

faith in human nature, despite the horrors of the war. Branting's fifty-seven years sit lightly on his shoulders. He is a man of a most remarkable vitality, and no task is too great for him so long as he sees a definite purpose ahead of him. It is this characteristic which places Hjalmar Branting in the front rank of statesmen. As a member of the Swedish Parliament it is unquestionably owing to

his personality that the Social-Democratic following now comes near to being the preponderating weight in the country's political affairs. Branting is the best possible guarantee that the Allies may look with confidence upon Sweden, no matter what Germany may do to embarrass neutrals.

JULIUS MORITZEN

England's Mighty Effort

THERE can be little doubt that a good many Americans who have visited the Allied countries during the war have carried with them on their travels a distinct prejudice, conscious or unconscious, to England and the English. One of the curious phenomena of the war is the fact that while, in this country, the best public opinion has from the beginning been predominantly on the side of the Allies, popular enthusiasm for France has not been matched by anything even distantly resembling enthusiasm for Great Britain; and that not a few of those who have been most outspoken in their condemnation of Germany have been reluctant to speak of England in terms of more than extremely moderate praise. It is as though we had found ourselves, by the logic of circumstances and against our will, compelled to assist, materially and morally, and now to walk side by side with a nation whose friendship we could not regard as disinterested, whose methods we resented, and whose aims we frankly distrusted. What Americans have thought of England as they crossed the Atlantic has been, of course, only the reflection of that which they thought, or imagined they thought, before they left home; and with not a few the impression of disfavor has remained, and they have returned, not perhaps to criticise openly or severely, but nevertheless to continue to impress, by implication or silence, an apparently ingrained feeling of distrust. It may well be doubted if the German propaganda which long afflicted us, and which has not yet ceased to show its head, would have attained anything like the proportions which it did attain had German agents not realized that large numbers of Americans of all classes did not like England and were not indisposed to see its prestige dimmed.

I was struck, during the weeks which I spent in England, by the large number of Englishmen who themselves frankly recognized as a fact the condition which has just been stated. From high Government officials to clergy, lawyers, doctors, teachers, writers, business men, and wage-earners, and among women as well as men, it was pretty generally admitted that England and its people were not popular in the United States. Whatever the expressions of individual Americans might be, whether an inspiring address by the American Ambassador, or a friendly editorial in a newspaper, or the cordial thanks of wandering observers grateful for the hospitality everywhere extended to them, the conviction was not dispelled that these things were the exception rather than the rule, and that among the masses of America there was little fundamental friendliness. Oddly, too, I never heard the admission of the fact coupled with expressions of surprise or resentment. The coldness of America was taken as, in a way, a particular illustration, albeit a great and regrettable one, of the generally conceded fact that Englishmen are not exactly popular anywhere.

Once I had become cognizant of how the matter stood, I

was interested to discover, if possible, the cause. Of the various explanations offered, some impressed me as of relatively slight importance, and none was entirely convincing. One Englishman long resident in the United States, and a professor during part of that time in a university whose name is well known abroad, ascribed the unpopularity of England in America chiefly to the influence of American school histories, which still, he declared, dealt severely with the conduct of George III and Lord North and with the policy of England in the War of 1812 and the Civil War. I could not but think that the speaker, however sincere his opinion, was harking back to a type of textbook which has all but disappeared from American public schools, and that he could hardly have remembered that the teaching of American history in our upper schools, whatever its shortcomings in other respects, has for at least twenty years been entrusted increasingly to graduates of colleges and universities, in none of which, so far as I am aware, is such one-sided emphasis upon our historical relations with England tolerated. Another English scholar, speaking at an informal conference at which the matter of Anglo-American relations was discussed, ventured the opinion that before America would be likely to feel much confidence in the democratic intentions of England, England would have to mend its ways in India; but I find it hard to convince myself that British rule in India, wise or foolish as it may be in the eyes of competent judges, has ever been a matter of much concern either way to the people of the United States.

