

Flemish Bethlehem, where little Flemish children are sliding on the ice-bound canals, and hustling Flemish villagers are busy about many things, while Mary and Joseph seek their lodgings for the night.

It is this aspect of their work that has most interested me in the exhibition of Primitives. I know there are many other ways of considering the collection. For the historian of Flemish art, it affords a chance that would have gone far to lighten the labors of Crowe and Cavalcaselle. To the scientific critic, it is a challenge which already he has accepted with enthusiasm, and pictures are changing masters with the bewildering rapidity and damaging results that make you wonder the more at the generosity of owners in lending them to exhibitions where they are exposed to such risks. But art does not depend for its value on history or science. True, the collection teaches nothing new of individual works from this standpoint. Indeed, many are not seen to such advantage as in the church or on the walls where the artist meant they should be seen—the reason why not one tells so well as the St. Ursula series on the shrine for which Memlinc designed it. But, on the other hand, certain qualities which all these painters shared, certain points upon which they differed, are emphasized, and early Flemish art, as a whole, is better understood. This is why I, at least, have come away with a heightened sense of their inborn realism, regretting the loss which the restraint put upon them has meant to the world. They would have envied, these old masters, the freedom in the choice of subject allowed to their modern successors. The real triumph of Belgian or Flemish art has been to maintain its independence in spite of the chains and claims of religion and fashion.

N. N.

Correspondence.

THE ETHICS OF THE WILDERNESS.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NATION:

SIR: In your issue, No. 1941, is an article entitled "The Law of Forest and Mountain." The theme will no doubt be new to nearly all your readers; still, it is one deserving serious attention, suggesting, as it does, an ethical principle not commonly recognized.

My reason for addressing you is to point out a very interesting example of the same "law" that came to notice in Sweden, where I travelled a good deal previous to 1882, and found that in railway restaurants, on passenger steamers and elsewhere, there were no means of checking customers, who were taken at their word altogether. On the steamers that ply in the Göta Canal, between Gothenburg and Stockholm, there were placed in the cabins books for the use of the passengers, each of whom selected a page and kept his own accounts for food and refreshments. At the end of the journey, which required about three days, the "mam'selle" in charge took this book and settled with the passengers on their own reckoning.

I mention this as one example. There were many more that could be named. I have discussed the subject with different

people in Sweden, asking if they did not fear being cheated. The answer was, "Oh, no! Why should they want to cheat?" Here comes the problem: Are people honest by law or honest by nature? And will people in an honest environment lose their propensity to steal and cheat? In Sweden at that day no one thought of being cheated, and the greatest rogue, once there and having caught the spirit of honesty, as it were, never thought of acting otherwise than honestly. I have lived there, know the language and customs, and shall never forget that, in coming away, as soon as I had landed in another country the horrid idea and care of "bargaining" began. It was like Christian assuming anew his load that had fallen away during the Swedish sojourn. This "law of the forest" is a neglected factor in our natures, and indicates a white spot amidst the enveloping black-wash of modern customs. Let us hope you will return to the theme.

J. RICHARDS.

SANSAITO, CAL., September 17, 1902.

ELLSWORTH'S ZOUAVES.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NATION:

SIR: My memory confirms the statement of Colonel Burt (*Nation*, No. 1942, p. 225) that Ellsworth's Zouaves were known as the Fire Zouaves, while Wilson's Zouaves did not have that designation. I think the contemporary New York papers will show that Ellsworth's regiment was more commonly referred to as the Fire Zouaves than anything else until after Ellsworth's tragic death, when, because of that, his name became more constantly associated with the regiment.

Fox's 'Regimental Losses in the Civil War' twice refers to the Eleventh New York under the alternative designation of Fire Zouaves (pp. 477, 481). Tenney's 'Military and Naval History of the Rebellion' (Appleton, 1865) thus refers to Ellsworth's death: "The only disastrous event occurring was the death of Col. Ellsworth, commander of the Fire Zouave regiment of New York."

