

her attempts to apply her theories merely served to set all classes in an uproar, and to bring about some serious open revolts.

—More curious and interesting, in the same volume, is the article by M. Vinavert, a lawyer of St. Petersburg, on "French Influence upon Russian Codification under Nicholas I." The *Svod*, or systematic code of laws in Russia, in fifteen volumes, was prepared under the direction of Speransky, at the command of Nicholas I. Speransky had been the greatest statesman under Alexander I., admired everything French, and fairly adored Napoleon I., especially after the interview at Erfurt between the two Emperors, at which he was present. In 1810 Speransky elaborated a civil code which was, in great part, copied from the Code Napoléon. As the war of invasion of 1812 approached, his French sympathies—in particular this civil code—raised a tremendous storm against him, and in 1812 he was banished to a remote province and subjected to the strict surveillance of the police. In 1821 he was allowed to return to St. Petersburg, and appointed a member of the Council of State. When a section of his Majesty's Chancellery was formed, in 1825, to edit the Code, Speransky was not placed at the head of it, but the work fell into his hands, and his chief was warned by the Emperor that he would be held responsible for any actions in the line of those committed by Speransky in 1810—i. e., for any copying from the French code; Russians being persuaded that they possessed, of native origin, everything requisite. But Mr. Vinavert has cleverly analyzed the Code prepared under these conditions, and finds that Speransky got his own way, after all, using half a dozen different devices to conceal his borrowings. Meanwhile, in his Introduction, Speransky asserted that "the articles of the code were set forth without the slightest change, in the very words employed by the ukases on which they were based"; and that "all our wealth in this line belongs to us by right, was acquired by us, and contained nothing borrowed." Mr. Vinavert explains, in detail, several of Speransky's disingenuous and baffling methods of procedure, and shows how, in many cases, the law, which was clear in the Code Napoléon or in Pothier, has been rendered obscure by the manner in which the Russian editors handled it. Mr. Vinavert's labors on this subject are very instructive and important.

—Prof. Ernest W. Clement is the Atlas supporting the little world of the Asiatic Society of Japan in the latest publication of its Transactions. Volume xxx., part i., contains but two papers, both by this author, one on "Japanese Calendars" and the other on "A Chinese Refugee of the Seventeenth Century." In more senses than one, the Japanese have plenty of time. They have solar, lunar, Japanese, Chinese, and Occidental time, two national calendars, and several chronological year periods or era-systems. Of the two vernacular calendars, one called *Ki-gen* (history-beginning) starts in the mythology of 660 B. C., and the other, *Meiji* (enlightened rule), began after the accession of the present Emperor Mutsuhito. The country people and most of the Buddhists still observe the old style of reckoning based on the twelve signs of the Chinese zodiac and the sexagenary circle, or period of sixty years. This

"cycle of Cathay," in all its divisions and subdivisions, rests upon, or at least receives its terminology from, the ancient philosophy of China. The old Japanese hour was one hundred and twenty minutes long, and the order of numbering was not what to us is the logical order; one, two, three, etc., but followed a style of computation based upon the multiples of nine (1x9=9, 2x9=18, 3x9=27, 4x9=36, 5x9=45, 6x9=54), and in each case the tail figure of the product was chosen as the name of the hour (9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4). In announcing time by the bell, three preliminary strokes were always struck, in order to warn people that the hour was about to be sounded; hence, to avoid confusion, the numbers, 1, 2, 3, were not used. In most old Japanese clocks there was but one hand or pointer, which stood still while the dial went around it. Despite watches and modern clocks, it will probably take the average Japanese, of the thirty-five millions in the empire, several generations to get accustomed to such trifles as "minutes" and "seconds"—common words for which did not exist in the old vernacular, at a time when "punctuality was the thief of time." The full calendar for 1902 and the list of year periods from B. C. 660 to the present Meiji, with much interesting folk-lore and illustrations of the Zodiacal animals, are given. To his previous studies of the Chinese refugee scholars who fled to Japan on the fall of the Ming Dynasty, causing a renaissance of learning something like that of the Greek scholars in Europe from Constantinople, Professor Clement adds another study of one who was a priest, a physician, and an engineer. The Transactions are to be had at the Librarian's Office, 56 Tsukiji, Tokio.

