

able departure from strict dictionary rules. Under "Poésies," "Romans," "Théâtre (Pièces de)" are alphabetically arranged lists of titles of poems, novels, and plays. In a pure dictionary catalogue these would be dispersed throughout the alphabet. The pleasure of getting this index will be somewhat dimmed by the announcement that the author now gives up the work, after twenty-seven years of labor. He expresses the hope that he shall find a successor. It will be very unfortunate for all who have to do with French literature if he does not. For the issues of nearly half a century (1840-1885) his work is a sure and easy guide; what should one do without it? The utility of continuing it ought to tempt some bibliographical enthusiast and martyr—for the pecuniary reward must certainly be slight. That the labor is not, may appear from Lorenz's assertion that he sent proofs to all the authors whose works were contained in his last two volumes (IX and X), some 6,000 circulars in all, and received replies from between 4,500 and 5,000.

—The October number of *Les Lettres et les Arts* (Paris: Boussod, Valadon et Cie.; New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons) opens with another long passage from the "Notes et Souvenirs" of M. Ludovic Halévy, extending this time from August 11, 1871, to January 19, 1872. It would perhaps be ungrateful to question whether these delightful notes were ever taken, even in the most rudimentary form, either at the dates affixed to them or at any other period; but the reader cannot help feeling that many of the events and personages of the brilliant collection here offered to his attention have nothing to distinguish them from the purely literary creations of the author. The comedy is as brilliant in one case as in the other, and no one will be likely to find any fault with M. Halévy that his "Souvenirs" are presented in so attractive a form. There are two very readable stories in the present number. In "Le Lotus rouge" a young captain of Zouaves and his orderly, and a young Chinese girl and her attendant, play their parts in one of M. Gaston Bergeret's light and amusing little comedies, in which the only thing real is the undercurrent of scarcely indicated sentiment characteristic of his writing. "La Déjanira" is by a less known writer, M. Alain de Mériorne. It is a story of Padua in the middle of the last century, in which music and jealousy are the principal motive powers. There is a charm in the telling of the tale and in the presentation of the scenes in which it passes that makes it pleasant reading. The most valuable as well as the most interesting article in the number is the second part of "Les Canons anciens et modernes," by General Thoumas. The startling progress made since the Franco-Prussian war in everything relating to artillery is told with a rapidity and precision that suggest well-executed military manœuvres, and add to one's interest in the statements made the pleasure caused by the complete harmony between the subject and the manner in which it is treated. The author in the end only states, without resolving, the well-known paradox, that the perfection of all the engines of destruction of which he has been writing is a step towards the realization of universal peace; but the facts he sets forth seem to indicate that the nations of Europe are now engaged in a new kind of war, in which physically destructive battles are superseded by struggles, of which the effects are both moral and financial, in the invention of more and more terrible and costly engines of destruction. It remains a question as yet whether this new warfare is any less de-

structive of human happiness and progress than the old.

THE COMTE DE PARIS'S HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR.

History of the Civil War in America. By the Comte de Paris. Vol. iv. 8vo, pp. 681. Philadelphia: Porter & Coates.

THE translation of the continuation of the Comte de Paris's 'History of the Civil War' appears in advance of the regular French edition. A note by Col. Nicholson, the American editor, tells us that this volume "contains, without abridgment, the seventh volume of the French edition, and so much of the eighth volume as was contained in the manuscript which the distinguished author carried with him when he was banished from France." It is also intimated that the preparation of the work is indefinitely suspended.

Irrespective of political questions between the Orleans princes and the French Republic, American readers will sincerely regret the suspension of historical work by the Comte de Paris. The fairness of his spirit has been manifest in every chapter, his military criticism is rarely at fault, his powers of description give his pages great vividness and stirring life, and his sympathy with the national cause for which he fought is sincere and outspoken, while he is by no means a blind partisan. No other historian of the Civil War can compare with him in grasp of the subject as a whole, and in judicious proportioning of the parts. We have numerous good histories of campaigns, and are accumulating much valuable material for a complete history; but, for some years to come, we shall be likely to look to the Comte de Paris for the formal history of the great struggle. This would make it the more unfortunate if his work is destined to remain a fragment.

