

SENATOR HOAR'S SPEECH.

The speech on the Philippine question delivered by Senator Hoar on Thursday recalls the memorable effort made by the greatest of Republican statesmen on an occasion equally great, and on a subject closely akin to that which inspired the Massachusetts Senator. On the 16th of June, 1858, Abraham Lincoln, at Springfield, Ill., began his speech in these words:

"If we could first know where we are and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do and how to do it."

He went on to show that the American republic was like a house divided against itself, which cannot stand. He believed that the Government could not endure permanently half slave and half free. He did not expect the house to fall, but he did expect that it would cease to be divided. It would become all one thing or all the other. This speech was followed, somewhat later, by Mr. Seward's "irrepressible conflict" speech at Auburn, N. Y., in which the same idea was expounded at greater length. The truth which both these statesmen sought to impress upon the people was, that a republic dedicated to human liberty could not endure permanently if it should cease to practise the principles which it professed.

This was the theme upon which Senator Hoar held his hearers spellbound for three hours on Thursday. And yet we are told by the leading Republican organ in this city that it was "chiefly a rethreshing of old straw." Was it so, indeed? If the principles of the Declaration of Independence could be called old straw, then might Mr. Hoar's speech be considered a waste of words. If the battle of Thermopylæ is an idle tale, if the battle of Lexington is inconsequential, if every struggle for human rights since history began to be written and deeds of valor and self-sacrifice for country and freedom to be sung has been vain, then is the speech of the Massachusetts Senator to be classed as rubbish, from which no more nutriment for human souls can be extracted.

It was time that somebody who has the ear of the nation should sound again the note of liberty, and tell a forgetful people what it signifies in comparison with power and pelf. "You are fighting for sovereignty," said Mr. Hoar; "you are fighting for the principle of eternal dominion over that people, and that is the only question in issue in the conflict." This was in answer to the contention of Senator Foraker and others that we are slaying the Filipinos and practising the horrors of the Spanish Inquisition upon them merely to restore order. Everybody knows—it has been repeated a thousand times—that order could be restored by simply telling those people that we intend to give them their independence. But we have

never said that. We have never said what we said to Cuba. Why not? Because some people thought that money could be made out of them. Others thought that it would be a fine thing to have ships and cannon there to match other nations in China, or to "dominate the Pacific." All these reasons meant pelf, direct or indirect. Nobody has ever yet made any money out of the Philippines, except army contractors; but if the island of Luzon were made of solid gold, nothing could ever compensate the American republic for overthrowing the liberty of a free people who never harmed us. It was time, we repeat, for somebody having the ear of the nation to ring this truth from the public belfry. Senator Hoar has earned the thanks of his own and of all future generations by performing this task in the way he did it.

What will come of it? we shall be asked. No man can say what shall be the final outcome—whether the Filipinos will be subjugated in blood, or the Americans be mired and strangled in their own riches. Of one thing, however, we feel assured. As long as the spectacle of oppression, tyranny, and cruelty exists in the Philippines, or elsewhere in the world, there will be men and women in the United States to rethresh the old straw of human rights. There will always be men to kindle the torch of liberty, and to do battle for the principles that Washington and Lincoln upheld. It is not for us to say who shall win in any coming election. A higher power will decide that question, but hope will always remain while men remain like Senator Hoar to tell the truth alike to willing and unwilling ears.

We have not sought to follow Mr. Hoar's argument, but rather to enter into the spirit of his discourse. The ability is not given to many to gather up the threads of a great and prolonged controversy, and present the whole of it in a compass brief enough to be grasped and held by ordinary minds. It is given to fewer still to seize hold upon the consciences and hearts of the multitude, and teach them to prize moral greatness above pelf and power. Senator Hoar has shown himself a master in both these great faculties. His speech will live as long as the controversy subsists out of which it grew, and it can never become stale while the love of liberty reigns in American bosoms.

ROCHAMBEAU.