—The yearly consumption of morphine, cocaine, ether, and similar drugs grows out of proportion to the increase of population and to the legitimate demands of medicine. The vice of addiction to narcotics accounts for this. Its immediate consequences are less obvious than those of alcoholic intoxication, but have quite as disastrous ultimate effects, and their very elusiveness makes the slavery more inexorable. We may not discuss here its probable causes, and can only insist that the use of narcotic drugs is a fascinating peril, whose gravity increases with its charm, and from which escape by self-help is practically impossible. "Morphinism, and Narcomanias from Other Drugs" (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders & Co.) is the somewhat inexact title of Dr. T. D. Crothers's hospital and other experience, and his deductions therefrom, in book form. His warnings and his advice are good, especially as applied to the more mischievous poisons, and his general deductions may be accepted with confidence. But we can hardly commend this as a model book. There are lapses in construction, and especially there is frequent failure to give exact references when authorities are cited. The latter is apologized for in a general way in the preface, but the deficiency is none the less tantalizing when the reader wishes to consult the originals. Should the precise data have been lost, it would be quite worth while to recover them, as might easily be done through the superb Surgeon-General's Library and Catalogue. The following case is gravely made a part of the record (p. 303): "Some very curious instances of coffee intoxication have been

reported. One, of a prominent general in a noted battle in the civil war: after drinking several cups of coffee he appeared on the front of the line, exposing himself with great recklessness, shouting and waving his hat as if in a delirium, giving orders, and swearing in the most extraordinary manner. He was supposed to be intoxicated. Afterwards it was found that he had used nothing but coffee."

PAULSEN'S KANT.

Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine. By Friedrich Paulsen. Translated from the Revised German Edition by J. E. Creighton and Albert Lefevre. With a Portrait. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1902. 8vo, pp. xix, 419.

Of the three "parts of the soul," as they used to be called, Sensibility, Energy, and Thought, Kant was decidedly deficient in the first and by no means a hero in the second. That he was genuinely great in thought would seem to be overwhelmingly proved by Vaihinger, from the manner in which he has commanded the attention of all subsequent thinkers. Yet very many of these thinkers, if not most of them, would hold Kant to have been wrong in almost every one of his arguments. Let us reexamine his capacities in sensibility, energy, and thought.

As for sensibility, we call to mind a single passage in Kant's writings as having been admired aesthetically. It is the well-known parallel between the starry heavens above and the moral law within. That genuine eloquence must be attributed to this passage is sufficiently attested by the general admiration it has excited, for it clothes an ethical doctrine which, nakedly presented, would be repugnant to the majority of admirers of the passage. This seems to be the one passage in all Kant's writings that can really be called fine. Professor Paulsen is of opinion that Kant might have become one of the great writers of Germany. He gives sundry reasons for thinking so—such as that Kant's style is marked by great emphasis, that he has a goodly stock of fine phrases and no little ingenuity in bringing them in, and that his "waggishness" is strongly marked. There is no reason to suppose that Kant might not have made a good writer, like anybody else, had he been trained under a good master. Any exaggeration of tone would have been repressed, his elegant extracts dismissed, and his wit subjected to good taste. A good writer, of course; but whether a great writer, or not, is one of those questions of which Kant himself would have said that they transcend the limits of possible experience. Measuring his sensibility by known facts, we find that his style, though it has qualities which excite the gratitude of a student who many times rereads and deeply ponders every section, is devoid of any other grace than that of keeping to the point—is not even always grammatical. Kant never contemplated matrimony, and apparently was never in love. He never had an unreasonable attachment. Though for years he was a distinguished lecturer on physical geography, he was never moved to go to look upon a mountain, never even tramped to the neighboring sea, never saw other town than his own little East Prussian capital. In sensibility, then, Kant must be rated as below the average.

