

of the Japanese commanders who piously attributed their victories to the virtue of the Mikado. "With far less excuse," we say, because, of course, Nogi and Togo knew perfectly well that it was only in some symbolic or mystical sense that they owed their victories to the Mikado's excellence. The extravagance and obfuscation of the idea is more like that which underlay the protectionist superstition in this country, when millions of otherwise intelligent Americans really seemed to think that had it not been for the tariff this great nation, with opportunities unparalleled in the history of civilization, would have been a poverty-stricken people grubbing along on pauper-labor wages. Or, to go a little farther back in history, it is on a par with that state of mind—now so difficult to realize, but which it required the genius of Adam Smith to dispel—when the whole mercantile world was obsessed with the idea that the great object of national commercial policy was to get, and to keep away from other nations, all the gold that it was possible for a country to lay hold of.

THE COLORADO PROBLEM.

The letter addressed to President Wilson by J. F. Welborn, president of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, made the prospect for a speedy return to normal conditions in the mining region of that State less promising than had been hoped. Some days later, a communication was presented to the President on behalf of forty-eight other Colorado coal-mining companies, taking essentially the same position as that expressed by Mr. Welborn, and going into fuller details as to the reasons for it. The first impulse of many, doubtless, will be to condemn out of hand the attitude assumed by the companies. But the case is one calling for calm and earnest consideration, and not for the passing of hasty and sweeping judgment. Let us endeavor to see, then, what the essential points in the situation are, and what may yet be done to bring about not, indeed, an ideal settlement, but a working solution, of the difficulty.

First and foremost, it must be recalled that the plan worked out by the Federal Commissioners, and submitted to both sides by President Wilson, was put forward not as a definitive, but as a "tentative" proposal. While, therefore, it was generally hoped, and indeed urged—as it was by the *Nation*—that both sides should accept the proposal, the making of objections to particular features of it, coupled with the expression of a desire

to discuss the question, cannot be regarded as fatal. This is what the operators have done. Secondly, it is stated that the President does not consider the question closed, that he is working for further negotiations, and that he still looks for a favorable settlement. In a matter of this kind, so much is possible as a result of face-to-face discussion, with the public interest represented by a man of Mr. Wilson's clearness of mind and strength of purpose, that we can but regard the outlook as hopeful so long as the President does not himself give up the effort.

As for the points in the proposed *modus vivendi* to which the operators object, the essence of them is easily stated. They object to the requirement that *all* miners who have not been found guilty of violations of law shall be reemployed; and this for three separate and distinct reasons. First, that many men who have not been so found guilty are nevertheless well known to have been guilty of fomenting and committing violence, and that their hostility to the men who continued peacefully at work will make their working alongside these latter in the mines a constant source of friction and of danger. On this head, the letter of the forty-eight companies particularizes as follows:

In six of the counties of the State 332 of the strikers, including officers of the United Mine Workers of America, are under indictment for murder and 137 for other felonies. None of them have been tried, therefore none have been found guilty, and much time may elapse before they are tried.

Secondly, that the requirement is incompatible with retaining the men who have stood by their employers throughout the time of trouble, and such desertion of faithful workmen would be disgraceful and against public policy. And thirdly, that the requirement in any case ignores the practical limitation of the opportunities for employment, especially at this time of diminished demand.

In addition to these broad considerations, relating to fundamental questions, the operators object to certain other points upon which we feel that they would have been better advised to show a more conciliatory spirit. These relate to functions of the proposed permanent Grievance Commission. They object to the proposal that mines shall not be closed down more than six days without permission of the Commission, on the ground that this would make the working of the mines dependent on the will of the Commission instead of on the conditions of business; but is not this rather a theoretical than a practical objection, when the Commission is to be composed of one representative of the operators, one of the miners, and a third im-

partial person? In like manner, the objection that the assessing of penalties by the Commission must be inequitable, because unenforceable upon the workmen while enforceable upon the companies, seems to us not to allow for the resources of common-sense and a just purpose on the part of the Commission. And the objection to the payment of half the expenses of the Commission by the miners seems to us hardly of sufficient importance to be put forward as a difficulty.

