



THE AMERICAN FLAG FLYING OVER THE CABILDO, OR CITY HALL, OF SAN JUAN, PORTO RICO.

OUR WAR WITH SPAIN.

BY RICHARD H. TITHERINGTON.

THE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES WON SO REMARKABLE A TRIUMPH, OPENING A NEW ERA OF OUR NATIONAL EXPANSION—THE NINTH INSTALMENT TELLS OF THE PASSING OF SPAIN'S FLAG FROM SANTIAGO AND OF GENERAL MILES' CONQUEST OF PORTO RICO.

ALMOST up to the moment of Toral's surrender, it was generally expected among Shafter's soldiers that the tedious negotiations would fail, and that Santiago would be stormed. The whole army was prepared to attack at the word. The artillery, reinforced by Randolph's batteries, and pushed boldly forward—one battery, Captain Riley's, was posted in front of the firing line—was eager for a chance to redeem its comparative failure in the battles of the 1st of July. At the point where the American lines were nearest to the enemy, on the extreme right, two of Lawton's brigades, Ludlow's and McKibbin's — Brigadier General

McKibbin, who came to Cuba as lieutenant colonel of the Twenty First Infantry, had succeeded Colonel Evan Miles—were ready to charge the Spanish trenches.

The attack would probably have been a bloody one. In front of the trenches was a double line of barbed wire fences, which would have held the assailants under a murderous fire. Further back there were pitfalls and barricaded streets. "Upon entering the city," Shafter said in the despatch he sent to Washington at the moment of the hoisting of the flag, "I discovered a perfect entanglement of defenses. Fighting as the Spaniards did

the first day, it would have cost five thousand lives to have taken it."

SHAFTER AS A COMMANDER.

With the raising of the Stars and Stripes on the governor's palace, the Santiago campaign was over, and Shafter,



DON MANUEL MACÍAS, THE LAST SPANISH CAPTAIN
GENERAL OF PORTO RICO.

after being brought to the very brink of disaster by adverse circumstances and by his own mistakes, had won a sweeping and complete success. As he afterwards said himself,* there had been very little strategy in his movements. He certainly had not proved himself a Napoleon or a Cæsar, but he had earned the right to say *veni, vidi, vici*. Bluff and untactful in personal intercourse, he was not a man to be widely popular among his subordinates. His attitude to the press representatives—gentry seldom beloved of commanding generals—involved him in some undignified controversies, and brought upon him, in retaliation, much unjust censure. But a hundred newspaper criticisms are more than offset by one such expression as those that have come from some of the men who were with him at Santiago.

General Wheeler, who has an ill word

* In his speech at a dinner of the Sons of the Revolution, in New York, November 25, 1898.

for no one, calls him "a man of more than ordinary intellect and force of character." General Breckinridge, not regarded as an especially friendly critic, bears testimony in his official report to "the remarkable energy, decision, and self reliance which characterized General Shafter's course during this distinguished military adventure throughout its arduous course to its most honorable conclusion." More valuable still is the judgment of that fine soldier General Chaffee, given in his reply to a speaker who had complimented him at Shafter's expense*:


He worked night and day at his duties, and though his physical disabilities made his strength unequal to mine and prevented him from doing some of the things I was able to do, yet I say there is no more honest, faithful, and conscientious man who ever went out to command troops. Let no one decry him in my presence. No man ever possessed more iron courage. General Shafter is a man. He has my unbounded respect.

These are strong words of praise, and they are entirely true.

When the Fifth Corps was preparing to embark at Tampa, newspaper prophets were spreading abroad detailed forecasts of the marvelous ways in which American engineering skill was to be applied to military uses. Shafter, we were told, was to invade Cuba with "fortification machines" that would throw up breastworks at railroad speed; with "road builders" that would construct macadam highways as if by magic; with powerful searchlights to reveal the enemy's movements at night; and with other novel paraphernalia destined to make victory swift and easy. As a matter of fact, if we except the work done by the signal service in establishing telegraph and telephone communication, the Santiago campaign was fought out on the most primitive lines, with scarcely an attempt at "scientific warfare." Shafter's small engineer corps accomplished practically nothing†; his artillery did little for him; of cavalry he had almost none. His battles were fought by infantry, and were won by the sheer pluck and dash of his men, in spite of the fact that to a certain

*At a dinner of the Commercial Club of Kansas City, Missouri, December 19, 1898.

†The engineers built a pier for the Cubans at Aserraderos, and later one at Siboney, which was not finished until just before the end of the campaign. They also did a little scouting and some road repairing, but did not succeed in making even a tolerable trail from Siboney to the front. They complained—no doubt truly—that they were seriously handicapped by lack of proper equipment, and especially of transportation.



THE TOWN AND HARBOR OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA. THIS VIEW IS TAKEN FROM THE GROUNDS OF A SUBURBAN RESIDENCE AT LA CRUZ, ON THE SHORE OF THE BAY OF SANTIAGO,
A MILE SOUTH OF THE CITY, AND JUST ABOVE THE TERMINUS OF THE NARROW GAGE RAILROAD FROM SIBONEY.

extent they had the disadvantage of inferior equipment.*


THE RELATIONS OF MILES AND SHAFTER.