Energy is of two kinds; that which reacts upon the outer world, and that which inhibits one's own impulses. We must be careful not to mistake a deficiency of either kind for an excess of the other. Kant was never moved to any enterprising action, nor even to making any troublesome observations. On the occasion of his being reprimanded for his religious philosophy by minister and king, the little fellow meekly promised to say no more upon the subject. It is true that he was seventy years of age; but then he was a bachelor, without dependents, and by far the most illustrious person in Germany, not even perhaps excepting Goethe. He declares, in a well-known paper, that he has read Swedenborg's 'Arcana Cælestia.' If he really did that, it was the most heroic effort of his life. He would have been better employed in reading Hume's 'Essays' or 'Treatise on Human Nature,' which concerned him more than any other books in the world; but Paulsen is quite right in saying that he never did read Hume in the sense of apprehending his meaning. It must be granted that Hume is an enigmatical writer. His so-called "easy" writing makes hard reading enough. It allows the superficial student to read into it ideas that the author never intended to express, especially the student unacquainted with what was going on in the English world of letters of the period. But take the ordinary traditional logic. A schoolboy can master that. Yet Kant's pamphlet on the 'Falsche Spitzfindigkeit' is devoted to setting forth as a novel discovery of Kant's own the very doctrine of the reduction of syllogism taught in every book of traditional logic. The only real novelties it contains are two or three absurd blunders. Kant probably did read Baumgarten's 'Metaphysica'; but one must doubt mightily whether he ever really read any other book of philosophy.

These things are most significant. In self-control Kant appears to be a prodigy. A man more systematic than he would not be reckoned among the sane. When, during his afternoon constitutional, he reached a certain corner, the good people of Königsberg would pull out their watches, not to see whether Herr Professor Doctor Kant was on time, but to see whether their watches were going right. His more important books were put together, as he expressed it, architectonically. That is, just as architects, until recently, used to insist upon designing buildings upon an arbitrary plan supposed to have certain merits, but not determined by the purposes which the buildings were to subserve; just so, Kant would enslave himself to an elaborate system of divisions and subdivisions—*Haupttheile, Theile, Abtheilungen, Bücher, Hauptstücke, Abschnitte, und Paragraphen*—laid down beforehand, not arising from the peculiar character of his theme, but supposed to be dictated *à priori* by reason and to be derived from the idea of pure reason. Such method either bespeaks extraordinary self-control or a singular defect of *élan*. Several circumstances besides Kant's apparent inability to read a work on philosophy somewhat incline us to the latter hypothesis.

At any rate, it was exclusively in the way of thought that Kant can be deemed great, if he was great at all. There are different kinds of thought: there is mathematical thought, that works by diagrams; there is

the thought which, from observing a fragment, divines a whole; and there is logical analysis. Kant was certainly not a mathematician. In scientific theorizing, however, he was decidedly strong. He is accounted by astronomers the author of the Nebular Hypothesis. In his younger days, he was a physicist; and he always remained a physicist who had taken up philosophy (naturally, less strikingly so as his powers declined), contrasting in this regard with Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schleiermacher, not to speak of Baader, Günther, etc., who were all theological students, and as strongly with Jacobi, Fries, Krause, etc., who came to philosophy by the route of theology; and even, more or less, with Schopenhauer, Herbart, Beneke, and all the others before Fechner and Lotze, who, at any rate, breathe rather the atmosphere of the seminary than that of the laboratory. Every scientific reader feels the philosopher of Königsberg to be of his kindred.

When we think of the stupendous amount of close study which intellectual men of every stripe have bestowed upon Kant, and when we ask ourselves, What is it, then, which has attracted all this attention? We are led to answer, it was his power of constructing a theory, which is the kind of intellectual feat that marks the man of science—the Young, the Faraday, the Darwin. We shall not, of course, be misunderstood as saying that constructing theories made any of them the great men that they were, any more than it did Kant. As a scientific man beneath the skin, Kant is comparatively free from the besetting fallacy of the philosophers, which may be described, without exaggeration, as consisting in producing arguments to prove a micron, at most, and in concluding a light-year, at least. Kant, perceiving in some measure this universal fault of the philosophers, was naturally led to his evident ambition to be the arbiter of philosophical disputes. But he could have exercised this office only in the weak manner of the Eclectics, allowing so much weight to this consideration and so much to another diametrically opposed to it, if he had not fortunately been gifted with a great strength in logical analysis, that enabled him at once to do full justice to the arguments and tendencies of both sides, and to make both contributory to a third unitary conception. Yet even his logical analysis would not have sufficed, if it had not been for a supereminent share in a characteristic that may be remarked in all the more powerful scientific intellects, the power of making use even of conceptions that resisted his logical analysis, and of drawing from them nearly the same conclusions as any clear mind would have done that had analyzed them. We cannot, in a few words, make our meaning very clear; but one might say that an ordinary intelligent mind has an upper layer of clear thought, underlaid by muddled ideas; while in Kant's mind there appears to be a pure solution down into those depths where daylight hardly penetrates. He thinks pretty correctly even when he does not think distinctly.