What we find regrettable in the letters of the operators, however, is not so much the substance of them as the failure to indicate such hearty and sincere desire to bring about a settlement as would comport with a realization of the serious nature of the situation. With their unwillingness to sacrifice the rights of non-union miners we are in the most hearty sympathy; all the more, therefore, do we regret the stressing of objections of a less vital nature. Nothing is plainer than that, if a settlement is to be reached, both sides must concede something. We believe that President Wilson is quite open to conviction, and ready to make any modification of the original proposal for which sufficient reason can be assigned; and we should feel it to be particularly fortunate if the operators shall succeed in impressing upon him the necessity of making any change which is necessary in the interest of the upholding of the rights of workmen who refuse to submit to trade-union despotism. And for that very reason we hope that the operators will show the most reasonable and the most liberal possible spirit, consistent with the maintenance of those rights. The manifestation of an obstinate disposition—any conduct which shall have even the appearance of indifference to the public sentiment so strongly desirous of bringing the long struggle to a close—would not only be deplorable from the standpoint of the public, but would prove in the end even more so from the standpoint of the operators themselves.

ATLANTIC COASTAL WATERWAYS.

In his welcome to the Atlantic Deeper Waterways Convention, Mayor Mitchel, of New York, protested against the "unwise economy" of certain cuts in the Rivers and Harbors bill. For seven years the Association has labored for the improvement of inland navigation routes, its special purpose being to obtain a continuous inner way for ships along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts from Galveston to Boston. The undertaking is as huge as it is generally worthy. By rea-

son of the expense involved, it must wait many years for realization; its accomplishment depends on steady progress, which is now interrupted. Against a drastic economy the Association cannot protest, nor against the almost sweeping condemnation of the original bill because of the abuses in some of its parts. There was little time for discrimination, and good provisions had to suffer with bad. The Mayor objected to the dropping of the items for a 35-foot channel in the East River, and for removing the dangerous reefs which prevent full access to the Brooklyn, Queens, and East Manhattan waterfronts. The Association will feel more keenly the postponement of Government acquisition of the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal for conversion into a ship canal. For the time being, the members must put their main hope in the future.

Yet what has been done in the last few years in obtaining Government support and enlisting public interest in a safe and standard inland waterway from Maine to Florida, connecting with the Great Lakes and the Mississippi, is highly encouraging. Last year found the Association in possession of reports by United States army engineers upon every section of the enterprise. Some were condemned, but the principal ones were supported on both commercial and humanitarian grounds. Gen. Bixby endorsed the Chesapeake and Delaware link as worthy of immediate improvement to a depth of twelve feet, at a cost of \$8,000,000, in addition to the purchase price of \$2,500,000. This direct connection of Philadelphia with Baltimore and Annapolis would open an old route—a relic of 1829, so limited in width and depth as to be almost unused by modern vessels, and owned by a corporation whose tolls approximate the charges by rail—to a traffic almost comparable with that of the Panama Canal. With the construction of another link from the Delaware to the Raritan and New York Bay, approved by the army engineers and by Woodrow Wilson when Governor of New Jersey, New York would have a channel to Newport News by a route far shorter and less dangerous than formerly, and serving in a new way Philadelphia, Wilmington, and a score of other cities south to Norfolk. This Delaware-Raritan Canal would cost \$20,000,000. Finally, the army engineers approved a seven-foot passage from Beaufort, N. C., to the St. John's River, inside Cape Lookout, Cape Fear, and the dangerous shoals beyond, at an estimated cost of \$14,400,000. Not only coastal cities, but people along rivers like the Connecticut, Hudson, Potomac, James, and Savannah,

should understand the potential benefits of these waterways.