A detailed account of the origin of the name is given in Nicolay's 'Outbreak of the Rebellion' (pp. 112, 113):

"Then came Sumter and the call for volunteers, and Ellsworth saw his opportunity. Hastening to the city of New York, he called together and harangued the fire companies of the metropolis; in three days he had 2,200 names inscribed on his recruiting lists. Out of these he carefully selected a regiment of 1,100 men, who chose him their colonel."

Very respectfully yours,

JAMES J. DOW.

FAIRBULT, September 20, 1902.

QUESTIONING SUSPECTED CRIMINALS.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NATION:

SIR: In the *Nation* of August 28, Margaret Irving Hamilton condemns the practice of police officers in questioning persons who are suspected of crime, for the reason that the Constitution provides that no person shall be obliged to criminate himself.

It would seem to be more to the purpose to protest against this absurd Constitutional provision, which is a relic of a barbarous age. It is a protection to rogues only. Any honest person will be glad to answer all

questions which will be helpful in discovering criminals. There is no good reason why a person suspected of crime should not be required by law to explain all suspicious circumstances. It is only in courts that the failure of an accused person to deny the charge against him raises no presumption against his innocence. It is everywhere else good evidence of guilt.

Respectfully yours,

FRANK W. PROCTOR.

FAIRHAVEN, MASS., September 22, 1902.

PAULSEN'S MISREPRESENTATIONS OF KANT.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NATION:

SIR: A reviewer in your issue of September 11 points out certain errors of exegesis in Paulsen's highly readable but occasionally misleading volume on Kant. It is perhaps worth while to improve the occasion, in the interest of historical accuracy, by calling attention to another rather serious misrepresentation in the same volume, upon a point of some consequence.

Professor Paulsen treats the essay 'On the Possibility of Introducing the Notion of Negative Magnitude into Philosophy' as one of the more significant of Kant's so-called "pre-critical" writings; but he contrives, in his exposition of it, to attribute to Kant a doctrine which is pretty precisely the opposite to the doctrine which the essay really sets forth. In this essay, says Paulsen (Tr., p. 83),

"one sees that Kant has abandoned the rationalistic method of equating conceptual and actual reality. No contradiction can obtain between realities, Baumgarten teaches; *ergo omnes realitates sunt in ente compossibiles*. Yes, says Kant, that holds in the realm of concepts. It is different, however, in the world of actual fact. Here it may very well happen that two positive determinations exclude each other, as when they are related as positive and negative magnitudes in mathematics."

From this one would certainly gather that, in the essay in question, Kant had controverted Baumgarten's maxim, and had maintained that "in the world of actual fact" contradictions may obtain between realities. In point of fact, however, the essay nowhere asserts that what is necessarily true in the realm of concepts can be false in the world of facts; it repeatedly declares that nothing that is self-contradictory can be real; and it consistently adheres to the Leibnitzian principle of "compossibility"—i. e., the principle that reality must be free from logical inconsistency.

Kant is endeavoring to introduce, beside the notion of logical opposition (i. e., contradiction), the notion of a sort of "real" or dynamic opposition (*Realentgegensetzung*). A simple concrete instance of the latter is the case where A owes B ten dollars, and B owes A the same. In such a case, the debt of either equals zero; but this zero is not merely negative—it is the result of the existence of two very positive facts, and of a certain relation of reciprocity between them. This sort of *Entgegensetzung*, which strikes Kant as having a peculiar logical interest, is obviously both possible and frequently actual; but, Kant constantly insists, it is possible only because it does not in any sense involve logical contradiction. "Es kann eine der opponirten Bestimmungen bei einer Real-

entgegensetzung nicht das contradictorische Gegentheil der anderen sein; denn alsdann wäre der Widerstreit logisch, und, wie oben gewiesen worden, unmöglich."

