

age to England for reconnaissance purposes, and of passing unseen under a British squadron off Scotland.

That this is not impossible appears from the fact that a submarine built at Kiel in 1908 is known to have had an ordinary range of action of 1,000 miles, coupled with the ability to make nine knots under water for a period of three consecutive hours. Since then improved vessels have been built—Germany has thirty-nine submarines built or building—indeed, it has been stated that the newest British submarines have a cruising radius of 2,000 miles, with an above-water speed of twenty-one knots and a submerged speed of not less than fifteen. The French submarine Mariotte has a radius of 2,200 miles at ten knots. One of the ninety-six English submarines built or building has already accounted for one small German cruiser, the *Hela*, and others took some slight part in the battle off Heligoland. But no submarine feat in naval history is comparable to this disposal in twenty minutes of three great cruisers. What anxiety, what nervous strain this will cause in Jellicoe's fleet no one can overestimate; but those of our officers who were with Sampson in the weary vigil off Santiago can well understand. Rear-Admiral Mahan, writing in the *Academy*, says that the heavy British blockaders must remain out of sight by day, and shift their positions every night, as the only possible safeguard against attack; and he rightly anticipated this latest news by saying that "in this war we may look for fairly decisive tests of the actual value of these new means of warfare; for the opponents are skilled, enterprising, and trained, which was not the case with the Russians in the naval war of ten years ago."

The nerves of Jellicoe's crews may be further tried by aircraft. Berlin insists that no Zeppelin has been injured or lost; Sir John French reports that not a single one has been sighted by the British troops. If they are being saved for some spectacular raid, might it not be for an effort to fly over the decks of the great British battleships quite as much as the coast of England? With the advent of winter the Zeppelins will become almost useless; this fact must steadily be before the British commander as the autumn wears away. But the submarine must remain the fleet's greatest danger. If there is luck, it may be smashed by a gun, as one of the German boats was recently sunk; if conditions are favorable to the attacker, the best of ships may go down like a stone, for some of these boats can fire eight torpedoes at a time. Altogether, if German

daring succeeds further, Sir Percy Scott, who so recently announced the retirement of the battleship by reason of the submarine, may find his prophecy verified far sooner than he could possibly have expected. It is interesting in this connection to note that another British officer, Brig.-Gen. G. F. Stone, declares that submarines are preferable to heavy guns for purposes of coast defence.

SUPERSTITIONS OF COMMERCE.

The development of German industry and commerce during the past few decades has been no less impressive than that of her military power. In both the Kaiser has borne a notable and highly influential part. But, strange to say, the attribution to him of an almost god-like power and efficiency is very much more marked in relation to the advancement which Germany has made in her economic activities than in the domain of war. The Kaiser, says Mr. Carnegie, "has built up a great foreign commerce and a marvellous internal business." The special correspondent in Germany of one of the New York newspapers, speaking of the futility of all talk of a downfall of the Hohenzollerns as a possible consequence of the present war, writes as follows:

Germans of every class have a worshipful admiration for the Kaiser. He is the greatest business man they have ever known. He has built German prosperity. It is to his leadership they owe that commanding position they have until this war occupied in the commercial world. He has not only encouraged mercantile and manufacturing enterprises, but he has almost created their over-seas trade. The marvellous development of commercial chemistry—in which field Germany stands easily foremost—is solely due to his initiative, and almost to his direct command.

That these statements represent the feeling and opinion prevalent throughout a large part of the German population, and especially in the high circles of finance and industry and commerce, we have no doubt. And that there is a certain degree of foundation for the feeling, we would not dispute. But in the main it is a striking instance of a phenomenon by no means rare in the history of commercial opinion—the tendency to cherish superstitious instead of rational views concerning the causes of material prosperity.

With the founding of the German Empire in 1871, the people of Germany entered upon a new era in their history—an era in which the ambitions and the energies of the nation were directed in a vastly augmented measure towards material advancement. The extraordinary thoroughness which had long been recognized as preëminent in their scien-

tific work was sure in this modern day to tell with overwhelming effect in the development of their manufacturing industries, if once it was directed towards that end. As a manufacturing country Germany, at the time of the foundation of the Empire, was in its infancy. With a large and growing population, with the tradition of universal education two generations old, and with this great domain of human enterprise almost a virgin field before it, there needs no recourse to the hypothesis of a superman to explain what happened. The time had come for just such a development as we have seen, and the development followed. A very similar thing has happened in our own country; the causes underlying the enormous industrial growth of the United States in the past thirty years, though different from those operating in the case of Germany, are like them not only in being perfectly natural, but in the one particular which is essential to them both. A vast opportunity was open to a great, energetic, and enterprising people; and the time had come for them to take hold of it. There was no more reason why Germany should remain indefinitely a minor factor in the enterprises of modern industry than there was that the United States should. In the case of Germany this expansion has been in large part—though by no means completely—coincident in time with the reign of William II; and while it is not to be denied that he has exercised a considerable influence in stimulating it, the idea that it would not have been essentially of the same nature if he had simply stood by and looked on, is not worthy of a moment's consideration.

