

THE SOVIETS FORESAW IT

The powerful eastern industrial bases the USSR can draw upon. Factories and mines behind the Urals. Why the Red Army can hold out until large scale shipments arrive.

WITH Leningrad besieged, the industrial metropolis of Moscow threatened, and the Donets basin under heavy fire, it is only natural to wonder what the Soviet Union has built up further east. The up-to-date facts are hard to get. Statistics from such authoritative sources as the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, or the American-Russian Institute are usually given for the year 1938, which was only the beginning of the Third Five Year Plan. Moreover, no one is in a position to calculate just how much or how little Soviet engineers were able to transfer from the areas now over-run by the invader, which further invalidates the 1938 figures.

Nevertheless, it is possible to give a reassuring answer along the following lines: there is a powerful base of Soviet industry east of the Volga, more powerful than the world realizes. It is enough, as S. A. Lozovsky observed the other day, to keep the Soviet armies in the fight for many years. But it may not be enough to make possible the kind of large scale counter-offensives without which Hitler will not be beaten; that is why our confidence in Soviet foresight, our admiration for what they have done in Siberia must not lessen the urgency of our demand for large scale shipments of every kind of material which the other anti-fascist powers have promised, and must deliver.

The striking thing about Soviet industrialization east of the Volga is that they planned it that way. Once you dig into the subject, it becomes clear that the Soviet leaders foresaw the possibility of having to retreat in the west. So they deliberately planned an intensive industrialization beyond the Urals with an eye to uninterrupted production in case of war. In this they were also guided by the need of manufacturing their goods as closely as possible to the reserves of raw materials in Siberia. In addition, they had in mind the fact that the hitherto backward and nomadic peoples of Central Asia needed a powerful industrial base for their national development. And of course, they were able to do things on an ambitious scale because they were not hampered by the pressure of heavy capitalization in the older industrial regions. It was simply a question of manpower, time, and the planned use of their capital.


HERE ARE SOME FACTS that give you an idea of what is being done. First, three-quarters of the capital investment in the Third Five Year Plan (1938-42) has been devoted to industrialization east of the Volga. It will help drive home what that means when you remember that the capital investment of the Third Five Year Plan will be at least 150 percent of what it was in the previous plan, especially in the key industries, producing largely the means of production.

Another fact: in the resolution on the new plan, passed by the 18th Party Congress, it is specifically forbidden to build any more mills and factories in Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev, Kharkov, Rostov. This ruling was relaxed after the additions to Soviet territory in 1940, but it indicates the trend of thought, the emphasis on building up the central Asiatic and east-of-the-Urals region.



In this same resolution, it was also decided that "... the mania for building giant factories ... must be resolutely combated," that "... a sweeping change be made in favor of building medium and small sized establishments in all branches of the national economy." The building of establishments "specialized along too narrow lines" was also criticized.


The significance of this for war production is obvious: Smaller plants get into production faster; all-around development in industrial regions avoids bottlenecks in any one material. In the Urals, for example, they have set themselves the job of actually duplicating their entire existing construction in the machine building and chemical plants so that no delays by accident or mismanagement will affect the steady functioning of industry.

Where are these centers of productive strength located? East of Moscow there is, of course, the Volga basin and the Donets which is still far from Hitler's grasp; towns like Gorky, or Saratov, or Kuibyshev, and many others. But the big industry is set in the




MAP on opposite page shows the centers of heavy industry east of the Volga. (Above) A KAZAKH plant manager, one of the kind of men responsible for industrialization in central Asia. (Upper right) BLAST FURNACE NO. 1 at Nizhni Taghil, a new plant in the Urals. (Below) A MACHINE-BUILDING PLANT at Sverdlov, also in the Urals.





(Above) THIS IS AMONG the many large cities that have grown up in Siberia. (Below) A BEVY OF TRACTORS from the Stalin plant at Chelyabinsk. Undoubtedly it makes tanks today.



