

sistence officers have been permitted to buy food for the men, they have never been intrusted with the duty of purchasing food for the animals. It constantly happens that a quartermaster at a post may be disbursing thousands of dollars monthly for new buildings or roads, repairs, forage, or what not, and yet he is never allowed to pay the troops. For this purpose an officer of an entirely different department must travel perhaps a thousand miles. In the navy of the United States one officer, the paymaster of a ship, has long performed all the functions which are now divided among three or four army departments.

It is plain that simplicity, efficiency, economy, and common sense have long demanded the change which Secretary Root urges. As disclosed thus far, his plan is to have one large supply department, in place of the Quartermaster's, the Subsistence, and the Pay Corps. This is to have a head with the rank of major-general, and will comprise four divisions, dealing with subsistence, finance, transportation, and construction, each in charge of a brigadier-general. Whether this is the most practical and desirable division of the duties of the new department, time alone will show, but that it is along the right lines is undeniable. There will in some quarters be criticism of the number of generals proposed. On the other hand, it will be said that more than one high position must be held out as inducements to men to qualify for this line of service. Secretary Root believes that many officers must be attracted to this kind of work, in order that there may be many qualified to undertake the staff duties with volunteer armies in the event of war. He would make impossible hereafter that resort to "sons of fathers" and politicians which marked the McKinley régime in 1898, with the excuse that there were no others better qualified.

In any event Secretary Root's plan assures prompt coöperation between the divisions which should work with full knowledge of each other's plans and purposes. Under it there should be an end to the tiresome delays in securing supplies, and the mistakes so frequently made in 1898 of shipping food to one point and other supplies to an entirely different place. Congress should not fail to act upon Secretary Root's measure at an early date, if for no other reason than that it will inevitably save large sums for the Government. Like Secretary Root's other reforms, this one, if introduced, will make his administration of the War Department memorable in army history.

THE CASE OF MR. SCHWAB.

The case of Mr. Schwab of the United States Steel Company is in many respects a peculiar one. It seems certain that, during his vacation in Southern France, he visited Monte Carlo, played

the tables recklessly, was for a moment the hero of the gamblers and pleasure-seekers of that notorious resort—in short, conducted himself like a weak man in the first wantonness of newly acquired power to spend. Despite a qualified and unsatisfactory denial of "sensational" gambling, one must believe that the great ironmaster behaved rather worse than the average wealthy man of little principle would have done.

It is precisely because Mr. Schwab is not the average wealthy man that his alleged actions have called forth bitter and well-deserved rebukes from many quarters. Mr. Schwab's wealth has not been lightly won and precariously amassed as the result of speculative operations, but it constitutes the just reward of rare special ability in a difficult manufacturing enterprise. His experience has been of the kind that usually sobers a man and hardens his moral fibre, and it is painful to feel that one who represents a well-earned success, who controls the lot of hundreds of thousands of laborers, and who conserves the interests of an army of investors, should be capable of playing the part of a gilded youth in the first riotous enjoyment of his patrimony, or that of a stock-jobber of the Jim Fisk or the Barney Barnato type. This is not the sort of man to be in a position of great trust and of vast financial responsibility.

To account for the case of Mr. Schwab is not difficult. It falls under the head of the demoralizing effect of money earned more rapidly than its wise spending has been learned. Here the social satirist might be tempted to write a bitter chapter on the subject of *Deferred Wild Oats*, and a very sordid chapter it would be—of dissipation after dissipation has lost the glamour of hot blood and high spirits, and of debauchery which borrows no grace of Epicurean theory. Where many a man who has become suddenly rich has fallen into this slough, one would willingly believe that Mr. Schwab has merely exhibited the recklessness which makes such a fall possible. In either case his example is deplorable.

Our millionaires, and particularly the self-made men among them, embody the ideal of the average American young man. Mr. Schwab's splendid ability is to a host of American boys and young men a shining object of emulation. In like manner his ability to fling down on the roulette table single stakes which exceed the year's wages of the average ambitious youth, is a challenge to the imagination of many a struggling young man, and a direct encouragement of many a boy whose first small savings are already drifting into the policy-shop or the pool-room. Such an example is doubly unpleasing from a man who had begun to wield large influence as a leader of public opinion—advising parents against the

time-wasting and spendthrift influences of college education, and speaking sober economic truth to the leaders of organized labor. Surely he presents an unedifying example of the education which he advocates in preference to that of the college, and belies that sturdy training as a laborer of which he is justly proud. In short, the wealth which is earned imposes a kind of special obligation, like that of gentle birth. The self-made man has escaped the enervating influences of a too easy course, and has acquired an intimate knowledge of men and of affairs which should create in him a finer and truer sense of social obligation than is often felt by the man who is born wealthy, and therefore should make his use of wealth doubly scrupulous.

