

WHIGS AND PITTITES.

Lord Chatham and the Whig Opposition. By D. A. Winstanley. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. \$2.95.

This is a work of great merit, revealing care and thought on every page, and is probably the best account that has been written of a very chaotic and hence very difficult period. Since the appearance of von Ruville's *Life of William Pitt*, English scholars have turned eagerly to the old problem of interpreting the politics of the first half of the reign of George III. They have been inspired either by the hope of refuting von Ruville's aspersions on the character of that popular hero, William Pitt, or else by the scholarly results of the German savant's methods. The problem of Pitt had already engrossed the attention of Dr. Winstanley before the appearance of von Ruville's volumes; but he shows in the above work the German's influence by a more painstaking examination of the archival material and a greater care in the weighing of evidence. There is no indication of his intentional desire to take issue with von Ruville, although he by no means follows the latter's interpretations.

The theme of the book is politics; and no previous writer has shown an equal understanding of the "men and measures" of the period. Mr. Winstanley has made a careful study of the personality and the politics of each individual, so that he is able to give in brief pen-pictures the portraits of those politicians who have made the reign of George III so notorious. Here we find an excellent likeness of the Duke of Newcastle, with a rather more prepossessing countenance than is usually drawn. In spite of his many mannerisms and his suspicions, the old Duke was learned in the game of politics and his advice better than that of the younger men, like the Marquis of Rockingham, who were so eager to slip the mantle from his shoulders. The picture of Lord North is not less well drawn. His imperturbable good nature and his keen sense of humor made him a foe against whom the darts of sarcasm and invective were ineffective.

In spite of the title of the volume, we do not see so much of Chatham as might be expected. Naturally enough, the greater part of the book is filled with an account of the Chatham-Grafton Ministry, at which time the former was at home nursing his mysterious gout, the details of which Mr. Winstanley spares us. But Chatham is not left out of the picture, and the author brings him forward at the proper periods and displays him in all his majesty. Chatham is a favorite of Mr. Winstanley's, and he shows him off to the fullest advantage, although he is no blind worshipper of the inspired statesman.

The keystone of Mr. Winstanley's interpretations of the politics of the era lies in the conflict of two opposing theories of government: the one favored by the court was that of Bolingbroke, which disapproved of political parties; that maintained by the

"Whig Opposition" was that party government was inevitable and salutary. George III believed that in Chatham he had found the ideal man to make Bolingbroke's theory a reality. Men were to be chosen by the Prime Minister, not for their party affiliations but for their fitness to govern. Mr. Winstanley shows how this plan completely broke down through the failure to persuade men to leave their political connections, through the sickness of Chatham and the weakness of Grafton, until under Lord North the King became the real master and the Whig party was broken.

The volume is so good that it is a pity that it is not perfect; but there is one fundamental error in Mr. Winstanley's interpretation for which the reader has to make many readjustments. Like so many English historians, he is infatuated with the name of Whig and reads back into the eighteenth century conditions which prevailed only after the death of George III. To him Whig generally means that faction which was formerly led by the Duke of Newcastle and Lord Hardwicke, but which, during the period under review, looked to the Marquis of Rockingham as its leader, and to Edmund Burke as its spokesman. He knows that there were other Whig groups, such as the Bedfordites, the Grenvillites, and the Pittites, and even Whigs among the court faction, but the fact that there are these other Whig groups has not led him, any more than it has other distinguished English historians, to modify his interpretation. For Mr. Winstanley the "Old Whigs" stand for the Whig party.

If Mr. Winstanley had considered more carefully the later history of this group of men, he would not have fallen into this error. They were those who made that "unhallowed alliance" with Lord North against Lord Shelburne; they formed the faction which divided at the period of the French Revolution, one group, the most weighty, showing their real colors by joining to form the new Tory party, the other becoming the centre of the new Whig party.

The period which Mr. Winstanley covers was one when there were no parties, only factions, which grouped themselves generally according to self-interest. Most of the groups were incompetent and self-seeking. Their leadership was in the hands of "standpatters," and that particular faction of the Old Whigs was of the most conservative character. Their philosophy was based upon the principle of *laissez faire*, and with Burke they gazed in awe upon the machinery of that "best of all constitutions" and would not mar its perfections by laying unhallowed hands upon it. It was this fundamental principle of theirs which prevented Lord Chatham from joining with them—and why he did not is a mystery to all Whig historians, including Mr. Winstanley. Lord Chatham and his following were most pronounced progressives, who believed that the Government should cure the evils existing in society. They would extend the suffrage; they would overhaul the civil service. They were expansionists; they advocated governmental control of East

India and the development of the colonial possessions in the west of America. Thus the fundamental principles of the Pittites and the Old Whigs were irreconcilable, and they wouldn't unite. When they did, in 1782, it was only for a moment, and then they separated to renew their struggle.