Two other explanations, vouchsafed in many quarters, appeared more weighty. The first is Ireland. Not only, it was urged, is the continually disturbed state of Ireland, whatever the cause, and the denial of independence, regarded in the United States as a blot upon the wisdom and sincerity of the British Government, but the systematic agitation of the Irish question in America, joined to the financial support of the Irish propaganda which has been drawn from the United States, has firmly implanted in the American mind a profound feeling of aversion, if not of positive enmity, for most things English. One cannot doubt that Ireland is unhappy, or that its grievances have been industriously nursed and exploited by Irishmen, clerical and lay, in this country. Nevertheless, even leaving entirely out of account the important consideration that, short of complete political separation, it is Ireland and not England that has been most unwilling to concede, it is at least an open question whether the Irish issue so far dominates American political thought as to determine the fundamental attitude of Americans in general towards England, especially at this time. Great numbers of Americans, I am confident, rarely think of Ireland at all, and not all who do on occasion think of it approve the programme that many Irish agitators appear to stand for.

The other explanation has to do with certain conduct of the British Government during the war: the interference with American neutral trade, the censorship of American mail, the blacklisting of American business houses. I have never found an intelligent Englishman who did not frankly admit that such practices, however necessary for the protection of British interests or safety, must be exceedingly irritating to neutrals. If to these infractions of international comity be added the rigorous repression of pacifists who at this distance seemed harmless, the erratic censorship of war news, together with the time-honored denunciation of England as a "land-grabber," the indictment upon public grounds certainly leaves little that is disagreeable to be added.

Weighing these various allegations, and testing them by the views of Englishmen who had not, as well as those who had, visited the United States, it is still not clear to me that they constitute, either singly or collectively, a wholly satisfactory explanation of an undoubted phenomenon. To historical causes, recent or remote, of misunderstanding between the two countries must be added, I think, as of at least equal influence, a vague jealousy of Great Britain as a Power which counts for very much more in world business and world politics than the United States has hitherto counted, an ill-concealed democratic contempt for a society popularly supposed to set much store by titles and class distinctions, and most of all, a pervading ignorance of what English people are really like. For every American who visits England, or who comes to know England well if he does visit it, some hundreds of thousands stay at home. For every American who reads a representative English book, many times that number read nothing at all. For every American voter who knows how England is governed great masses have only vague notions about their own political system. We have, in short, the spectacle of two great peoples who speak the same language, live under the same general system of law, and enjoy similar traditions of freedom and culture, who do not yet know each other, and where ignorance prevails there prevail also misunderstanding, recrimination, and hostile feelings.

It is to the credit of England that, frankly as it has recognized and deeply as it has regretted the lack of cordiality in American public opinion, it has studiously refrained from anything that could be construed as a deliberate attempt to close the chasm. It has not ostentatiously sought the friendship of the United States, or intrigued for favor in the devious ways known to diplomacy. Through Sir Gilbert Parker and others it has sent a good deal of useful and informing war literature to this country, but it has avoided newspaper propaganda on this side of the Atlantic. It has smoothed in many ways the path of every correspondent or writer who has gone to England with a legitimate purpose, but it has not suggested to him how or what he should write. Neither publicly nor privately has it lavished social attentions upon American visitors; and the few English scholars or writers who, from time to time, have visited the United States during the war have been, for the most part, persons who, like Prof. Gilbert Murray, would have been welcomed at any time for their own sake quite apart from the circumstances of their coming. It has neither concealed nor apologized for its lack of initial preparation for war, or the hesitation and ineffectiveness with which it has from time to time attacked some of its war problems. Not until the coming of the Balfour mission, after the United States had itself entered the war, was an official attempt made to lay the English

case fully before either the American Government or the American people. Americans were left to realize for themselves, by their own observation and reflection, if they would, the greatness of England in the war.

How great that greatness is, how deep and substantial are the foundations on which it rests, cannot but be borne in upon any one who, with open mind, views attentively the England of to-day. The story of the tremendous task which the coping with Germany has laid upon England, and of the far-reaching transformation of English society which the performance of that task has already brought about, cannot be set forth in detail here. But the historian who, in time to come, shall essay to tell the story in its fulness will fail if he does not point out how England, in the gravest moment of all its long history, faced the imminent possibility of defeat. There came to England, rich, powerful, confident, a day when the German plans seemed near to consummation; when the Empire, and all that the Empire stood for, was imperilled; and the soul of England entered the valley of dread. It was a solemn hour, not only for England, but for the world; but it was out of that searching experience, traversing the shadows until the path was once more plain, that the greatness of the new England was born.