The unveiling of the monument to Rochambeau, on Saturday last, recalls a story never heard by Americans without a thrill—the story of the aid which came from France at the turning-point of the War of Independence. It is this permanent sense of gratitude which lends to the reception of the French commissioners and of the de-

scendants of Rochambeau a warmth and reality that such formal expressions of friendship often lack. The commander-in-chief of the French allies, it should frankly be admitted, was not one of the salient personages of the Revolutionary War. No opportunity was granted him for that display of ardent personal devotion which secured for Lafayette a kind of filial relation to the Father of his Country, hence a brotherly relation to us all; nor did Rochambeau receive the glory which redounds to Admiral Grasse for a single brilliant and decisive evolution. He stands, instead, as the representative of sheer military sagacity; patient, resourceful, as ready to coöperate unquestioningly with his American commander as to offer valuable counsel. Finally, he has the undying fame of having planned and secured that timely descent of the French fleet which brought the war to a dramatic close.

For a year he had an ungrateful part to play. Landing at Newport in July, 1780, he found himself condemned to complete inactivity. The second contingent which he had been promised never came; he was supported by a naval force inadequate and unaggressive; the French Ministry regularly refused his recommendations for money, ships, and men. For a year he did little more than win golden opinions for the discipline of his troops. Lafayette wrote to Washington, as a crucial instance of the good conduct of his fellow-countrymen, that the Newport chickens which fed freely in the French camp might be counted at night on the roosts. This was glory of a kind, but, after all, not much for a veteran of the Seven Years' War.

During all this time Rochambeau was in the position of failing to coöperate in Washington's cherished plan of a joint attack upon New York. At an early period he seems to have had an instinct that the final campaign would be, not on the Hudson, but on the Chesapeake. It gradually became plainer that the British were trying again, in somewhat different fashion, the plan of Burgoyne—namely, to cut off New England for subsequent conquest, as the most difficult, and, accordingly, to subdue gradually all the country south and west of the Hudson. It was therefore necessary to strike them in the south. Just who deserves the most credit for cornering Cornwallis on the peninsula between the York River and the James will probably be a matter of endless dispute; but this much is indisputable, that Rochambeau by his own efforts secured the indispensable aid of Admiral Grasse's squadron.

Those who love to qualify the word initiative with the epithet Anglo-Saxon would do well to study the movements of Admiral Grasse during the late summer of 1781. Under Rochambeau's earnest solicitation, he sailed from the

West Indies without sanction from the French Ministry; collected troops which he virtually borrowed from France's ally, Spain; in fact, took so many liberties with the programme laid down for him that he was obliged to serve notice that Cornwallis must be captured in two months' time, or not at all. If the stoical French General ever gave way to enthusiasm, it must have been on the day, August 14, 1781, when he informed Washington, whose command he had joined, that Grasse was already at sea, and headed for the two capes. It was, contemporaries say, one of the few occasions when Washington betrayed emotion.

How timely this aid was, need hardly be recalled. Rochambeau, after his juncture with the Continental army, had written: "Gen. Washington has but a handful of men. . . . This country has been driven to bay, and all its resources are giving out at once." Lafayette, whose scanty regiments alone opposed Cornwallis during those anxious months, had written to Washington that the troops were not enough even "to be decently beaten." The coming of Grasse put a different face on things; and from the time that the grizzled Saint-Simon placed his reinforcements at the disposal of the young Lafayette, the fall of Cornwallis was inevitable. The feeling of the French towards Washington is quaintly symbolized in an anecdote recorded by Col. Butler. The evening that Washington and Rochambeau, after their long march, joined Lafayette and Saint-Simon at Williamsburg, there was naturally a great dinner. "To add to the happiness of the event and evening," writes Col. Butler, "an elegant band of music played an introductory part of a French opera, signifying the happiness of the family when blessed with the presence of the father, and their great dependence upon him."

After the juncture with Washington, Rochambeau acted merely as an auxiliary, accepting loyally the subordinate part which His Most Christian Majesty had assigned to him. It was reserved for Lafayette and his Continentals to take the first redoubt with the bayonet, and for Lafayette to send back a proffer of aid to the leader of the French column, who had questioned the courage of the Americans. Yet when Louis XVI. ordered the official battle-painter to paint for Rochambeau two pictures—one depicting the siege of Yorktown, and the other the capitulation—it was more than a perfunctory compliment.