Much has been said, in the newspapers and elsewhere, upon the question whether Santiago was surrendered to General Miles or to General Shafter. Unlike another question that has been raised by sundry war critics ignorant of warfare, who have debated whether Admiral Sampson or

General Miles left here at 10.40 last night for Santiago, but with instructions not to in any manner supersede you as commander of the forces in the field near Santiago so long as you are able for duty.

This not unnaturally led to a certain amount of misunderstanding. On the day of the surrender, in reply to an order directing him to move his troops to fresh camps, Shafter telegraphed to Miles:

Letters and orders in reference to movement of camp received and will be carried out. None is



THE SPANISH TORPEDO BOAT DESTROYER TERROR'S UNSUCCESSFUL ATTACK UPON THE ST. PAUL, OFF SAN JUAN, PORTO RICO, JUNE 22, 1898.

Commodore Schley was in command of the fleet that destroyed Cervera,† this is not entirely an idle query. It appears that on July 8, the day after Miles left Washington, Adjutant General Corbin telegraphed to Shafter:

Secretary of War directs me to inform you that

*There is little to choose between the Mauser rifle and the Krag Jorgensen, but there is no question of the terrible disadvantage under which the American volunteers and artillery labored by reason of their lack of smokeless powder.

†The answer to this question is so self evident to any one who has the slightest understanding of naval affairs that no space has been wasted on it in the present narrative. It may be said here that the attempts which have been made in the press, and even in Congress, to deprive Admiral Sampson of the honor justly earned by his splendid services to his country are disgraceful to their authors. They must rest either upon a total misunderstanding of the facts, or upon some most unworthy motive of jealousy.

As a sample of the methods employed, Sampson's signal, on the morning of July 3, to "disregard the movements of commander in chief" has been distorted into "disregard the orders of commander in chief," and paraded as a proof that he had nothing to do with the battle of that day.

The fact that venomous attacks upon Sampson have been coupled with extravagant praise of Schley must be most embarrassing to the latter officer, who very properly said, in an official despatch written a week after the battle with Cervera: "Victory was secured by the forces under the command of the commander in chief, North Atlantic station, and to him the honor is due."

more anxious than myself to get away from here. It seems from your orders given me that you regard my force as a part of your command. Nothing will give me greater pleasure than serving under you, general, and I shall comply with all your requests and directions, but I was told by the secretary that you were not to supersede me in command here.

To this communication, an entirely creditable and soldierly one, Miles, who had gone to Guantanamo Bay with the transports carrying Henry's troops, replied (July 18):

Have no desire and have carefully avoided any appearance of superseding you. Your command is a part of the United States army, which I have the honor to command, having been duly assigned thereto and directed by the President to go wherever I thought my presence required and give such general directions as I thought best concerning military matters, and especially directed to go to Santiago for a specific purpose. You will also notice that the orders of the Secretary of War of July 13 left the matter to my discretion. I should regret that any event would cause either yourself

or any part of your command to cease to be a part of mine.

This was unanswerable, and exactly defined the position General Miles occupied



BRIGADIER GENERAL OSWALD H. ERNST, COMMANDING
THE FIRST BRIGADE OF GENERAL WILSON'S
DIVISION.

during his brief stay before Santiago. When he landed at Siboney, in the afternoon of July 11, he had found the place in a very unsatisfactory condition. General Duffield, in command, was ill, and apparently no one had taken his place; an alarming outbreak of yellow fever had begun—probably caused, and certainly hastened, by the use of infected buildings which should have been destroyed; the medical and transportation services were frightfully inadequate. The landing stage was still unfinished, and General Miles went on shore through the surf. He began to issue orders at once, signing them "Nelson A. Miles, major general commanding";* but he countermanded no plan of Shafter's, and his part in the conclusion of the campaign was limited to his share in the conferences with Toral—which, on Shafter's own statement, Miles allowed to continue when his own judgment was in favor of breaking them off—and his preparations, afterwards abandoned, to land troops at Cabanas.

* One of his first orders was for the burning of the buildings believed to be infected with yellow fever, including the army post office, a house used by the newspaper correspondents, and others occupied by the Thirty Third Michigan. General Shafter had that morning issued instructions to the same effect, but apparently nothing had been done toward carrying them out.

Warnings against the use of buildings likely to be infected had been issued before the Fifth Corps landed, and General Miles regarded the neglect of proper precautions at Siboney as a distinct violation of orders.

It was hardly a secret at the time, and has since become notorious, that an unfortunate ill feeling had arisen between General Miles and the army staff at Washington; but Secretary Alger's despatches distinctly recognize him as in command, notably the one mentioned in Miles' note of the 18th to Shafter, already quoted. This is dated July 13, and addressed to "Major General Miles, Camp near Santiago":

You may accept surrender by granting parole to officers and men, the officers retaining their side arms. The officers and men after parole to be permitted to return to Spain, the United States assisting. If not accepted, then assault, unless in your judgment an assault would fail. Consult with Sampson, and pursue such course as to the assault as you jointly agree upon. Matter should now be settled promptly.

After such an order, clothing him with complete authority, and therefore with full responsibility, it was certainly both tactful and generous on Miles' part to




COMMANDER CHARLES H. DAVIS, OF THE DIXIE, WHO
CAPTURED THE CITY OF PONCE, PORTO RICO,
JULY 27, 1898.

leave the formal reception of Toral's surrender to Shafter, whom he would necessarily have outranked had he been present. At the same time, it was a very proper recognition of the fact that to the commander of the Fifth Corps belonged the honors of a victorious campaign, and

had been in full view of the officers commanding his troops, and they had reported to him having seen fifty seven vessels, some of them loaded with troops, menacing that part of his position.