Far more surprising than Mr. Schwab's failure to grasp this point of personal honor, but hardly less regrettable, is the fact that he vainly imagined that the head of a great corporation could permit himself the irregularities which are condoned in obscurer men. Many who palliate the actual offence will think this an error in judgment which disqualifies him from holding his high position. For better or for worse, the great leaders of finance are the princes of to-day—our *noblesse*. Their every movement is reported, their pleasure trips are royal progresses. This, we believe, is unfortunate, alike for the millionaires and for the public—it inculcates a false sense of values; but this is the case before us. And for the "iron king" or the "copper king" there is no convenient incognito, such as the royalty of blood may affect—no transparent disguise which all may penetrate but will respect. Towards the head of a billion-dollar company the eyes of a multitude are directed. The character and the judgment of its President are the chief guarantee that the smallest investor is secured in his interests. We no longer tolerate in our public officials moral delinquencies which become openly scandalous, and such offences in the presidents of banks and great stock companies seriously impair the credit of their respective institutions. Against this wholly just sentiment Mr. Schwab has offended grievously. Many who waive the broader moral issue will feel that in the gross forgetfulness of his great responsibility, and in the readiness to accept for the President of the United States Steel Company those facile moral standards which might serve for the mere man of wealth, lies the sum of his offending. We regret profoundly that so typical an example of great wealth and high position fairly earned should symbolize also the profligate misuse of wealth—that a character which we have observed in many admirable aspects should so signally fail in the point of honor which great responsibility imposes.

THE NAPLES TAMMANY OVERTHROW.

ROME, December, 1901.

When the royal decree of November 8, 1900, instituting a commission of inquiry into all the acts of the municipal administrations of the city of Naples appeared, we felt a certain incredulity as to the result, remembering the innumerable *inchieste* that have been ordained and completed during the forty years that have elapsed since Garibaldi entered, inaugurating the Unity of Italy under the house of Savoy, and the Bourbons fled, leaving him victor all along the line. Something has resulted from the numerous public and private "inquiries" made in the island of Sicily; but in Naples, from the hour when Garibaldi quitted the city for Caprera, and the Moderates, taking possession, inaugurated their partisan reign, to their downfall in 1876 and the instalment of their successors, the Left, alias Progressists, Liberals, Reformers—again, to the overthrow of these, and the dictatorship of Depretis-Crispi, of Crispi alone—again, through the successive reigns of Rudini-Nicotera, of the "law by decree" ministry with the horrors of 1898—up to last September things had gone from bad to worse, and King Camorra, from a pretender to an uncrowned sovereign, had continued his triumphal career until, at the death of Humbert, he was the uncontested, uncontested, inviolable monarch of Naples and the provinces.

Your readers are not unacquainted with the performances, character, and attributes of King Camorra. They have read Villari's descriptions, which have grown more and more vivid and emphatic, from his first Southern Letters to his pictures of the misery and ignorance of the plebs, the corruption, oppression, and general infamy of the ruling and wealthy classes, culminating in the photographs of the "disembowelment" of Naples, the robbery of the 100 millions destined for the housing of the poor—seized by the municipal authorities and their clients for themselves with connivance of the provincial authorities and sanction of the successive governments at Rome; or, if not direct sanction, non-interference, in order to retain the votes of the electors who seconded their choice of candidates. Nor has your present correspondent failed to expose the situation, which could not be exaggerated, either in itself or in its fatal consequences to the entire life of Italy, even as cancer taints the whole system, poisoning its very heart's blood. Cavour, who cannot be justified for the means which he employed to oust the entire party of action which had freed Naples from the Bourbon—in order to install the staunch supporters of his policy, the champions of the House of Savoy—was fully aware of the crucial problem involved in the annexation of the southern provinces, especially of the Neapolitan, as affecting the moral unity of the new kingdom. In the years that elapsed between 1793 and 1860—if we except a brief moment at the commencement of the reign of Ferdinand—the one aim of the Bourbons was to exterminate all the intelligent, patriotic citizens by death on the scaffold. Between the 31st of October and the 11th of November, 1793, one hundred and twenty physicians, professors of the university, military and naval officers, and fifteen priests, were hung in the market-place; thousands were imprison-

ed and banished, their property sequestered, their families reduced to misery. The executions and murders that took place during the reign of terror, 1799-1800, can never be enumerated, as all the documents of the famous Giunta were burnt by order of the King, on his restoration. The same system was continued in 1821, in 1830, and again in 1849. At the same time, every effort was made to maintain the plebs in a state of ignorance, superstition, and corruption.

