

of Hoshi Toru. Our guide handles with ready familiarity and firm touch every subject which he brings before us. His style is pleasing, and such mistakes in the text as we have been able to find are manifest slips of penman or printer. The transliteration of Japanese words is that of an accurate scholar. Wherein the author seems blind or purposely omisive, is in not giving to modern external influences their deserved credit. Knowing how thoroughly the American teachers in Japan not only trained up many of the men now most active and influential in Japanese politics in the spirit and practice of the deliberative assembly, which was unknown in Japan until they came, it seems absurd to make no reference to these potencies. The American reader will also find that almost all the references to his own country are sinister, and, if ever complimentary, of microscopic dimensions. The "Tammany Hall boss" we know, but the "scheister" ascribed to America seems to have been made in Germany. Pretty much all the "modern instances" are English, rather even than British, revealing the author's limitations.

The author quite rarely quotes from any other writer, having perhaps little need to do so; but his bald statement that "Griffin"—a misprint for the author of "The Mikado's Empire"—"was content to think that they [the Japanese] are modern Ainu," is not just to that writer, especially as another critic of equal eminence finds fault with the same American for deriving the Japanese from Malaysia. Capt. Brinkley, like most modest investigators, concedes the fact "that the Japanese are not a pure race. They present several easily distinguishable types, notably the patrician and the plebeian." Indeed, the Japanese are a very mixed race, and "the theory which seems to fit the facts best is that the Japanese are compounded of elements from central and southern Asia." The conquering immigrants arrived by way of Korea, though they were neither Koreans nor Chinese, while the south Asian immigrants drifted to Japan from the Philippine region and below, along the strange current called The Black Tide.

At the end of each volume the author gives in an appendix several pages of notes and references, all of them very interesting, and showing fulness and nicety in scholarship. Concerning the mythology which the educated intelligent Japanese resolves not to scrutinize too closely, it is hardly a correct intimation that "neither a Colenso nor a Huxley has yet arisen to attack [it] publicly," for it is a fact which, in the light of scholarship and of Japanese professions of intellectual liberality, is not at all creditable, that a native professor in the Imperial University was, not so long ago, first officially silenced and then retired for venturing to criticise the mythology on which theories of government still current were based. Capt. Brinkley himself (p. 81) suggests that written "history" in Japan began only when books and writings reached the continent. Those Japanese who became scholars, found in Chinese history, when its pages were first opened for their inspection, an explanation of the Japanese nation's origin. In all probability, the first historiographers in Nippon derived the idea of an "age of the gods" and of a divinely descended emperor

from the stories found in the Chinese fabulists. In other words, just as the first European settlers of America brought to this continent the old-world myths of the Amazons, the Seven Cities, and the Antilles, and roamed westward chasing the shadows of their own fancy, so the first Japanese users of writing took continental fiction, and gave it a local habitation and new names. They invented that great system of mythology out of which has emerged the serviceable political doctrine that the Japanese emperors, being of divine origin, rule by heavenly right—a doctrine incorporated in the preamble and first article of the Constitution of the Empire. On the official text of a "line of emperors unbroken for ages eternal," the Marquis Ito, in his famous Commentaries, sets forth this notion gravely and with intensest dogmatism, in apparently childlike faith. And this, though the "Nihongi" (Chronicles of Japan), composed 720 A. D., shows repeatedly transparent imitations, and even extended copying, of ancient Chinese writings.

It is Capt. Brinkley's method to omit purposely the details of battles and sieges, and give a social, intellectual, and literary history. In volume i. he treats of the primeval Japanese, Japan on the verge of history, the early eras, and, most felicitously and luminously, of that wonderful epoch of Nara (709-784), when Buddhism was the new teacher and nurse of civilization. The Hei-an epoch lasted from the eighth to the middle of the twelfth century, when Kioto was the capital, the centre of all refining influences and civil power, when the Fujiwara nobles ruled the court, while the Minamoto and Taira generals were asserting Imperialism, and carrying the bounds of the empire to the farthest islands. No author has yet treated this period with such consummate ability and grace.