THE NAVY AND THE SURRENDER.

For the navy, too, a share in the work is claimed—apart from its victory over



MAJOR GENERAL JOHN R. BROOKE, COMMANDING THE FIRST DIVISION OF GENERAL MILES' ARMY IN PORTO RICO.

From a photograph by Steffens, Chicago.

especially the credit of having secured a capitulation without further fighting, thus capturing Santiago at a cost which, after all, was small in proportion to the great results gained.


General Miles' report indicates his belief that his preparations to land a brigade at Cabanas helped to bring Toral to terms:

The Spanish commander was well aware of our designs, as the position and movements of the fleet

Cervera, which was the great decisive event of the campaign and of the war. A board appointed by Sampson to inspect the captured city reported, after a detailed account of the damage done by the war ships' fire:

We believe that the bombardment by the ships had much to do with the early surrender of the city.

This is indorsed by the admiral. "The effect of our shell," he says, "was un-



COMMODORE JOHN C. WATSON, WHO COMMANDED THE EASTERN SQUADRON, ORGANIZED IN JULY, 1898,
FOR AN EXPEDITION TO SPAIN.

From a photograph—Copyrighted, 1898, by F. Gutekunst, Philadelphia.

doubtedly one of the principal causes of the surrender at this time."

And in distributing the credit where it is due mention should be made of the effective stroke of military diplomacy that came from Washington. There is no doubt that the offer to return Toral's forces to Spain did much toward making the surrender possible.

It was somewhat anomalous that in the ceremonies marking the successful ending of a joint land and sea campaign the American navy was not represented. On July 13, when Shafter informed Sampson

that a surrender was expected, the admiral expressed his desire to share in the negotiations, which involved questions of importance to both branches of the service. The general acquiesced, and promised that if possible he would give due notice of the final arrangement of terms, in order that Sampson might send a representative. Next morning (July 14) Shafter again telephoned to Siboney that there was "every prospect of capitulation," and Miles invited the admiral to send an officer ashore; but before this could be done there came a message

telling him that Santiago had already surrendered.

On the 15th Sampson was informed of the hitch in the negotiations. On the 16th Shafter telephoned:

Enemy has surrendered. Will you send some one to represent navy in the matter?

Captain Chadwick, as Sampson's chief of staff, landed and went to the front as

late experience of Spanish perfidy in regard to injury of ships, which in my opinion made it necessary to look after their safety at once." But when he sent in prize crews, they found army officers in charge of the vessels, and General McKibbin, who had been designated as military governor of Santiago, declined to give them up until Sampson had sent



BRIGADIER GENERAL P. C. HAINS, COMMANDING THE THIRD BRIGADE OF GENERAL BROOKE'S DIVISION.

From a photograph by Blessing, Baltimore.

quickly as he could. The convention had already been signed; it contained no reference to the navy, nor to the Spanish ships at Santiago. The captain told Shafter that these latter—the gunboat Alvarado and five merchant steamers, one of which, the *Mejico*, was armed—would be regarded by the navy as its prizes. Shafter said that he would refer the matter to the Secretary of War.

"This," Sampson says, "could have no bearing upon what I considered my duty in the matter, particularly in view of our

Shafter an emphatic protest. In a joint campaign, the admiral pointed out, usage gives captured cities or forts to the army, floating property to the navy; he had left the harbor batteries to be occupied by the troops, and he expected, in return, similar consideration with regard to the ships. "My prize crews must remain in charge," he concluded, "and I have so directed." His action was approved at Washington, but the merchant vessels, a few days later, were ordered to be turned over to the army for use as trans-

ports. The Alvarado, commanded by Lieutenant Blue, formerly of the Suwanee, was added to Sampson's fleet.

THE SURRENDERED CITY AND PROVINCE.

On the day before the surrender (July 16) Shafter personally invited Garcia and his staff to witness the ceremony. The Cuban chief asked if it was intended to continue the Spanish civil officials in power, and on being answered in the affirmative he dramatically declared that he could not go where Spain ruled. No Cuban troops were allowed to enter the city—a very proper precaution against disorder, but one that was bitterly resented by the excluded patriots. Garcia was so deeply offended that he marched his men northward into the interior, and sent Shafter a letter* reproaching the American commander for his ingratitude.

Early in the morning of the 17th the Spanish troops began to deposit their rifles at the arsenal in Santiago, where they were received and inventoried by Lieutenant Brooke, Shafter's ordnance officer, the disarmed men being marched out to a camp near San Juan. Of the Spanish Mauser, the weapon of the regular troops, the number surrendered was



COLONEL WILLIS J. HULINGS, OF THE SIXTEENTH PENNSYLVANIA VOLUNTEERS.

7,902 rifles and 833 carbines, besides about 7,000 guns of other makes, chiefly the Remington, which was used by the volunteers. There were only 1,500,000 rounds of Mauser ammunition—less than 200 cartridges for each gun. The store

* Or at least Shafter received a letter purporting to come from Garcia. Its authenticity does not seem to be certain.



