



WHAT THE JAPANESE ARMY FACES

WHILE a curious world was expecting the Potsdam communique to divulge "sensational" agreements concerning the future role of the USSR in the struggle against Japan, the lengthy 7,500-word document devoted only twenty-two words to something which might be construed as having a bearing on the Pacific war. The last paragraph of the communique said: "During the conference there were meetings between the chiefs of staff of the three governments on military matters of common interest."

It would seem that "matters of common interest" connected with military occupation activities in Europe would have been discussed by the respective commanders of the forces of occupation. The Chiefs of Staff obviously discussed something bigger. Irrespective of the role the Soviet Union is destined to play in the war against Japan, it has an "interest" in the matter. The "interest" is to destroy fascism wherever it is to be found and to insure peace. Thus, say what you may and as you wish in diplomatic language, the Soviet people are interested in the destruction of Japanese feudal militarism and modern imperialism. Much more interested in this than in a railroad or a port in the northern part of China.

The sympathies of the Soviet people in the struggle now going on have been definitely expressed in many ways. Premier Stalin has called Japan "an aggressor nation" in an official speech. The Red Army has been conducting large scale maneuvers along its Far Eastern border this spring and summer. The Soviet press and its military commentators have been giving a pretty realistic picture of Japan's military plight to their readers. There was a small, but highly characteristic item in the press: the Soviet military command in Berlin "advised" a German opera company not to produce Puccini's *Madam Butterfly* for the time being. Now, Russians love Puccini, as they love all good music, but . . . Cho-Cho-San in the opera is Japanese and *right*, while the naval officer is American and *wrong*. And so it was a matter of courtesy to the American allies of the

Soviet Union as well as of expressing once more on what side Soviet sympathy lies. And then—look at the film of the May Day parade in Moscow and you will see the splendid isolation in which the Japanese military attache watches the proceedings. So much for the psychology of the Soviet attitude toward Japan. However, the Chiefs of Staff did not discuss parades and opera. Other "matters of common interest" occupied them. One of them, and perhaps the only one, was the Japanese army, which is the only branch of the Japanese Imperial Service which is still almost intact. This army is in the process of being checkmated, cornered in Manchuria and North China.

The Japanese army is psychologically concerned. Traditionally it was *not for a big oceanic war, but for a big continental war* (Max Werner). The famous Tanaka memorandum of the twenties set out to prove that China must be conquered before Siberia, and Siberia—before the world. This meant first and foremost a big continental war. General Tojo, an army man, advocated publicly in 1938 a two-front war against China and the Soviet Union. This resulted in the "trial wars" of 1938 and 1939 against the Soviet Union, wars which had such dire results for the Japanese (not that their losses were decisively heavy, but their "nerve" was broken for any future attack on the Red Army). However, some time later, the Japanese navy, the army's aristocratic and traditional rival, stepped in with a plan for a big oceanic war. The navy was going to get for the army and its future continental conquests all the natural resources of the south. In acquiescing to the attack on Pearl Harbor the Japanese army leadership completely defeated its own plan and reversed its doctrine. It can be rightly accused of "tailism" in relation to the navy.

The Japanese navy has utterly failed in the execution of its plan for a big oceanic war. In fact the oceanic war has come back to Japan's Inner Sea. Instead of the Hawaiians, Honshu is being attacked. Kiska has moved to Paramushiro, the Gilberts have gone to Okinawa and the Solomons have shifted

to Borneo. In a long process beginning in the Coral Sea more than three years ago and through a series of practically unbroken air-sea victories by American arms the Japanese navy has been reduced to the sorry shadow of itself.

Our Assistant Secretary of the Navy said the other day: "The Japanese do not have a single battleship in operation. They probably have two or three carriers that may be operational, but they are no longer a serious threat. If the Jap fleet has three cruisers left that can still steam, I'd be very much surprised. . . ."

Even discounting Mr. Artemus L. Gates' optimism somewhat, there is not the slightest doubt that what is left of the Imperial Fleet is no damn good for an oceanic war. It is good for the temporary defense of the communications across the Japan and Yellow Seas—no more. It is nothing but a sort of "rear echelon" to the Japanese continental army.

Thus "the wind has returned upon its circles" and the Japanese army is again the "main thing." However, it is not what it was in the glorious days of the Tanaka-Tojo doctrine simply because it has lost its freedom of action. It can strike for the rice of the "Chinese bowl," it can carry through small scale maneuvering between the railroad corridor and the coast of China. It can ship a few divisions to the home island or shuttle them to Korea and Manchuria, but it has been robbed of its strategic initiative. It is cornered in the northern continental theater. The words "checkmate" are ringing in its ears.

What robbed the Japanese army of that initiative? Several factors. First, *having for years prepared for a continental war and then embarked on an oceanic war*, it was faced with a discrepancy in means. It simply did not have the means for waging a modern amphibious war (which needs aircraft carriers in great numbers, special craft and weapons, special planes, etc.). It squandered its fleet and its air force in "oceanic attempts." Now it cannot shift back to the production of weapons for continental war.

