

PERSPECTIVES FROM POTSDAM

By THE EDITORS

THE essence of the Potsdam Declaration of President Truman, Generalissimo Stalin and Prime Minister Attlee is that the three powers which brought the German armies to defeat now have agreed upon a detailed plan for the destruction of the economic and political base of fascism in Germany. It is a heartening document in that the representatives of the two most powerful capitalist nations and of the Soviet Union, months after the removal of the compelling pressures of the European war, have given expression in it to a continuing high level of anti-fascist unity among the United Nations leaders.

Because of the confused and often anti-democratic policies practiced by American and British authorities in their zones of occupation, because of pro-fascist tendencies in the foreign policies of both of these nations toward Greece, toward the problem of Trieste, toward China and toward the Nazi government of Argentina, there has been widespread fear that the victory over Hitlerism might be betrayed. The Potsdam Declaration does not altogether remove these fears, for its terms have still to be applied with the same forthrightness and clarity as they are expressed in the tripartite document. However, that agreement has been reached on such decisive measures marks another historic victory for the forces of democracy.

As early as 1929 the Communist International recognized fascism as "the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic and most imperialist elements of finance capital." Sixteen years later the Soviet Union has reached an agreement with the two most powerful representatives of monopoly capitalism to strike at the roots of fascism in the nation where it gained its most reactionary and brutal expression. There can be no doubt that the major role which the land of socialism has played in the defeat of Germany and in the making of the peace is primarily responsible for the anti-fascist vigor of these latest agreements.

IT is the evident intention of the Allied leaders to eliminate the possibility of a resurgence of fascism in Germany. In addition to thorough-going industrial disarmament, the economic section of the Potsdam Declaration calls for the following highly significant action: "At

the earliest practicable date the German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements." The leading Allies, moreover, declare their intention "to exercise control and the power of disposition over German-owned external assets not already under the control of United Nations." An easy test of whether Britain and the United States mean what they say in making the latter pledge will be to watch what they do to seize Nazi wealth now hiding under the protective wing of the Farrell-Peron government of Argentina.

The economic principles adopted at Potsdam also mark a defeat for those groups in Britain and the United States that sought to preserve German heavy industry in order to rebuild Germany as a counterweight to the USSR. What emerges in the Potsdam Declaration seems to be along the lines of the measures advocated by former Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau and other progressive members of the administration—measures similar to those urged by Soviet spokesmen. All war production is to be suppressed and the production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that might be used for war purposes is to be "rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany's approved post-war peacetime needs. . . ." In addition, industrial capital equipment not needed for German peace production is to be removed in payment of reparations. "In organizing the German economy," the Declaration states, "primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries."

The Declaration also includes an agreement on reparations. A principle guiding reparations payments will be to "leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance." And average German living standards are not to exceed the average of other European countries.

The political principles of the Potsdam Declaration, if faithfully adhered to, will spell the extermination of the Nazi Party and its affiliates and of all Nazi institutions, as well as the removal of all those Nazis and quasi-Nazis who have been comfortably bedded down in

various administrative posts in the American and British zones. But beyond this the Declaration looks toward "the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis" and "eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany." In keeping with this the Declaration accepts for the whole of Germany the practice established in the Russian zone of permitting the formation of democratic political parties and trade unions and of granting within the limits of military security freedom of speech, press, assembly and religion.

THE sections on Germany constitute the most carefully worked out portions of the tripartite agreement. In addition, the Declaration contains a number of other significant decisions. The policy toward the provisional government of Poland is vigorously reaffirmed and the boundaries of that nation are tentatively determined. The first task of the new Council of Foreign Ministers, created during the conference and including the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, is designated as the conclusion of a peace treaty with Italy. Similar treaties are then to be drafted with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. The fascist government of Spain "having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers," is not to be admitted to the United Nations.

Two proposals put forward by the Soviet Union on which agreement was not reached at Berlin are noted and will be studied in the near future. One involves the extension of the authority of the provisional government of Austria to the entire country. The other, the inclusion of former Italian colonies in the trusteeship system set up at San Francisco, indicates that the Soviet Union will continue to champion the principle of genuine self-determination for dependent countries at every international gathering. The disposition of the Italian colonies is to come up again when the Council of Foreign Ministers negotiates the peace treaty with Italy.