The volume under consideration contains a careful account of Kant's place in history, of his life and character, and of his philosophy, by one of the most accomplished and popular of the German philosophers of to-day. It is not a suitable guide for a beginner in Kant. The 'Critic of the Pure

Reason' is, perhaps, as wholesome a book as a student of force could find with which to begin the study of philosophy. But the only accompaniment to it that is advisable at first is a textual comment. Such books as Paulsen's are best left for later perusal. We need not say that the student must not allow himself to imagine that in going through the 'Critic' for the first time without preparation he can understand Kant entirely, far less duly estimate him, until he has read the discussions which led up to the 'Critic.' Deeper students will find this volume interesting and convenient. It leaves hardly any question of metaphysics untouched.

We have said that it is drawn up with care. We will now give two specimens of its inevitable inaccuracies. In summing up Kant's historical position, Paulsen says that to have cleared the ground and pointed the way to a poetic naturalistic pantheism as the fundamental form of the conception of the world, is the imperishable service of Kant. This not only forgets that Lessing introduced "poetic naturalistic pantheism" the year before the 'Critic' appeared, and that its propagator, Goethe, was uninfluenced by Kant, but conveys the idea that Kant's importance is exclusively theological and poetical; and accordingly, in the summary of his philosophy, his scientific writings are left unmentioned, and, throughout, his relations to theology are made infinitely more important than his relations to what is generally called science. But Kant, as we have said, was, on the contrary, mainly a man of science—not oblivious of aspirations towards God, freedom, and immortality, but yet dwelling in the realm of experience; and his theory of cognition—its general design, at least, and some of its corner-stones—still stands, as far as scientific thought is concerned, firmly established. Under these circumstances, and since he himself was not a pantheist, it is unjust to sum him up as a forerunner of what he condemned.

The following is an example of another kind of inaccuracy. On p. 147 we read:

"How synthetic judgments *à posteriori* can have actual validity seemed to him to be no problem at all. If he had raised the question, it would have shattered the whole structure of the 'Critique.' He would have been forced to reply that there can be no such judgments; synthetic judgments *à posteriori* are a *contradictio in adjecto*."

Compare this with the following from page 8 of the 'Critic of the Pure Reason':

"In synthetical judgments, I must have, in addition to the concept of the subject, A, something else, X, upon which thought may react, in order to cognize a predicate, B, as belonging to A, although not a part of it. In empirical, or experimental, judgments there is no difficulty in fulfilling this condition. The X is merely the complete experience of the object of the concept A, which is but a part of that experience. [Having expanded this remark very clearly, he concludes:] Experience, then, is that X which extends beyond the concept A, and upon which the possibility of the synthesis of the predicate B with the concept A is founded."

We thus find that Kant does consider the very problem which Professor Paulsen says he does not consider. He does not, indeed, consider it in all its branches, but he does so quite sufficiently to show that his answer, had it been more complete, would have borne not the slightest resemblance to the absurdity which Professor Paulsen says he would have been drawn

ish Government had assumed this responsibility, it went to war with the Boers, and impaired the value of its consols one-fifth. It owes the depositors in the savings banks really more than their investments amount to, and in that department of the finances is probably insolvent, judged by the standard of private commercial morality. Doubtless consols will now rise; but what would have happened if the issue of the war had been different? What will happen if a general European war breaks out?

The author of this book has collected many facts concerning building associations, insurance, and the various methods of saving and of caring for savings. His accounts, however, are not sufficiently complete to be very satisfactory, and he does not succeed in getting a comprehensive grasp of his subject. But his aim is laudable, and this essay may lead to others of a more substantial character.

The Ethical Treatises of Berachya, Son of Rabbi Natronai Ha-nakdan; Being the Compendium and the Masref, now edited for the first time with an English translation, etc., by Hermann Gollancz, M.A., D.Lit. London: David Nutt. 1902. Pp. lvi, 362, 154.