The sentiments which the inauguration of the monument to Rochambeau in Washington arouses are best expressed in terms of reminiscence. The enduring gratitude which the American people feel for him is quickened by the courtesies which have attended the preparation of the memorial, and by the cere-

monies of the day. Rochambeau required no greater glory than to be the subordinate of Washington—the "auxiliary" of the General of "a handful of men." If there were choice of gallant service, would not one choose that which the stronger renders to the weaker's need? It is, then, a most happy coincidence that brought within a single week this commemoration and the installation of the republic of Cuba among free nations. The proudest title of our rulers, as it was of Rochambeau, may well be that of "auxiliary" to a brave and struggling people.

THE NEW CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT.

As the conventions for the nomination of Congressmen approach, attention is called to the fact that there is about a twelfth more districts under the new apportionment of Representatives in the House than under that which controlled the election of 1900. There will be, of course, a corresponding increase in the electoral college when the next President shall be chosen in 1904.

The Constitution fixed the number of Representatives when the first Congress should meet in 1789 at 65, and provided that thereafter the apportionment should be based upon the "respective numbers" of free persons in the several States and "three-fifths of all other persons," as determined by a national census to be soon taken, as it was in 1790, and every tenth year thereafter—each State, however, to have at least one, no matter how small its population. The first basis adopted was one Representative for every 33,000 people, which resulted in a House of 105 members. The variation from this standard was not very great for forty years, the ratio having risen only to one for every 47,700 after the census of 1830; but the growth of the country had been so rapid that the number of Representatives had considerably more than doubled, reaching then 240. At this rate it was clear that a body as large as the British House of Commons was to be expected in the not distant future, and a halt was called after the census of 1840. The standard was jumped up one-half to 70,680 people, and the number of Representatives was thus reduced to 223.

No House has had equal courage in the sixty years since that time, and the size of the body has steadily increased—at first slowly, as to 237 after the census of 1850 and 243 after 1860; and then rapidly—with the enfranchisement of the blacks after the civil war and the growth of the nation later—to 293 after 1870, 325 after 1880, and 357 after 1890. The last Congress resolved that no State should lose a member, and this required an increase of the total to 386. To prevent such loss by Maine and some other States, which are almost stationary in

population, a ratio had to be adopted which permitted gains in twenty of the forty-five commonwealths.

The changes thus made constitute an interesting study in the distribution of political power. The Northeastern section of the nation—New England and the old "Middle States" of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, not counting Delaware, which has been long ranked as part of the South—gain 9 of the 29 new Representatives, 3 in New York, 2 each in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and 1 each in Massachusetts and Connecticut, and will have 108 of the 386 members—almost exactly 28 per cent. The "Middle West," comprising the great commonwealths between the Alleghanies and the Missouri, gains 6—3 in Illinois, 2 in Minnesota, and 1 in Wisconsin—to which should be added 1 more for North Dakota. This will make their full number 106—or 120 if Kansas and Nebraska be ranked with this division, to which they most naturally belong—about 31 per cent. of all. The Rocky Mountain and Pacific Coast regions, including nine States of vast territorial extent but generally sparse population, will have 21 members—Colorado, Washington, and California each gaining one—6 per cent. of the whole body. There remain the sixteen States in which slavery formerly existed—the "Solid South," as they were for the twenty years beginning with 1876. These have 126 Representatives now, and are to have 136 hereafter—36 per cent. of the House, respectively one more member apiece for West Virginia, North Carolina, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri, and a gain of three for Texas.

Analyzing these gains still further, it will be found that one-third of the increase is credited to what used to be the "Solid South," although West Virginia, which is to have five Representatives, has now a solid Republican delegation, and Delaware has long elected a Republican Congressman. These States in which slavery used to exist furnish almost exactly two-thirds of the Democratic party's strength in the present House—108 out of its 160 members. Leaving out of the account West Virginia, and also Missouri, which sends two Republicans from the city of St. Louis, the new apportionment will help the Democrats here. All of the other gains are in States like the Carolinas, Mississippi, and Louisiana, which have practically disfranchised the negro (the two North Carolina districts now represented by Republicans are accounted Democratic hereafter), or in States which send solid Democratic delegations without the necessity of amending their Constitutions to this end. The various boroughs of New York city now elect fourteen members, of whom eleven were Democrats in 1900, and that party should fare better with seventeen districts in this part