

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE.

It is not strange that the Anglo-Japanese treaty is received with great enthusiasm in Japan. Apart from any immediate advantage which that country may gain by it, the English alliance is a recognition of her rise to a place among the civilized Powers which can only be flattering to her pride. Fifty years ago, Japan was, to all Western nations, simply one of the outlying hordes of barbarians. Until within ten years she was still under treaty obligation to allow foreigners on Japanese soil to be tried by their own extra-territorial courts—so deep was the distrust of native methods. Now, at one bound, Japan comes forward as a nation with which Great Britain is glad to treat on equal terms. It is a vivid reminder of the folly of arrogance of race. Who knows that the despised Filipinos, if given a chance by the removal of foreign pressure, might not make as rapid progress in the next half-century as Japan has made in the past? We ought never to forget the pit whence we ourselves were digged. Go back far enough, and we find our ancestors the inferior race looked upon with contempt by the then leaders of civilization. William Pitt exclaimed in the House of Commons, when a bill to repress the slave trade was up: "We Britons were once as obscure among the nations of the earth, as savage in our manners, as debased in our morals, as degraded in our understandings, as these unhappy Africans are at present."

The drift and tendency of events, long ago foreseen, furnishes a sufficient explanation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. "Every port, every town, every village that passes into French or Russian hands," says Mr. Curzon, in his 'Problems of the Far East,' "is an outlet lost to Manchester, Bradford, or Bombay." Can England, or England and Japan, or those countries and the United States, stop the progress of Russia in Manchuria, or in any other part of North China? Probably not; but they may retard it sufficiently to give China an opportunity to become civilized and to help herself to resist the aggression of her northern neighbor. Russia is not yet ready to swallow her prey, and it may be possible for England and Japan to make conditions which shall secure to other nations all the trading rights that they now enjoy. In any such endeavor the United States is a deeply interested party. Accordingly, Secretary Hay has rightly protested against the conclusion of a secret arrangement between the Chinese Government and a Russian banking company, giving to the latter exclusive mining concessions in Manchuria. Such exclusive concessions would be in conflict with rights secured to us by the treaty with China, dated June 18, 1858, which secures to the citizens of the United States equal privi-

leges with those of any other nation in respect of navigation, commerce, political or other intercourse. An exclusive privilege of mining granted to Russian subjects would be in conflict with the spirit, if not the letter, of this clause. So, too, would be the exclusive privilege of landing telegraph cables on the coast of China for thirty years, which was granted to a Danish company a few years ago, and which has since been acquired by an English company, and approved by Parliament on the 6th of June last, and which effectually prevents the American Pacific Cable Company from reaching the Chinese coast.

Technically, the treaty provides for a coalition only against a coalition. Neither Great Britain nor Japan would be entitled to call upon its ally for aid if either became engaged in a war, for example, against Russia alone. It is only when some "other Power or Powers should join in hostilities" that "the other contracting party will . . . conduct war in common and make peace in mutual agreement." But, as things stand, this practically covers all the chances of war in the Orient, and binds England and Japan to maintain "the *status quo* and general peace." Needless to say, there stands behind the agreement the power to make it respected. The English and Japanese fleets united would absolutely command the China Sea; and Japan could, at present, more quickly fling an efficient army into Korea than could Russia. With the United States neutral, as it would be bound to be in any contest in that part of the world, the union of Japanese and English forces, on land and sea, would obviously be strong enough to enforce their common will.

It cannot be denied that the publication of the treaty is tantamount to serving notice upon Russia that what Baron de Staël at the Hague Conference called her "lurking hopes" (*espérances ultérieures*) in the Orient must, for a long time to come, be held in abeyance. There will be no insinuating Russification of Korea. That country was recognized as independent by both China and Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, as it was later by the Nissi-Rosen protocol between Japan and Russia signed in April, 1898; yet by both the latter Powers it has been almost openly treated as a prize to be striven for. Russia wants Korea, not simply because it is territory to be seized and developed, but also because it stands like a wedge between her two Pacific ports, Vladivostok and Port Arthur. Japan looks eagerly over the Korean gulf to that old "land to the westward" which she conquered more than 2,000 years ago, which has since, though lost to her, sustained the most intimate relations with her—in religion, in art, in commerce—and which to-day stands before Japanese imagination and ambition as the one rich and sparsely

settled country into which the overflowing millions of crowded Japan may press. There was thus undoubtedly a bad quarter of an hour in St. Petersburg when the news arrived that England had thrown her sword on the Japanese side of the trembling Korean scales.