Volume ii. is devoted to military life and the military epoch, in which civil life, so splendid in the capital, formed its own code, and in which elegance in art, costume, literature reached among the nobles (*kugé*) the highest pitch, while the military families (*buké*) were in the field and on the frontiers devoting themselves to arms, armor, and physical training without letters. The nation was, in fact, divided into three factions, the court nobles, the military families, and the priests. The æsthetic tendencies and delight in nature and art were as manifest, though in smaller compass, as now, among the Japanese. Of the manners and customs, the weapons and operations of war, the refinements and pastimes of the military epoch, Capt. Brinkley writes with the exactness of an expert. He expounds in one chapter the Bushi-do, the warrior's way, or code of chivalry, unwritten, indeed, but mightily influencing Japan in the twentieth century, and making her people unique among Asian nations. Indeed, the aim of government since 1868 has been to lift up the whole nation into knightly ideals and privileges, and this is the secret of the morale of its sailors and soldiers.

The subject of the military classes is continued in the third volume, which, however, is mainly devoted to the splendid era of the Tokugawas, from rise to fall. In the fourth and concluding volume, the author handles with masterly power every subject likely to interest an inquirer into the springs of life and action; and the secrets of Japanese potency. He treats of the court, manners and

customs, and of criminal procedure and criminal classes, and every page of his text shows familiarity with both recondite sources, standard fiction, and popular notions. The chapter on personal liberty, justice, slavery, and checks of vice, corrects many shallow Western notions about the Japanese, and proves the earnestness of the statesmen of the Tokugawa times, who, within the limits of their knowledge and possibilities, strove manfully to solve social problems.

The movements of the native religions, Buddhism and Shinto, and the influence of philosophy are finely set forth, ponderated and measured. The work closes with a chapter on Méiji, or the era of enlightened government, in which the story, from 1868 to the fall of the last Ito cabinet, is told by one who seems to hold all the threads, weaving them into a bright texture, rich in color, which corresponds to the pattern of reality. Probably no other foreigner living has a keener insight and closer understanding of Japanese parties and politics, of which the former as yet are built on persons rather than on ideas or principles. The author is eminently judicial, sparing neither severity of language nor hearty appreciation. He awards high meed of praise to the great constructive statesmen, and understands well the motives of their noisy detractors. He does not hesitate to lay open the abysses of sensualism and the barbarism that prevailed in days gone by, and that still exist under the name of civilization, while showing the great ability of this nation that "adopts nothing but adapts everything."

It is clear from this long view of Japan's evolution that, from the very first, the Japanese have been ready to try experiments. They have always been willing to learn, and have ever proved themselves apt pupils. Even Buddhism, essentially a creed of compromises, in grafting other faiths upon its own system rather than seeking to uproot them, has helped the Japanese to adapt themselves docilely to radical changes, and to become expert in adjustment and compromise. It has thus been solidly serviceable to the Japanese in their modern career. On the other hand, the moral limpness of such a creed, inducing weakness of moral fibre, may explain why Japanese enterprise often seems to flag on the threshold of attainment. It is perhaps Buddhism, also, that has taught in the people a patience almost unlimited, inducing the profoundest faith in time. As we all know, in the story of the Forty-seven Ronins, the marked victim, just when he ought to have been sleeplessly vigilant, supposed his enemy had abandoned the field altogether. On the contrary, the victim found him waiting at his post, the result being that his own head soon decorated the tomb of the avenged, where a perpetual decoration day is kept amid perfume and homage. What the Japanese cannot gain through collision he will often attain by sheer insistence.

MAHAN'S TYPES OF NAVAL OFFICERS.

Types of Naval Officers. By Capt. A. T. Mahan, United States Navy. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1901.