Urals, some six or seven hundred miles east of Moscow. From the north around Solikamsk going south to Orenburg and Orsk, there are vast "combinats" producing machine tools, pig iron, rolled steel, chemicals, and non-ferrous metals. New rail lines have been built running north and south with connections east, west, and southeast to Kazakhstan. In the great iron fields of the Magnit Mountain rests the famous steel mill called Magnitogorsk. Just off to the west, the stretch of soil toward the Volga has been found to bear oil. This is today called the "second Baku" and plans are that by 1942 this region will produce as much oil as did Baku in 1913. Absolute dependence on the Caucasus and the Caspian fields will be over.

SO MUCH for the Urals. Some 900 miles still further eastward lies the great basin of the Obi River, known as Kuznetsk. Here coal beds have been discovered five times as rich as the coal of the Donets. For a time this coal was shipped to the Magnitogorsk region in return for Ural ore, but now local iron fields are being exploited and a regionalized industrialization is under way. At Stalinsk there is a continuous strip-rolling mill on the model of the most modern American plants. The Ridder combine producing lead-zinc ores now furnishes sixty-one percent of total all-Union production.

Midway between the Urals and Kuznetsk, somewhat to the south, lie the newly developed areas of Kazakhstan, especially the Karaganda coal fields. This has now been connected by rail to the other centers; the new line from Karaganda to the Urals now makes it possible to substitute the Karaganda for the Kuznetsk coal, a shorter distance by 400 miles. On the shores of Lake Balkash are the Kounrad copper works, the largest in the whole world. Kazakhstan is larger in size than Germany, France, Holland, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia combined. And together with the other central Asiatic republics, it is among the fastest growing areas in the Union.

An even better way to understand what is happening east of the Volga is to consider the population growth in what were only yesterday steppes and deserts. There are now seven cities of about 500,000 people, that is, seven cities the size of Buffalo or Cincinnati in and east of the Urals. There are seventy cities with populations that range down to 100,000, that is, the size of Gary, Ind.

And what I have said thus far is exclusive of the Far East, where a center of heavy industry has grown up, which we must assume is working primarily on its own defense needs.

IT IS CLEAR then that they'll keep going. What we have to do is see that our materials get across in the next weeks and months, to tide them over the critical winter period, to give them time to fulfill their own plans. That is what Mr. Harriman and Lord Beaverbrook promised.

JOSEPH STAROBIN.

EASTERN FRONT: FOUR MONTHS


Colonel T. summarizes the major developments of the mammoth campaign. The slowing down of Nazi blitzkrieg methods. The Red Army's superior use of infantry and artillery.

AT THIS writing, when four months have elapsed since the invasion of the Soviet Union began, it seems timely to take stock of the major developments of the mammoth campaign. In four months the Germans, roughly speaking, have occupied a band of Soviet territory 500 miles wide and 1,000 miles long, or a total of 500,000 square miles. The price of this conquest has probably been not far from 4,000,000 casualties, or eight men per square mile, or two divisions per day. Truly a terrific price.

From a geographical breakdown of this offensive month by month, as roughly shown on the map and charts on the next page, we plainly see that during the first month the Nazi High Command made a definite bid for Moscow in the hope of capturing it and offering "peace." The Nazi advance reached a point some 475 miles from the border during that month, and that on the Moscow line only. The advance on the Leningrad line was about 300 miles; on the Kiev line, 200 miles; on the Odessa-Rostov line, only about fifty miles. There is no doubt that up to the second month of the war the German High Command expected to capture Moscow within six weeks from the start of the war.

The *second month* saw a complete stalemate on the Moscow line, with the Germans making a bid for Leningrad and the Ukraine on the right bank of the Dneiper. The *third month* was the least spectacular of all: a small advance toward Leningrad to invest the city, but failing to take it. On the Kharkov line—the battle east of Kiev. On the Rostov line—the investment of the Crimea. On the Moscow front general stalemate continued, with Timoshenko's armies launching a local counter-offensive at Yartsevo and Yelnia. The *fourth month* of the war saw a general broad-front offensive developing from Lake Ilmen to the Sea of Azov, with the Germans remaining comparatively passive only on the Leningrad front.

