

standing contributions to solving the problems of his times was the Statute of Virginia on Religious Freedom, which was written as the climax of a long, hard battle to separate church and state.

The fathers of the American Revolution fought so vigorously against state support of any church that it is startling in the twentieth century to find an issue before the US Congress which involves just that. The problem of federal aid to education is a deepgoing one which has not even begun to be met by the US Congress. It comes then as a real blow to find a bill providing federal funds for buildings, libraries, transportation, health programs, instructional material and other educational facilities dragging in a fundamental issue of this magnitude. The

Mead-Aiken-Lesinski bill (S-717, HR-3002) among other things, makes special provisions for those states in which the distribution of public funds is prohibited to sectarian schools; it specifically violates the constitutions of those states, as well as a basic principle on which this republic was established, by setting up a board to determine the proportion of funds to be allocated to public and "non-public" schools. This means fundamentally the Catholic parochial schools, with some 2,000,000 pupils, which constitute the majority of non-public general schools in the USA. The backers of the bill have won support from the American Federation of Teachers-AFL through some fine phrases about providing "without discrimination . . . in regard to race, creed or status," and have confused others

on this matter, which in its essence provides direct financial support for sectarian teaching, even for buildings, libraries, textbooks, etc. The Teachers Union (Local 555, State County and Municipal Workers-CIO) and the Teachers Guild (affiliate of the AFT-AFL) of New York are fighting the bill.

An alternative, the Thomas-Hill-Ramspeck bill, supported by these organizations, and embodying the favorable provisions of the Mead bill, is also before the Senate Committee on Education. Be sure to include in your stint of letter-writing to Congress a memorandum to your representatives in both Houses that you don't want the taxpayers' money supporting any creed, and that you want the Thomas-Hill-Ramspeck bill instead.



## FRONT LINES

by COLONEL T.

# RETREAT TO THE "REDOUBT"

News from the Orient—very good news—has been pouring in thick and fast these days. And so manifold and complex are the various battle sectors involved that the average reader of newspapers and dispatches may easily lose sight of the forest for the trees. There is one outstanding strategic factor which must be borne in mind in order to understand the whole picture: the Japanese leadership is now convinced that it cannot preserve its empire in the form it is in today and that, furthermore, it cannot bring the war to as much as a draw. It is playing for time, hoping against hope (exactly as Germany did during the last year of the war in Europe) that: (a) the "damn Yankees" will get tired of fighting; (b) the British will not put their shoulder to the wheel in East Asia beyond "token efforts"; and (c) that the Anglo-Saxons will fall out with the Russians in Europe and that what happens on the plains of Brandenburg will be immediately reflected on the plains of Manchuria. This reasoning is not new, for back in 1938, during the days of the Changkufeng affray, one of the Polish fascist ministers said: "The fate of Poland is being decided on the plains of Manchuria." The Japanese may well reverse the saying thus: "The fate of

Japan is being decided in Brandenburg."

The Japanese empire (including all the loot) looks like a huge tadpole, some five thousand miles long from head to tail, that is, from the Amur to the eastern tip of Java. It is about six thousand miles long, however, if one should include the "horn" of the Kuriles. In the fateful fall of 1942 when the Red Army stood with its back to the Volga

and the British stood with their back to the Nile, the "tadpole" looked like a huge egg whose eastern curve touched the international date-line and whose western curve touched the frontier of India. The northern tip of the egg was in the Aleutians while the southern tip threatened Australia.

During the last two and one-half years, starting at Guadalcanal, we have caved in the eastern wall of the egg and have progressed from the international date-line to the Japan Stream—a small matter of three thousand miles of island-dotted water. We have reached the eastern shores of the chain of inner seas which form the life line of the enemy empire—the Japan Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea—and we are covering at least the latter two of these seas with our air power and in part with our surface naval power.

