

on Hindu India," has not failed. It simply has not made the progress which might have been expected from the amount of work done. It is a fallacy to think that it is detested as the faith of the conquerors. The real obstacles are that the Hindu can be intellectually convinced of the truth of Christianity and remain unchanged; in other words, he becomes "a convert but not a Christian." The methods of the Christian missionary are imperfect and "slightly absurd"; he is setting before himself a false end, "the Europeanization of Asiatics." The result is that the "missionary becomes an excellent pastor or an efficient schoolmaster, instead of a proselytizer, and that his converts or their children, or the thousands of pagan lads he teaches, become in exact proportion to his success a hybrid caste, not quite European, not quite Indian, with the originality killed out of them, with self-reliance weakened, with all mental aspiration wrenched violently in a direction which is not their own." "Mohammedan proselytism succeeds in India," this writer concludes, "because it leaves its converts Asiatics still; Christian proselytism fails in India because it strives to make of its converts English middle-class men."

—A Western Shaksperian writes us:

"History repeats itself, otherwise the Shaksperian delineations would be for a day and not for all time. The feelers of a politician, and his involuntary indications of chagrin when he finds his feelers disappoint him, must have a family likeness in all ages. The manipulations of Cæsar when Mark Antony thrice did offer him a kingly crown, are told to the life by the great dramatist. But the Shaksperian picture is a presentment which befits Cæsar no better than Blaine, who, while lingering amid Cæsar's relics, seems to have been moved to mimic his manoeuvres. 'Cæsar,' says Casca, 'put the offered crown by him with the back of his hand; he put it by thrice, every time gentler than other; he put it by, but for all that he would fain have had it; he put it by, but to my thinking he was very loth to lay his fingers off it,' etc. May our plumed knight follow further his Roman original who, 'when he perceived the common herd was glad he refused the crown, and shouted at every putting-by, fell down, foamed at the mouth, and was speechless.'"

—The keen competition of the conversation dictionaries in Germany has developed a new feature, almost irresistible, in the case of the seventh edition of 'Pierer's Konversations-Lexikon' (Stuttgart: W. Spemann). Prof. Joseph Kürschner, to whose inventiveness we owe already, among other useful publications, the 'Deutscher Litteratur-Kalender,' has induced the publisher of Pierer to graft upon it twelve dictionaries in the following manner. Every German word not a proper name met with in the general alphabet in the two broad columns of each page has affixed to it equivalents in Latin, Greek, Bohemian, Danish, Dutch, English, French, Hungarian, Italian, Russian, Spanish, and Swedish. But this is not all. A narrow column on the outer margin carries these same languages (save the Greek) in one alphabet, and interpreted back into German, so that the circle is complete. The convenience of this arrangement speaks for itself, and the economy of it, seeing that the language dictionaries are "thrown in," is equally obvious. We have here a hint for the next maker of a first-class English dictionary, whether cyclopædic or other. It need hardly be said that to accomplish so much in a dozen volumes involves a great deal of typographical compression, and the free use of small characters, so that the eye has to be cautious in reading. The print, nevertheless, is very clear, and the catchwords especially distinct. The engravings and maps and colored plates in the first number before us are of good quality, and

we do not perceive any direction in which the execution has been slighted. We subscribe without hesitation to the profession stamped upon the cover—"Eines der originellsten Bücher der Welt!"

THE INVASION OF THE CRIMEA.

The Invasion of the Crimea; its origin, and an account of its progress down to the death of Lord Raglan. By A. W. Kinglake. Vol. VII. From the morrow of Inkerman to the fall of Canrobert. Vol. VIII. From the opening of Pélissier's command to the death of Lord Raglan. Edinburgh: Blackwood & Sons. (New York: Harper & Bros., in one volume, Vol. V.)

THESE two volumes complete the history of the Crimean war as far as Mr. Kinglake intends to write it. The work was undertaken in order to vindicate the memory of Lord Raglan, the British Commander-in-Chief, from the aspersions cast upon it, and Mr. Kinglake may therefore urge, with some show of reason, that the death of Lord Raglan is a proper point at which to arrest his labors. Actually, however, whatever was the prime intention, the vindication of Lord Raglan has, in the working out, become a very subordinate part of it. No one will ever consult these pages in order to find what manner of man Lord Raglan was, but because they contain a singularly thorough and painstaking account, written in the choicest English, of a very remarkable campaign. And having told so much of the story, Mr. Kinglake, it seems to us, was under a species of moral obligation to his readers to continue it to the end, for it is to the last degree improbable that any one else will have the audacity to attempt what he has left undone. But this, perhaps, is too bold an assertion. Mr. Martin Tupper did not scruple to try his hand at the finishing of Coleridge's "Christabel," and, with that fact before our eyes, it certainly is not prudent to assert that any enterprise is beyond the reach of human audacity. This, however, we may say, that Mr. Kinglake, having made it so exceedingly difficult for any one else to complete the history of the war, ought himself to have done so.