BRIGADIER GENERAL ROY STONE, WHO SERVED ON GENERAL MILES' STAFF IN PORTO RICO.

of food was larger than might have been expected, amounting—on the authority of General Wood—to 1,200,000 rations, but including little except rice.

Of the men, it seems that no precise count was taken—a rather curious omission.* In his official report Shafter estimates their number as about 12,000. In his *Century Magazine* article he gives it as 11,500, which is still probably an over statement. Lieutenant Miley, who was in a position to have exact information, puts it at 10,500,† and other estimates are lower. Of these more than 2,000 were sick and wounded men in the four hospitals.‡

Toral's division included nine garrisons outside of Santiago, numbering 13,000 men, and stationed at Guantanamo, Baracoa, Sagua de Tanamo, El Cristo, El Songo, Dos Caminos, Moron, San Luis, and Palma Soriano. The surrender of such considerable forces without a shot fired against them came as a surprise when the

* No report was made to Washington of the number of men forming the garrison of Santiago. The only figures received by the War Department were those of the whole number of soldiers transported to Spain—22,137.

† "In Cuba with Shafter," page 214.

‡ "At the hospitals," says Lieutenant Müller, "only the seriously wounded and sick were admitted; those who could stand on their feet were refused and sent back to the trenches. If this had not been the case, there would not have been beds enough in which to put them nor physicians to attend them."

Spanish general offered it; yet it is easily accounted for. The five thousand men at Guantanamo, as was already known,* were on the brink of starvation; and the

surrendered to Shafter they would be left to the tender mercies of the Cubans.

Shafter commissioned Lieutenant Miley, of his staff, to receive the surrender of



BRIGADIER GENERAL GUY V. HENRY, COMMANDING THE SECOND BRIGADE OF GENERAL WILSON'S DIVISION, AND AFTERWARDS MILITARY GOVERNOR OF PORTO RICO.

other detachments were little better off. Toral told Miles that all of them were hard pressed by insurgents. With Santiago taken, and the coast blockaded, their position became hopeless, and if not

the inland garrisons. With two mounted troops of the Second Cavalry, under Captain Lewis, and accompanied by Captain Ramus, an aide of Toral's, the lieutenant started on July 19, making his way over the mountains, through a country from

*MUNSEY'S MAGAZINE for March, page 908.

which almost all traces of civilization had disappeared, to El Cristo. The small Spanish detachments here and at Moron and Dos Caminos* surrendered readily, but the *comandante* of the larger force at San Luis refused to accept the statements of Miley and Ramus until he had sent a messenger of his own to Santiago. At Palma Soriano, on the 22d, eight hundred men capitulated without resistance, though Miley had been warned at San Luis that he would probably be fired upon. The prisoners from all these places, and from El Songo, which yielded without a visit, were marched down to Santiago as rapidly as possible, and the First Infantry, a regiment which had scarcely suffered in the fighting, was sent up to garrison the towns.

The Spanish troops at Guantanamo surrendered to Colonel (now Brigadier General) Ewers; but it was not until August 13—the last day of the war—that Lieutenant Miley, with another Spanish staff officer, Major Irles, set out for Baracoa and Sagua de Tanamo, on the northern coast. At neither place was there any attempt at resistance, though no news of the fall of Santiago had reached these isolated towns. Shafter's transports had passed within sight of Baracoa, and the *comandante* had told his men that they were Spanish ships, loaded with troops on their way to conquer the Americans. At Sagua, which Miley reached on the 15th, a bulletin was posted announcing a great victory won by Montojo at Manila.

SHAFTER'S FEVER STRICKEN ARMY.

At Santiago, on July 16, the refugees from Caney, a miserable procession of sick and starving people, who had endured horrors worse than a bombardment, began to return to their homes. On the two following days the electric mines in the

harbor mouth were exploded, and the contact torpedoes taken up, two that could not be moved being marked with buoys; and on the afternoon of the 18th the transports, headed by the Red Cross ship *State of Texas*, were able to come into the bay.

This ended all fear of a shortage of supplies; but the victorious army was in a sorry and shocking condition of sickness and debility. More than half the soldiers were either down with malarial fever, or slowly recovering from it; dysentery was prevalent, typhoid had appeared, and there were cases of yellow fever in every regiment. Attempts were made to fight this last, the most dreaded of diseases, by moving to fresh camping grounds, but it was soon found that the soldiers had not strength enough to move their tents and impedimenta. Any exertion in the hot sun only increased the sickness. The hospital service was still utterly inadequate; there was a lack of needed medicines, and a total absence of suitable food.

The wounded and part of the sick were sent back to the United States on returning transports. On some ships—notably the *Seneca* and the *Concho*, which reached Fort Monroe on the 18th and the 28th of July respectively, and, hoisting the yellow flag, were ordered on to New York—there was great suffering through their utter lack of proper accommodation and attendance. The *Seneca* had four deaths during the voyage, the *Concho* six; and the arrival of these vessels with their wretched cargo—in such pitiable contrast to the strong and eager host that sailed from Tampa a few weeks before—was the first revelation to the people of the United States of the sinister results that a defective army organization had inevitably caused.* But still, both in Washington

* "Algerism" is a word that has been coined by certain newspapers to denote the cause of all the army's sufferings. The term is an unfair attack upon the Secretary of War, and betrays either political spite or ignorance of the true facts of the case.

