


# VICHY'S COUDERT

Vichy Buys the Palatial Mitchell Mansion  
On Fifth Ave. for Use as Consulate General



THE Rapp-Coudert committee has spent \$200,000 in its investigation of "subversive activities" in the public schools and colleges of New York City. That's a lot of money. The boys on Bataan would have appreciated \$200,000 worth of extra equipment.

How was the money used? Against the enemy or for him? The answer is given by the Rapp-Coudert committee in its report to the New York State legislature. The answer is an affront to our troops at Corregidor, New Caledonia, North Ireland.

The committee reported that information regarding Nazi activity in our schools "was not material to the education inquiry." Pro-fascist conspiracies evidently do not fall into the category of "subversive activities." As a result, the Rapp-Coudert committee does not present a single case of enemy activity against our schools. The committee therefore lends a protective coloration to the enemies of our war effort.

Coudert's attempt to make "Communism" the issue falls in with Hitler's strategy. This attempt "is designed to divert attention from the job we should all be united on—the defeat of Hitler and all his puppets." In these words, Pres. Charles E. Hendley of the New York Teachers Union sums up the whole case against Coudert. It is no cause for wonder that two members of the committee refused to sign his disruptive report.

As we have constantly warned, the "anti-Bolshevik" crusade is the mask of a general drive against every genuine anti-fascist force. Frederic Coudert proves it by smearing not only the alleged reds, but by concentrating his fire on

among the 434.

The investigation did not divulge "substantial evidence of Nazi or Fascist conspiracy against the schools," despite such activities outside the schools.

Several pages of the report

Murphy's postal card to Mr. Grunwald

I will call to see you to-morrow evening about seven o'clock I will then recommend that you come to school and talk to some of our younger members who are scholars in methods of joining the ranks. Sincerely J. Murphy

On the left is the photo from the New York Times of March 26 of Vichy's new quarters in New York. We have added the inset photo of Senator Coudert which should adorn the building since his firm, Coudert Bros., are attorneys for Hitler's "collaborators." Above is a clipping from Hearst's *Journal-American* of April 22, and below it evidence of the fascist activity Coudert worked so hard not to find: a post card sent by Timothy F. Murphy, until recently dean at Samuel Gompers Vocational School, to Werner Grunwald, linked to the Nazi Bund, inviting him to "come to school and talk to some of our younger members."

New York's Board of Higher Education. He attacks the faculty-democratization plan of the New York public colleges on the ground that the democratic principle is untrustworthy. In fact, the committee now claims for itself the right to excommunicate any ideas or conduct of which it disapproves. It urges that "emphasis be laid on personal standards of conduct rather than proof of membership in conspirative groups." And these "personal standards of conduct" are to be judged in terms of whether they correspond to the "Communist pattern." Here is a net wide enough to cover every anti-fascist in America.

A study of the committee's report shows a striking resemblance to the recent pronouncements of Laval's puppet regime. It is an interesting fact that Mr. Coudert is an attorney for that regime.

It is astonishing that newspapers like the New York *Herald Tribune* and the New York *Times* fail to see this. They must learn to see the contradiction between their support of Coudert and their support of the war against the Axis. Moreover, there is a glaring disparity between the *Times'* attack on American Communists, whether real or alleged, and its editorial observation the same week that the French Communists form "a rallying point for patriots joined for the first time to the forces of the extreme left by the strong bond of a common hate." This strong bond of anti-fascist hate would be loosened by the Lavals and the Couderts. That is their common object.

It is not too late to urge Governor Lehman to withhold the \$50,000 added appropriation for Coudert. That money should buy cartridges, not aid and comfort for our enemies.

# WHY HITLER PROMOTED LAVAL



turned over the power to Petain. Laval acted merely as a go-between.

Were it not for Laval, Petain would have remained just another retired marshal, remembered by officials as "the victor of Verdun" and by the World War veterans as the man who butchered the mutiny back in 1917. Whether he accepted his new role as an accomplice or as a tool, is a problem for psychologists. The result was the same.

At the time of the armistice the future Vichy personnel comprised men who wanted Hitler to win and those who were convinced he had won already. Only to that extent can one speak of any differences of opinion among the Petains, the Darlans, and the Laval. The politician was simply smarter than the marshal and the admiral. The latter might have nurtured illusions about a fascist France in a democratic world, but Laval knew that their common rule could endure only in a Hitler-dominated world.

That was in 1940. In the two ensuing years—during which foreign observers have emphasized a conflict between Vichy and Berlin, an actual struggle was going on between Petain and Hitler on one hand, and the French people on the other.

