

WHAT IS CHINA'S FUTURE?

By **FREDERICK V. FIELD**

I DON'T know any better than anyone else what went through the mind of the Chinese farmer in Honan when he learned the detested Japanese enemy had offered to surrender. What was the reaction of the Malay rubber plantation worker or the farmer in Java who for decades and as far back in the history of his family as he knows has been raising crops for a foreign ruler?

I wonder what was the second and third thought of the Chinese Eighth Route Army private with a red star on his cap when he learned that the long war of which he and his fellow soldiers were perhaps the greatest heroes might suddenly come to an end. My mind wanders to the Filipino guerrilla of the Huk . . . who after years of truly heroic struggle against the beasts in the Mikado's uniform was disarmed by the American liberators. Will the British Tommy, who for three years has waited at some camp in the Middle East, march back into Singapore to reclaim that outpost for the Empire with a joyous heart or with disturbing questions in his mind?

The point is, does the crushing of Japanese aggressive power in itself guarantee the future security of the Far East?

Will reaction and fascism be thoroughly routed? Will the forces of democracy be sufficiently fortified during the war to look forward with confidence to the immediate future?

Sitting at a desk in the unscarred city of New York one raises these doubts at such a breathtaking moment in history as this with some diffidence. All of us share an indescribable elation. The Axis is smashed! *We* will have won a just war, and eliminated those forces who in their unquenchable lust for power adopted the terrorism of fascism.

Surely we at our safe desks may claim this affinity with the fighter in North China, with the farmer of Luzon whose rifle harassed the invader until help came, with the exploited farmers and workers of the southwest Pacific. We join together the world over in celebrating our common victory.


But I am also concerned with second and third thoughts. Will the victory really be ours, or must we still struggle to consolidate it? Cast your mind over the Far East today. It looks like this. There are three sections of China. One has been occupied by the enemy for seven years. Its people and its land have

been outraged. It accounts for over 100,000,000 people. Another 100,000,000 Chinese have been liberated by the Eighth and New Fourth Armies, by guerrilla forces and Partisans. They became parts of these forces themselves. They struck a fatal blow not only at the fascist invader but at their own feudal institutions. They planted seeds of economic and political democracy and they saw them take root and grow. All of this took place under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

BUT there remains in China a third section of some 200,000,000 people under the oppressive rule of a backward, feudal, reactionary and in many respects pro-fascist dictatorship at Chungking. Sabotaged in their own efforts to fight against the invader, ruined by the profiteering and exploitation of the ruling clique, these people find that the enemy is not yet obliterated from their horizon.

There are another 125,000,000 and more colonial people in the Far East. And, if you include India, you have to add to that number 400,000,000 more. An immense population, nearly one-

March 17, 1936



Hitler occupies the Rhine.

April 20, 1937



Mussolini, Champion of Non-Intervention.

July 13, 1937



"Mad Dogs and Englishmen Go Out in the Midday Sun."

NM August 21, 1945

August 3, 1937



Soriano.

"Training for the Battle of the Century."

third of the world. What can the victory mean to them? There can be no question but that the Japanese oppressor was far more hateful than the British, Dutch or French imperialist whom he replaced. The worst of the oppressors is being eliminated. But will oppression itself, inherent in the colonial system, be eliminated?

To the north lies the Soviet Union, whose magnificent armies knifed through 100 miles of Japan's vaunted Kwantung army in the first forty hours of their offensive. Here is the nation which, in sharp contrast to the semi-colonial, semi-feudal character of most of China and to the imperial bondage of the colonies, has built a socialist society. It is the Soviet Union which at the San Francisco Conference raised the slogan of freedom and independence for all people. It is the nation which never appeased the fascist-militarists of Japan and which lashed out at all those who did, the nation which gave the Chinese people the most substantial encouragement and material assistance in the long days of war before Pearl Harbor.

THE Far East, then, is an area of political and economic contrasts. The law of uneven development of society is nowhere more dramatically illustrated. Within it vast millions struggle for a goal which is only sighted by the defeat of Japan. The chances of postwar security in such an area, we must conclude, depend upon how smooth the remainder of the path toward that goal proves to be.

We who hail the triumph of the

November 2, 1937



Gropper.


"The Eighth Route Army Round-up."

United Nations have a large variety of second and third thoughts on the present situation. We have different points of view and different perspectives, depending on where we are and what we do. But I believe that it is incontestable that the great majority of us regard the surrender of Japan as an event of historic importance, but one which instead of marking the end of our struggles for freedom and democracy, clears the decks for the continuation of that struggle under more favorable circumstances.