The head of the tadpole in Japan, Korea, Manchuria and Inner Mongolia is linked to its tail in the East Indies only by a long and tenuous coastal sea lane running through the bottlenecks of Tsushima and Formosa and by a strip of land in China which at this writing is no wider than twenty-five miles in Kwangsi Province.

It must be remembered that the huge



Eugene Karlin.

area between the Yangtze and the southern border of Inner Mongolia—an area about 500 miles wide and 1,000 miles long from north to south—is shot through with Chinese guerrilla forces which often prove considerably more effective than Generalissimo Chiang's "regulars." In this area the Japanese hold only the big cities and the railroad lines.

Thus it is quite clear that the tadpole is about to fall apart into two or more segments (the "head," in Japan, Manchuria, Korea and Inner Mongolia, the "neck" in North China between Peiping and the Yangtze, and the "tail" in South China, Indo-China, Burma, Malaya, Thailand and the East Indies). The most likely point of rupture will be somewhere on the Yangtze, along the Ichang-Shanghai line.

THERE have been a number of concrete facts reported of late which tend to indicate that the Japanese are shifting their power north. Our fliers have been observing for weeks the movement of troop trains northward bound from South China. General Chennault has said the Japanese were shifting their air power from the south to Manchuria. Naval convoys have been attacked and dispersed by our air forces between Shanghai and Nagasaki; these convoys were shuttling troops homeward from the continent. The Japanese themselves have been saying that many of the factories are being evacuated from the home islands to Manchuria. All this tends to indicate that the Japanese expect to concentrate their available military might in the north.

Now, does this mean that they will abandon the south, or the tail of the tadpole? Not at all, if only because they cannot abandon it, having no adequate lines of communications for the shifting of a million troops dispersed between Bougainville and the Andamans, and between Timor and Formosa. These troops are stuck for good. They cannot even be supplied and from now on must live and fight on their stores and on the dribbles of stuff local industry can provide them.

What then will the role of the severed tail of the tadpole be? It will be that of a general nuisance for us. First, the scattered Japanese garrisons in an area of more than a million square miles of land, islands and water will keep considerable American and Allied forces busy, if not fighting then at least watching the Japanese. All these "watchers" will have to be supplied over immense

distances. Naval and air power will be kept busy preventing the isolated Japanese from being supplied, evacuated, or reinforced, even if by the method of robbing Peter to pay Paul. Second, the Japanese will try to deny us the use of the great ports of Surabaya, Singapore, Hongkong, Swatow, Amoy, thus forcing us to use the "beach method" for landing operations, so dangerous, especially during the typhoon season when a hard blow of the weather can sever for days on end all communications with troops already landed. Third, by hanging on to the great barrier of Malaya-Sumatra-Java, the enemy will effectively keep British naval and land power in the Indian Ocean isolated from ours in the Pacific. The British, much weaker in the Orient than we are, might be kept immobilized by whatever Japanese power is available in the tail of the tadpole, as long as their tactical cooperation with us is impossible because of the East Indian barrier.

Thus the Japanese forces in the tail of the tadpole would play a role very similar to those the Germans kept in Norway as well as in the ports of France only on a still larger scale.

The Japanese position in the neck of the tadpole, that is, in the provinces of Hopei, Shansi, Shantung, Honan, Hupoh, Anhwei and Kiangsi, precarious as it is, will depend largely on our policy toward the Communist-led area of China and toward Chungking. If we get off our high but lame horse of dealing only with Chiang and give some help direct to the Yen-an forces, the Japanese in the neck will be placed in an untenable position. If they lose the

neck of the tadpole, they will be reduced for their last stand to the redoubt of Manchuria, Korea, Inner Mongolia and Japan proper, that is, to the fighting space north of the Paotow-Peiping-Tientsin-Dairen-Nagasaki line.

Let us see in what strategic position (or condition) this "redoubt" is today. Its eastern front, between Kyushu and the northernmost Kuriles (some 2,000 miles of intermittent coastline), is under close attack by our air and naval power. Fortresses and fighter-bombers from Okinawa reach Shanghai, the southern tip of Korea, the Tsushima Strait and Kyushu with their tactical air arc and can reach Peiping and Changchun with their strategic air arc; the tactical air arc from Iwo extends to Tokyo while the strategic arc reaches all of Japan.