There is this comfort, however, in the matter—that the point to which he had brought his narrative when he left France was a natural period in the history. The present volume brings it down to the appointment of Gen. Grant to the command, under the President, of all the armies of the nation. It tells of the campaigns of Chickamauga and of East Tennessee, of Missionary Ridge and of Knoxville, of Gillmore's operations before Charleston, and of Banks's Red River expedition. It closes the period of multifarious scattered efforts, and prepares the way for the last act in the drama, when our Eastern army and our Western—Grant before Richmond, and Sherman from Chattanooga to Raleigh by way of Atlanta—concentrated the attention of the civilized world. It would be impossible to find a point at which a writer could more easily stop (if he must stop short of the end) than that which the historian has now reached. The volumes already published make a work in themselves, covering the period when the direction of our armies was in the hands of McClellan and Halleck, the assumed theoretic experts in the art of war, before they passed to the control of Grant, the hardy, inexorable, and indomitable soldier who had no academic standing worth speaking of.

Looking at these four volumes together, it is not difficult to see that the Comte de Paris has predilections which modify his views, notwithstanding the manifest fairness of his purpose. He has what it is not unjust to call prejudices, both political and military; and his military prejudices may be subdivided as personal and as between the regular and volunteer officers. It would have been very strange if his mind had not been more or less warped, considering

the circumstances of his connection with our army. He was an aide-de-camp of McClellan during the Peninsular campaign, and then returned to France. He was a very young man, susceptible to the personal charm of his chief and to the influences which prevailed at headquarters. He was there accustomed to hear Mr. Lincoln spoken of in habitual terms of gross contempt, and Mr. Stanton as an unprincipled political adventurer who had been made Secretary of War through McClellan's friendship, only that he might seek to ruin the man by whose aid he had mounted to power. At the same headquarters it was a fixed opinion that McClellan had no second as a general, being the only man in the country competent to conduct a great army. Another article of faith was that only the officers of the regular army had any claim to be considered soldiers, and that, even of these, a comparatively small inner circle included all that should have aspirations beyond the command of a brigade. When the air was saturated with such notions, maintained with passionate earnestness by the younger men, and more or less openly avowed by all, the wonder is, not that the young French prince should have been influenced in his view of American affairs by this medium through which he necessarily saw them, but that, in his later studies, he should have risen so far above them as to leave comparatively little trace of their effect.

Yet there are traces. He blames Mr. Lincoln's retention of McDowell's corps near Washington in the spring of 1863, while he does not blame McClellan's disobedience of the condition on which the Government assented to the Peninsular campaign, viz., that a fixed number of troops should be left for the protection of the capital. The general tone adopted towards the Administration is, in all military matters, at least depreciating. In the volume before us, the tardiness of Rosecrans's movements towards Chattanooga in 1863 is debited to the account of the Government, because Grant and Burnside had not been put in motion to support his flanks in July. "One month," it is said, "would have sufficed, if the direction of these manœuvres had been intrusted to one head only, and not to three generals under the pedantic and annoying control of the small Aulic Council at Washington." The intimation here is that, although Halleck was the responsible general-in-chief, there was also a habitual consultation by the President and Secretary of War with other military men at the capital, and that this was mischievous in its effects. This was one of the common matters of complaint at McClellan's headquarters in 1862, and originated with the consultation by Mr. Lincoln with McDowell, Franklin, and Meigs, when McClellan was ill in the December previous. Gen. Hitchcock was substituted for Franklin in the gossip of subsequent years. There was nothing resembling that bugbear of European soldiers, the Austrian Aulic Council. It was both the right and the duty of the President, as commander-in-chief, to enlighten himself by consultation with the members of his official staff or other military officers on duty at Washington. After a general was assigned to a command in the field, he was allowed as large latitude as is ever given to such commanders. In the Austro-Prussian war, Manteuffel commanded a separate army in the Rhine valley, whilst Moltke was with King William in Bohemia, and the orders to the former were not less definite than those sent by Halleck to Rosecrans. We should not quarrel with the author if he argued that Halleck was not Moltke's equal, but we cannot admit that the case was one of an Aulic Council.