The Improvement of the Moral Qualities. An Ethical Treatise of the Eleventh Century by Solomon Ibn Gabirol, printed from an unique Arabic MS., together with a Translation and an Essay. By Stephen S. Wise, Ph.D. Columbia University Press. 1901. Pp. 120, 47.

The awakening of the East is affecting not the living only but the dead as well. Books supposedly laid to their rest long ago, over whose dusty graves the drums and trappings of many conquests have passed, are being brought forth into a new life as immortal (through the kindly art of the printer) as any sublunar life may be. Not so many years ago such a resurrection would have seemed a pious dream, but the utterly impossible is steadily coming to pass, and these sheeted dead, often strangely and uncomfortably enough, are beginning to move in twentieth-century life. For the Muslim East its mediæval scholars and sages, so awakened, still have kinship of aspiration and habit of mind; but in Europe, for all our rigors of historical science and *pietas* towards the founders and transmitters of our thought, there is almost a Hamitic element in the exposure of the nakedness which oblivious time itself had perhaps more wisely veiled. The soaring geniused few who, by the universal within them, were kin to all the ages, may have nothing to fear; but the little men who clung and groped around them, who understood the masters so little and were yet so confident, so definite, and so particular—for them there is great pity in this awakening.

Such dismay and sore puzzlement would surely have befallen Berachya if he, like his books, had come to life again in our time. A worthy man, come of a family of Massoretic scribes and probably in youth plying that art himself, he—so Dr. Gollancz has with singular skill and acuteness reconstructed his life—must have turned early to the science of the time and translated a 'Lapidarium' of most miscellaneous stone-lore and the 'Questiones Naturales'

of Adelard of Bath—that queer dialogue between an uncle and a nephew on the respective values of eastern and western methods; both probably through the French. Later, it would seem, he took up ethical philosophy as accessible to him in Hebrew, French, and Latin. Arabic he plainly did not know; the new life which was to come from it through the families of Tibbonids and Kimhids, was only just beginning. Last of all, he, like so many of his time, wrote fables. These he managed so to dress in easy Scriptural Hebrew, barbed with Biblical allusion, that they have remained, and with them his own name, very much alive to the present time. Practically, up till now, Berachya has been Berachya of the fables. Round them has centred the burning question of his place and date. He himself has been only a name, or rather several names, and some witty Hebrew fox stories. Mr. Joseph Jacobs, after his wont, had a fantastic hypothesis that he was a certain "Benedictus le puncteur," a Jew of Oxford who was mulcted by Richard I. towards his ransom. But this hypothesis was smitten sorely by both Neubauer and Steinschneider, and now Dr. Gollancz has very fairly demonstrated that Berachya was really of Languedoc, one of the brilliant circle gathered in the twelfth century at Lunel round the Jewish Mæcenas Meshullam.

This he has done by bringing into court and publishing the present ethical treatises. For themselves, it must be confessed that these are of a phenomenal dullness. They are a rehash of sections from the great work of Saadya, the Gaon—from whom, indeed, all Jewish ethics dates and comes—in part straight, in part mingled with matter from Ibn Ezra, Bahya and Ibn Gabirol. All these he knew in the older Hebrew translations only; to the broader Arabic culture he had no access. And thus, as a link in the chain of ethics, he is frankly valueless. His line ends with him. The intellectual energy which sprang from Ibn Gabirol's 'Fons Vitæ' did not reach him, though it reached and affected Europe down to the Renaissance; he appears even to have known nothing of Halevi or Maimonides. In ethics his face was set backwards into that past which is so unintelligible to us; only by the art of his beast fables can he have part with modern men. We may therefore rejoice at Dr. Gaster's promise of an edition of them. We shall learn from it what relation, if any, Berachya had to Marie de France, and what part he played in the whole Isopet development.

In Dr. Gollancz's own work only one point seems open to criticism. That is the *obiter dictum* that the old translation, so long ascribed to Berachya himself, of Saadya's 'Amanat' was made in the East. When we consider that learned Oriental Jews wrote regularly in Arabic and that the ordinary language of the masses of Oriental Jews was Arabic, it is hardly explicable how such a translation could have there been called for. In Spain and Italy the case was different. There a Hebrew version would be required as soon as the book was known.