Our naval task forces have penetrated into the Sea of Okhotsk, breaking through the Kuriles barrier and might soon give a dose of ship artillery to southern Sakhalin. The Kuriles and the Ryukyus are no more barriers on which the enemy can rely as flank guards.

Admiral Halsey has sailed into Tokyo Bay and into Muroran Bay on Hokkaido and has bombarded the "inner sanctum" of Japan. No counter-action worthy of the name has been encountered. The Japanese Navy—what is left of it—and the Japanese Air Force kept very quiet. They are probably being saved carefully for the protection and maintenance of the innermost communications between the home land and Korea—the last thread that will keep the "redoubt" together.

For the present it would appear that only the typhoons are protecting the eastern coasts of Japan from invasion. The typhoons will last until about Labor Day (and a serious opponent it is, judging by the terrific buffeting Admiral Halsey's Fleet got on June 5 when the cruiser *Pittsburg* lost 104 feet of its bow, severed clear by the 138-mile-an-hour storm and a score of other ships, including the biggest battlewagons, were damaged). Be this as it may, in the east we are smack up to Japan's front "trench."

The southern front of the "redoubt" runs from the Gulf of Chihli to Paotow. There are open plains here and on them our superior mechanization will put the Japanese at a terrible disadvantage. It is one thing to fight against us from caves; it is another to meet us in open mobile warfare. Marshal Zhukov in the summer of 1939 demonstrated what happens to the Japanese



Irvin Greenberg.

when they encounter a first class army in open warfare. (The Japanese Sixth Army under General Kamatsubara was wiped out in a matter of days at Nomohan.)

The most vulnerable sector of the "redoubt," however, is in Inner Mongolia. Without discussing idly the probabilities of the entry of the Soviet Union into the conflict, it can be said with assurance that the Japanese, whatever we do, will keep the cream of their continental troops on that front, which will help us considerably.

Thus from all appearances Manchuria, perhaps this winter, will be the scene of Japan's last struggle.

## The GI Comes Home

(Continued from page 15)

on unemployment insurance is wholly inadequate, especially when he knows that these payments will be deducted from a future bonus. When he returns for his old job he may find that it is not there, or that the industry is faced with reconversion. Many return incapacitated and unable to handle their previous jobs. The GI Bill of Rights is inadequate. Much more is necessary. Here the reactionaries are taking advantage and speaking up with Rankin as champion. Actually only labor can help. Its voice must be heard!

**I**N OTHER words, we soldiers are a very uncertain lot and our minds are open. If we're like that we're open to anyone and everyone, friend and foe alike, fascist demagogue and labor-progressive. Those that speak out the loudest and create the impression of doing the most will be listened to attentively. Therefore it is important that our real friends, labor in the first instance, be alert, informed and active in relation to all the problems we face, because we will soon be the nation's number one problem, good or bad, positive or negative. Labor can help to see that we are part of progress.

Labor's enemies are working feverishly to make inroads among us. Representative Rankin of Mississippi, as chairman of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs in Congress, never lets a day pass without blaming labor for the veterans' problems. Pro-fascist groups with an anti-labor bias and many thousands of dollars behind them are cropping up among veterans, groups like the American-Veterans in Texas, etc. These are danger signs. They must be recognized for the tremendous menace they are. Labor, however, can block them.

## Ben Davis and the ALP

**I**N FAILING to give its official endorsement to the candidacy of Benjamin J. Davis, Jr., for reelection to the New York City Council the American Labor Party has done itself and the cause of progressive unity in the city a serious disservice. Davis has made an enviable record in his first term. The Negro and white people who elected him two years ago want him to return to office this fall. He is the acknowledged leader of his community in the metropolitan government. His progressive role in all phases of the city's government has earned him the praise and support of all groups who aspire to defeat reaction and corruption.