The American reader will naturally ask why Capt. Mahan should have thought that the lives of the six British admirals, selected as types of the naval officer, needed

to be rewritten and subjected to comparative analysis. The answer to this query will doubtless be found in the author's desire to complete his treatment of the great subject of sea power (especially in the eighteenth century), begun in his initial work and illuminated in broad outlines by his *Life of Nelson*, but still requiring that detailed elucidation which Hawke and Rodney, Howe and Jervis, Saumarez and Pellew, through their characters and deeds, seemed best adapted to furnish.

In the present volume are described the changes in naval warfare which, introduced by Hawke, galvanized into vigorous activity the British navy, then moss-grown and suffering from the dry-rot of formal Fighting Instructions that cost poor Mathews whatever of reputation he possessed, and Byng his life itself. Fifty years later, these changes reached a magnificent culmination under the genius of Nelson. Nowhere else, by the way, has Byng's action off Minorca in 1756 been made so clear to the layman; nowhere else has Mathews's action in 1744 been so ably analyzed. If any demonstration were needed of the folly of laying down minute regulations as to how to engage an enemy, and of attempting, by Governmental order, to eliminate personal initiative, these pages should suffice. The apparently incidental discussion of the difference between "errors of conduct" and "errors of judgment" was evidently written with one eye turned towards the wretched Schley matter—a circumstance which somewhat lessens its weight. We are still too near that dreadful subject to gain a just perspective.

Few naval heroes are so inspiring as Hawke (Mahan's first type), whose career is almost unrivalled in its lack of incidents to regret. He came first into prominence in Mathews's action, when, breaking with the old traditions and the Fighting Instructions, he boldly captured the Spanish *Poder*, after having severely crippled the *Neptuno*. The story of his victory over Confians in Quiberon Bay in 1759 is one of the most dramatic in naval history. From Horace Walpole it extorted this unwilling tribute:

"It was the 20th of November; the shortness of the day prevented the total demolition of the enemy; but neither darkness nor a dreadful tempest that ensued could call off Sir Edward Hawke from pursuing his blow. The roaring of the elements was redoubled by the thunder from our ships; and both concurred in that scene of horror to put a period to the navy and the hopes of France."

Hawke's greatest feat was, unquestionably, the establishing and maintaining of an efficient blockade of the French naval port of Brest, "prolonged through six months of closest watching, into the period of the winter gales, in face of which it had been hitherto thought impossible to keep the sea with heavy ships massed in fleets." This policy afterwards, under St. Vincent, had no small share in wrecking Napoleon's scheme of universal dominion.

Capt. Mahan's treatment of Rodney's character and career is especially commendable, for Rodney's was not a simple nature like Hawke's, but complex in the extreme. To Americans Rodney is of surpassing interest. It was his distinction to see with the eye of the strategist, and to assume great responsibilities in obedience to his sense of duty. By his coming from the West In-

dies in 1780 (without orders) to North America, and assuming general command, the well-laid plans of Washington were brought to naught and our War of Independence prolonged. The approval of this action by his Government is a splendid tribute: "It is impossible for us to have a superior fleet in every part, and unless our commanders-in-chief will take the great line, as you do, and consider the King's whole dominions as under their care, our enemies must find us unprepared somewhere, and carry their point against us." Rodney's professional reputation is based on his defeat of Langara, an action whose circumstances lose little even in comparison with Hawke's fierce onslaught at Quiberon, on his affair with De Guichen off Martinique in 1730, wherein the fruits of victory were lost through the incompetence of some of his subordinates, and on his battle with De Grasse on April 12, 1782. The less pleasing side of his disposition is shown in his reluctance to leave the spoils of St. Eustatia, which he gathered to the extent of £3,000,000, and in his failure to press home his advantage after De Grasse and the French flagship had been captured. "What he had won, he had won; what more he might and should do, he would not see, nor would he risk." He had grave personal faults, which were not generous like Nelson's, and which were increased by the financial straits in which the greater part of his life was passed. We think Capt. Mahan has not sufficiently appreciated the exceptional capacity in strategy displayed by the only Englishman of his day who, like Washington alone on our side, grasped the situation, and realized that upon naval supremacy hung the issue of our struggle for independence.