Even in the matter of rapidity of growth, a certain amount of illusion is prevalent among those who stand agape at the Kaiser's miracle. Thus if we look at the trade statistics in the latest volume of the Statesman's Year-Book we find that in the eight years 1905 to 1913 Germany's exports grew from £292,000,000 to £495,000,000, while those of the United Kingdom rose from £330,000,000 to £525,000,000. But it would be absurd to belittle in any aspect the achievements of Germany in manufactures, commerce, or finance; all that we are saying is that they are the achievements of a nation of 65,000,000 people equipped with the most efficient educational system the world has ever known, and highly endowed in ability, diligence, thoroughness, and thrift. To ascribe what they have done, except in an altogether subordinate degree, to the interposition of a divinely gifted ruler, is to adopt, but with far less excuse, the attitude

of the Japanese commanders who piously attributed their victories to the virtue of the Mikado. "With far less excuse," we say, because, of course, Nogi and Togo knew perfectly well that it was only in some symbolic or mystical sense that they owed their victories to the Mikado's excellence. The extravagance and obfuscation of the idea is more like that which underlay the protectionist superstition in this country, when millions of otherwise intelligent Americans really seemed to think that had it not been for the tariff this great nation, with opportunities unparalleled in the history of civilization, would have been a poverty-stricken people grubbing along on pauper-labor wages. Or, to go a little farther back in history, it is on a par with that state of mind—now so difficult to realize, but which it required the genius of Adam Smith to dispel—when the whole mercantile world was obsessed with the idea that the great object of national commercial policy was to get, and to keep away from other nations, all the gold that it was possible for a country to lay hold of.

THE COLORADO PROBLEM.

The letter addressed to President Wilson by J. F. Welborn, president of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, made the prospect for a speedy return to normal conditions in the mining region of that State less promising than had been hoped. Some days later, a communication was presented to the President on behalf of forty-eight other Colorado coal-mining companies, taking essentially the same position as that expressed by Mr. Welborn, and going into fuller details as to the reasons for it. The first impulse of many, doubtless, will be to condemn out of hand the attitude assumed by the companies. But the case is one calling for calm and earnest consideration, and not for the passing of hasty and sweeping judgment. Let us endeavor to see, then, what the essential points in the situation are, and what may yet be done to bring about not, indeed, an ideal settlement, but a working solution, of the difficulty.

First and foremost, it must be recalled that the plan worked out by the Federal Commissioners, and submitted to both sides by President Wilson, was put forward not as a definitive, but as a "tentative" proposal. While, therefore, it was generally hoped, and indeed urged—as it was by the *Nation*—that both sides should accept the proposal, the making of objections to particular features of it, coupled with the expression of a desire

to discuss the question, cannot be regarded as fatal. This is what the operators have done. Secondly, it is stated that the President does not consider the question closed, that he is working for further negotiations, and that he still looks for a favorable settlement. In a matter of this kind, so much is possible as a result of face-to-face discussion, with the public interest represented by a man of Mr. Wilson's clearness of mind and strength of purpose, that we can but regard the outlook as hopeful so long as the President does not himself give up the effort.

As for the points in the proposed *modus vivendi* to which the operators object, the essence of them is easily stated. They object to the requirement that *all* miners who have not been found guilty of violations of law shall be reemployed; and this for three separate and distinct reasons. First, that many men who have not been so found guilty are nevertheless well known to have been guilty of fomenting and committing violence, and that their hostility to the men who continued peacefully at work will make their working alongside these latter in the mines a constant source of friction and of danger. On this head, the letter of the forty-eight companies particularizes as follows:

In six of the counties of the State 332 of the strikers, including officers of the United Mine Workers of America, are under indictment for murder and 137 for other felonies. None of them have been tried, therefore none have been found guilty, and much time may elapse before they are tried.

Secondly, that the requirement is incompatible with retaining the men who have stood by their employers throughout the time of trouble, and such desertion of faithful workmen would be disgraceful and against public policy. And thirdly, that the requirement in any case ignores the practical limitation of the opportunities for employment, especially at this time of diminished demand.

In addition to these broad considerations, relating to fundamental questions, the operators object to certain other points upon which we feel that they would have been better advised to show a more conciliatory spirit. These relate to functions of the proposed permanent Grievance Commission. They object to the proposal that mines shall not be closed down more than six days without permission of the Commission, on the ground that this would make the working of the mines dependent on the will of the Commission instead of on the conditions of business; but is not this rather a theoretical than a practical objection, when the Commission is to be composed of one representative of the operators, one of the miners, and a third im-

partial person? In like manner, the objection that the assessing of penalties by the Commission must be inequitable, because unenforceable upon the workmen while enforceable upon the companies, seems to us not to allow for the resources of common-sense and a just purpose on the part of the Commission. And the objection to the payment of half the expenses of the Commission by the miners seems to us hardly of sufficient importance to be put forward as a difficulty.

What we find regrettable in the letters of the operators, however, is not so much the substance of them as the failure to indicate such hearty and sincere desire to bring about a settlement as would comport with a realization of the serious nature of the situation. With their unwillingness to sacrifice the rights of non-union miners we are in the most hearty sympathy; all the more, therefore, do we regret the stressing of objections of a less vital nature. Nothing is plainer than that, if a settlement is to be reached, both sides must concede something. We believe that President Wilson is quite open to conviction, and ready to make any modification of the original proposal for which sufficient reason can be assigned; and we should feel it to be particularly fortunate if the operators shall succeed in impressing upon him the necessity of making any change which is necessary in the interest of the upholding of the rights of workmen who refuse to submit to trade-union despotism. And for that very reason we hope that the operators will show the most reasonable and the most liberal possible spirit, consistent with the maintenance of those rights. The manifestation of an obstinate disposition—any conduct which shall have even the appearance of indifference to the public sentiment so strongly desirous of bringing the long struggle to a close—would not only be deplorable from the standpoint of the public, but would prove in the end even more so from the standpoint of the operators themselves.

ATLANTIC COASTAL WATERWAYS.

In his welcome to the Atlantic Deeper Waterways Convention, Mayor Mitchel, of New York, protested against the "unwise economy" of certain cuts in the Rivers and Harbors bill. For seven years the Association has labored for the improvement of inland navigation routes, its special purpose being to obtain a continuous inner way for ships along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts from Galveston to Boston. The undertaking is as huge as it is generally worthy. By rea-