Secretary Alger did not accomplish such wonders as those that Stanton achieved when he brought order and efficiency out of the chaos of President Lincoln's war office. The task of equipping an army to fight Spain was well nigh an impossible one, and the badly organized system of which General Alger was the official head was incompetent to grapple with it. Much creditable work was done, but it was inevitable that there should be failure at many points, and that loss and suffering should result. But in attempting to fasten blame upon the personnel of the department it is impossible to find more than the unavoidable percentage of human error. Though he did not prove to be the rare and brilliant organizer who alone could have cut the obstructive red tape and met the overwhelming needs of the service, the secretary himself labored with the most devoted energy.

The main cause of the army's troubles is to be found in the illiberal and unintelligent policy that has been traditional

*This is a station on the railroad from Santiago to San Luis, and must not be confounded with the village of the same name just outside of Santiago, on the road to Cobre, mentioned on page 273 of last month's issue. "Dos Caminos," meaning Two Roads, or Crossroads, is a common Spanish name.

Lieutenant Miley ("In Cuba with Shafter," page 193) thus describes the condition of these outlying Spanish posts:

"Surrounding each of the towns there was a little cultivated zone with a radius of half a mile or a mile, depending on the size of the place, planted mainly to corn and sweet potatoes. The mango trees were to be found everywhere loaded with fruit. The natives in the towns consisted of old men, women, and children, while the able bodied men were all soldiers in the insurgent army. I found all these towns surrounded by bands of insurgents, and the Spanish garrisons could not lay down their arms in safety unless I had American troops to leave as guard. For that reason, the garrisons at El Cristo, Moron, and Dos Caminos were not disarmed until I came back on my return to Santiago."

and in the country generally, there was no realization of the desperate plight of the soldiers in Cuba.

On July 14 Secretary Alger had telegraphed to General Miles:

As soon as Santiago falls, the troops must all be put in camp as comfortable as they can be made, and remain, I suppose, until the fever has had its run.

Miles gave similar directions to Shafter several times, and on the 21st he cabled to Washington from Guantanamo, where he was preparing to sail for Porto Rico:

There is not a single regiment of regulars or volunteers with General Shafter's command that is not infected with yellow fever, from one case in the Eighth Ohio to thirty six in the Thirty Third Michigan.

After consulting with best medical authorities, it is my opinion that the best mode of ridding the troops of the fever will be as I have directed, namely, the troops to go up as high into the mountains as possible, selecting fresh camps every day. If this does not check the spread of the disease, the only way of saving a large portion of the command will be to put them on transports and ship them to the New England coast, to some point to be designated by the surgeon general.

THE "ROUND ROBIN."

The plan of changing camps, as has been said, proved worse than useless, yet on August 3 Shafter was again instructed to move his command along the San Luis railroad to the high ground north of Santiago. It was quite impossible to carry out such an order. Shafter assembled his general officers, read the instructions he had received, and asked their opinion. One of them* was for seizing every ship in the harbor and starting northward at once, orders or no orders; all agreed that to leave Cuba was an imperative necessity. At the suggestion of General Bates, they drew up a "round robin" letter to the corps commander, stating that the army was utterly disabled by malarial fever; that it was in a condition to be destroyed by an epidemic, already threatened, of yellow fever; that it must be moved at once or perish as an army; and that those responsible for preventing such a move would be responsible

with Congress in its control of the military establishment. The responsibility rests upon the national legislature, and indirectly upon the nation that it represents.

*General Shafter records this incident without mentioning names, but the outspoken officer was probably General Ames, who expressed a similar opinion to a correspondent, and who sent a private telegram to Mr. Allen, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy: "This army is incapable, because of sickness, of marching anywhere except to the transports. If it is ever to return to the United States, it must do so at once."

for the unnecessary loss of thousands of lives.

This strong letter was signed by all the officers present—Major Generals Wheeler, Kent, Lawton, Bates, and Chaffee, Brigadier Generals Sumner, Ludlow, McKibbin, Ames, and Wood, and Colonel Roosevelt.* There was, as Shafter says, no secrecy about it, and the newspaper correspondents cabled its contents to the United States, where it came as a revelation. This was no utterance of a sensational reporter; it was the voice of an army that had been sent out to fight the nation's battles, and that now found itself left to perish on the soil it had won.

At Washington—Shafter telegraphed it to the War Department with an expression of his own opinion, saying that if the troops were not to be moved till the fever had passed there would be very few to move—its effect was immediate. Next day (August 4) the general was ordered to transport his men as rapidly as possible to Montauk Point, where General S. B. M. Young, himself a fever convalescent, was commissioned to prepare a camp for them.

VICTORS AND VANQUISHED LEAVE SANTIAGO.

The embarkation began on August 7, and was continued as rapidly as transports could be secured. On the 25th General Shafter sailed with almost the last men of his corps, leaving General Lawton in command of the province, with General Wood in charge of the city. Some of the "immune" regiments were sent from the United States to do garrison duty, it being expected—too sanguinely, as it proved—that they would not suffer from the climatic fevers that had been so disastrous to the Fifth Corps.