Yet the Russians may be excused for sardonically smiling at this new guarantee of the "territorial integrity of China and Korea." Their diplomats have not forgotten the European guarantee of the integrity of the Turkish Empire. In spite of that, province after province and principality after principality have been shorn from the Sultan, mainly by the Russian shears. England stands officially, as Lord Cranborne declared the other day, for "the *status quo* and the integrity of Persia"; yet Russia is steadily annexing it commercially from the north, while Germany is eating into it from the west. "It is all very well," Russians may say, "for those who do not want territory to talk about leaving it in its integrity. We want it. We are taking it and occupying it every day, and mean to keep right on." So they undoubtedly will. They will politely agree to any international understanding which they are forced to accept, but in their steady push into North China, as travellers, colonizers, merchants, they will not be deterred for a day. They have the inside lines. Theirs is the advantage of proximity, of adaptability to native ways, and of sleepless energy. Nothing but a crash in Russian finance (which is always possible) can prevent the speedy absorption of Manchuria and as much else of Chinese territory bordering on her Siberian possessions as Russia cares to occupy. There still remains a great measure of truth in Napoleon's remark to Gorgaud at St. Helena: "Russia is the Power that marches the most surely, and with the greatest strides, towards universal dominion."

There is a powerful Russophile element in England, led in the press by the *Spectator*, which has long advocated a Russian alliance, and which will see in the friction that Russian diplomacy may easily provoke at different points a proof that Lord Salisbury has once more laid his money on the "wrong horse." From the American point of view, however, he seems to have made a great stroke. The United States is not and cannot be a party to the Anglo-Japanese treaty, but we are vitally interested in it, and stand to gain much by it. It tends to insure peace in the Orient, and our advantage there and everywhere lies in peace. Further than that, the treaty is expressly designed to secure "equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations." This is a specific pledge of the open door, though none would have been necessary in a treaty to which England set her signature. She is for a fair field and no favors in matters of trade, and that is our

avowed policy in the Orient, as it should be everywhere. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the United States should hail the alliance between Great Britain and Japan as an auspicious event, and should give it the heartiest approval and moral support.

THE PREVENTABLE WAR WITH SPAIN.

Just as Uncle Sam was most chucklingly complacent over the recent diplomatic blabbing in competition, apparently, for American friendship, he was subjected to a cold douche. In the note of the Ambassadors at Washington, given out by Germany, it appeared that they all agreed that the Spanish concessions had "removed all legitimate cause for war." Then unpleasant intimations began to be heard that the President had not informed Congress of the full extent of those concessions. The European press fell to speaking of our not having clean hands when we went to war, and odious comparisons were made between Mr. McKinley's treatment of Gen. Woodford's dispatch and that of the Ems telegram by Bismarck. Thus we are curiously brought back to the important historical inquiry, Did the President have in his hands in April of 1898 a basis for the relief of Cuba and peace with Spain—a basis which a resolute Executive could have used in a way to avert war?

The only answer we propose to give is drawn from the official documents. We put aside the private accounts that have reached us of the way in which the President allowed himself to be overriden by Congressmen. Looking first to the President's own message to Congress of April 11, we find him describing his final demands on Spain as follows: (1) "the immediate revocation of the order of reconcentration"; (2) "an armistice until October 1." The message went on to say that the reply of the Spanish Cabinet was received on March 31, and that it agreed to an armistice only as prepared by the Cuban Parliament, which was not to meet till May 4. This the President called a "disappointing reception" of his "last overture in the direction of immediate peace," and said that with it "the Executive is brought to the end of his effort."

