessarily synonymous with conservatism or reaction, and that there has been in Great Britain and America a fairly well-defined Tory tradition over many years. However, it represents a way of life, for it is possible that there was no real Tory political party after 1715. Toryism is different from what passes for conservatism today and is not represented adequately by the British Conservative Party or the Republican Party of the United States. It is also not reactionary.

What is Toryism, and why are Tories unhappy at being defined at various periods in history as Irish robbers, Church

of England divines, or supporters of King George III in the American Revolution? Tory, used as a label for an English political party, began to disappear about the time of the 1832 Reform Bill. "Conservative" was substituted. Sir Robert Peel's "Tamworth Manifesto," addressed to the electors in his constituency in 1834, expressed the newer philosophy. In the following year Peel became the first Conservative Prime Minister. As the natural Tory constituency of landlords and Church of England clergy declined as a force in the national life, business interests grew. Their counsels were eventually to dominate the Conservative Party. Benjamin Disraeli, in his famous Crystal Palace speech in 1872 and later as Prime Minister, tried to reach a working class audience. He met with some success, but generally the Conservative Party became responsive primarily to industry and commerce. Shorn of its former base on the land, Toryism was left as a loose assortment of ideas and attitudes.

There is so much in this philosophy which is old-fashioned and ill at ease with the thrusting, profit-oriented, business-dominated civilization of both modern Britain and America. The restless modern world which is filled with people possessing short attention spans is anathema to the Tory. He is opposed to the materialistic basis of society, whether it be