Garibaldi and his Secretary-General, Dr. Agostino Bertani, at once recognized the dangerous condition of the masses steeped in misery, vice, and corruption. They set to work to reorganize the police, which the Bourbons had used solely in order to persecute the patriots and to enlist in their service the camorristas and malefactors. Garibaldi abolished the secret-service fund, established twelve infant schools in the twelve quarters of the city; a military college for the sons of the poor; allotted to the communes the product of the *octroi*; commenced the abolition of lotteries, and introduced the system of saving banks; decreed the sequestration of ecclesiastical property. To the short term of Garibaldian administration also belongs the first attempt at sanitation and the disembowelment of Naples. Cavour, who had made a special study of Naples as early as 1847, and then wrote that "no province of the peninsula had suffered equally, during centuries of domination by foreigners, such excessive feudal oppression, undergone such bloody revolutions, or such sanguinary oppression," at once recognized the importance of thorough reorganization of the entire system of government, administrative, educative, moral, and material. In a memorable treatise on Italian railroads, he dwelt upon the necessity of extending the Neapolitan lines to the toe and heel of the Southern provinces, and did his utmost to encourage the influx of Italian and foreign capital, regarding the population, with all its ignorance and corruption, as frugal and naturally intelligent, well suited to form an active industrial community. He sent one of his ablest helpers, Vittorio Sacchi, to study the finances of the city and provinces. As secretary to the first Lieutenant-General, the Prince of Carignano, he sent Costantino Nigra, with instructions to found and encourage various industries. "If," he wrote, "we do not place the various provinces of Italy, and the southern ones especially, in a position to increase their production, we shall encounter a sad future. Taxes must be increased, but first we must increase the contributive capacity of the population by stimulating production and the formation of wealth." So complicated did the state of Naples appear to Cavour that he did not hesitate to admit the possible necessity of special administrative measures to be voted by Parliament, even as Mazzini also counselled special administration for the islands. Up to the last moment of his life the Neapolitan problem occupied Cavour's thoughts. "I am grieved by the situation of Naples," he wrote, "but neither surprised nor discouraged. People cannot be regenerated in a week, nor can political difficulties be overcome by gymnastics. The regeneration of Naples depends chiefly on the strength and the honesty of the Government. We must prepare to resist all pressure, all political influence, at the cost of exposing the Min-

istry to extreme unpopularity." But June, 1861, deprived Italy of the great statesman, and his successors managed in a very short space of time to efface every trace of Garibaldi's efforts and of Cavour's good intentions.

Your experience of Tammany Hall proceedings can give but a faint idea of the state of Naples at the death of King Humbert; and that his son and successor was fully aware of the depths of degradation to which his native city was reduced, is a fact well known among his intimates, although he never, during his father's life, interfered, directly or indirectly, with political or administrative affairs. His cordial welcome to Zanardelli (who, throughout his entire career, has not a blot on his moral character, and who, during his brief months of power under Kings Vittorio and Humbert, had struck the note of morality in a key quite too high for the ears of most of his colleagues) was not unconnected with his desire to see a moral régime introduced and supported in the South. The deepest depths of corruption had meanwhile been reached in every department of municipal and, as we shall soon see, provincial administration, while the wholesale plundering of the charitable institutions had reached a point which, if surpassed, would leave nothing more even for the plunderers. *La Propaganda*, a newspaper conducted chiefly by young Socialists, attacked on front, rear, and flank the communal administration personified in the Syndic Summonte, strongly supported by the now ex-Deputy Casale. Many such attacks had been made by honest newspapers, Moderate, Liberal, and Clerical, but the results had been zero, the Government either interfering or ignoring the questions, so that the authors of the attacks have generally undergone heavy sentences for libel, defamation, calumny. But Casale, unable to keep silence in the face of the direct accusations made against him, brought an action for libel against the director of the *Propaganda*. He believed that he should gain a verdict by placing the action on political grounds, by attacking the Socialists as such; but neither public opinion nor his judges fell into the trap. All understood that the honor of Naples was at stake; and as the pillagers and plunderers had gradually restricted the number of the sharers of the spoils, many who had been excluded came forward with their testimony. The witnesses summoned by Casale to attest his honesty and uprightness declined the office. Called upon to explain his private resources, to say how he managed to live like a prince on a pauper's income, he tried to withdraw the action; but the Public Minister, seeing that even the Syndic Summonte, when summoned, failed to appear, declared that no other witnesses for the defence need be summoned, and, instead of drawing up a case for the plaintiff Casale, denounced him severely, and expressed his surprise that a public officer (Comm. F. S. Gargiulo, substitute of the Procurator-General at the Court of Cassation in Naples) should have come forward to maintain the honesty of Casale.

The sentence of the tribunal was most severe. It was found that "the facts asseverated by the *Propaganda* were fully proved." The conclusion of the sentence is tremendous:

"To all these specified facts of such ex-