The major task of the Berlin Conference was to work out a detailed plan for the extermination of German fascism and for the eventual development of German democracy. In this task it achieved a large measure of success. Its other work reflected the same demo-

cratic unity which characterized the great wartime conferences of Moscow, Teheran and Yalta and which eventually triumphed at San Francisco. The Berlin Conference, however, has not thereby ended the struggle for democracy throughout Europe. No reference was made to Greece, where British subsidized reaction still sits in the saddle, nor to Yugoslavia, where Tito's democratic government is still under attacks inspired from abroad. The action on Spain, moreover, can only be described as the minimum that could be done under the circumstances. Above all, the

Potsdam Declaration as a whole and in its several parts remains to be implemented by actions and policies consistent with its principles. Such implementation will require a far more democratic and anti-fascist policy on the part of the American State Department and the British Foreign Office than has so far been evidenced. And it will require vigilance and action from the labor movements and peoples of these two countries.

Moreover, there can be no separation of the problem of dealing with a militarily defeated Germany from that of bringing to completion the war against

fascist Japan. No one can miss the extraordinary contrast between the terms agreed to regarding Germany and the double talk and shady maneuvers vis-a-vis Japan emanating from high official American circles. Until the inconsistencies which today exist between the agreements on Europe and Anglo-American policies in the Far East are removed, until our anti-democratic China policy is reversed and a colonial program is adopted that looks forward to early independence, the splendid words of the Potsdam Declaration remain in constant jeopardy.

NM SPOTLIGHT

America's Petainist

THE publication of Admiral Leahy's shocking letter to Marshal Petain casts a cloud over the Truman administration which can be lifted only by the public repudiation of the letter and the removal of its author from his post. Admiral Leahy is President Truman's personal chief of staff, serving in the same capacity as under the late President Roosevelt. As such he participated in the Potsdam conferences. He is also the former American ambassador to France, having been accredited to Vichy from January 1941 to April 1942. It is evident that his interests and activities are not limited to military matters.

Leahy's intervention in Petain's treason trial in order to defend France's arch-war criminal is a political act. His effort to depict Petain as anti-Nazi and his statement that the Marshal's "principal concern was the welfare and protection of the helpless people of France" are an insult to the memories of the heroic Frenchmen—and Americans—who have died fighting all that Petain and his master, Hitler, stood for. This insult is not diminished by Leahy's attempt to make it appear that he disagreed with Petain's servile yielding to the Axis. It was Petain and his accomplices who showed their concern for the French people by delivering thousands of patriots into the hands of the Gestapo executioners. It was Petain who sentenced De Gaulle to death. It was Petain who ordered his minions in North Africa to resist the American and British liberating armies. It was Petain who overthrew the French republic and established a fascist state sprinkled with

clerical holy water. It was Petain who even in the hour of Germany's doom refused to break with the Nazis and sought refuge among them from his own people.

The Leahy letter, dated, ironically, on the fourth anniversary of the Nazi invasion of Russia, is a blot on the Potsdam Declaration and will shake the confidence of the peoples of Europe in the purposes of the American government. For President Truman to retain this pro-fascist as a close adviser is to compromise his administration in the eyes of the entire democratic world.

Culture for the World

THE State Department has now published the draft proposals for an Educational and Cultural Organization of the United Nations, prepared by the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education in London. It is an enlightened proposal based on the recognition, in its own words, "that cooperation in education and the furtherance of cultural interchange in the arts, the humanities and the sciences will promote the freedom, the dignity and the well-being of all, and therefore assist in the attainment of understanding, confidence, security and peace among the peoples of the world." The scope of the proposed organization, which shall consist of a conference—a representative body to which the participating organizations shall send delegates—to meet annually, with an elected executive board and a permanent secretariat, has the richest of possibilities. Its essential functions are declared to be to "facilitate consultation among leaders in the educational and

cultural life of all peace-loving peoples," to "assist the free flow of ideas and information among the peoples of the world through schools, universities and other educational and research institutions, libraries, publications and the press, radio and the motion picture, international conferences and the exchange of students, teachers and all other representatives of educational and cultural life, with special attention to the exchange of information on major educational and cultural developments, including advances in scientific knowledge." It is to promote programs within the participating countries supporting peace and security, to "develop and make available" cultural materials, "conduct and encourage research" on educational and cultural programs "related to maintaining peace and the advancement of human welfare," and finally, to "assist countries that need and request help in developing their educational and cultural activities." In a word, it provides the basis for an organ that can immensely enrich the lot of mankind everywhere.

But these proposals, like many others that are the fruits of the great efforts of the democratic peoples of this time, can produce much or little, depending on how they are implemented. The State Department has asked for thorough public discussion of the draft before the final sessions in November to draw up the constitution, and much of its eventual success will depend on just how widely understood and supported these proposals become in the intervening period. Much will especially depend upon the USA as the wealthiest of the participating nations, and one with great

potential contributions. Much will also depend on how clearly the people will make known their will to participate in such a wide cultural project. For this program will be fought by the same old enemies of enlightenment and culture, in many devious ways, and it will take vigilance, knowledge and unmistakable public enthusiasm to bring America's contribution to the high standard of our potential in such an undertaking.