With Ibn Gabirol the matter stands otherwise. He would be no uneasy ghost in modern life. If his Hebrew poems, and especially the "Kether Malkuth," give him part in the devotions of the synagogue, his 'Fons Vitæ'—the authorship of which was

so long ascribed to a shadowy *Doppelgänger*, Avicbron—connects with the Muslim neo-Platonic school, and puts him in the great line of philosophical development that runs from Plato and Aristotle to our day. His influence was heavy on Duns Scotus and Giordano Bruno, and from them has passed on. But the present ethical treatise gives little suggestion of his weight as a thinker. In spite of independent flashes, it is of the old type, and evidently formed part of his more public writings as distinguished from the esoteric tractates in which his real opinions were given out. Dr. Wise does not seem to have appreciated this economy of teaching which characterized all Arabic philosophy, nor to have divided sharply enough this book from the 'Fons Vitæ.' The two have little in common; they are intended for quite different audiences. As to details, it is a pity that the Arabic text—the first edition of the original, though there have been many of the Hebrew translation—should have suffered so in printing. The diacritical points have been too often broken away, and the text would be hard to read if its vocabulary were not of a well-worn monotony. Dr. Wise, too, might have paid more attention to the vowels; they seem sometimes to be scattered in at random. Further, his translations, especially of the verses, might often be improved. Ibn Gabirol, whether sincere or insincere, was worthy of more care. Finally, the remark on the *Todtschweigen* of Ibn Gabirol will hardly hold. Berachya, though of the steadiest orthodoxy, quotes him repeatedly.

A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander. By J. B. Bury. Macmillan. One volume. 1900. Library edition; two volumes. 1902.

In the preface to his first edition, the author intimates that the work is intended not only for the general reader, but also for use as a text-book in universities and schools. He writes under the conviction that those histories which are capable of enlisting the interest of mature readers are best also for informing younger students. This perhaps would be a sound view, if it were only practical; but, at least in America, secondary teachers universally demand short, simple books; and even college instructors say that they find works of the compass of Holm and Bury too detailed for use as texts. Another opinion of the author, as to the superior usefulness of a one-volume history, must have been modified somewhat by experience, else we should not now have his far more attractive "library edition" in two volumes. The new edition omits the cuts, but retains the maps and plans. Of the few changes in the text, the most important is that which notices the progress of the Cretan excavations. "The other chief additions are a fuller account of the diplomatic transactions between the peace of Nicias and the first battle of Mantinea, a short biographical notice of Herodotus, and a clearer statement regarding the character of Thucydides as an historian." It is difficult to understand why the author ended with the death of Alexander; the broad view of Greek history now prevalent ought to have influenced him to continue the work to the beginning of the period covered by his 'Later Roman Empire.'

Mr. Bury is favorably known to classical scholars by his edition of Pindar, and to students of modern history as the editor of the "Foreign Statesmen" series. His 'History of the Later Roman Empire' is a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the neglected period which it treats, and his 'Student's Roman Empire,' though scarcely more than a compilation, has served a good purpose in bringing to the English reader the views of Mommsen as to the early imperial Constitution. The breadth of the field in which Mr. Bury works, however, prevents him from being a specialist in anything. It is true that he brings to the preparation of the present history not only his long experience as a writer and editor, but also the broad, sympathetic knowledge of Grecian literature rarely found except in the professor of Greek, and a good acquaintance with the best modern authorities in his field. Yet he is wanting in that mastery of the material which distinguishes Busolt, Holm, and others who have devoted their lives to this one subject. In everything excepting literary form and expression he lacks originality. In his treatment of Athens the influence of Wilamowitz-Möllerndorff appears on nearly every page, but the greater part of his work seems to be drawn from Busolt's exhaustive history. He goes so far as to take credit for suggestions offered years ago by Busolt. For instance, in volume II., p. 474, the suggestion as to the original application of *pentakostomedimni* was made in 1891 by Busolt (Philol., I, p. 396), and repeated in his history (II., p. 182, n. 3). In such cases Mr. Bury's memory is doubtless at fault. It is a question, on the other hand, whether the kind of work he does is just toward the original investigators. After the Germans, with infinite toil, have advanced historical science in a given field, is it fair that an English writer, competent to handle every subject in the ancient or modern world with equal brilliancy and success, should leisurely reap the fruit of all their labor? In the instance before us, it is highly probable that, had the works of Busolt and Wilamowitz-Möllerndorff been translated into English, Mr. Bury would never have attempted a history of Greece. But the fault is not his alone; the custom of preying upon German scholarship is so general that we have become hardened to the injustice of it.

