

action, and loses his consciousness of living at a later period. It might be about a part of Ireland today that has not been radicalized. Peasant habits change little within a hundred years, and the desperation of the famine has reduced their deference to institutions. The irreligion has become a part of the order of nature; its rituals, though still accepted as habitual activity are ineffectual for the time being as social control. The famine dominates these peasants, uproots them, shifts them across the decades into our own troubled era. O'Flaherty at the end of his novel sweeps us past the mirage of American prosperity into completest sympathy with the contemporary movement for Irish emancipation. Crises speak a common language.

EDWIN BERRY BURGUM.

### *Principles of Warfare*

IF WAR COMES, by R. Ernest Dupuy and George Fielding Eliot. Macmillan. \$3.

WAR is the most pressing problem before mankind today. Yet it is a problem concerning which most people know practically nothing. Mainly because of their ignorance, they have little or no voice in the shaping of defense policies and armament programs, but must leave these vital tasks in the hands of "experts," who may, though as a rule they do not, have the interests of the masses at heart.

This ignorance is not universal by any means. In the Soviet Union, for example, various periodicals devote considerable space to an enlightened discussion of military questions. In consequence, an informed public opinion is being created that will be increasingly instrumental in shaping and guiding Soviet defense policy. In England, with such noted military correspondents and students as Richmond, Bywater, Liddell Hart, Fuller, and others writing constantly for public consumption, something of the same sort is developing, though on a much smaller scale. To a still more limited extent this is also true of France, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries. And in Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, of course, there is no end of talk about military affairs, but it is all rigidly directed from above to the one end of glorifying war and lethal weapons for their own sake.

Here in America we are on the whole utterly ignorant of the technical side of the war problem. This may be due to our fancied isolation, or it may be because no genuinely objective and intelligent school of military writers has developed in this country. The truth probably is that our imagined security against war has discouraged public discussion of the problem. At any rate, we have no one to compare with Bywater or Liddell Hart, with Delaisi, the Frenchman, or Major Bratt, the Swede. Only one newspaper in the entire country has a military correspondent on its staff. His work apart, virtually all of the discussion of military questions that finds its way into the public prints is merely so much propaganda when it is not outright chauvinism. In the service jour-

nals a good deal of sound objective writing can be found, but these journals never reach the public eye.

In the interest, therefore, of a more enlightened American democracy one must welcome the book here under review. Messrs. Dupuy and Eliot, who are army officers, touch only sketchily upon the American defense problem itself. Their work deals in the main with the general principles of warfare, the problems of strategy, the conflict between the mass army and the mechanized force, the defense policies of the leading powers, and the initial moves that probably will be made by each belligerent in another great war. But their approach and treatment is sane and objective, devoid of maudlin sentiment and spurious flag-waving. They write as experts and not as propagandists. One may hope that they are laying the groundwork for a school of popular and honest American military writers who will stimulate public debate and so educate the people to enable them to play an intelligent and decisive part in the making of American defense policy.

This is not to say that one must agree with everything that Messrs. Dupuy and Eliot have written. They believe, for instance, that the day of the mass army, the vast and unwieldy conscript horde, is now definitely over. The evidence they marshal in support of their contention is impressive and persuasive. If reason prevails, the mass army as such should be done for (although, one might add, that if reason prevailed there would never be need for any kind of an army). But reason does not always prevail in the heat of war. The tendency both among military men, too many of whom still think of superiority exclusively in terms of man-power, and among politicians who will find it quicker and cheaper to draft men than to increase the supply of mechanized weapons, will be to fall back upon wholesale conscription of untrained men. Indeed, the military policies of practically all of the great powers rest in the last analysis upon conscription, i. e., upon the mass army.

Yet it may turn out that the authors are right. At all events, they are undoubtedly right in contending, on the other hand, that the military "progressives" have gone too far in extolling the virtues of the mechanized weapon, the tank, the airplane, the submarine. They assert that the mere introduction of new weapons cannot change the fundamental principles of

warfare and that the human element will and must remain the controlling factor, while they add that there are many limitations upon the use of the mechanized weapons, limitations so obvious that they should have been discerned by such "progressives" as General Douhet, the fascist.