Breadlines?

AS THE reconversion situation stands today a speedy victory over Japan will be marred by mass unemployment and economic confusion that may well lead into a grave depression. Organized labor has been warning the nation of this danger for over a year. Franklin D. Roosevelt saw the gathering clouds and took preliminary measures to combat the perils, but up to now no adequate steps have been taken to prepare the nation for the transition to peacetime production. The latest analysis of the situation comes in the fourth annual report of the Mead Senate Committee investigating the national defense program (former Truman Committee) which states that "should the war in the Pacific end soon, it will find us largely unprepared to overcome our domestic problems." The ensuing large-scale unemployment which the committee foresees will not only be tragic punishment for millions of war workers and their families, but also a potent economic force that will "seriously interfere with the achieving of prosperity."

The Mead report finds the chief weakness in the reconversion picture to be the absence of overall planning and central authority. The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, set up by FDR with James F. Byrnes as its first director, "must plan and issue orders and not confine itself to umpiring disputes." The report calls for granting the OWMR authority to coordinate all reconversion planning and executive power to act. It is unfortunate that the recommendations overlook the vital legislative measures essential to safeguard the human side of reconversion.

It is all too obvious that the urgent warning of the Mead Committee fell on the deaf ears of Congressmen occupied with planning their two-month vacation. Pending their return to their deserted posts the responsibility for emergency measures rests now with President Truman. The President, whose views on reconversion are sound



We are deeply conscious of the loss we have suffered through the untimely death on Tuesday, July 31, of David McKelvy White, Executive Secretary of the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Friends of Republican Spain are grieved that David White, who was a machine gunner in the International Brigade in Spain and later through his organizational activities, contributed so much to the aid of that brave country, will be unable to carry on until the fight is won. Mr. White contributed to New Masses on many occasions. Next week we will print a profile of him by a member of the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade.

but whose actions to date are not impressive, can do much through energetic executive measures to correct the irresponsible complacency of men like J. A. Krug, chairman of the War Production Board, who has urged reliance on natural economic forces to tide us over the reconversion period. And centralized planning and direction of the reconversion process, to be truly effective, requires the active participation of the labor movement. The CIO's proposal of a national production council and industry councils, in which labor, management and the government shall be represented, remains the best plan for achieving an orderly transition to peacetime production.

Congress Fiddles

THE right to work as formulated in the Murray full employment bill and expressed in the popular demand for 60,000,000 jobs constitutes the cen-

tral domestic war aim of the American people. The British people likewise placed full employment in the forefront of their postwar aims when they elected their Labor government. Senator Pepper in his recent speech to the Senate put it succinctly when he said: "The people want—nay, they demand—that we have full employment in peace as well as in war. This is the demand of the returning veterans as well as the war workers at home . . . the people are on the march."

Senator Pepper reflected the mounting volume of popular insistence that the Murray bill be adopted. At the preliminary Senate hearings on the bill last week Senator Wagner voiced similar views in urging its passage. But the opening session of the hearings also revealed, as might have been expected, that a number of large employers have already placed themselves on record against the bill on the grounds that "private enterprise" requires a substantial pool of unemployed and that full employment is a "Communist doctrine." Organized labor as yet has had no opportunity to state its views at the hearings. But organized labor is conducting a nationwide campaign in the factories and communities to bring pressure on Congress to pass the full employment bill, the emergency unemployment insurance, and the sixty-five cent minimum pay law.

We must also insist that Congress return to Washington promptly and discharge its responsibilities to the nation. There is no reason why members of Congress should enjoy a two-month vacation with pay when thousands of their countrymen are bleeding in the Pacific, when scores of thousands of their constituents are being laid off, and when the national economy is on the verge of crisis. Either President Truman or the congressional leaders can call Congress back to work.

Here and There

SALUTE to the 969th Field Artillery Battalion, made up of Negro enlisted men, which received a presidential citation for its historic nine-day stand at Bastogne.

- Congratulations to Dr. Cornelia T. Snell, chemical engineer, who became the first woman chairman of the New York section of the American Chemical Society.

- Applause for the outstanding young American composer, William M. Schuman, who at the age of thirty-five was appointed head of America's great conservatory, the Juilliard School of Music.



WHAT THE JAPANESE ARMY FACES

WHILE a curious world was expecting the Potsdam communique to divulge "sensational" agreements concerning the future role of the USSR in the struggle against Japan, the lengthy 7,500-word document devoted only twenty-two words to something which might be construed as having a bearing on the Pacific war. The last paragraph of the communique said: "During the conference there were meetings between the chiefs of staff of the three governments on military matters of common interest."