Condensed to a phrase, the characteristic of the new England is collective effort. Of effort, as such, there had been no great lack from the moment the war began; but it was in the main individual effort. The numberless small businesses which had long been the peculiar characteristic of English industrial organization, workmen in their several trades and labor unions in their several spheres, had turned to and were speeding up production along the accustomed lines. The army and navy had been recruited by voluntary enlistment, and taxes had been laid on for the supposed needs of a brief and uncertain future. Every man who thought he could render service to the national cause had had, in general, a chance to render it in such way as he might choose. Individualism, in short, did its best. But individualism failed. There was prodigious activity, but without effective coöperation. Only when the possibility of defeat stared it in the face did England see that only by working collectively as one organized community, and not by any amount of individual effort of the old sort, could it hope to win the war. Then sacred traditions and ancient customs began to go by the board. Antiquated machinery and outgrown methods were scrapped, and improved ones installed. Workingmen accepted longer hours and fewer holidays; what was more, they were consulted. Increased output was matched by nation-wide saving. Children joined with their parents in practicing economy and "doing their bit." Scholars, teachers, and professional men entered the Government service to take the places of men who had been called to arms, or to meet the demands of multiplying departments and bureaus. The barrier of class, and those which had separated capital and labor, yielded to the call for national coöperation. On every hand was to be seen an ancient society, hitherto accepting complacently the easy theory of *laissez faire*, transforming itself into a socialized state moved by a common purpose and working for a common end.

With the ground thus prepared, the wide extension of Government control of industry and social habits followed naturally. It was, indeed, inevitable that, with the independence of England at stake, every agency of production and every social activity at all closely related to the prose-

cution of the war should more and more pass under Government control. The joint administration of railways and shipping, the taking over of mines, breweries, flour-mills, and factories of various kinds, was paralleled by the establishment of huge Government munition plants, the regulation of wages and prices, the encouragement of agriculture by wage subsidies, the control of markets and food consumption, the all but confiscatory taxation of profits, the inauguration of vast schemes for recruiting, housing, and protecting industrial laborers, and military conscription. With only sporadic and negligible expressions of hesitation or dissent, awakened England passed, almost before it knew it, under a régime of collectivism more comprehensive, practical, and satisfying than the most convinced advocates of state Socialism had ever seriously hoped to see. For party control was substituted personal leadership; in place of denunciation of governmental interference one heard the demand for wider and more vigorous governmental control. Even the vast and knotty problem of Imperial organization, alike the troubled dream of statesmen and the football of politicians, became, under the Imperial Conference and the War Cabinet, a hopefully realizable part of the socializing programme.

Of the almost innumerable changes in the spirit and form of English society which collectivism has wrought, not even the barest list must be ventured here. One, however, perhaps the most far-reaching of all in its revolutionary possibilities, may not be passed over. I mean the new status of women. What the "new freedom" of widened participation in industry and affairs has meant to the women of England can be adequately realized only by recalling the constriction and subordination which everywhere encompassed the daily life of women under the old régime. The greatness of the change is in part to be measured by the questions which are being increasingly asked about the future. Will there be a quiet and unprotesting return to the old conditions when the war ends? For some, yes; for the overwhelming majority, never. In no large numbers will the women who have found in the necessities of war the opportunity of independent livelihood cease to demand the same opportunity after the war; nor will they long continue to accept, in peace or war, the discriminations of lower wages or restricted personal freedom which are still, to an appreciable extent, imposed upon them. They will not marry to be supported; they will not have children unless they so choose. With the attainment of the suffrage now practically assured, and of economic and social equality a certainty of the near future, there will doubtless be many who will care less for family life or who will insist upon freer divorce; and they will almost certainly cease to be, what they have for some time been, the mainstay of the Protestant churches. I make no comment here upon these predictions, which one hears everywhere in England, save to say that surprisingly few persons there appear to look with fear or regret upon the outcome, or regard the change as other than natural and desirable. When England, with its hitherto invincible cult of masculine superiority, accepts women as the equals of men, it mines the last stronghold of the old order; yet collectivist England is to-day thus liberating a full half of its citizens.

