

tion as a whole is represented in reality by the Chief Executive, not by Congress. It falls to him to impose upon provincial leaders the power of national opinion. By virtue of his office, and of his practically direct election thereto, he alone is the recognized Attorney of the People.

It is true that the framers of the Constitution foresaw divergent local interests that would conflict in the arena of Federal legislation. But they had been mindful of the equality of the States in assigning two Senators to each and every commonwealth. And a lower house, constituted upon the basis of population, was supposed to guarantee directly an adequate reflection of popular sentiment. The Fathers did not, in all probability, enter very deeply into the philosophic distinction between the delegate and the representative, between the man who simply counted numerically as the index of local sentiment, and the man who undertook the responsibility of determining what was for the interest of his constituents. But having secured, as they supposed, a Federal Legislature, they seem to have had no misgivings that it might degenerate into an essentially non-representative body.

There never have failed to be clashings of petty local interests in Congress. But the issues of the Civil War and the subsequent problems of reconstruction had a solidifying effect that erased most regional differences. In 1861 the M. C. was for the Union and the war, or was a "copperhead." Up to 1876 the reconstruction acts and the war amendments to the Constitution kept party affiliations intact. With the subsidence of these issues, a new set of interests began to manifest themselves. These were essentially pecuniary, not political. But as they were to be served by the control of the tax machinery, these interests found it convenient to mask, so long as they could, in partisan disguises.

It is true that, on a relatively small scale, national economy, and sometimes even national solvency, had been endangered by what Congressmen now regard as the rather primitive process of "log-rolling." Localities have been able in the past to secure costly public buildings and disbursements for harbors and rivers by an alliance of representatives who conspired to promote their mutual inroads on the Treasury. But the growth of the Speaker's power converted this

individualistic system of coöperative robbery into a method of collective "conversion" (as the wise call it), which required the party sanction. The real trellis-work upon which the parasitic form of degenerate legislation has climbed is found in the rules of the Senate. The right of unlimited debate means, at the limit, the right of individual veto of legislation. Of course, this right has to be exercised under such limitations as may be imposed by human capacity to keep talking. There is the equally efficacious check of not offending opponents overmuch. But in the last resort, as Senator Tillman has demonstrated, a determined, persistent, and aggressive individual Senator can foist an appropriation upon a general bill by simply holding up supplies for the entire government.

It is this situation which makes the tariff legislation of the United States to all intents and purposes a treaty between the great industrial interests whose ambassadors, under the title of Senators, raise or lower rates of duty in contemptuous disregard of the interests of the entire body of consumers. Senator Lodge has even declared the consumer to be only "a myth." At all events, the consumer's influence upon the great schedules of taxation is purely mythical. The Senate rules are practically those of international law. The equal sovereignty of all nations, *alias* Senators, is the cornerstone of all peaceful negotiation.

A pertinent illustration is furnished in Senator Bulkeley's recent intervention in tariff-making, not in his capacity as Senator from Connecticut, but as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the tobacco-growers. The action of the Concert of the Powers in Crete, for example, is not different in kind, but is presumably more laudable in character and intent, than the Bismarckian way in which Baron Aldrich is seeking to secure the maximum benefit for the protected interests. With a tariff policy such as we have long pursued, this perversion of the essential character of Congress is inevitable. It will not be until the people as a whole recognize the unmistakable usurpation of Constitutional function for sordid interests, that we can expect to recover a national Legislature imbued with real concern for national interests.

THE REAL STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

English opinion, it is reported, looks upon the meeting between Kaiser and Czar with equanimity. England nowadays is so disinclined to look upon anything with equanimity that her refusal to shape a new scare out of the periodical meeting between the two Emperors, may be taken as a sign of returning common sense in Albion. It would have been so easy to show how the interview in the Gulf of Finland was another staggering heart-blow at the Empire; how William II's purpose was to win Russia away from her friendly understanding with Great Britain; how Russia would be incited to antagonize British interests in Persia and persuaded to join hands with Japan against her present ally; how the dominions beyond the seas would thus be put in mortal peril as a preparation for Armageddon in the North Sea; how anything and everything else a nation's panic fostered by a yellow press can render conceivable, is bound to come. But instead the English nation has chosen to believe that the Imperial interview will actually assure the peace of Europe. The ruin of the Empire is perceptibly no nearer than it was on the afternoon before the interview, though, of course, it is much more imminent than before Lord Rosebery and Mr. Balfour delivered their speeches at the Imperial Press Conference. After all, it is possible that Parliament will close and Englishmen will enter the grouse season in a fairly composed state of mind.