What must we do now? Primarily we must support those who seek to unify and democratize China. For China has to be the bulwark of security in the Far East. Historically the role of China is to give democratic leadership to the dependent peoples of the Far East. Without a progressive Chinese nation we have little prospect of maintaining security. Without such a China the imperialist power of the foreign capitalists will be so dominant in the area that the colonial people will have little chance to break their chains. The main burden falls upon the Chinese people themselves. That they are ready to carry this burden is evident from the heroic struggle they have put up during the war and from the epic progress they have made in certain sections of their country. They need now only the aid and encouragement of their Allies to complete their task.

For us in the capitalist nations our first task in the Far East is to remove those obstructions which our governments are now imposing upon the Chinese democratic forces and develop policies which will give them positive sup-

March 29, 1938



Ellis.

"The Soviet Government . . . is ready to participate in collective action."—Litvinov

port. For us the task is also to speed up those commercial and political policies which will most rapidly break up the institution of colonialism.

These are not easy objectives. They require in our country a far greater and more militant mobilization of progressive forces. They require constant vigilance and struggle against the monopolists. They require much closer contact with the Russian, Chinese and colonial peoples and their problems than anything which American progressives have so far achieved.

We have won the war—now we have a new job to do. Unless we do it speedily and effectively our victory will not be complete.

April 5, 1938



"Italian-British Negotiations May Prepare Ground for World Peace."—News Item.

SOVIET STAKES IN THE FAR EAST

By ALVIN DWIGHT

THE Soviet Union's stake in East Asia is a big one. Not alone because more than half of the Soviet Union is in Asia; not only because five of its sixteen republics are truly Oriental and many of its nationalities Asiatics; its main stake is in the fact that it has a land border nearly 5,000 miles long in east Asia, which compares with the 3,000 miles of the American-Canadian border.

Both its economic and political stakes in the Far Eastern war flow out of this fact. In past centuries there was more to the Russian stake. Before the Revolution Russia had political and economic concessions in China which in Russian policy-making even outweighed in importance the safety of the country (Cf. Russo-Japanese war). But these stakes abroad were liquidated by the Revolution and the commercial interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway, which the Soviets shared with China, was sold in 1935 when it had become a source of war danger to the USSR.

It might be supposed that the defense of its frontier would not give the USSR anything but a military or strategic problem. If this is all that is involved, how can it be said that the Soviet Union has any economic or political stake in the

area? The answer to this lies in the nature of the Soviet's Asiatic defense problem. This gigantic frontier can be defended, basically, only in the way the American-Canadian border is defended—by having friendship and prosperity across it. The Soviets have long recognized the fact that the welfare of its neighbors directly affects its own welfare and security. This has been especially true in the Far East. The Soviet policy toward its Eastern neighbors has been to aid them in becoming politically independent and economically modern. In China, Soviet cooperation with Sun Yat-sen was dedicated to freeing the country from its imperialist shackles, providing it with a modern army and a progressive (or at least progressing) economy.

Another notable example is the Mongol People's Republic. The Soviets first cooperated with the Mongols after the last war when Japanese-financed White-guard puppets wreaked havoc in Siberia and Outer Mongolia. Together, the Red Army and the Mongol forces defeated Ungern von Sternberg and freed Mongolia from what would have been Japanese rule. The Soviet Union recognized, however, that as long as the Mongols remained primitive, poverty-

stricken, disease-ridden people, Japanese intervention could repeat itself at will. A mere military alliance would not solve the problem of Soviet defense in that most vulnerable sector of its frontier where the Trans-Siberian Railway is squeezed between Lake Baikal and the border. A strong Mongolia was needed. To this end the Soviets gave economic aid. Outright gifts of technical equipment, non-interest bearing loans, and advisers in all fields of public welfare were provided. With the economic assistance, factories were established for processing local materials—wool, leather, etc. Some mining was initiated. Transportation was improved.

At first many of the enterprises were jointly owned—Soviet-Mongol—but today they are entirely Mongol. The country is becoming literate, its health is improving, and, though it has not a socialist economy, its standard of living has been raised appreciably. The consequence is that today the Mongol army is well-trained, healthy, well-equipped and the Soviet-Mongol mutual assistance pact means something to the defense of the Soviet Union as well as to the defense of the Mongol People's Republic. The Soviet Union has a real stake in seeing

April 12, 1938



"Neutrality" in Spain. Gropper. NM August 21, 1945

September 20, 1938



Japanese Boycott. Reinhardt.

October 4, 1938



Pre-Munich Maneuvers. Gropper.