A GLANCE at the charts of the Nazi advance show that at the end of the first month the front appeared as a sharp salient pointing toward Moscow. Here we have Hitler's basic failure. He did not succeed in taking Moscow in August and to get the rest by negotiation or what is now called in France "*une petainade*." Failing this, the German High Command started to bring up its flanks. This was the job at hand during the second month. But Kiev held and formed a bulge. Leningrad held, too. So during the third month the Germans further tightened their lines around Leningrad, eliminated, at long last, the Kiev salient, and thrust toward the Crimea. The front became an almost straight line, from Leningrad to Melitopol. And then



came the fourth and crucial month with its general assault on the broadest front ever seen: eight hundred miles of fierce fighting, with probably two hundred divisions engaged on each side.

TODAY THE FRONT LINE is licking the railroad trunk line Leningrad-Moscow-Kharkov-Rostov at many points along its 1,300-mile length. But the very symmetry and evenness of the huge line reveal the frustration of the Nazis' original plan. They hoped for a stiletto stab at Moscow and for a quick "*petainade*." Instead of that they have to hammer with all available forces along the entire length of the great front. The cost of this hammering to the German Army is, among other things, reflected in the fact that the German High Command had to bring Finnish and Hungarian divisions to the central front, thus throwing to the winds the cheap fiction that these countries were only fighting for territories they consider "their own"—along Karelia and in the Carpathians. The Germans are forced to make full use of the 100-odd divisions drawn from the people subjugated by them.

The failure of the classical blitzkrieg methods against the powerful resistance of the Red Army has also brought about a fundamental change in German tank tactics. Instead of independent fully mechanized thrusts to crack the enemy front, paralyze his rear, and produce huge encirclements and surrenders by means of unsupported tank divisions and armies, the Germans now are forced to distribute their tanks among their infantry divisions, using them for purely tactical, instead of strategic purposes. This remains a war of tanks, but the German tanks are not forming great "daggers" any more. They are being drawn up steam-roller fashion. Instead of stabbing and killing at one blow they now push and press. And, of course, instead of being shot at only along the faces of a salient,

they are being engaged and destroyed along the entire front. They still keep coming, but their losses are huge. They have to fight instead of pursuing, as they did in the west. This is why their losses are greater than those of the defenders and the difference in numbers is being slowly reduced.

It is now clear after four months of war that the German Luftwaffe has completely failed to win supremacy in the air. The Germans, on the average, have been losing more than two planes to every Soviet plane. The German flyers have not reduced great cities to rubble. They have not seriously impaired the Soviet railroad system even in the immediate rear, as attested by the arrival of reinforcements from Kaluga to Bryansk within several hours. They have failed to crush the Soviet airdromes. A great toll of German tanks is being taken by Soviet dive bombers. Soviet fliers destroy a great part of German planes on the ground.

SOVIET ARTILLERY plays an outstanding role in beating off German attacks. There seems to be no numerical inferiority in that branch of the Red Army. The shortness of Soviet artillery preparation for an attack (from ten minutes to six hours) shows that Soviet artillery has a high rate and power of fire.

As far as infantry is concerned, it has been noted that this all-important branch of the service is superior on the Red Army side. It is superior in staying power and in dash. Soviet infantry does not waver when outflanked, does not retreat when enveloped, and does not surrender when encircled. The German infantry usually fails to stand up to a Soviet bayonet charge.

The manpower reserves of the Soviet Union are equal to at least 20,000,000 fully trained men, plus perhaps another 15,000,000 fighters trained in guerrilla warfare. Hitler cannot possibly extract more than half that number from the German people. The more Nazis are killed in the East, the less men he will be able to force into his ranks from the conquered peoples of Europe, be it in the armies or in the fields and factories.

The German lines of communications have now been stretched to the fateful (from the logistical viewpoint) length of 500 miles on the average. The length of the Soviet lines has been reduced by that much, assuming that the main army supply centers are on the Volga-Ural line. This, of course, should not be taken to mean that the Soviet Union has been benefited by a huge loss of territory, but from a military viewpoint the shortening of the lines must be chalked up as an advantage in the trial balance.

And, finally, winter has settled down on a great part of the Eastern Front. One of