Again, in the criticism of Burnside's campaign, the "Washington Government" is charged with sacrificing the true military end of the movement to politics. In a sense, this is true. It was a question of high politics as well as of Mr. Lincoln's sympathy with the noble loyalists of East Tennessee. It would be easy to state this so that no blame would be attached to the President's action under such motives, even if a military man disagreed with him; but we cannot approve of attributing it to the low side of political conduct, as the author does when he says, "True military interest was sacrificed to the desire of securing a politic result which might be praised in the newspapers and applauded by the multitude." The truth is, that the military view was sacrificed to the political in ordering the movement at all, and not so much in the orders given to Burnside after he had reached Knoxville. Buell had pointed out, in the fall of 1861, that the only way to liberate East Tennessee was by an army moving from Nashville upon Chattanooga, and nothing could be better evidence of his sound military judgment. He analyzed the problem, showing the impossibility of sustaining an army there by a line of wagon communication over the mountains two hundred miles long. Burnside's soldiers learned the truth of this to their cost when they were starving and naked in the winter of 1863-64, before railroad communication could be extended to them. But the loyal mountaineers had burned their ships as soon as the war began, and had been hunted and harried and hanged from that time till the national forces occupied the valley. It was not low politics to be willing to do even unmilitary things for their rescue.

The personal predilections of the author appear gracefully in losing no opportunity to praise those whom he had known in the Potomac army, and not unpardonably when he condones or apologizes for the faults they may have committed in later campaigns. He is, however, true to history in matters of fact whenever they are known to him, and even his friendship for McClellan does not make him conceal the fatal defect of constantly and grossly overrating the opposing army. As a good "McClellan man," he has no mercy for Halleck, and can see no good in him. We could more easily agree with him in this were not the two men so alike in mental constitution that a list of the faults and weaknesses of the one would pretty well answer for the other. There was no comparison in their personal attractiveness, but this counts for little in a critical estimate of their performance of public duty. The sharp contrast in the tone used towards them by the author must therefore be set down in good part to the personal predilection already mentioned.

The Comte de Paris can hardly be said to have known much of the volunteer officers of our army. His service with them in a single campaign, and that the first one made by the Army of the Potomac, could hardly enable him to form any accurate judgment of their quality. It was the well understood policy of McClellan to concentrate in that army the largest possible number of regular officers, and they were proportionately much more numerous than in the Western armies. Gen. Scott had begun the organization of forces for the war, with the settled opinion that it was to be, like the brief conflict with Mexico in 1848, a war in which volunteers would not have time to learn the soldier's trade, and must be regarded as undisciplined auxiliaries to be used in a subordinate way to assist the smaller body of regular troops. McClellan modified this so far as to aim at forming a large army of volun-

teers, officered, as far as possible in places above regimental commands, by regular officers. One who accepted the views current at headquarters of the Potomac army in its first campaign, could scarcely credit the change which a year or two of constant field-work would make. There remains, throughout all the volumes of the history before us, a perceptible difference of manner in speaking of officers of the two kinds; it is probably unintentional, but it is noticeable. An illustration will best make it evident.

The author details with fulness and unquestionable good faith two unfortunate expeditions—that of the cavalry under Gen. Sooy Smith, intended to cooperate with Gen. Sherman in the Meridian expedition, and the Red River expedition under Gen. Banks. In both he takes the unfavorable view of the performance of duty by the responsible commander. In the first he limits himself to such criticism as is strictly necessary to reach his judicial conclusion, and makes no general comment whatever upon the character of the officer as a soldier or a man. In the second, however, one cannot avoid the impression that volunteer officers as a class are criticised over Gen. Banks's shoulders. The relation of the expedition to the purpose of bringing out cotton from the Red-River country, leads to mention of cottonspeculators, who are said to have been the "scourge" of the Western army, "wherever the honest and energetic chiefs, imbued by their education with true military spirit, such as Grant and Sherman, could not nip the evil at its root. These speculators," it is added, "were too often spared by generals who had the fault of mingling political matters with the duties of their command." The contrast instituted between generals of military education and political generals is obvious. If, however, we inquire who had been the objects of severest criticism (justly or unjustly), we must answer Frémont, Ormsby Mitchell, and Butler, of whom two had been regulars. A subsequent chapter narrates the Florida expedition under Gillmore and Seymour for a similar political purpose, equally unfortunate, and condemned also by the author as unmilitary; but no intimation is made that the regular officers who conducted it were therefore political generals.