Like all other writers in their turn, Mahan has fallen a victim to the engaging personality of Lord Howe, that warm-hearted, bluff, and capable sailor. Howe was a close student of his profession in a faithful and dogged way, but he certainly was not brilliant. To read about him is to be inevitably drawn towards him in affection. He could not bear the thought of fighting the colonists in 1778—a circumstance which Americans are not likely to forget; and the very kindness of his nature caused the one conspicuous failure in his career. Said Admiral Codrington: "It was want of discipline which led to the discontent and mutiny in the Channel fleet. Lord Howe got rid of the mutiny by granting the men all they asked; but discipline was not restored until the ships most remarkable for misconduct had been, one after the other, placed under the command of Lord St. Vincent."

Lord Howe has always been accepted as a tactician, but his operations against D'Estaing, off our own coast, which brought despair into American hearts in 1778, were more characterized by an unexpected energy in the refitting of Byron's storm-tossed reinforcement than by evolutions; while his great fight of the "First of June," 1794, was waged, in spite of himself, on the traditional lines of ship to ship. Although the prior manoeuvres in this campaign compare favorably with Rodney's striving to wrest the weather gauge from De Guichen, nevertheless Howe's reputation is based chiefly upon his well-known and constant study. Conditions beyond his control robbed him ever demonstrating in a skillful sea fight how great was his real mastery over this branch of naval science.

No navy ever produced an abler "all-around" officer than John Jervis, Lord St. Vincent. His influence upon the British fleet cannot be measured. He licked it into shape, and he made of it the instrument which eventually wrought the downfall of Napoleon. His victory off Cape St. Vincent in 1797, fifteen ships against twenty-seven, gained him fame and an earldom. "A victory is very essential to England at this moment," he said, as the Spaniards came out of the fog. When the mutinies in the Channel Fleet, which Howe had sought to allay rather than to crush, extended to the vessels off Cadiz, St. Vincent stood like a rock. He rejected the suggestion that suspicious letters should not be delivered, with this grim comment: "Should any disturbance arise, the Commander-in-chief will know how to repress it." He made the mutinous crew of the *Marlborough* man the yard-arm whips to hang two of their shipmates, condemned to death, although their captain feared they would refuse to obey his orders. "Do you mean to tell me, Captain Ellison, that you cannot command his Majesty's ship the *Marlborough*? for if that is the case, sir, I will immediately send on board an officer who can." The men were hanged and in the manner St. Vincent had prescribed. "The law was satisfied, and, said Lord St. Vincent at the moment, perhaps one of the greatest of his life, 'Discipline is preserved, sir!'" He was conspicuous for the care of the health of his men, "by instructed sanitary measures, by provision of suitable diet, and by well-ordered hospital service"; it "was his proudest boast among the services to which he laid claim." "To St. Vincent, more than to any one man, is due the enforcement and maintenance of Hawke's system of blockade; and in this sense . . . he is fairly and fully entitled to be considered the organizer of ultimate victory." Stern in his conception of duty, rigid in exacting all the forms of professional etiquette, inflexible in determination, and merciless towards the incompetent, he was generous in his praise for faithful and honorable service, and he bound men to him by a devotion in which professional respect went hand in hand with personal esteem. Among British admirals he ranks second only to Nelson.

Admiral Lord de Saumarez appears to have been a man of singularly balanced character, and to have exhibited a rare combination of physical, mental, and moral attractions. Handsome in person, of exceptional ability, he was as brave as Hawke, a better seaman than Nelson, and as close a student of his profession as Howe. His ship was always noted for efficiency, for contentment at a time when the fleet was infected with mutiny—a contentment shown by the fact that his crew followed him from vessel to vessel as long as they were permitted to do so. His best work was as a squadron commander. He was next in rank to Nelson at the Nile, and he did notable duty at Brest, anchoring at will close in shore and just clear of the range of the French batteries. "With you there," wrote St. Vincent, "I sleep as sound as if I had the key of Brest in my pocket." Fate denied him the full measure of opportunity when in chief command, although his last fight was a brilliant victory against heavy odds, and after a reverse which would have disheartened a less determined and self-reliant officer. A sort of mystery of pathos seems to cloud his relations with Nelson; between whom and him-

self there was loyalty and respect, but never warm friendship.