The authors debunk once more the childish notions concerning death rays and new and more potent poisonous gases that supposedly will wipe out entire cities and whole armies— notions that have been deliberately concocted and spread by military propagandists and eagerly swallowed by ignorant pacifists. They also show, pointing to Madrid as their example, that it is both foolish and futile to suppose that civilian populations of enemy countries can be demoralized by mass attacks from the air, though they add that this particular notion is held by some of the most highly respected military authorities in our presumably civilized western countries. (In fact, the British have put the idea into effect in India just as the Nazis have in northern Spain, the Italians at Malaga and Valencia, and the Japanese at Canton and Nanking.)

One cannot mention here all of the points the authors raise, but three at least must be recorded. First, they demonstrate that a fascist victory in Spain would greatly harm both France and England from the standpoint of their own defenses. Second, contrary to the propaganda ceaselessly being put out by fascists and Tories everywhere, they assert that, once the Soviet Union's defense problem is properly visualized, "the enormous Soviet military establishment becomes, not a Red colossus threatening world peace, but a reasonable defense mechanism." Third, they indicate that, barring an overwhelming surprise move bringing immediate victory to the enemy, the Anglo-French combination with its potential allies should have relatively little difficulty in beating the fascist powers, and they are of the opinion that no such surprise move is likely.

If their style is not quite as polished as that of some of the English writers, Messrs. Dupuy and Eliot have nevertheless produced an excellent and useful study. Their work has only one grievous fault—it lacks an index.

MAURITZ A. HALLGREN.

### *Second American Revolution*

RECONSTRUCTION: THE BATTLE FOR DEMOCRACY, by James S. Allen. International Publishers. \$1.25.

SINCE Charles A. Beard termed the Civil War the "Second American Revolution," that war has generally been understood as a struggle between the industrial capitalists, whose sectional stronghold was the North, and the plantation aristocracy of the slave-holding South; a struggle which was to smash the last barriers to the development of the greatest capitalist nation in the world. But it remains for the Marxist historian to analyze the outcome of that second revolution



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and to discover the extent to which it realized its goal of national unity under the bourgeoisie and completed the job of establishing democracy in America.

James S. Allen is such a historian. His book is an example of scholarship and analysis which not only lays bare and clear the events of the Reconstruction period, withering misconception, but also arms the reader with an understanding of present-day problems which are a legacy of the Civil War.

That war began badly for the North. What Marx discerned at the outset, writing to Engels in the first year, namely that the northern bourgeoisie was doomed to failure unless it acted in a manner befitting a class which was seeking to revolutionize America, the bourgeoisie did not realize till the war had gone on for two years. But by 1862, the Homestead Act, which nationalized the land, and the Emancipation Proclamation, which promulgated the end of chattel slavery in the seceding states, testified to the forging of a leadership that was ready to take any steps necessary to gain the support of the workers and farmers and of the Negro people and win the war. Sherman's march to the sea, with its ruthless destruction, was to be the military counterpart of revolutionary politics aimed at smashing the economic base of the planters.

This much is understood by most contemporary historians; but from this point all cease being liberal and remain merely bourgeois. At best, they gloss over the second phase of the revolution in which the bourgeoisie consolidated its victory against the struggle for democracy on the part of the Negroes and the attempt by the Radical Republicans to continue their policies into the post-war period. At worst, they consider the Reconstruction as a time of corruption and chaos in which the newly freed Negro people are ignorant dupes of scoundrelly carpet-baggers and grafting scalawags. In history and fiction the bourbons have portrayed Reconstruction as a "tragic era"; have sought to prove the myth of white superiority and to hide the historical lessons of the Civil War. Such history is perverted and such fiction remains fiction, as Allen's book, with unimpeachable evidence drawn from the documents of the time, shows.

For Allen, Reconstruction was a battle for democracy. The period saw the end of chattel slavery and the consolidation of the power of the industrial bourgeoisie. It saw also the brief emergence of the Negro people as freed men carrying on a fight for democracy and for the land. It was finally turned into counter-revolution when the old plantation aristocracy became reconciled to northern domination, ending the brief period of Negro liberation, restoring the former rulers of the South to their accustomed ways, and transferring the seat of power to Wall Street.