If Mr. Winstanley had grasped this fundamental difference between the Pittites and the Old Whigs, he would probably have reached other interpretations of some events. When the Rockingham Ministry came into power in 1765, they tried very hard to induce Pitt to join them, but he said then, as always, that "measures not men" were what he considered; and during the whole of their brief period of power the Old Whigs never exhibited an interest in a broad progressive policy. They even nullified their repeal of the Stamp Act by passing the Declaratory Act, which was so contrary to the opinion of Pitt. When, in 1766, Pitt (or Lord Chatham) came into power, he persuaded individuals of the Old Whig faction to remain in his Ministry; but they soon left it, because, as they alleged, the Minister removed Lord Edgcombe from office; but before that was done, Alderman Beckford had announced what the new Minister's policy in East India was to be, and the Old Whigs showed by their opposition to the later measures introduced by the Ministry that they never could have stood on the same political platform with Lord Chatham. Did the Old Whigs use the removal of Lord Edgcombe as an excuse to leave a Ministry whose measures they could not support? Mr. Winstanley does not see the necessity even of asking this question; nor, because he identifies the Old Whigs with the Whig party which developed later, is he able to explain why Chatham turned always to the Duke of Bedford in his negotiations to gain additional strength for the Ministry rather than to the Marquis of Rockingham, even when the King expressed his preference for the latter.

THE NOBLE LECTURES ON DANTE.

The Spiritual Message of Dante. By the Rt. Rev. W. Boyd Carpenter. Harvard University Press. \$1.50.

The six lectures contained in this volume are those delivered at Harvard in 1913 on the William Belden Noble foundation. Their purpose is primarily religious. "They are not intended as a contribution to the critical study of the *Divina Commedia*," the Preface states; "they are simply thoughts on religious experience as exemplified in Dante's poem."

The spiritual message of the "Comedy" is so clear and so compelling that it must remain deeply impressive in any faithful report, and it is impressive, indeed, in these lectures, which are enthusiastic as well as faithful. They are good in their exposition of the nature of sin as Dante conceived it; they are excellent in their insistence on the energetic quality of the divine love. Plain Dantesque truths are often plainly and effectively restated: "for ordinary mortals

the very sight of evil is bad, and may end in a paralyzed conscience"; "the readiness to bear the penalty becomes a remedial power"; "righteousness is as the salt of love, to preserve it from corruption"; "the power of evil is in the spiritual enfeeblement which results from evil indulged in."

The impressiveness of the lectures is, however, seriously impaired by their sentimentality. Human love is a fond theme with Bishop Carpenter; he treats phase after phase of it with zeal and zest, even to the rehabilitation of Rahab. Eight pages are spent in drawing and defending a wholly imaginary picture of the maternal love that Dante supposedly enjoyed in his childhood—this argument, among others, being offered in the defence: there is a story that before Dante's birth his mother dreamed that her offspring was a peacock; such stories do not circulate round an unwelcome child; *ergo*, etc. The Paolo and Francesca legend is set forth, like a favorite *novella*, in sweet phrasing and in full detail; the ugly historical facts are briefly told; and we are then bidden to forget the facts and remember the "pathetic romance" on the ground that the legend is what appealed to Dante!

Scarcely less unfortunate is the haphazard composition of the lectures. The Preface offers an apology: the book must represent the lectures as they were given, and they were not written out before they were given. But if the book was to represent the lectures as given, they should have been given in a form ready for publication. Dante held that the proper utterance of his supreme message required the most exquisite formal care. He who would report that message as Dante would have it reported should be systematic in plan, appropriate in detail, choice in imagery, and measured in diction. Bishop Carpenter's pages are repetitious in the extreme; certain ideas and groups of ideas are forced upon the reader with such frequency that resentment tends to cancel acquiescence. Irrelevant digressions and *exempla* abound, particularly in the first two lectures. The cold hands of William Pitt, Masson's portrait of Shakespeare, the disinterment of Rossetti's poems, the misfortunes of Jim Bowker, the "exercises" at Nauheim—what have these to do with the spiritual message of Dante? With regard to Dante's description of his emotion on first meeting Beatrice we are told that "it is all most true; but the emotion felt was emotion, as it were, in the cradle; the emotion described is emotion which is struggling out of the cradle, but the baby is the same." Elsewhere occurs this figure: "I am not attributing these thoughts to Dante, though they are the outcome of one of those pregnant fragments of thought which Dante has left hanging, as it were, on the hedges of the way along which his pilgrim feet have trod." Again we have: "The Florentine school rose to a higher level, and founded a school of love which bore the shield of a lofty purity"; "at the summit we meet those who are not so much sinners as those who lacked the help of Christianity." For phras-

ing such as this the "De vulgari eloquentia" has stern adjectives.