So much has happened since—so many greater wars have convulsed the face of the world—that an account of the siege of Sebastopol sounds, at first hearing, like an excursus into some region of ancient and half-forgotten times. For the historical student, however, there is this unique interest attaching to the war in the Crimea, that it marks the termination of that period of peace which set in with the final fall of Napoleon. Not that the intervening years had by any means been a period when "war nor battle's sound was heard the world around." But this war constituted the first struggle on anything approaching the colossal scale to which Europe had become accustomed in the days of the first Napoleon. In the history of Great Britain, the outbreak of this war marks the moment of a change in her foreign policy, the more important consequences of which are still below the horizon. Up to that time France had been the "natural enemy," and Russia the traditional ally, of our transatlantic kinsfolk. The Crimean war reversed the relative position of these two Powers, and since that day it has been impossible for the Russian Government to say or do anything—to send out a solitary geographer to explore some remote region of mountain or desert, or move half-a-dozen Cossack horsemen from one station to another—without being denounced by all reasonable Britons as menacing the peace and possessions

of the British Empire. The incessant reiteration of these sinister predictions tends, as every one must see, to assure and hasten their fulfilment, and it is worthy of note how sedulously those Powers—Germany, Austria, and Italy—who hunger for the partition of the Ottoman Empire, seize upon every occasion to stimulate the wrath and the fears of the British people. If only Russia and Great Britain could be persuaded, on this pretence or that, to "lock horns" in a far distant Central Asian desert, the dividing out of the heritage of the Turk might be carried through with so much ease and celerity.

But to return to Mr. Kinglake's book. We do not think that he has been altogether successful in his attempt to vindicate the reputation of Lord Raglan. He has shown abundantly what, in truth, was never denied, that Lord Raglan was a chivalrous, courteous, accomplished, and experienced soldier. One who had fought by the side of Wellington from his first landing on the Portugal coast down to the crowning victory of the 18th of June, could hardly fail to be a skilful and experienced soldier; but lack of skill was never charged against Lord Raglan—lack of will, want of determination, was; and it seems to us that the facts, as stated by Mr. Kinglake himself, prove that the charge was true. Lord Raglan, it cannot be denied, was in a position of extraordinary difficulty. In the conduct of military operations on a large scale his experience was incomparably greater than that of either Canrobert or Pélissier; but the British army which he commanded was little more than a single division when contrasted with the masses of his French allies, and this disparity of numbers placed him, of necessity, in a position of less authority than the French Commander-in-Chief. Moreover, the British Ministry at home were for ever reminding him that the thing needful above all others was to work harmoniously with the French, and so preserve the *entente cordiale*. The difficulty, in fact, which he was called upon to overcome was of this kind. He was expected to command, and to seem to agree, at one and the same time. He was expected to save his colleagues from blundering, without doing injury to their sensitive self-esteem. He was to stand by his own convictions, and yet not to carry opposition so far as to diminish the cordiality of the Alliance. Perhaps the first Duke of Marlborough, who was as skilful in the management of men as in the conduct of armies, might have been sufficient for these jarring and contradictory duties. It is no great reproach to Lord Raglan to admit that he was not. Having to choose between the sacrifice of his military judgment and the possibility of a breach with the French General, he elected to sacrifice the former. Perhaps he was right, but the immediate result of this decision was the failure of the first assault upon Sebastopol, with a loss to the allies in killed and wounded of about seven thousand men.