The shipment of Toral's troops† began on August 9, and on September 17 all the prisoners had left Santiago except a

*Brigadier Generals Kent, Lawton, Bates, and Chaffee had just received their major generalships. General Ames—a distinguished general of the Civil War, hailing from Massachusetts, though formerly Governor of Mississippi—was in command of Kent's third brigade, formerly Colonel Wikoff's. Wood, promoted brigadier general, had on July 20 succeeded McKibbin as military governor of Santiago. Being a physician by profession, he was peculiarly fitted for a post whose most immediate and important problem was that of sanitation. Colonel Roosevelt, who had also gained a step in rank, was present as commander of the second cavalry brigade.

†Just before he sailed, Toral is said to have sent Shafter a letter commenting bitterly on the fact that the surrendered arms had not been returned, as recommended—or promised, as the Spaniards seem to have understood—by the American commissioners who negotiated the capitulation.

small number who elected to remain in Cuba, and a few yellow fever patients at Baracoa and Guantanamo. The work was done by the *Compania Transatlantica Española*, which made the lowest tender when bids were invited by the quartermaster general's department. It seemed, at first sight, anomalous that the United States government should employ a Spanish company, some of whose ships were actually serving as auxiliaries in the enemy's navy, and representatives of other ocean lines—willing to accept the contract at a much higher price—were greatly concerned at so extraordinary an arrangement. Undoubtedly, however, the War Department's action was businesslike and judicious. It was very satisfactory that the Spanish soldiers should be intrusted to their people, so that no charge of ill treatment could be laid at any American door. For these hapless men were suffering terribly during the unhealthy months of August and September. Several hundred died before they could be taken on board the ships, and several hundred more during the voyage. On one vessel, the *Pedro de Satrústegui*, there were seventy six deaths.

The total number of people carried to Spain was 22,864. This included 22,137 soldiers—1,163 officers and 20,974 men; the rest were officers' wives and children, priests, and sisters of mercy. The cost to the United States government was a little more than half a million dollars.

THE MOVEMENT ON PORTO RICO.

The Spanish colony of Porto Rico had figured in the early war plans.* General Miles had suggested an attack upon it in a letter dated May 27, and on June 6 Secretary Alger telegraphed to him, at Tampa:

The President wants to know the earliest moment you can have an expeditionary force ready to go to Porto Rico large enough to take and hold island without the force under General Shafter.

Miles replied that he could be ready in ten days—an estimate that seems decidedly sanguine, in view of the experience of Shafter's corps, and of the lack of transports. On June 9 he was again informed that "expedition No. 2 must be organized as rapidly as possible;" but on the 15th his preparations were interrupted by

an urgent summons to Washington. On the 26th a new plan was formulated: General Brooke was to organize a corps from Chickamauga and Camp Alger, for "operation against the enemy in Cuba and Porto Rico;" Shafter's troops, or any that he could spare, were to join it, and Miles was to be commander in chief. But instead of detaching part of his force, Shafter began to plead for reinforcements, and Miles went to Santiago, where his share in the last days of the campaign has already been narrated.

For some time after Sampson's resultless bombardment of San Juan on May 12, Porto Rico scarcely appeared in the war news. On June 19, to prevent the armed ships* at San Juan from attempting to molest the transports passing between the United States and Santiago, Admiral Sampson ordered the *St. Paul* and the *Yosemite* to blockade the port. Captain Sigsbee reached his station first, on the morning of the 22d, and he had been there only a few hours when he was attacked by the *Isabel II* and the *Terror*.

THE ST. PAUL'S FIGHT OFF SAN JUAN.

The Spanish vessels had been ordered to drive the *St. Paul* off, and the bluff above the harbor mouth was crowded with people who came out to see the fight. The *Isabel* opened an entirely ineffective fire at long range, keeping close under the shore batteries. The *Terror*—whose only weapons were her torpedoes and two small guns, her twelve pound rapid firers having been put aboard the *Maria Teresa* for the voyage across the Atlantic, and left there when she parted company with Cervera—moved eastward along shore, to get out of the *Isabel's* line of fire, and then steamed straight at the big liner. Such an attack showed more pluck than judgment. At night, it might have succeeded; in the daylight, the *St. Paul's* five inch guns were not likely to let her come within striking distance. She was three quarters of a mile distant† when a shell shattered her steer-

*At San Juan were the small Spanish cruiser *Isabel II* (1,130 tons, a sister ship to the *Antonio de Ulloa* and the *Juan de Austria*, destroyed by Dewey in Manila Bay), the torpedo boat destroyer *Terror*, and three gunboats. This was no doubt known to the Navy Department, which had an agent—Ensign H. H. Ward, of the Bureau of Navigation—in the city during June. Ensign Ward, who passed as an English traveler, was arrested on suspicion by the Spanish authorities, but was released on the demand of the British consul.

†According to the account of the engagement given by her captain, Lieutenant de la Rocha, to Commander Jacobsen, of the German cruiser *Geier*, and published by the latter in the *Marine Rundschau*.

*MUNSEY'S MAGAZINE for March, page 911.

ing gear. She veered around, practically disabled, and another shot went clear through her, killing three men, damaging her engines, and making a dangerous hole in her side just below the water line. She was barely able to turn and get back into the harbor, where she was run aground to prevent her sinking, and was subsequently under repair for a month.