The differing direction of the class forces united in carrying on the war led to various schemes for Reconstruction, but the plans of the Radical Republicans, representatives of



John Heliker

the petty bourgeoisie which had successfully carried through the war, were to be first hamstrung and finally defeated in the counter-revolutionary alliance of the bourgeoisie and its erstwhile enemy. Most important of Allen's contributions, however, is the description of the steps taken by the Negroes in their attempt to guarantee the promises of freedom.

Allen's insistence on the democratic character of the freed men's movements is borne out in the description of the state conventions, people's assemblies, and Negro militias. One use of the book is soon apparent: it refutes those who declare that complete liberation for the Negro people in the South would mean an end to what rights the southern whites possess today. This refutation is accomplished with the examples of the actual steps toward democracy for both white and Negro taken by the Black Parliaments of the late sixties. And beneath this political action is the seizure of the land by the Negroes as their attempt to smash the old system.

Special mention must be made of the chapter in which Allen deals with a little-treated subject, the relation between the freed Negroes and the rising trade union movement. Here is material which not only foreshadows present problems in trade unionism but also explains one peculiarity of the Negro question in this country. This is illustrated by Frederick Douglass's fear that an alliance of the Negroes with the trade-union and Labor Party-Populist movement, ending their support of the Republican Party, would prove harmful to the interests of the Negroes. A shortcoming, excused perhaps by lack of space, is the failure to discuss in detail the reasons as well as the fact of Douglass's position.

The battle for democracy was to be only partly successful. The victorious industrial bourgeoisie were not to permit completion of the tasks assigned by the second revolution. Had those tasks been completed, had the Negroes retained the land they had seized, let alone received the land promised, had the democracy which was the slogan of the revolution been granted, the history of the whole country as well as of the South might well have been different. At least we would not today see a South with a semi-feudal social system ruled by monopoly capitalism.

Closing mention must be made of the foreword by Richard Enmale, editor of the series

of which this book is the second. His critical remarks apropos the bourgeois historians of the period are valuable as an overture to Allen's approach. Included also are excellent appendices containing important documents such as the manifestos of the people's assemblies. The book will be of value not only to the student of history but to the worker and intellectual who wishes to understand the significance of the Civil War and the bearing of this dramatic period upon America today.

DAVID LURIE.

### A Doctor's Dilemma

THE CITADEL, by A. J. Cronin, Little, Brown & Co. \$2.50.

"EVERY doctor I've met swears that practice is a dog's life. . . . Why is that? It's because there's no attempt at organization in our profession." In such a manner A. J. Cronin states what seems to be for him the problem, and its solution, of the medical profession. Paradoxical as it may seem, however, the theme of *The Citadel* is not social organization at all, but a representation of one man's road to happiness.

Dr. Andrew Manson begins by working as an assistant to a "company doctor"—the medical neglect of the miners becomes obvious to him, but at no time does he relate this to the social and economic system responsible for it.

In the course of time, Manson rises from obscurity to a position of wealth and renown as a doctor to the idiotic and rich in the West End of London—his work becomes a racket and he an unconscious quack and parasite feeding upon those parasites who feed, if remotely, upon those miners to whom he first brought his surgical aid and medical knowledge.

By a series of fortuitous accidents, the surgical murder of a man and the accidental death of his wife, Dr. Andrew Manson comes to a realization of his moral and spiritual bankruptcy. Seeking again for an ideal—rehabilitation into a functional role in society, a road to life—he returns to his earlier interest in "organization"—but organization of what a kind!

With certain of his medical friends, he organizes a clinic in a semi-agricultural town. Here is the solution, A. J. Cronin would seem to say, to the doctor's problem in a capitalist world—a "solution" which, needless to say, has been tried in the United States.

NORMAN MACLEOD.

### Brief Reviews

LENA, by Roger Verel. Translated from the French by W. B. Wells. Random House. \$2.50.

This Goncourt prize novel for 1934, which has just appeared in America, has as its central theme the degeneration of human personality under the impact of national hatred during the World War. De Quesnay, a French officer, is captured by the Bulgarians after he has been transferred from the air service because he can no longer bring himself to bombard defenseless Bulgarian towns. During the