Second, our advance to the doorstep

of Japan and to within striking distance of the China coast has almost cut the communications between Japan and the southern half of its loot-empire where between half a million and a million Japanese troops are virtually cut off and are bound to be abandoned to their fate by their generals. Thus the Japanese army is not only left without the necessary power for a *modern* land war, but is doomed to awaiting the final blow in a theater not of its own choosing. In other words, it cannot maneuver strategically any more and meet its opponents where it wishes. It must stay between the Yangtze (or the Yellow River) and the Amur. In 1945 Japan is back almost where she was in 1937 and soon will be back where she was in 1931.

Third, the Japanese army is deprived of strategic initiative by the fact that the Soviet Union is victorious over Germany and free to move as many troops as she wishes to the Manchu and Mongolian border. If even during the days of the Battles of Moscow and Stalingrad, the Soviet Union had enough troops in the Far East to ward off an attack by forty to forty-five percent of the Japanese army, how much less favorable is Japan's situation in the north today. The Japanese army cannot move a single battalion from the Soviet and Mongolian borders from now until the day of the final reckoning. These are the reasons for the "checkmate" the Japanese army is experiencing.

We don't know what the exact tenor of the Chiefs of Staff discussions in Potsdam was, but it seems certain that the question of the "silent threat" of the Far Eastern Red Banner Armies, as well as the intensity of that threat (including probably some psychological warfare emanating from Chita and Khabarovsk) were high on the agenda of the military men at Potsdam. Marshal Zhukov, the conqueror of the Japanese at Khalkingol in 1939, might have had some weighty advice to give for he is the only commander of a modern army who has come to grips in modern mobile warfare with the Japanese, and defeated them.

The presence of the Red Army on Japan's flank and rear is the factor which will determine the strength of the Japanese garrison in the caves of the homeland, on Formosa and in China. It certainly will cut that strength by half. Thus the Soviet Union, though not at war, is one of the decisive strategic factors in the coming battle against the enemy "northern redoubt," just as the Soviet Union, while not at war with Germany in 1940 was the determining

Streicher's Shadow in the Senate

SENATOR THEODORE G. BILBO of Mississippi is today something more than a particularly repulsive representative of southern lynch-rope *Kultur*. He has become a symbol of that fascist way of life against which millions are fighting in this greatest war in history. His is the face of the faceless men who have trampled on every human value and tried to build a new barbarism on the ruins of civilization. That is why Bilbo today is an issue far greater than his personal capacity for evil. For the fact is that if we do not strike down the fascism of the Bilboes, we have won only a partial victory over the fascism of Hitler and Mussolini.

To his racist Senate speeches and his record of filibustering against the Fair Employment Practice Committee, against anti-poll tax and anti-lynching legislation, Bilbo has recently added letters of insult to American men and women, attacking Negroes, Jews and the foreign-born. Those letters, which might have been ghosted by Goebbels, have been inserted in the *Congressional Record* at public expense—and with the unanimous consent of Bilbo's colleagues. They are providing subversive, anti-Semitic groups with fresh ammunition against American democracy.

A storm is rising against this man Bilbo. It is rising from all parts of the country, including the South where newspapers like the Macon, Ga., *News*, the Richmond, Va., *Times Dispatch*, the New Orleans *Item*, and the Chattanooga *Times*, and groups like the Southern Methodist Women's Organization have spoken up against Bilbo. In New York the National Maritime Union has demanded action against him, Joseph T. Sharkey, vice president of the City Council, has introduced a resolution condemning Bilbo, and the Mississippi Senator has been denounced by various public figures including Brig. Gen. William O'Dwyer, Democratic and American Labor candidate for mayor. One of the recipients of a scurrilous Bilbo letter, Miss Josephine Piccolo of Brooklyn, whom he addressed as "Dago," has also been getting letters of support from individuals and organizations in various parts of the country.

At this writing, however, though several members of the House of Representatives have lashed out at the Mississippi fuehrer, only one United States Senator, H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey, has criticised him. In fact, Bilbo was actually included in a recent informal luncheon of a group of progressive Senators who discussed pending legislative problems.

This complacency must be ended. It reflects an attitude in high quarters not only toward Bilbo, but toward fifth columnists and spreaders of hate doctrine as a whole. It is this attitude which is responsible for the delay in retrying the twenty-six indicted seditionists who are continuing to do the enemy's work in time of war. It is this attitude which has permitted fascists like Gerald L. K. Smith and groups like the Ku Klux Klan to carry on with impunity and to prepare for bigger business when the war ends.

Bilbo can be stopped. He can be expelled from the Senate by a two-thirds vote of that body. Or he can be impeached by two-thirds majorities of both the House and the Senate. The members of the Senate should learn from their constituents that they cannot evade this responsibility. Bilbo must go!

factor in the so-called Battle of Britain.

And so, dear reader, the twenty-two words of the Potsdam communique which maybe disappointed you are pre-

nant with things that will have a direct bearing on the reduction of possible American casualties between now and V-J Day.