The point is worth noting, because it brings out the fact—which Paulsen seems to overlook throughout—that, so far as the principle of contradiction is concerned, Kant never "abandoned the rationalistic method of equating conceptual and actual reality." At the beginning and at the end of his career, he remained sure that we know, in advance of experience, at least one important truth about all real entities, even about things-in-themselves; namely, that they cannot involve contradiction, either of one another or of the facts of sense-experience. It is true that Kant did not very clearly understand just what he meant by the principle of contradiction; and he therefore failed to see that, by admitting its validity as a criterion of the nature of reality, he had left open a door for a vast amount of possible metaphysical construction. But to the principle in the abstract, he remained always loyal. He was here, at least, wholly a man of the eighteenth-century enlightenment; he had no sympathy with the romanticist's love of paradox, and would hardly have subscribed to Goethe's sentiment:

"Wo die Widersprüche schwirren
Ich mag am liebsten wandern."

Least of all would he have sympathized with that modern combination of agnosticism with realism in metaphysics, which declares that we must conceive to be real that which we have previously declared not to be logically conceivable at all. Professor Paulsen's exposition, however, would, I think, lead the unsuspecting reader to suppose just the contrary of all this.—I am,
Yours very truly,

ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY.

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, ST. LOUIS,
September 23, 1902.

HAMLET'S SOLILOQUY.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NATION:

SIR: What commentators I can find on Hamlet's most notable soliloquy seem to regard suicide as its theme. I would suggest, however, that the speech beginning "To be, or not to be" is not concerned as a whole with a contemplation or consideration of suicide.

When last on the stage, Hamlet had shown impatience with himself as a coward, or at least lacking "gall to make oppression bitter." The pretext of using the play to make sure of his "father's foul and most unnatural murder" has not altogether reconciled Hamlet to his procrastination. And now, in the third act, he comes on still chafing at his own irresolution, rather than in a contemplative mood. "Is my enterprise ever to be, or not? Is it nobler to endure this disgraceful situation, or, facing about on the flood-tide of my own and the time's troubles, to be overwhelmed in at any rate opposing it?" The sarcastic "nobler" implies Hamlet's answer to the question. He is for the moment, I think, viewing his death in the attempt to "set right the time" as practically assured, just as drowning would be certain were he to turn and rush upon the rising tide. How can the idea of suicide be made out of "take arms . . .

end them"? Is there any point in "by opposing end them," unless it implies ending one's life in manfully meeting, not running away from, the swelling flood of evil?

After this opening burst of impatience at his irresolution, Hamlet passes, as frequently (e. g., i. 4, "The King doth . . . take his rouse . . . a custom more honored in the breach than in the observance"), from a present, particular matter to a general reflection. The prospect of his own death in the adventure laid upon him by "cursed spite" suggests a consideration of death in general. His impatient tone dies down into reverie. "Death is only a sleep, and it ends a thousand sufferings. But if that sleep has dreams? Yes; if it were not for that thought, how many men in trouble of love or law or anything would end it even by self-slaughter! But all men shrink from death and the unknown ills of negation. And so, such fearful enterprises as mine, many of great pith and moment, may lose, even in hands of native resolution, the name of effected action." Here suicide, only incidentally and only objectively, does enter momentarily into the course of Hamlet's meditation, not as a recourse for himself, but as a general possibility. "The native hue of resolution" and "enterprises . . . moment" have surely nothing to do with suicide, either for Hamlet or anybody. He comes back at this point to his subject proper, the danger of his enterprise—to what he calls his "craven scruple of thinking too precisely on the event." Hamlet, brave as he really is, has a delicate conscience, which blanches his "native hue." The danger of the event is heightened for him by the sense of his own unworthiness, by uncertainty as to fundamental principles of right and wrong, by conscience that "makes cowards of us all."

Yours very truly,

W. F. TAMBLYN.

WESTERN UNIVERSITY, LONDON, ONT.,
September 20, 1902.

Notes.

