

ed in the thought that they would prove embarrassing to Mr. Wilson, but he made of the difficulty a triumph. His answers would alone stamp him as a man of uncommon force and courage. Without a single quibble or once hedging, he went directly to the point in each instance; while the questions that were expected to be peculiarly awkward for him, he utilized for the expression of some of the soundest political doctrine that has been heard in many a day.

Nineteen questions were asked. To those to which a direct "yes," or a blunt "no," could be given, Mr. Wilson replied with those monosyllables. This is as delightful as it is unheard of in a public man. Without ifs or buts, or a glittering "as it may appear best," Mr. Wilson was as sharp and precise as a business man answering a correspondent. "Do you think that the Public Utilities Commission should have full power to fix just and reasonable rates?" "Yes." "Should United States Senators be elected by popular vote?" "Yes." "Does the Democratic platform declare for the choice of candidates for all elective offices by the direct vote system?" "I so understand it. If it does not, I do." "Will you call upon candidates for the Legislature to pledge themselves in writing in favor of the reforms you favor?" "I will not. That is the function of the voters."

These examples of Wilson's refreshing frankness are fine, but the finest remains. He was artfully questioned about certain Democratic bosses—Smith, Nugent, and Davis. The possible control of Wilson by these men has been bruited abroad by the Republicans, and is really their last despairing argument. But Wilson met the questions without the slightest suspicion of dodging, and couched his replies in plain and unmistakable words. The Democratic bosses, he said, "are not and cannot be in control of the government of the State if the present Democratic ticket is elected." Would he not consult with those men? Wilson's reply was that he should welcome advice and suggestions from any citizen, but he should not "submit to the dictation of any person or persons, special interest or organization." He added, in words that are in themselves half-battles: "I should deem myself forever disgraced should I in even the slightest degree coöperate in any such system or any such transac-

tions as you describe in your characterization of the 'boss' system."

It is the simple truth to say that the New Jersey campaign has revealed, not only to that State, but to the whole country, a first-class political leader. Woodrow Wilson has again reminded us of our unsuspected and undeveloped resources of statesmanship. Of course, Mr. Wilson is no accident. What he is now giving out with such impressive power is the product of long and close thinking. He is not a university man suddenly taking to politics; he is, rather, a man of great political capacity who has happened to engage in university work. But his emergence into public life and the high level of character and the inspiring discussion which he has exhibited there are cause for congratulation, and for fresh courage, on the part of the entire nation.

CRIME AND THE LAW.

The contrast presented by the swift, decent, and orderly process of the English criminal law in the Crippen case, as compared with what we are accustomed to in similar trials in this country, has aroused general attention. Of unfavorable comment on the English procedure we doubt whether there has been a single word. Everywhere it has been recognized that there is not the slightest ground for supposing that the right of the accused to a fair trial was in any respect abridged. Nobody imagines that he is being "railroaded" to the scaffold. The speedy acquittal of Ethel Le Neve, charged with being his accomplice, only served to emphasize the moral of his prompt conviction. Even the motion for an appeal, which has now been made, tells the same kind of story. Appeals in criminal cases are a new feature in English jurisprudence; but, judging from the report concerning this one, there is no inclination there to make of them that clog upon the wheels of justice which they have so widely proved to be in this country. It is possible, say the dispatches, that the hearing of the appeal may cause a postponement of the date of the execution—which had been set for November 8, hardly three weeks from the day of the impanelling of the jury!

Now, the reason we all feel so impressed with the propriety and the soundness of this mode of dealing with a case like Crippen's is that it truly cor-

responds to the realities of the case. Everybody knows that all the real light that can be thrown upon such a question can be thrown upon it in a very limited time; that days spent in prolonging the trial would be spent not in making it more probable that the final result was in accordance with the truth, but only in affording exercise for legal ingenuity and in furnishing to the public a subject of morbid and demoralizing interest. Nor is that all. If there is anything at all in the deterrent efficacy of legal punishment, prompt and impressive disposal of criminal cases—in so far as it is compatible with the ascertainment of the truth—is of the essence of the matter. Of every hundred men who, reading of the Crippen case in England, had borne in upon them the solemn and terrible connection between crime and punishment, scarcely one would have been impressed in that way if the result had been merely the final outcome of a long-drawn-out trial of skill between prosecution and defence. It is upon the instinctive feelings of men, not upon a mere cold-blooded calculation of chances, that the impression must be made. A brutal murderer like Crippen sternly and decently disposed of in four days, a swindling promoter like Whitaker Wright swiftly tried and sentenced—these are the things that sink deep into men's minds, and erect in the hearts of the weak and vicious a barrier against their base or criminal impulses.

There is, indeed, nowadays, a more or less firmly held conviction in the minds of many who have devoted their lives to the cause of prison reform, that legal punishment is not a deterrent of crime at all. In the current issue of one of our high-class magazines, the sweeping statement is made that "students of criminology are unanimously agreed that punishment is not a deterrent." That this is a gross overstatement, we need hardly insist; of course, no such unqualified opinion is held "unanimously" by students of criminology. In the abstracts of the papers presented by very advanced criminologists at the recent International Prison Congress at Washington, the idea of deterrence as one of the objects of the penal law is admitted again and again. But what we assert is that, even in the case of those who deny it in form, the idea is admitted in fact, in a score of ways. In the parole system, in the working of "golden-rule" methods under

Chief Kohler—in any of the hundred confrontations of humanitarian theory with the immediate demands of things as they are—the idea of punishment as a deterrent is constantly, though perhaps only tacitly, admitted.