Petaín did score a few "victories." He outlawed the people's political parties and the trade unions, persecuted the Jews, filled the concentration camps, and made innumerable speeches. But all this was of no avail; he failed to win the French people. They would not collaborate with Hitler. They would not collaborate with Vichy. They would not even believe—as did many persons abroad—that the Nazis actually were displeased with Vichy. If at first the Frenchman had been stunned by the defeat, if many of them did really trust Petain, if problems of food were at one moment more pressing than politics, today that is no longer so.

England was not defeated. The Soviet Union inflicted the first great defeat on Hitler. Petain no longer could plead the inescapability of a Nazi victory. America joined the fight and Petain became less useful as a link between Hitler and the neutrals. Above all, he did not succeed in presenting Hitler with a benevolent France: the Nazis face today a country more hostile and much more united than in 1940. The old marshal outlived his importance, if ever he had any. Fascism has lost the second battle of France, in which its troops were led by "the victor of Verdun." Fascism has lost it at a time when it cannot afford to lose battles.

What was Hitler to do? To occupy south-

*A Frenchman tells why the Petain-Darlan combination failed.  
The new Premier's task: "To make France safe for fascism."  
Antoine Hebert forecasts Der Fuehrer's next step.*

WHILE Pierre Laval stood before the microphone to deliver his first broadcast as the head of the Vichy government, still warm bodies of Frenchmen, riddled with Nazi bullets, were piling up in barracks, yards and vacant lots of the occupied zone. Thus began what has been termed "a new era in the history of French-German relations," and what will be known later as the beginning of open warfare in France.

I must say that the reaction of many American commentators to the latest French events was as naive as it was sudden. They pitied the poor old Marshal Petain, and incidentally the French people. They foresaw a complete change of rule in Vichy. They lamented the second and decisive "fall of France," now reduced to the status of a Nazi vassal.

But in my opinion, it is time to quit worrying about that senile butcher of his own people. The new shift in the Vichy personnel can become a defeat for the fascist rulers of France, hence a Nazi defeat. As for the French people, they do not need pity, but arms. They do not care about obituaries but would welcome a second front.

Laval did not pop up unexpectedly out of Otto Abetz' pocket. In the past fifteen years French reaction has tried time and again to impose him upon the French people who invariably ejected him from office. The struggle culminated in 1935 when the then Prime Minister Laval, on the eve of senatorial elections, relinquished his seat in a Parisian suburb and fled to his native village rather than face a Communist opponent. As an individual he was unimportant, and still is. He and scores of other reactionary politicians, carried away by the landslide of the People's Front, were but the obedient servants of the Schneiders, the de Wendels, the Michelins.

As long as the latter succeeded in keeping the people divided and their own stooges elected, they had been all out for democracy. Confronted with a united front of common people, they changed their mind. If a constituency no longer could be blackmailed or cheated into electing Laval, if the Parliament insisted on governing the country, de-

mocracy had outlived its purpose. Bullets were to prove more efficient than vote bulletins.

When the day of reckoning came—in June 1940, in Bordeaux—two problems were involved. First, how to make the armistice contribute toward a Nazi victory? That was Hitler's chief concern, in which the French fascists were vitally interested. Second, how to make the people of France swallow the deal without provoking a civil war? That was the chief concern of the French fascists, in which Hitler was vitally interested. On the solution of these problems depended the future of fascism—in France and in Germany.

It is often assumed that Hitler aimed at enslaving France and reducing her to a colonial status. That may be true, but only after he has won a world-wide victory. As long as the war lasts, what Hitler needs is a strong and friendly France. Not strong enough to remain a danger to himself, but powerful enough to be able at least to defend herself—on his side, and against his enemies.

After all, France is not Slovakia; it is the second largest empire in the world. As an Axis partner, she would prove much more valuable than Italy. If close collaboration were impossible, however, France had to be kept neutral. Already planning to attack the Soviet Union, Hitler could not afford to get involved in an upheaval in the West; nor did he have men to spare to conquer hostile French colonies, or man the French Navy. Moreover, a neutral France would protect his rear, just as Italy did until June 1940. Accordingly, instead of appointing a Gauleiter, Hitler let the French fascists take the matter in their own hands. If he needed them, they needed him even more.

They knew they could not beat the French people into submission, they had to double-cross them. The French army, though defeated, still existed; there were loyal officers; and the privates were armed. The use of a decoy was imperative: a man whose soldier's honor was unquestioned as yet even by his adversaries at home and abroad. Even Parliament had to be respected. So the Chamber of Deputies voted itself out of existence and