It would seem that "matters of common interest" connected with military occupation activities in Europe would have been discussed by the respective commanders of the forces of occupation. The Chiefs of Staff obviously discussed something bigger. Irrespective of the role the Soviet Union is destined to play in the war against Japan, it has an "interest" in the matter. The "interest" is to destroy fascism wherever it is to be found and to insure peace. Thus, say what you may and as you wish in diplomatic language, the Soviet people are interested in the destruction of Japanese feudal militarism and modern imperialism. Much more interested in this than in a railroad or a port in the northern part of China.

The sympathies of the Soviet people in the struggle now going on have been definitely expressed in many ways. Premier Stalin has called Japan "an aggressor nation" in an official speech. The Red Army has been conducting large scale maneuvers along its Far Eastern border this spring and summer. The Soviet press and its military commentators have been giving a pretty realistic picture of Japan's military plight to their readers. There was a small, but highly characteristic item in the press: the Soviet military command in Berlin "advised" a German opera company not to produce Puccini's *Madam Butterfly* for the time being. Now, Russians love Puccini, as they love all good music, but . . . Cho-Cho-San in the opera is Japanese and *right*, while the naval officer is American and *wrong*. And so it was a matter of courtesy to the American allies of the

Soviet Union as well as of expressing once more on what side Soviet sympathy lies. And then—look at the film of the May Day parade in Moscow and you will see the splendid isolation in which the Japanese military attache watches the proceedings. So much for the psychology of the Soviet attitude toward Japan. However, the Chiefs of Staff did not discuss parades and opera. Other "matters of common interest" occupied them. One of them, and perhaps the only one, was the Japanese army, which is the only branch of the Japanese Imperial Service which is still almost intact. This army is in the process of being checkmated, cornered in Manchuria and North China.

The Japanese army is psychologically concerned. Traditionally it was *not for a big oceanic war, but for a big continental war* (Max Werner). The famous Tanaka memorandum of the twenties set out to prove that China must be conquered before Siberia, and Siberia—before the world. This meant first and foremost a big continental war. General Tojo, an army man, advocated publicly in 1938 a two-front war against China and the Soviet Union. This resulted in the "trial wars" of 1938 and 1939 against the Soviet Union, wars which had such dire results for the Japanese (not that their losses were decisively heavy, but their "nerve" was broken for any future attack on the Red Army). However, some time later, the Japanese navy, the army's aristocratic and traditional rival, stepped in with a plan for a big oceanic war. The navy was going to get for the army and its future continental conquests all the natural resources of the south. In acquiescing to the attack on Pearl Harbor the Japanese army leadership completely defeated its own plan and reversed its doctrine. It can be rightly accused of "tailism" in relation to the navy.

The Japanese navy has utterly failed in the execution of its plan for a big oceanic war. In fact the oceanic war has come back to Japan's Inner Sea. Instead of the Hawaiians, Honshu is being attacked. Kiska has moved to Paramushiro, the Gilberts have gone to Okinawa and the Solomons have shifted

to Borneo. In a long process beginning in the Coral Sea more than three years ago and through a series of practically unbroken air-sea victories by American arms the Japanese navy has been reduced to the sorry shadow of itself.

Our Assistant Secretary of the Navy said the other day: "The Japanese do not have a single battleship in operation. They probably have two or three carriers that may be operational, but they are no longer a serious threat. If the Jap fleet has three cruisers left that can still steam, I'd be very much surprised. . . ."

Even discounting Mr. Artemus L. Gates' optimism somewhat, there is not the slightest doubt that what is left of the Imperial Fleet is no damn good for an oceanic war. It is good for the temporary defense of the communications across the Japan and Yellow Seas—no more. It is nothing but a sort of "rear echelon" to the Japanese continental army.

Thus "the wind has returned upon its circles" and the Japanese army is again the "main thing." However, it is not what it was in the glorious days of the Tanaka-Tojo doctrine simply because it has lost its freedom of action. It can strike for the rice of the "Chinese bowl," it can carry through small scale maneuvering between the railroad corridor and the coast of China. It can ship a few divisions to the home island or shuttle them to Korea and Manchuria, but it has been robbed of its strategic initiative. It is cornered in the northern continental theater. The words "checkmate" are ringing in its ears.

What robbed the Japanese army of that initiative? Several factors. First, *having for years prepared for a continental war and then embarked on an oceanic war*, it was faced with a discrepancy in means. It simply did not have the means for waging a modern amphibious war (which needs aircraft carriers in great numbers, special craft and weapons, special planes, etc.). It squandered its fleet and its air force in "oceanic attempts." Now it cannot shift back to the production of weapons for continental war.

Second, our advance to the doorstep