Pélissier was at this time in command of the French Army, and it had been agreed between him and Lord Raglan that, after a preliminary bombardment of two hours, a general assault was to be made on the defences of Sebastopol by the allied armies. Had this agreement been adhered to, there is no question that Sebastopol would have fallen in the summer instead of the autumn of 1855. The defences had been assailed, for the space of eight days, with a tremendous and destructive fire from the allied batteries; and though the patient and indomitable fortitude of the Russian soldiers availed to repair in some measure during the night the damages which had been wrought in the day,

the works were on the morning of the assault so shaken and weakened that a cannonade of two hours would have sufficed to silence their fire. A few hours before daylight on the night preceding, the French commander sent word to Lord Raglan that he had changed his mind, and resolved to assault the fortress at break of day without the preliminary bombardment. Lord Raglan acquiesced in this insane change of plan without an attempt to shake the resolution of Pélissier, and the consequence was, that, except at a single point, which led to no result, the attacking columns never got near the fortifications they wished to carry. The intervening distance was swept with such a murderous fire of round shot, grape, and rifle bullets from the Russian works that the heads of the assaulting columns were literally swept away as soon as they emerged from the shelter of their trenches.

It is impossible to acquit Lord Raglan of unpardonable weakness on this occasion. His fault becomes the greater because he clearly recognized the impossibility of the enterprise under the changed conditions to which Pélissier had suddenly committed himself. The capture of the great Redan was the operation which had been intrusted to the British troops, and to do this, under those changed conditions, they had to traverse four hundred yards of open country swept along its whole extent by the fire from the Russian batteries. The undertaking was, in consequence, hopeless from the outset. If a strong assaulting column were told off for the duty, nothing was gained but the presentation of a larger mark to the fire of the enemy; if a weak column, it could make no impression upon the defences, even assuming that any portion survived to reach them. Mr. Kinglake tells the story of this abortive assault with his wonted patient labor and minuteness, but he does not seem to appreciate how heavily Lord Raglan was to blame for consenting to a sacrifice of life so large, so utterly useless.

But what was the cause of Pélissier's sudden change of purpose? Mr. Kinglake attributes it to a temporary aberration of mind, brought on by the exasperating interference in the conduct of the campaign exercised by the Emperor from his cabinet in Paris. The narrative of the part played by the Emperor during this remarkable siege constitutes the most interesting portion of Mr. Kinglake's latest volumes, and is, moreover, quite new. Even in France, except to the few directly concerned, it was not known until the fall of the Empire placed the private and confidential documents of the Imperial Government at the disposal of the Republic.

Louis Napoleon, as is notorious, was always on the lookout for occasions of electrifying the French people by great theatrical achievements like the campaign of Marengo or the victory of Austerlitz. He thought that he perceived a brilliant opportunity for a *coup* of this kind when it became apparent that the allies were not in a position to carry Sebastopol with a rush. He drew up a plan of campaign in which he, at the head of a French army, was to operate in the country to the north of Sebastopol so as to compel the surrender of the place by the defeat and destruction of the Russian field army. The plan, as Mr. Kinglake very clearly shows, was based upon a number of gross misconceptions, and was altogether impracticable. So enamoured, however, was the Emperor of his own scheme that he issued secret but peremptory orders to General Canrobert that he was on no account to press the siege, lest success in that quarter should obviate the necessity for the Emperor taking the

field in person to carry out his own pet design. The French General, at the same time, was ordered to keep the imperial purposes secret from Lord Raglan, with, as Mr. Kinglake points out, this singular consequence, that almost from the morning after Inkerman until the resignation of Canrobert, the siege of Sebastopol was little else than a sham siege. The French Army was an "army in waiting." It was not intended to accomplish anything. Canrobert was not of a character sufficiently strong to set at defiance the foolish injunctions of the Emperor. He was too good and loyal a soldier not to feel deeply the humiliation of his position in consequence of them. And, as his only way of escape, he resigned the command.

Pélissier, his successor, was a soldier of a different calibre. Mr. Kinglake is singularly successful in literary portraiture; but in all his gallery there is no picture more striking than that of the fiery, passionate, resolute Frenchman who replaced Canrobert. Regardless of the Emperor and his impracticable plans, he began at once to press the siege with vigor, to narrow the circle of defences held by the enemy, to prepare for an assault upon the town in real earnest. This change of tactics could not be entered upon without vehement opposition from the Tuileries in the interests of "the plan." This opposition took the form of telegraphic messages which rained in upon the much-tormented Pélissier in a continual shower, producing such an effect upon him that for the space of eight days, and in the supreme crisis of the siege, he was not, in the judgment of Mr. Kinglake, accountable for his actions. In consenting, therefore, to an assault under the conditions imposed, at the last moment, by Pélissier, Lord Raglan was, according to this reading of the situation, sacrificing his better judgment to the caprices of a madman.