Still further publications by Messrs. Scribner are 'Through Hidden Shensi,' by Francis H. Nichols, and 'Cross Country with Horse and Hound,' by Frank Sherman Peer. 'Pictorial Scotland and Ireland,' illustrated, and 'Lays for Little Chaps,' by Alfred J. Waterhouse, are in the press of the New Amsterdam Co.

William R. Jenkins will publish directly a 'Comprehensive French-English Dictionary.'

The next volume of the 'Oxford History of Music' to be issued will be 'The Music of the Seventeenth Century,' by Sir C. Hubert H. Parry, and this may be expected immediately from Henry Frowde.

The season of reprints has set in, and a high standard is raised in Houghton, Mifflin & Co.'s revised and enlarged edition of Mrs. Alice Mabel Bacon's classic 'Japanese Girls and Women.' The additions are considerable, being two chapters or 64 pages. The interest of that entitled "Within the Home" culminates in the account of the burdensome funeral rites. "Ten Years of Progress" deals with the movement for the advancement of women—in education at

home, in study and travel abroad; Japan being to-day in this respect "where England and America were in the first half of the nineteenth century." A revolutionary book by the late eminent reformer, Fukuzawa, in refutation of Kalbar's 'Great Learning of Women,' is summarized in this chapter. The illustrations, by a native artist, Keishū Takenouchi, some in color, are a capital adornment to this instructive volume. The frontispiece shows us a "cherry-viewing."

Little, Brown & Co. find in illustrations by Henry Sandham a pretext for reissuing Mrs. Helen Hunt Jackson's 'Glimpses of California and the Missions.' These drawings are of both scenery and people, and certainly enhance the reader's interest in the narrative.

Macmillan's new Thackeray proceeds with the 'Paris Sketch-Book' and 'The Irish Sketch-Book' in one volume, with the writer's own illustrations, including a caricature of O'Connell as Lord Mayor.

Though Helen M. Winslow, in compiling her 'Literary Boston of To-day' (L. C. Page & Co.), takes leave in her dedication to rate herself "a small fraction" of that Boston, she does not actually celebrate herself in the succeeding biographical sketches. Mrs. Julia Ward Howe's portrait serving as frontispiece is a frank reminder that a large and the weightiest part of the 'Literary Boston of To-day' is the 'Literary Boston of Yesterday.' The face of the new editor of the *Atlantic*, Mr. Bliss Perry, fitly closes this portrait gallery, of which the text is written with sobriety if (as a matter of course) "genially" and in the journalistic vein.

Mrs. Lucia Ames Mead's book on 'Milton's England' (Boston: L. C. Page & Co.) shows a pleasant commingling of literary and antiquarian interests, with just a flavor of the summer holiday. It may be commended as a satisfactory pilgrim's guide-book to the places in which Milton lived; and its picture of the life of his time will practically assist the imagination of the tourist who has not made a special study of that period. Mrs. Mead also takes note, in passing, of the local associations connecting some of the towns and buildings she describes with famous Americans, such as Penn, Franklin, and Roger Williams. The illustrations, which are mainly reproduced from old engravings, represent many churches and houses as Milton must have seen them.

When the publishers of Esther Singleton's 'London, as Seen and Described by Famous Writers' (Dodd, Mead & Co.) announce that it "will appeal to the thoughtful reader as well as to the tourist," they draw a distinction which is not flattering to those of our compatriots who crowd the Atlantic steamers every summer. But a book which lays under tribute the work of such a variety of writers as Charles Dickens, G. W. Steevens, Augustus Hare, Charles Lamb, Théophile Gautier, Austin Dobson, and Washington Irving might safely challenge the attention of many more than two classes. It is arranged topographically: after a few chapters on London as a whole, we begin at the docks and work our way westward as far as a charitable bazaar in the Albert Hall. Perhaps this order was better than the chronological, but such transitions as that from Justin McCarthy to Leigh Hunt are somewhat