It is characteristic of the English temper that a democratic revolution which in Germany bids fair to be stoutly resisted by Government, and which in Russia has thus far spelled little more than a turbid mixture of anarchy and autocracy, should in England have progressed without violence,

and should have been accepted by all classes as both necessary and wholesome. Nor has there yet appeared any disposition to abandon the devotion to justice and fair play which, with English people everywhere, has long been recognized as a national trait. The German air raids upon unfortified communities, the sinking of unarmed passenger steamers, the bombing of hospitals, and the brutal treatment of prisoners of war, deeply as they have stirred the English sense of decency and right, have nowhere awakened any general demand for reprisals; and not even the prospective rigors of such hostile economic programmes as that of the Paris Conference have been urged on any other important ground than that of necessary defence. The principles of personal freedom and of legal protection for life and property, which for centuries have been the essence of English law, have not been weakened; on the contrary, they have been both strengthened and amplified as England, realizing itself more and more as a collective Power, has found new liberty in the pursuit of a common good.

It is these social transformations within the state, rather than zeal or success in prosecuting the war, that best exhibit England's advance in insight and outlook. The stubborn resistance to German onslaughts, the mobilization of troops in the scattered colonies as well as at home, the unshaken grip of the fleet, the cheerful assumption of unparalleled debt for the benefit of its allies as well as for itself, are all of them national performances for which no praise is likely to be too high. But they are, nevertheless, only the repetition on a huge scale of the kind of thing that England has done before; the kind of thing that England has been, on the whole, generally expected to do in times of stress. It is the sustaining spirit that is new. England has often exerted itself greatly, but never with the consciousness of social solidarity, the merging of individual preference or ambition in a new conception of the state and its functions, which now distinguishes it.

More, even, than the United States is England now a democracy, not merely because economic and social life have been democratized, but also because, notwithstanding unprecedented centralization, the people may still change their rulers when they please, and not, as with us, only at fixed chronological intervals. Into the great stream of democratic effort flow, moreover, all the tributary rivers of loyalty from British colonies and dependencies throughout the world. To have thus relaid, on deeper and broader lines, the economic foundations of the state, to have drawn closer the devotion of all save an insignificant proportion of those who anywhere own the British name, and in the face of fierce provocation to have kept its mind from hate, while at the same time perfecting its efficiency in war and turning a possibility of disaster into an assurance of ultimate success, is the master political feat thus far of the twentieth century. The new structure is not complete, nor the whole scheme of decoration and furnishing determined; there will be changes of detail and even of plan; but the work of building goes on. Moreover, whatever selfish ambitions may from time to time distract it, whatever material gains the fortunes of war may bring to it, the broad aim of the new England is a free world for free peoples. Herein, at least, for Great Britain and the United States, is to be found the essential basis for that alliance of spirit and purpose which, whether embodied in legal documents or not, would, once its existence were perceived, become the determining political influence in the modern world.

WILLIAM MACDONALD

Correspondence

THE SCHELDT AND U-BOATS

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NATION:

SIR: In your issue of June 14 Rear-Admiral Goodrich writes that "Antwerp is generally supposed to be a German submarine base and the Scheldt habitually used for the passage of such boats to and from the North Sea, in violation of the neutrality of Dutch waters."

I feel bound to state that not the slightest evidence of this supposition has ever arisen in Holland, nor, may I add, has a similar suggestion up to this moment appeared in any of the foreign newspapers that have come under our eyes. This is the first time that we have seen it mentioned. If it were or had been well founded, I trust that the Dutch Government would long since have taken prompt measures against this most unpopular abuse of our territorial river. As a matter of fact, the mouth and canal of the Scheldt have since the beginning of the war been blocked by Dutch mines, and I do not think the safe and unnoticed passing of any German U-boat from Antwerp would even be possible. I shall feel obliged if you will publish this comment on Admiral Goodrich's statement, in order to prevent the American public from fostering unjust opinions on the vigilance of Holland, opinions which I for one would highly regret.

The Germans seem to have found a submarine base which fully serves their ends at Zeebrugge on the Belgian coast—a port that can be entered directly from the North Sea.