COLUMBIANA.

Christophe Colomb et Savone: Études d'histoire critique et documentaire. Genoa. 1887.

Le Quatrième Centenaire de la Découverte du Nouveau Monde: Lettre adressée à son Excellence le Ministre de l'Instruction Publique, du Royaume d'Italie par un citoyen américain. Genoa. 1887.

No one has done so much to elucidate the minor points of the career of Columbus as Mr. Henry Harrisse. The two large volumes of his 'Christophe Colomb,' published three years ago, were throughout minute in investigation and careful in construction; but Harrisse, like so many enthusiasts, having got a bent, is prone to turn everything to its support, and in this way he found everywhere the evidences of the fraud which he believed to be perpetrated in the life of Columbus usually accredited to his son Ferdinand. This failing of Harrisse is so patent that it invites conflict, and it was to be expected that an old antagonist like Henry Stevens would not remain silent. Dr. Shea, too, entered the lists in an article on "This Century's Estimate of Columbus" in the number of the *American Catholic Quarterly Review* for last July, in which he stands a champion for Ferdinand. Harrisse thinks himself conscientious, and he is an honest antagonist in so far as he does not garble or conceal. He professes that "le document est son seul guide," and he has been wonderfully successful in ferreting out such materials; but with all this he is too confident in his theories always to see evidence that tells against them.

His last criticism, however, is open to little of this objection. An old memoir about the

history of Savona by Verzellino, who flourished in that Italian town at the beginning of the seventeenth century, was printed there for the first time three years ago, and imbedded in it there happened to be a document which served to reinforce effectually the arguments heretofore maintained, that the father of Christopher Columbus was a citizen of Genoa at the time of the discoverer's birth. This led Harrisse, in a paper which he published in the *Revue Historique* last autumn, to go over the whole question of the birthplace of Columbus, and this paper enlarged is now published as above. He very soon narrows down the question to Genoa and Savona, for the multitudes of towns on the Mediterranean shores claiming the honor of the nativity of Columbus is very large, and, as he tells us, the family name of Colombo is still a common one in the Italian maritime towns. It is this fact, and the eagerness to connect their history with that of the great discoverer, which has caused the Italian press almost to swarm within a few years past with local monographs in the interest of this or the other town or village. Any current Italian bibliography will show the excess of this zeal. They have added something to our general knowledge, and have been the incentive of some valuable studies. Konrad Hübner gave us, in Von Sybel's *Historische Zeitschrift*, the other day, a summary of the recent literature on the Columbus story; and another has lately begun to appear in the *Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin*, No. 131.

Harrisse seems to think that this new document, in connection with Verzellino's memoir, with its notarial attestation that "Dominico de Columbo" was of Genoa, settles the question, with the aid of the corroborative testimony which has been the ground of the arguments of those who contended for Genoa as the place of Columbus's birth—and it probably does.

In anticipation of the coming celebration in 1892, Mr. Harrisse has also printed the second pamphlet reported above. It is an appeal to commemorate the event by the publication of the works of Columbus, of which he says there are sixty-four separate titles known, and of these at least twenty-five are preserved in his own autograph—namely, nineteen in the collection of his descendant, the Duke of Veragua at Madrid; two in the Spanish archives; three in the palais Turci at Genoa; one in the library of the Lieutenant-General, the Marquis de San Roman; and the rest in the library left by Ferdinand Columbus to the Cathedral at Seville, of which Harrisse has already given us so much information. Nearly all, he says, have been published and translated; but the texts need to be revised and annotated. He does not despair of finding yet other manuscripts of Columbus in Italy, at present unknown; and he further urges the collection and preservation in print of the numerous reports sent back to Italy by her representatives of various sorts, who, during the days of Columbus, were living in Spain, and making known by letters home the progress of maritime discoveries.

Harrisse contends, also, for a complete Columbus bibliography, and represents that there are at least six hundred titles to be gathered of books, tracts, or papers devoted exclusively to the study of Columbus and his career. He would further add a summary of the cartography, with facsimiles of all the cardinal charts illustrative of the train of discoveries which Columbus instituted, beginning with that of Juan de la Cosa in 1500, and ending with those of Schouten and Baffin in 1616, when the contour of the American Continent was first in the main determined. Those interested