The amount of traffic predicted for them is not a more forcible argument than the loss of life resulting from the passage of barges and other coastal vessels upon the high seas. In ten years (1900-1910) the disasters to such ships are stated to have numbered 5,700, with a loss of 2,200 lives and of \$40,000,000 in property. The urgency and the assured profit of some of the proposals are seen in the attention paid to them by non-Federal agencies. With every reason why the Government should build the Cape Cod Canal, it has been constructed by a private company under two State boards. It will yearly handle 12,000,000 tons of coal alone, and is expected to develop a huge barge traffic. The State has laid plans to build still another link in the intracoastal route, that from Narragansett Bay to Taunton, and possibly to Boston Harbor. New Jersey is considering a similar work. While such enterprise is to be encouraged, the field is properly the national Government's, which has already spent \$700,000,000 upon our rivers and harbors. And the two considerations of the extent of Atlantic coastal commerce—more than three-fourths of the whole country's—and its dangerousness, lend support to the contention that Congressional appropriations have discriminated against the Eastern littoral. Congressman Hampton Moore states that Maryland and New Jersey have together received but \$17,000,000, while the comparatively new States of Oregon and Washington, with far less commerce, have had \$33,000,000.

The Atlantic Association and the bodies working for a solution of the Mississippi flood problem have aims so practical and worthy that they should be active in opposing projects of another sort—those which have for years viciously drained the Treasury. Theirs are not the only sound projects, but they are the most powerful of the internal improvement organizations. One of their aims should be to repress the unworthy schemes which cling to the commendable ones—schemes for improving little rivers of the East and Middle West. Another should be to have instituted a responsible and permanent agency for carrying on rivers and harbors work in a scientific manner. Temporarily, it has been entrusted to the army engineers. If it were given over to some adequate commission, as has been frequently proposed, there would never again be any necessity to cut the appropriations to an absolute minimum to prevent unjustifiable waste.

Chronicle of the War

A fresh enemy, more deadly probably than bullets or shrapnel or even than the Krupp siege guns of which we have heard so much, has appeared to menace all the armies of Europe impartially. Disease is the inevitable concomitant of every war. In the Boer War, it is said that 55,000 British troops were attacked by enteric or dysentery, and in our own Spanish War the figures of those who were disabled by disease have been put as high as 60,000. In the present war the appearance of disease has been postponed longer than could reasonably have been expected. Three weeks from the beginning of a campaign is the usual time allowed for this enemy of armies in the field to make itself felt, and the fact that it has not assumed serious proportions until recently is a high tribute to the efficient organization of the sanitary, medical, and commissariat arrangements of the various armies.

Of the Germans this was expected, for meticulous attention to the minutest details of campaigning is their particular province—and in spite of this it is to be remembered that when Metz surrendered in 1870 half of the besiegers were on the sick list—but the British have obviously taken to heart the lessons of the Boer War in this as in so many other respects, for we hear on all sides of the remarkable efficiency of their commissariat and sanitary corps, and the French and Russians cannot be far behind them. The most serious outbreak of disease is reported to be among the Austrian troops, where it is said that Asiatic cholera has appeared, and for the defeated forces of the Dual Monarchy this may well prove a subtle form of revenge, since the Russian troops, going over the ground vacated by the enemy and taking prisoners, will find it difficult to escape infection. In the west dysentery and enteric are the two enemies, but other infectious diseases, such as measles, may appear, as smallpox, the danger of which is now happily minimized by vaccination, did in the Franco-Prussian War.

More than ever, then, we see that war is a matter of endurance. The fittest will survive, and calculating that the average of resistance to disease will be pretty much the same in the armies of all the combatants, the problem still resolves itself, as we pointed out last week, into a matter of battalions, in which the ultimate superiority must rest with the Allies. Meanwhile, we learn that feverish efforts have been put forth to provide against the spread of disease. Large quantities of quick lime—growsome intelligence—have been sent to the front for use on battlefields, and extraordinary precautions are being taken to insure that the drinking water is not got from contaminated sources. This latter precaution will be difficult to enforce, as the rivers in northern France must by now have been thoroughly contaminated, and in addition, as experience in the Boer War showed, it is next to impossible to induce a dry-throated Tommy Atkins to refrain from slaking his thirst wherever opportunity offers.

The battle of the Aisne, now approaching the end of its third week, may be likened to a wrestling match, in which two combatants, well matched in strength and skill,