Mr. Bury's work has enabled the English reader to think the thoughts of the most advanced German specialists in the field of Grecian history. For instance, he does ample justice to the merits of Herodotus; he calls attention to the partisan attitude of Thucydides toward the leaders of the Athenian democracy; and he appreciates the part taken by Themistocles in the making of Athens. Had he followed the principles of historical inquiry more strictly, he might even have acquitted the great Athenian statesman of the charge of bribery, as Eduard Meyer has done. Following Köhler, Mr. Bury dares in one case to prefer the authority of Aristotle ('Constitution of Athens') to that of Thucydides. To scholars of like mind with Mr. Evelyn Abbott, this judgment will doubtless appear sacrilegious. These conservatives will find our author heretical on so many other subjects that we may expect to see them putting their ban upon his work and denouncing him as no true historian of Greece.

In the early part of the work Mr. Bury shows little evidence of dependence on German scholarship, but leans rather upon those English archaeologists who are directly interested in the Cretan excavations. An archaeologist, it is to be noted, is as a rule an untrustworthy historian. In the historical interpretation of his "finds" he indulges in the most fanciful speculations; two or three facts furnish him with material for a whole chapter of "history." Taking his clue from the English archaeologists, Mr. Bury attempts to follow in minute detail the fortunes of the Pelasgians, Achæans, and many other races through the third and second millennia B. C. Nearly all that he says about primitive Greece might possibly be true; it is easy, however, to imagine a hundred other ways in which the movements and the development of the primitive races might have taken place. Had these speculations appeared in a paper rather than been prefixed to a history, whatever value they may have would not thereby have been diminished, and the public could more quietly await the judgment of the sober historian as to the bearings of the recent discoveries.

The weakness of this first chapter is not confined to the interpretation of archaeological material, but in various respects the treatment is unscientific. The founders of cities whom we have long regarded as legendary, Mr. Bury considers historical. In his view, Ilios was named after "King Ilios, who perhaps was its founder." Similarly, he supposes that whenever two cities of Greece are found with the same name, one must be a colony of the other. The truth is, that identity of name does not of itself prove connection of any kind. His reasoning, too, from later to earlier conditions is often faulty. "The Javones," he says, "were a people who had settled on the coasts of Argolis and Attica, but there the name fell out of use, and perhaps passed out of memory, until on Asiatic soil it attained celebrity." There is in fact no historical hint that those early people of Argolis and Attica called themselves Javones; it is nothing more than a possibility. But history is something more than a chain of possibilities; and if we are to have a history of early Greece, it must be based on a more scientific method than is to be found in the present work.

As a whole, Mr. Bury's history answers to a need which could have been better supplied by the translation of certain German works into English, but this limited value can hardly be more than transient.

The Alps in 1864: A Private Journal by A. W. Moore, edited by Alex. B. W. Kennedy, F.R.S. Edinburgh: David Douglas. 1902. 8vo.

Moore's Journal has long been one of the most sought of the rarities of Alpine literature. It was written for the author's own amusement, privately printed for the pleasure of his friends, and is now offered to the public, fifteen years after Moore's death. Moore was a remarkable man, about whom the world knew nothing. For many years he was the soul of the India Office, where he came to occupy a high position. He was Lord Randolph Churchill's confidential assistant. He was a silent official who exercised great influence over his chiefs. All who knew his

work agreed that he was the beau-ideal of a civil servant. He died of overwork. This book is his only monument, except the warm remembrances of his friends. The Alpine Club was largely made by him. He was its organizing mind at a critical period. Moore took part, and a very important part, in many of the first ascents described in Whymper's 'Scrambles.' Whymper described them picturesquely; Moore's descriptions are written with all the accuracy and clearness of an official dispatch. If there are books that can be described as Alpine classics, Moore's book should stand high, perhaps at the head of the list. It would be impossible to write such a book on the Alps now. The freshness is gone from the climbers' hearts; the Alps have become *vueux jeu*. Hence the possible permanent value of this book. It may live long after those who knew the author and admired or loved him have all passed away.