Now, we ask, what was lacking in the statements of this part of the President's message? In the first place, any intimation that Spain had agreed to his demand for the abolition of reconcentration. Yet there it lies in the very dispatch of March 31 to which he refers, but which he did not publish. "The reconcentrados order has been entirely abrogated in the western provinces," wrote the Spanish Minister, and Gen. Woodford telegraphed the same day to the same effect, adding that Gen. Blanco had been given a special credit of 3,000,-

000 pesetas to help the people back to their farms. All this the President withheld from Congress. So he did also the definite offer of the Queen Regent, reported by Gen. Woodford on April 5, to proclaim an "immediate and unconditional suspension of hostilities in the island of Cuba . . . for the space of six months, to the 5th of October, 1898." Further on in the message, the President referred to the later Spanish note of April 10, with its offer of an armistice, though he said of this armistice that its "duration and details have not yet been communicated to me." They had been, however, in the Woodford dispatch of April 5. Of that he left Congress wholly in ignorance. It was, in fact, jealously guarded in the State Department for more than three years.

All through those later dispatches the President showed a strange disinclination to alter his message to make it square with the new facts. When that moving and pious message of the Queen's was telegraphed him, he replied at once that he highly "appreciated" her "desire for peace," but that his "message will go to Congress to-morrow." The only reason that it did not go was to give Consul Lee time to leave Havana. Not even then was there any hint that the message would be modified to fit the changed situation. Even the Spanish note of April 10 the President tucked away in a cold reference at the very end of his message. That note, he said, had been received "since the preparation of the foregoing message." It ought really to have made him throw away his message and write a new one. But he was so enamoured of it that he could not bear to change a word; and therefore laid it before Congress, with its unmistakable leaning towards war, although he had just received a communication from Spain which, in the opinion of all the foreign Ministers in Washington, "removed all legitimate cause for war." Again we put aside all unofficial stories about the way in which Mr. McKinley came to do this. The official account is given in a dispatch from Mr. Day to Gen. Woodford of March 30, 1898. In that we read that there was "profound feeling in Congress," and that it was held in check "only by assurance from the President that . . . he will submit all the facts to Congress at a very early day"—that is, let the war party have its head.

Some people get angry when told that President McKinley, at that crisis, "abdicated." But he himself admitted it. In his answer, through Mr. Day, to Gen. Woodford's urgent appeal, he said, "The President cannot assume to influence the action of the American Congress." But who said that? Why, the man who had in his own hands the entire negotiation. It was his sworn duty, his solemn obligation, to conduct the affair alone, and to report to Congress, if he could, a com-

pleted solution of the grave international problem. Yet instead of seizing eagerly upon the great concession by Spain, and using it to build up an honorable peace, he turned politely away with the remark that he could not think of undertaking to influence Congress! There was the unmistakable surrender of the powers and duties of a great office. What we assert is that a determined Executive, at once accepting and publishing Gen. Woodford's dispatch, hailing it, as he well might, as a great triumph for American diplomacy, and throwing his superseded message into the waste-basket, where it belonged, could have rallied such a peace party throughout the country that a Congress mad for war would have been brought to a muttering submission. There was the great opportunity to prevent the war. It was an "inevitable" war only in the sense that the President of the day was one who would inevitably yield to the pressure of hot-headed Congressmen. "In war," said Napoleon, "*men* are nothing, and a *man* is everything." Unluckily, that man was wanting in those critical days of April, 1898.

THE BILL AGAINST ANARCHISTS.

House Bill 10,386, reported from the Judiciary Committee on February 8, and accompanied by a long explanatory report, is entitled "A Bill for the protection of the President of the United States, the suppression of crime against government, and for other purposes." It is really the residuum of all the bills introduced into the House by excited members since President McKinley's assassination, and represents all that the Judiciary Committee thinks can be done in the way of legal punishment of anarchistic crimes and the suppression of anarchistic doctrines. Some clauses of the bill, as we shall show, are foolish because they are incapable of enforcement; but, on the whole, it is a reasonable and conservative measure, which, after due debate and suitable amendment, might well become the law of the land.

In no respect did the Committee more clearly display its wisdom than in brushing aside the wild proposals which, in the first flurry of grief and indignation last September, were made by apparently sober people, and some of which were embodied in bills introduced in Congress. All criticism of the President, it will be remembered, was to be treated as criminal. Anarchists were to be "strung up" on sight, or else deported to one of Senator Hoar's unnamed islands. All good citizens were, in short, to put down lawless folk lawlessly. But the bill and report of the Judiciary Committee coolly throw all this out of the window. "We have studiously," says Chairman Ray, "avoided interference with the freedom of speech