As for the supposed inductive basis of the doctrine, it is astonishing how often the same—and a most inconclusive—argument is used in its support. "It is susceptible of very easy proof," says the magazine from which we have already quoted, "that in countries where and in days when penalties for crime are most severe and are most dramatically executed, then and there crimes most abound. When England, little more than a century ago, punished 125 crimes with death, English was a hundred times as criminal as it is to-day." That this argument, as a basis for the general doctrine that "punishment is not a deterrent," is soaked through with fallacy, is obvious. In the first place, it is one thing to prove that there is no efficacy in punishment so savage and indiscriminating as to lose all moral sanction and to brutalize the population familiarized with it; it is quite another to prove that a penal system tempered by humanity and guided by earnest study is likewise futile. And, secondly, there have taken place in England other changes besides those in the penal law—among them, not only general education and sanitation, but also effective policing everywhere, and abundant illumination of city streets, which a hundred years ago were pitch dark. Most grateful must we be for the work of those who have forced the world to recognize the possibilities of reformation and humane treatment; but neither must we lose sight of the fundamental truth which, in spite of all the abuses of the past or present, underlies the whole system of penal justice.

THE TEACHING OF GREEK.

The announcement that no prize was given this year at Yale for the best entrance examination in Greek because none of the papers came up to the required standard, might mean only that this is an off-year. But with the position of Greek fairly unstable of late in our educational system, every sign is scrutinized for its cumulative effect. An even more striking symptom was the recent recommendation of the highest advisory council at Oxford that Greek should be

made optional in the work leading to the B.A. degree. Fortunately, a recommendation of this sort, before becoming effective, must be approved by a large percentage of Oxford graduates, who, we believe, are not ready to cleave asunder long-standing traditions.

Now, it is no secret that in this country the teachers of Greek have partly brought upon themselves the attacks which are proving so troublesome. There is a time to dance, there is a time to laugh, and there is a time to settle "hoti's business." But to give too much time to the last was clearly unwise. Yet grubbing for roots became so perpetual a process that it has taken years of hostile criticism to make any alteration. Not that the consideration of parts of speech is in itself an unworthy employment. Browning's Grammarian "was a man born with thy face and throat, lyric Apollo." That, no doubt, was a time when the discovery of roots meant the winning of new means to search a wonderful, forgotten world; knowledge of language was to bring knowledge of life and of "the glory that was Greece." Yet even to-day he who can look down the long vistas of word development, watching the color of meaning come and go and subtly change, may still feel many a thrill of wonder. The fault lies not in linguistic investigation itself, but in its usurpation of the whole field, and in the transfer of the so-called scientific methods of philology to the study of literature. When the study of literature is made a mere subsidiary to philology, it becomes by definition divorced from life, which is nothing of the sort. The excuse for such error in modern times is the less because of the melancholy examples furnished by the ancient grammarians of Greece. Those who have sought amid their futile work for the gems of lyric poetry, there embedded and employed solely as instances of metrical or grammatical usage, might, it should seem, have learned their lessons. At least, they have learned it none too well; and many a student alert for stimulating ideas has been repelled and shocked to find the leading scholars of the country still wrestling with the enclitic *de*, when they are supposed to be teaching Plato or Sophocles. The elements of the language should obviously be taught in the secondary schools and matters of higher import in college.

Of late—very lately—there has been

some improvement. And here is one instance, at any rate, where the elective system has largely availed. The great majority of undergraduates, if uncom-pelled, were not going to take Greek under the old conditions. Finally, the shrinkage in numbers, especially in the ranks of really interesting fellows, gave instructors serious pause, and reaction set in. To-day, you may hear professors, with the most severe previous records, talking jauntily about Pindar and Greek athletics. The release from the old bondage has begun; and however humorous at times is the change, for every chain broken there will be much gratitude and probably an increase of attending students. For it ought not to be difficult to interest men in this rich past. In the whole range of human expression Greek language and literature show great qualities which have been unsurpassed elsewhere—above all, infinite adaptability coupled with an unfailing freshness of approach. Some educators, we know, disgusted by features of modern systems, have believed the wisest preparation for present needs to be solely an immersion in the Greek life of the past. Extreme though this view may be, there is a modicum of truth in it.

In some colleges where reform has recently begun in teaching Greek, there has been an embarrassing scramble to import exceptional men. The fact is recognized that the ideal instructor of Greek should be acquainted with pretty much everything else. Such has been the influence of Greece and so numerous are the chances for stirring comparisons. Indeed, it has been found almost necessary to approach ancient times by the less remote, Greek tragedy by Shakespeare, for instance. If amid all its strangeness of expression and of stage device, "Oedipus" can be shown to contain much the same human problem as "Lear," a student will explore the older drama often with the real excitement of discovery. The Greek lyric, too, though expressed in its peculiar outward forms, becomes tremendously vital if seen to manipulate virtually all the themes which have occupied lyric poetry since. And to study Aristotle without observing the manner and times of his influence—the fusion of his ethics and logic all through the Middle Ages with the doctrines of the Christian Church; his theory of poetry and fine art accepted as the final author-