The new edition is well printed, carefully edited, and beautifully illustrated with choice heliogravure reproductions of photographs by the editor and other well-known Alpine specialists.

BOOKS OF THE WEEK.

Adams, F. P. In Cupid's Court. Evanston (Ill.): William S. Lord.
Benton, C. E. As Seen from the Ranks. G. P. Putnam's Sons.
Black, B. N. Primer. Syracuse: C. W. Bardeen.
Beylié, L. de. L'Habitation Byzantine. Paris: Ernest Leroux.
"Chaufeur." Two Thousand Miles on an Automobile. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co. \$2.
Cherterton, G. K. The Defendant. London: R. Brimley Johnson; New York: Dodd, Mead & Co.
Clark, Kate U. Up the Witch Brook Road. J. F. Taylor & Co. \$1.50.
Conrad, Joseph. Typhoon. G. P. Putnam's Sons.
Corelli, Marie. "Temporal Power." Dodd, Mead & Co. \$1.50.
Craddock, C. E. The Champion. Houghton, Mifflin & Co.
Crane, Elizabeth G. The Imperial Republic. The Grafton Press.
Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago: (1) Starr, Frederick. Physical Characters of Indians of Southern Mexico; (2) Klenze, Camillo von. The Treatment of Nature in the Works of Nikolaus Lenau. Chicago: The University Press.
Glasgow, Ellen. The Voice of the People. Doubleday, Page & Co. \$1.50.
Hall, J. L. Judith, Phoenix, and Other Anglo-Saxon Poems. Silver, Burdett & Co. 75 cents.
Hall, Ruth. A Downreiter's Son. Houghton, Mifflin & Co.
Higgins, Elizabeth. Out of the West. Harpers. \$1.50.
Industrial Conciliation: Report of the Proceedings of the Conference Held under the Auspices of the National Civic Federation. G. P. Putnam's Sons.
Joyce, J. A. Brickbats and Bouquets. F. Tennyson Neely.
Kauffman, R. W. The Things that are Caesar's. D. Appleton & Co.
Lawton, W. C. Introduction to the Study of American Literature. Globe School Book Co. \$1.
Matthews, Brander. Aspects of Fiction. New ed. Scribners. \$1.25.
Merriman, H. S. The Vultures. Harpers. \$1.50.
Metcalfe, Cranston. Fame for a Woman. G. P. Putnam's Sons.
Mollna, Julia W. Mingled Sweets and Bitters. Abbey Press. \$1.50.
Naylor, J. B. In the Days of St. Clair. The Saalfield Pub. Co. \$1.50.
Patterson, Ada, and Bateman, Victory. By the Stage Door. The Grafton Press. \$1.50.
Prungst, Arthur. A German Buddhist. London: Luzac & Co. 2s.
Pidgin, C. F. The Climax. Boston: C. M. Clark Pub. Co.
Price, Lillian L. Wandering Heroes. Silver, Burdett & Co. 50 cents.
Riley, I. W. The Founder of Mormonism. Dodd, Mead & Co. \$1.50.
Sabin, E. L. The Magic Mashie, and Other Gollish Stories. A. Wessels Co. \$1.
Sadler, M. E. Special Reports on Educational Subjects. Vols. 10 and 11: Education in the United States of America. London: Wyman & Sons.
Sayre, T. B. Tom Moore. Frederick A. Stokes Co. \$1.50.
Scudder, Vida D. Introduction to the Study of English Literature. Globe School Book Co. \$1.20.
Super, O. E. "Phiers" La Campagne de Waterloo. Silver, Burdett & Co. 40 cents.
Supino, J. B. Fra Angelico. Florence: Allinari Bros.; New York: Lemcke & Buechner.
The Complete Works of Edgar Allan Poe. (Virginia Edition.) Edited by James A. Harrison. 17 vols. T. Y. Crowell & Co.
Villari, Luigi. Italian Life in Town and Country. G. P. Putnam's Sons.
Wyatt, Lucy M. L. Constance Hamilton. Abbey Press. 50 cents.