Throughout her present sharp attack of nerves, nothing has been more striking than Great Britain's omission to find encouragement in any reserves of moral strength she might honestly claim to possess. She has weighed her chances against Germany's in terms exclusively of reeking tube and iron shard. When men have predicted the dismemberment of the Empire and the destruction of London by a German army corps, it seemingly has occurred to no one to inquire whether the British Empire and the German Empire do not embody certain diverse ideals which might have some influence in throwing victory to one side or the other. Moral issues, we admit, have no interest for the experts who balance broadside against broadside and battalion against battalion, and love to forecast the fate of battles by

the narrowest of arithmetical margins. Yet it is these same experts who, after the event, explain away their sad miscalculations by that despised moral factor. It was the superior moral weight of the Japanese cause that, by common confession, contributed as much as anything to the defeat of Russia. It was the moral superiority of the Boer cause that gave it two years of victory against tremendous odds. It may have been the needle gun and Moltke's genius that brought about the downfall of France, but Germany's moral right to make herself into a united nation played a sufficiently important part. Men and guns are not everything if they are arrayed against the trend of civilization and the spirit of the age.

When the British fire-eaters picture Germany as pouncing upon the Empire and seizing it for herself, it is pertinent to ask whether Germany's strength is such as to make her a fit ruler of dependencies. We may go further and ask if even that fear of a great Germanic empire in all Europe, can be anything but an empty fear. To exaggerate the power of the German army is only to indicate the limitations of German expansion. Prussian militarism may be justified in the eyes of most Germans today by the unity, the prestige, and the assurance of peace it has brought them. To the extent that the Prussian army has worked towards such ends, it has been a moral agent. But Prussian militarism will not retain its effectiveness when it sets out to conquer and keep down foreign nationalities. By so much as the Prussian element in the Hohenzollern dominions dwindles to a minority, by so much will it become more difficult to maintain a Hohenzollern empire that shall be at the same time a great hive of industry and an armed camp. All over Europe and the world the current runs away from war-lord and autocracy to democracy and self-government, and Hohenzollern ideals cannot in the end make head against it.

English rule, with all that can be cited against it in India and Egypt, still carries with it the fundamental principle of democracy. England is still the mother of parliaments and the inspiration for oppressed nationalities. Her Empire is mainly based on self-government; and even in India, where the problem is so immensely difficult, the English instinct for progress with pru-

dence is now manifesting itself. Would it be foolhardy in an English statesman to declare that until Germany had thoroughly learned the lesson of democracy and the supremacy of the civil over the military authority, the British Empire has, in the long run, nothing to fear? It is hard to imagine Canada, Australia, or South Africa overrun by German troops. But even if we imagine the conquest as effected, it is quite impossible to think of Germany ruling these colonies. The process of sergeant's drill is not the right preparation for world-empire. The spirit of German government and administration must grow more supple and more modern before the war-lord can look toward domination over non-Germanic Europe, or dominions beyond the seas.

Not all the moral weight is on the side of Great Britain. The German nation has discipline, loyalty, laboriousness, enterprise, and method. British statesmen have conceded the Germans the palm for efficiency. Germany has no such internal sores as England's pauperism to weaken her. Her laborers work harder and fare worse than the English, but they have a greater assurance of immunity from starvation, or the poorhouse, in their old age. We may enumerate every fine quality that has contributed to Germany's leading place among the nations, and yet question whether expansion along undemocratic lines can go much further than it has gone with her.

THE TASK OF PRESIDENT ANGELL'S SUCCESSOR.

A recent visitor to the United States is reported as remarking that we Americans are no less excited over the choice of a president for one of our universities than over that of the President for the nation. The election of President Eliot's successor, which occasioned the remark, is safely over. President Angell's successor is still to be appointed—another appointment involving much more than local interest. Indeed, it is scarcely too much to say that in educational importance—which with us almost spells national importance—this choice is second only to that of the president of Harvard. In each case, the new president takes direction of a university grown great under his predecessor; in each case his problem is, not to destroy, or even to recast, but to restrain

the excesses and to develop the strength of a valuable type of education. The incoming administration at Harvard promises changes of this progressive kind: the encouragement of scholarship by outward as well as inward sanctions, and the more philosophic control of the elective system. The successor of President Angell will have a task of great delicacy if he is to do likewise for the fine type of education represented by the State universities of the West.

Under President Angell, the University of Michigan grew, as it were, to manhood. And as a young man "feels his life in every limb," without as yet feeling the need of conscious control from the centres of brain and heart and will, so this university has come to live a life instinctive and peripheral rather than deliberate and central. There is room for doubt as to how far power should be concentrated in the hands of a university president; there can be no doubt that actual conditions at Ann Arbor call for change. Power has slipped from the president's hands, upward into the hands of the regents, sideways or downward into the hands of the deans. The regents have come to interfere in faculty appointments, promotions, and dismissals, and in the regulation of student activities; the deans, each intrenched in his own school or "department," have grown to be virtually autonomous. At the faculty meetings of schools other than the college proper—the "literary department"—the president has been of late not so much a controlling force as an honored guest.

The presidency has thus shrunk to the Headship of the College. Other "departments" of the university, each under its dean, have been walled off, each in its corner of the campus. The whole has been subject to irresponsible interference from without. This system has not been altogether justified of its children. Upon the wire-pulling, the "seeing" of high personages, the undignified procedure of university politics, in some cases barely stopping short of scandal, it is better not to enlarge. More important educationally is the fact that this system has compelled the university to leave unused much of the spontaneous energy of its teachers. More than one scholar, for instance, whose appointment has happened to land him in a "department" where only preparatory drill-work is done in his subject, has