REVIEW and COMMENT

SUMMER READING

The Father of Democracy

THE YOUNG JEFFERSON, by Claude G. Bowers. Houghton Mifflin. \$3.75.

THE third in point of publication, though the first in strict biographical order, this volume apparently completes what is surely the best work in its specific field and one of the great works in American biographical literature. I am not equipped to pass upon the fine points of Mr. Bowers' use and interpretation of his documentary material. As biographer he tends to the other extreme of the debunking school, and it is obvious that to give full effect to his portrait he has done some arbitrary arrangement of background and lighting. But equally obvious is the fact that the likeness is from life.

In his preface to *The Young Jefferson* Mr. Bowers writes: "It is during this period of his life that it is possible to present the Jefferson of flesh and blood, the human being, for he is more intimately revealed during these younger years before he was so completely absorbed in political controversies. To most Americans, including historians, he has been a symbol, a flag, a steel engraving, a philosopher in an ivory tower, or, more often, a cunning politician spinning his web of intrigue in dark corners. I have tried here to rescue a very human being from the wilderness of myth and fable."

For a literary analyst with the three volumes of this Jefferson biography before him, this suggests an interesting study in the literary means to make a biographical subject lifelike. Mr. Bowers gives us, here, the Jefferson practicing on the violin and exchanging adolescent enthusiasms over the poems of Ossian; he gives us his hero as lover, husband, father, lavish host, intellectual companion. But these incarnations are done mainly in set descriptions. They lack the movement of opposition which makes the Jefferson of the previous volumes, *Jefferson and Hamilton* and *Jefferson in Power*, so stirring.

Of the three volumes in the series *The Young Jefferson* is the most conventionally biographical and the most conventionally literary. It is of great value for its accumulation of material;

and it is necessary for a rounded evaluation of Jefferson, particularly in its data on the political struggles in Virginia, the training ground for Jefferson's role on the national stage. But the book falls short of its predecessors not only in lifelike realization of its subject but as reconstruction of history.

The unusual distinction and power of *Jefferson and Hamilton* and *Jefferson in Power* was that they were centered on critical political struggles. Not only Jefferson but his antagonist was in full view. And the opposition was full scale. The drama and excitement of conflict gave the characters a living glow. Moreover, the antagonists were such well realized personifications of social forces that, in effect, the works were also vigorous dramatizations of the class struggles of the first generation of the American Republic.

The Young Jefferson, however, dutifully proceeding chronologically and uncentered, as the other volumes were, on critical political struggles, has much less of portraiture in action. Mr. Bowers makes as much as, apparently, he can, of the antagonisms Jefferson met and overcame in these earlier years—his struggle with the Tidewater aristocracy that maintained a class rule over early Virginia, with the Episcopal parsonages that sought to secure their vested interests in alliance with the Tidewater landlords, with the opponents of his draft of the Declaration of Independence and with the opponents, active and passive, of the American revolution, etc. Mr. Bowers is also careful to explain the importance and significance of these earlier struggles. These antagonists however lack the proportions and the force of the others. Mr. Bowers feels that they ought to be dramatic and makes adjectival assertions to that effect, but the drama fails to materialize. He accumulates data but it has, too often, no more effect than a string of synonymous adjectives. One feels a limitation of sheer literary skill, and of psychological insights. The latter may be due, here, to Mr. Bowers' conception of Jefferson as a flawless figure, which leads to an excessive gloss of surface, like that which often mars statuary.

But if *The Young Jefferson* is a de-

cline, it is a decline from Mr. Bowers' own eminence. From any other hand it would rank as a work of great distinction. Though in a more limited form, he still presents Jefferson mainly in terms of political struggles. And it remains his great contribution here to see these struggles as keys both to Jefferson's life and to America's history.

Another virtue of Bowers' great biography, in its wholeness, is that it helps to make clear the continuity of the struggle for democracy. Democracy must be maintained, as well as won, by struggle; and the struggle, though the same in essence, constantly changes in form.

In common with the English political philosophers who were his inspiration Jefferson, for example, saw one of the democratic goals in a balance of public powers, executive, legislative and judicial, each limiting the other's possible restraints upon the individual. This applied to the acquisition of property. With opportunities opened to him by the democratic revolution, and with physical space enough on the virgin continent to afford every individual toehold and swinging room, the right to property, then primarily a matter of worked land and earned tradesman's profits, was a democratic right.

The world has changed vastly since then. Space has shrunk and the relations of the individual to society have become more complex. Property has lost its character of individual accumulation, and has been transformed in other significant ways. Thus the terms of the continuing struggle are very different today. But for that struggle, today, Jefferson's adroit and determined fight and his victories can serve us as a guide and inspiration. Giving them so clear a presentation, Mr. Bowers has served the people well.

ISIDOR SCHNEIDER.

The People of Africa

WHAT DO THE PEOPLE OF AFRICA WANT? by Mrs. Paul Robeson. Council on African Affairs. 10c.

THE war has made us realize to some extent the strategic importance of Africa for resources, but to too many it