During the same afternoon (June 22) the Isabel appeared again, accompanied by a gunboat, apparently attempting to draw the St. Paul under the shore batteries—a challenge which Captain Sigbee wisely declined, his great ship, with her high freeboard, being a mark that even Spanish gunners might have found an easy one. There was no further fighting, though the blockade of San Juan was kept up as closely as circumstances permitted, the Yosemite arriving on June 25, and the New Orleans and other vessels being ordered there during July.

MILES STARTS FROM GUANTANAMO.

On July 21, as he had 3,500 men at Guantanamo, and reinforcements were on their way from Tampa and Charleston, General Miles decided to move upon Porto Rico. The regiments with him were the Sixth Massachusetts and the Sixth Illinois, with 275 recruits ordered to join Shafter's corps, but not needed at Santiago; Batteries C and F of the Third Artillery, B and F of the Fourth, and B of the Fifth; and detachments of engineers, of the signal corps, and of the hospital corps. He had requested permission to take the marines from Playa del Este, but the Secretary of War refused it, saying "we have enough army for our work." His troops were on the Columbia, the Yale, and seven transports, and as a convoy Sampson assigned the Massachusetts, the Gloucester, and the Dixie, with Captain Higginson of the Massachusetts as senior naval officer. The Cincinnati was also ordered from the Havana station to Porto Rico. The admiral's hands were very full at this time, with almost the whole Cuban coast to patrol, and with some of his strongest men of war detached for service in Commodore Watson's Eastern Squadron; and he had considered that with Cervera's fleet destroyed and San Juan blockaded, the Cincinnati alone, in addition to the guns of the Columbia and

the Yale, would be a sufficient protection; but at Miles' request, and finally upon the President's positive order that a battleship should be sent, he added the three vessels mentioned.

The garrison of Porto Rico consisted, according to General Miles' report, of 8,223 Spanish regulars and 9,107 volunteers. These figures, presumably, were obtained officially after the surrender, and are accurate, though Commander Jacobsen gives the Spanish army roll of January 1, 1898—since which time it seems that no reinforcements were sent—as showing 7,002 regulars. It was believed—quite correctly, as it proved—that the volunteers were disaffected, and would refuse to fight. The chief military stations, besides San Juan, were Mayaguez, in the west; Ponce, the largest city in the island, in the south; and Guayama, in the southeast; but since the outbreak of war the Spanish forces had been concentrated in San Juan, only small detachments remaining elsewhere.

The port of Fajardo, near Cape San Juan, at the northeast corner of the island, was the point selected for the landing of the expedition; but on the way eastward from Guantanamo, General Miles went on board of the Massachusetts (July 23) and told Captain Higginson that he preferred to make for Guanica, at the other end of Porto Rico, in the extreme southwest.* His reasons were that the enemy was likely to have information of his plans, and to be prepared to resist a landing at Fajardo; that there were reported to be no defenses either at Guanica or at the neighboring city of Ponce, from which a fine military road led across the island to San Juan; and that he would find there plenty of sugar lighters, which he could use in taking men and material ashore, the tugs and launches promised him from Washington

* It has been stated that a landing at Guanica or Ponce was really planned from the first, Fajardo being mentioned merely as a ruse; but such does not seem to have been the case. On July 18 Miles telegraphed to Washington that Sampson and himself had agreed upon Cape San Juan (presumably meaning Fajardo). On the same day he received a despatch—the result of a conference between the President and Secretaries Alger and Long—authorizing him to use his own discretion in the matter. On July 26, just before his report of the capture of Guanica reached Washington, the Secretary of War sent him a telegram that shows surprise, if not disapproval:

"Conflicting reports here as to your place of landing. Why did you change? Doraco [Dorado], fifteen miles west of San Juan, is reported an excellent place to land. Did you leave ships to direct Schwan and Wilson, now en route, where to find you?"

Miles replied with a despatch stating at length his reasons for preferring Guanica to Fajardo.

having failed to arrive.* Captain Higginson at first demurred on the ground that the harbor at Guanica was too shallow for the heavier ships, and that the southern coast was less convenient for coaling, and less sheltered from the prevailing winds; but he finally waived his objections, and after passing Haiti the fleet turned southward by the Mona Passage, detaching the *Dixie* to summon any ships that might go to the abandoned rendezvous near Cape San Juan.

MILES LANDS AT GUANICA.

Guanica was reached at sunrise on July 25, and Lieutenant Commander Wainwright took the *Gloucester* into the harbor, scorning the possible dangers of unknown batteries or torpedoes. A landing party of thirty men, under Lieutenant Huse, executive officer of the *Gloucester*, went ashore and hoisted the Stars and Stripes. At this a few shots came from the outskirts of the village, and a countryman—the only male inhabitant who had not fled at sight of the American ships—told the lieutenant that the garrison of Guanica, thirty Spanish regulars, had sought shelter in the bushes, after telegraphing to Yauco for reinforcements. Huse barricaded the road leading inland, and a little later, when a small body of mounted troops appeared, a few shots from the *Gloucester's* three pounders drove them off.

By this time the transports had followed the *Gloucester* into the bay, and the soldiers were landing in boats from the ships and in some lighters found in the harbor and promptly seized. The village was occupied without further resistance, and at daylight next morning (July 26) General Garretson, with six companies of the Sixth Massachusetts and one of the Sixth Illinois, moved upon Yauco, about four miles inland. After a skirmish in which four men of the Massachusetts regiment were wounded, and the Spaniards lost three men killed and thirteen wounded, the garrison abandoned the place and retreated eastward, leaving the road to Ponce open.