DR. J. A. VAN HAMEL,

Member of the Second Chamber of the States General

Amsterdam, July 24

MR. WARNER FITE ON "FREE SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY"

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NATION:

SIR: One of the disadvantages of magazine controversy is that the critique and the argument criticised can seldom come before the public at the same time. Hence a writer by tremendously emphasizing some quite obvious and acknowledged truth may convey either that his opponent has denied it or that he has shown himself so unaware of its import that it must be restated to him with a fresh insistence. Few readers will take the trouble to verify the justice of this by turning back to the article concerned.

Mr. Warner Fite in exposing my misapprehension about the value of free speech dwells upon the "vital and fundamental" character of this privilege for democracy. He explains that when an issue is before the people both sides must always be heard. He bursts into invective against the stifling of discussion as "false to the fundamentals of righteousness." And he apologizes for pressing so elementary a point on the ground that "Mr. Stewart affects to regard free speech as a mere detail of social order." Referring to my views as expressed in the *Nation* of August 30, he calmly writes this: "Regulation of speech, I suppose he would say, is a question of the same order as the regulation of the exhaust of a motor car."

In justice to myself I must ask you to reproduce a few lines from what I actually said, that your readers may judge how far Mr. Fite's remarks are fair comment:

There is a certain sense in which this right is more sacred

than others and more deserving of zealous guardianship by a nation that governs itself. . . . Free speech is good, because only thus can the collective wisdom be fully brought to bear. Minorities have again and again turned out to have been in the right. Stray voices that were not listened to at the time, voices that were drowned in a chorus of obloquy, have afterwards proved to have been the only voices of intelligence. Hence it behooves a free people to give the largest possible latitude to discussion. Only thus can it be sure that a problem has been looked upon from every side. Special care should be taken to protect and encourage those whose opinions are for the moment unpalatable to us. . . .

The real difference between my critic and myself is that, while recognizing the enormous importance of free speech in normal times, I have tried to indicate limits which may be set to it when a nation is struggling for its life. Otherwise our advocacy of freedom will end, as Mr. Fite's has done, in something like burlesque. Your correspondent plainly belongs to that well-known type of controversialist whose trump card is to ask his opponents where they mean to "draw the line." He wants to know whether all criticism of a Government's war policy is treason. If he asks where I mean to stop I reply by asking where he means to stop. What degree of social disorganization and national enfeeblement does he think it necessary to allow in order that the sanctity of free speech may be protected? He will have no limitation of speech in time of war "beyond the ordinary limitations of peace time." Otherwise, he tells us, democracy would be "betrayed." When the British War Office covered the walls of London with placards calling for the first million of Kitchener's army, would it have been tyrannical to object if Mr. Bertrand Russell had chosen to stand by a recruiting station and dissuade men from entering to enlist? When the Allied troops were suffering fearful havoc for want of high explosives, and the munition factories needed men and women to work day and night for their relief, would some apostle of "democratic" labor have been within his rights in urging every one to stick to his previous job? Would that power of trade-union combination, which is used so freely in time of peace, have been equally legitimate if in time of war it had organized a strike on the Clyde to prevent an increased output of ships? Or can we say that it is proper for one man to incite to a course which it would be criminal for other men to adopt? There was no law requiring men to remain in the shipyards, any more than there was a law compelling subscriptions to the Liberty Loan.

Those who have the Allied interests in charge take, fortunately, a different view on this subject from that of Mr. Warner Fite. Mr. Lloyd George spoke in unmistakable terms to the labor leaders. The United State Postmaster-General—about whose action I know nothing except what your correspondent has mentioned with a note of disapproval—appears to have shown very sound sense. He did not see the consistency of sending American youths to pour out their blood in the war for civilization, and at the same time permitting the mails to circulate a newspaper in which those at home were advised to withhold the needful money for giving these brave soldiers weapons to defend themselves. But whether in this special case the Postmaster-General was right or wrong is irrelevant to the point at issue. I repeat that, while free speech is among our dearest possessions, national life is dearer still, that a war may be of such gravity and of such unchallengeable justice as to make this no less than other liberties a fit field for Government interference, and that in any particular instance