Lord Exmouth's largest operation was the bombardment of Algiers in 1816. He had refused additional vessels, pressed upon him by the Admiralty, accepting complete responsibility for the outcome of his plans; and he distributed his small force with so much skill that he broke for ever the spirit and the power of the piratical Dey. This was the professional culmination of a life full of hairbreadth escapes, foolhardy adventures, instances of cool pluck and marvellous presence of mind, of stubborn fighting and daring seamanship, which cast fiction quite into the shade. His scarcely challenged superiority as a sailor brought him safely through dangers which would have wrecked almost any other captain. From his sailing in 1775, as Midshipman Pellew, on board the *Blonde*, which carried Burgoyne to our shores, he passed from one thrilling episode to another. In Canada; on Lake Champlain, where he distinguished himself against Benedict Arnold (no light task), to share Burgoyne's fate at Saratoga; in command of a frigate on the coast of France; commander-in-chief in the East Indies and the Mediterranean, he is almost as picturesque a character as our own even more brilliant Paul Jones.

We cannot refrain from expressing the hope that Capt. Mahan will take up a few native types that seem to need his friendly ministrations, and do that justice which only his talents can compel to some of his compatriots and predecessors, such as Barney, Biddle, Decatur, Morris, Perry, Foote, Cushing. His own *Life of Farragut* might well be rewritten in the light of his wider knowledge and larger experience. May we add that it would be well if our author shunned the blandishments of a rhetorical temptress, who makes him at times involved and obscure? "There was prefigured the ultimate predominance of the traditions of the English-speaking races throughout this continent, which in our own momentous period stands mediator between the two ancient and contrasted civilizations of Europe, that so long moved apart, but are now brought into close, if not threatening contact"—is a sentence typical of Capt. Mahan's occasional strayings from a generally lucid style. What it means, he doubtless knows, but the reader can only surmise.

The Great Persian War and its Preliminaries: A Study of the Evidence, Literary and Topographical. By G. B. Grundy. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1901.

This volume treats of the relations between Greece and the Eastern nations—especially Persia—from the rise of the Lydian kingdom to the end of the year 479 B.C. The first twelve chapters discuss the events in their order; the thirteenth sums up the war as a whole; and the final chapter is devoted to Herodotus as the historian of the conflict. The analysis of the sources and method of Herodotus is sound and sufficiently detailed for the purpose. The author concludes that Herodotus is remarkably accurate in his statements of fact, but lacks information as to personal motives. Although Mr. Grundy claims this as the result of his own investigation, the judgment, with more or less modification, applies to nearly all extant classical his-

torians, and is, in fact, the first thing to be noticed in the criticism of these authors. It may not be well known in England or America, but to the German scholar it is as familiar as the alphabet.

In citing his sources, Mr. Grundy should have mentioned book and chapter. If the reader is to be won to a new point of view by the authority, for instance, of Aristophanes, he has a right to know what particular passage is to effect this mental change. Perhaps Mr. Grundy could not conveniently supply the information; but vague impressions from studies pursued long ago are not enough for scholarly purposes. As to modern authorities, the author admits that he does not know from whom he has borrowed or to what extent. "I cannot acknowledge the written sources of assistance to which I have had recourse in compiling this volume, because I cannot recall the whole of a course of reading which has extended over a period of ten years." Oxford ought to teach a more systematic method of reading and research. In a work of this kind, it is unfortunate that the reader should be denied the advantage of knowing how far the author is indebted to his predecessors. Mr. Grundy should have made it clear that he is working in a field already well mapped out by others. H. Delbrück (*Die Perserkriege und Burgunderkriege*, 1887), began the careful, scientific study of the military affairs of this period. It is an epoch-making work, to which those who now write on the subject are consciously or unconsciously under great obligations. Mr. Grundy cites the work two or three times, only to differ from the author. He says, too, that he has read Busolt, but makes no reference to special passages. In cases in which he differs from historians of the first rank like Busolt, it would have been better to compare views, and to show why his own should be preferred.