In strictly military comparisons, there is the same disparaging contrast. We are told that the Confederate Gen. Richard Taylor was eager to take the "first opportunity to measure his strength with his adversary, of whose military inexperience he was but too well aware." So, when Banks was superseded by Canby, the author remarks that "the authority with which he (Canby) was invested, and that which his vast experience conferred upon him, were guarantees that henceforth the Federal Armies of the Far West were going to be handled with a thoroughness which up to that time had been lacking." The contrast is in both cases based on the "inexperience" of Banks; yet it is a simple historical fact that Banks had had more experience in handling large bodies of troops in actual war than either Taylor or Canby. In the expedition to the Texas coast preceding this to the Red River, the author has very frankly given the evidence, and stated the conclusion that, both in sound military conception and in practical execution, Banks's ideas were superior to Halleck's, and were well carried out.

On the Red River expedition, Gen. Franklin was second in rank to Banks, and Gen. Stone was his chief-of-staff. Unless it were shown that these officers were excluded from his consultations, it would be presumed that the organization and movement of the army were not wholly Banks's work. But in this, as well

as in the tactical handling of the troops at the battle of Mansfield, the prominent subordinates are exonerated from responsibility and blame, and the "ignorance of the true principles of warfare" on the part of the General is made to account for all that was untoward. The same sweeping condemnation follows each step, till the last one is characterized as "the finishing stroke of disgrace for the general-in-chief." It would be too long a task to analyze the campaign and point out the debatable points in the criticism. We think it enough to say that the tone of the whole, when compared with that used in regard to the other commanders of expeditions mentioned, seems to show that the same standard of judgment of principals and subordinates is not used; and the assumption of Banks's inexperience and ignorance is made a reason (unconsciously, no doubt) for saddling upon him many more sins than his own.

It is time that it should be distinctly recognized that three years of actual experience in a great war and in responsible commands was, for a man of intelligence and of courage, a school in military art in comparison with which any academic preparation is insignificant. Grant explicitly and most broadly recognizes this in his 'Personal Memoirs,' and declares that at the close of the Vicksburg campaign such men as Logan and Blair were every way fit to command armies. European wars attest the same principle. Moreau and Hoche and Ney are too brilliant examples of men passing from civil employment to successful military careers to be overlooked by a French writer, if Americans should not think of them. It is the first step which costs, and the advantage of what in this country has been rather rashly called military education is found in the beginning of an unprecedented struggle, and not after it has continued through several campaigns; after that time, men may safely be left to stand on the merits of their conduct, considered by itself, without reference to their antecedents in time of peace. Our civil war showed the wreck of many reputations among those assumed by a false standard to be pre-eminently fit to lead armies, and gave solid ground for the conclusion that no man can be called a general till he has stood the test of responsible command when the lives of men and the fortunes of his country depended on his action.

We do not now discuss the question how far the judgment of incompetency against Gen. Banks would be modified by applying to him the same canons of criticism, with the same presumptions in his favor, which are applied to Halleck, Gillmore, Seymour, Sooy Smith, Franklin, or Stone. We only say that this does not seem to have been quite completely done in the volume before us. With the limitations thus indicated, the high praise to be given the author for clearness of vision, for industry of investigation, and for an earnest purpose to judge fairly, cannot easily be overstated. There are some apparent slips in translation, but the delay of the original edition would make any statement of them merely conjectural. The general current of the narrative is lively and attractive, and the vivid picturing of the several campaigns makes fascinating reading of the whole work.

SOME HOLIDAY BOOKS.

Warwick Brookes's Pencil Pictures of Child Life. Boston: D. Lothrop Co.

Fairy Lilia, and Other Poems. By Alfred Tennyson. Illustrated. Boston: Estes & Lauriat.