On the morning of the 27th the *Wasp* and the *Annapolis* joined Captain Hig-

ginson's squadron, and Major General Wilson and Brigadier General Ernst arrived from Charleston with the latter's brigade, which included the Second Wisconsin, the Third Wisconsin, and the Sixteenth Pennsylvania. The troops were not landed at Guanica, as Miles was now ready to take and hold Ponce, a point of importance in itself, and a better base for his movement upon San Juan.

THE CAPTURE OF PONCE.

It fell to Commander Davis, of the *Dixie*, to receive the surrender of Ponce and of its port, La Playa. With the *Annapolis* and the *Wasp*, the *Dixie* anchored in the harbor just before sunset that same day (July 27). Lieutenant Merriam, who was sent ashore, found that the garrison of La Playa had fled, leaving no one with whom he could deal; but the British and German consuls came down from Ponce, with some representatives of mercantile interests, and through their mediation the *comandante*, Colonel San Martin, surrendered the city to Commander Davis, on condition that he should be allowed to retreat un molested with his soldiers—who numbered about three hundred, besides forty or fifty sick men who were left behind. He could have done nothing else; the *Dixie* alone, with her guns trained on his defenseless city, was a sufficient argument for capitulation, without considering the overwhelming force close behind her; yet it was the luckless colonel's fate to be a scapegoat for Spain's resentment of her misfortunes. On reaching San Juan he was arrested and courtmartialed by Captain General Macias, and sentenced to death for giving up Ponce without resistance. Upon the intercession of General Brooke and other American officers, his punishment was subsequently commuted to life imprisonment, and it is understood that he is now a prisoner in the Spanish convict station at Ceuta, in Morocco.

The transports came into the harbor of Ponce early on the 28th, and the army took possession of the city. Here, as elsewhere, they were received with a general display of friendliness by the natives. General Miles issued a proclamation, setting forth in somewhat flowery periods that the American forces were in Porto Rico "in the cause of liberty, justice, and humanity," and "bearing the

* General Miles received valuable information about Porto Rico from Lieutenant H. H. Whitney, of the Fourth Artillery, who during May spent two weeks in the southern part of the island, traveling in disguise, and who now returned there on Miles' staff.

flag of freedom;" that they represented "the fostering arm of a nation of free people, whose greatest power is in its justice and humanity to all those living within its fold. Hence," the general added, "the first effect of this occupation will be the immediate release from your former political relations, and, it is hoped, a cheerful acceptance of the government of the United States." General Wilson was appointed military governor of Ponce, and Captain Chester, of the Cincinnati, captain of the port.

MILES' FOUR LINES OF ADVANCE.

With this firm foothold in the southwest of the island, General Miles waited for the troops he needed to advance in force. They came on the 31st, when Brigadier General Schwan arrived from Tampa with the Eleventh and the Nineteenth Infantry, a troop of the Second Cavalry, and two batteries of the Seventh Artillery; and Major General Brooke and Brigadier General Hains brought nearly six thousand men from Newport News, including the Third Illinois, the Fourth Ohio, the Fourth Pennsylvania, a company of the Eighth Infantry, a troop of the Sixth Cavalry, the Philadelphia City Troop, Troops A and C, New York Cavalry, and Rodney's battalion of artillery. One

of Schwan's transports had an adventure en route. She was chased by the Eagle off the Cuban coast, and as her captain ignored Lieutenant Southerland's signals and warning shots she narrowly escaped being fired on.

Miles' plan of campaign now began to disclose itself. At Ponce he had before him a fine highway running through Coamo and across the center of the island for seventy miles to San Juan. General Brooke's division was carried eastward on its transports to Arroyo, which surrendered to Captain Goodrich, on the Gloucester, on August 1. Landing there, Brooke was to march by Guayama to reach the San Juan road at Cayey. Schwan, meanwhile, was ordered to go ashore at Guanica and move around the western end of Porto Rico, by way of San German and Mayaguez. Henry and Garretson—with General Stone, famous as a road builder, to make a practicable highway out of a neglected trail across the hills—headed straight across the center of the island, by Adjuntas and Utuado, to cut off the retreat of any Spanish forces dislodged by Schwan. All four columns were to converge upon San Juan, where the Spaniards were likely to make their last stand, and where the final blow could be struck by army and navy together.

(To be continued.)

A RHYME OF RAIN.

In the ringing and the rhyming of the rain,
As it patters on the roof and window pane,
What a host of dreams and fancies
Through the hall of memory dances,
Now retreats and now advances
Bright with sunny smiles and glances
From the Nellies and the Nancys
Of the bygone days when trances
Filled with rare and subtle sweetness every nook of heart and brain,
Now repeated in the ringing and the rhyming of the rain.

In the ringing and the rhyming of the rain,
As it patters on the roof and window pane,
How the words and thoughts come streaming
Down the path of idle dreaming,
Visions fair so brightly beaming,
Hopes of youth so gaily gleaming,
All the air with rapture teeming,
Sorrow's darkest days redeeming.
Listening to joy's golden cadences, love's olden, sweet refrain,
Now reëchoed in the ringing and the rhyming of the rain.

Clarence Urmy.