The subject-matter is both political and military. The political narrative, however, is superficial and one-sided; the author's peculiar views of men and of parties are not well sustained by facts. For instance, he assumes that, in the period ending with the battle of Marathon, the democrats at Athens were intriguing with Persia, and that this victory was a defeat for the party. His assumption explains nothing, and is self-contradictory. The political history of the period is presented far better by Holm, Busolt, and Meyer.

The chief feature of the book, however, is the military narrative. To prepare himself for this part of his task the author first learned the art of surveying, and then, going to Greece, examined carefully the topography of battlefields, roads, and passes. In some cases he has drawn plans based upon personal surveys. His diligence and zeal in this difficult work are admirable. The maps and topographical discussions are an important contribution to the history of the war between Greece and Persia, and are highly appreciated by scholars: "Ueber die Topographie," says E. Meyer, "ist grundlegend die sehr gründliche Untersuchung von Grundy, *The Topography of the Battle of Plataea, 1894, mit vortrefflicher Karte*." This material will doubtless be of great service in rewriting the history of the war. The task is not for the mere classical student, however,

but for one who has at once a thorough knowledge of military affairs and a constructive genius. It would certainly be unwise to assume that Mr. Grundy's reconstruction of the period is final, or is distinctly better than that, for instance, of E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, III (1901).

In point of fact, recent writers have left our knowledge of the battles of the war and of the size of the armies in a deplorable condition. We do not know, for instance, whether at Marathon the Athenians were posted on Mount Agrieliki (Meyer), or high up in the valley of the Avlona (Grundy); whether the battle was fought in that valley (Delbrück) or in the plain (Grundy); or whether the Greeks (Busolt) or the Persians (Grundy) stood on the defensive. The estimates of the Persian force range from ten thousand to sixty thousand. There are as great differences as to the size of Xerxes's army. Delbrück estimates it at 65-75,000, Meyer at 100,000, Busolt (following Niebuhr) at 300,000, and Grundy at half a million. The reasoning of any one of these writers might convince us, were it not for the equally cogent arguments of the others. Mr. Grundy's reasoning is the least satisfactory. He assumes that any number less than half a million would be too small in view of the vast resources and thorough organization of the Persian empire. But thereupon he marvels at the great ability of the Persian Government which could bring so vast a host into Greece and maintain it there so long in excellent condition. Interesting in this connection is Meyer's remark that Antiochus the Great, who ruled an empire nearly as large as the Persian, could muster at Magnesia hardly more than seventy thousand men. A writer who wishes his own view to prevail must undertake the disagreeable task of refuting opposing views. So far from attempting this line of procedure, Mr. Grundy leaves it uncertain whether he is acquainted with recent literature in the field. But if he has settled nothing, at least he has raised a number of interesting questions, and has suggested many new views of the relations between events; and, most important of all, his geographical knowledge will illuminate the whole history of the period which he treats.

London Afternoons: Chapters on the Social Life, Architecture, and Records of the Great City and its Neighbourhood. By W. J. Loftie. Brentano's.

There is no need for Mr. Loftie to apologize for adding to the list of books on London this delightful volume. It is not wholly about London, seeing that, for some reason which has escaped us, Mr. Loftie includes chapters on Berkhamstead, Tring, Guildford, and King's Langley. Mr. Loftie has for more than a quarter of a century studied old London, both in its monuments and in its records, and in this book he gives us the cream of his studies. We have chapters on London five centuries ago, and at the beginning of the century just ended; on Newgate, St. Paul's, Old and New; the older city churches, and on other subjects scarcely less interesting. Perhaps that on the older city churches will be found most interesting by the majority of readers. American visitors should know that the best time to