The student of Dante will be annoyed, moreover, by a considerable number of loose statements and downright errors. "There is a studied reserve in his writings: he does not darken sanctities with song." Darken, no; but did any other poet ever so illumine them? "The spirit of Dante's age saw woman as one might behold a glorious vision." Rather, the spirit of Dante and a very few poet-comrades. For the spirit of Dante's age, see the "Decameron." "It [the "Divine Comedy"] is not a work in which a great poet's vivid imagination plays over a theme of worldwide interest." But it is precisely such a work, and none the less so because at the same time "it is a personal record." Dante never watched the slow growth of Giotto's tower; the rise of the Provençal lyric is not the romantic movement; sins of impulse do not "grow into sins of wilfulness" in the Styx; Caina, not Caino, awaited Giancesotto; Aeolus did not cease to be a god when he let out the winds; there is but one angel in the boat of the redeemed; there was no local pride in Dante's inquiry if there were any *anima latina* among the envious; the two words "Agnus Dei" did not make up the whole prayer of the wrathful; it was not the *works* of Statius that Juvenal brought to Limbo; Guido Guinizelli was not a Provençal poet.

The book is well printed, and the illustrations are excellent.

THE NEW REALISM.

The Concept of Consciousness. By Edwin B. Holt. New York: The Macmillan Co. \$3.25.

The volume before us, from the pen of a Harvard professor, is the latest production of the school of philosophers known as the new realism. The present volume hardly disturbs the impression that the main purpose of the school is to administer a refreshing shock of scandal to a bored philosophical world by parading a contemptuous disregard for all existing philosophy, along with an obsequious deference to natural science and mathematics. Mr. Holt's special brand of realism belongs in general with the airy mathematical Platonism (in Mr. Holt rather Neoplatonic) of Mr. Bertrand Russell, whose magnificent manner he seems to imitate in his style. But he lacks the Jovian self-assurance of Mr. Russell, his tone is often petulant and shrill, and his repetitious emphasis upon the finally "neutral" character of all "entities" betrays a certain sense of hollowness.

Mr. Holt's theory of consciousness is an elaboration of the theory of James embodied in the essay "Does Consciousness Exist?" which may be said to have begotten the new realism. James's point (by no means new in the history of philosophy) is that when I perceive, say, a tree, experience reveals but one tree, which is at the same time a real tree, having an objective existence in the material world, and a subjectively per-

ceived tree belonging to the order of ideas in my mind, each according to the order, or "context," in which it is placed. Thus the "entity" tree, in Mr. Holt's terminology, is "neutral"; and "consciousness," on the one hand, and "matter," on the other, are but different configurations of neutral entities. For Mr. Holt, however, consciousness is an order determined by the relation of these to the nervous system. It is "that cross-section of the realm of being to which the organism specifically responds." Consciousness is therefore a mere relation, and logically, it would seem, not a more significant relation (if we may now speak of significance) than a cross-section of the world determined by reference to the dog-star or to my lead-pencil. As for the fact of error, Mr. Holt boldly takes the bull by the horns and puts error into the objective world. He does the same with volition. Knowledge of the past is past, *i. e.*, knowledge of the first century is, as far as it goes, identical with the first century; in the character of knowledge, it is simply the first century mutilated. Here, for convenience, he assumes that the nervous system can get in touch with an object without the intervention of sense-organs, the contrary notion being relegated to "the mind of the hod-carrier" or of the idealistic philosopher. And as for knowledge of the future, well, "If most persons know more of the past than of the future, it is chiefly because they do not take the trouble to look at the future" (253). This sounds as if the relational theory of consciousness were in desperate straits; and the impression is confirmed by a number of passages (187, 202, 209) in which empirical evidence is offered to show that consciousness "depends upon" the nervous system. Such statements, if they mean anything, must mean that consciousness is not fully defined by the relation of dependence itself.

Not less remarkable than the concept of consciousness is the concept of the "neutral entities" which constitute the "being" of consciousness and matter alike. The stuff of which they are composed—rather, the stuff which they are—is something which Mr. Holt calls "logic." And "logic" is created by the simple expedient, borrowed from the mathematicians, of affirming without argument—as axiomatic, perhaps—the highly debatable theory of real classes, *i. e.*, that the classes of things constitute an eternal order which is independent of any purpose of classification. The neutral entities then form a hierarchy of "logical" classes. Their neutrality is secured by the equally simple expedient of attributing subjective qualities to objective things and objective qualities to subjective things. Thus a collision of bodies is called a "contradiction" of propositions, and propositions are said to be "active" (in a sense not defined) and, we might say, to "do things" to terms.

From this it would seem that the neutral entities, instead of being "neutral" and having the qualities *neither* of consciousness nor of matter, have all the qualities of both; and, further, that consciousness and