For the American Labor Party to withhold its support will do more harm to its own prestige and to the election chances of its present candidate, Eugene Connolly, than it will to the candidacy of Ben Davis. It is for the very reason that New York progressives cannot afford to see the ALP weaken itself by such a blunder that a widespread demand from unions and other mass organizations is being made upon the party to correct this error.

The arguments advanced against endorsing the Communist incumbent, Davis, are specious. If the ALP's present position is taken from fear of being Red-baited it may as well shut up shop. For Red-baiting can never be cured by Red-baiting oneself. If its failure to endorse Davis arises from ALP secretary Eugene Connolly's fear of competition on the ballot, he should be reminded that he will lose far more votes by isolating himself and his party from the Negro people, the progressive unions and other democratic forces in the city.

For these reasons NEW MASSES joins a host of other voices in urging the American Labor Party speedily to endorse the candidacy of Ben Davis.

Finally, collectively and as individuals, we come back as much stauncher and stronger Americans. As a group we return with a tremendous potential strength, with great pride and confidence in ourselves. A man who goes through combat and comes out all right is stronger, more experienced and surer of himself. As individuals we have more wisdom and are more worldly, even if it is only from that trip on a boat and meeting new and different people, something most of us would never have normally experienced. We come back greatly matured and advanced in our thinking, certainly on matters of war, peace, intolerance, the Negro, the Soviet Union, etc.

President Truman placed the question well when he said, "In the next generation the veterans of this war are going to lead the country. They fought to save it and now they want to fight to maintain it and that is their duty."

I personally return proud to have been a part of a great Army, and am confident that with proper attention and leadership the veterans can be on the side of labor, for progress.

## Letter to Our Readers

(Continued from page 16)

work, what is bad, what we ought to know that we miss. We invite you to do this in letters up to eight hundred words, since space is one of NM's problems. You know many others we have and we are sure you will take them in consideration in your proposals for improvement. You know that we cannot, like commercial magazines, adequately pay for articles we need; hence we rely on the good will of our writers. We rely on their morale, their self-sacrifice for a common objective. All of us search for a better life for our nation, for humanity. Since all of us share that common objective we must close our ranks, march together. That, in practice, means your fullest cooperation in the discussions we are instituting in these pages; your acceptance of responsibility for hammering out a policy. We sincerely invite your participation. If we succeed in getting your thoughtful, active cooperation we shall truly be sure of "getting back on the high road again."





## REVIEW and COMMENT

# FROM THE BOOKSHELF

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FRONTIERS OF SOCIETY, by Abram Kardiner, with the collaboration of Ralph Linton, Cora Du Bois and James West. Columbia University Press. \$5.

THIS book is representative of a new and significant trend in American social science. Refusing to be bound by the customary academic separation of the various social disciplines, Dr. Kardiner has fused contemporary anthropological research with a modified psychoanalytical approach in his continued efforts to clarify the relations between personality and culture. Like its predecessor, *The Individual and His Society*, this is a joint work undertaken with the active collaboration of practicing anthropologists.

The anthropologists first present the findings of their field research: Ralph Linton writes of the Comanches of the American southwest, Cora Du Bois of the Alorese of the Dutch East Indies; in contrast to these two pre-literate cultures James West portrays "Plainville," a rural community somewhere in the midwestern United States.

Kardiner then analyzes the interrelations between personality and culture in these three societies in terms of his major concept, the "basic personality structure." As Kardiner makes explicit, the basic personality structure is not identical with an individual's total personality. It corresponds, instead, to "the projective systems or, in different phraseology, the value attitude systems which are basic to the individual's personality configuration." These are believed to be manifested in folklore, myths, and religious or other kinds of ideologies.

Postulating that the individual's early experience exerts a lasting effect upon his personality, especially the development of the above-mentioned projective systems, Kardiner therefore emphasizes the role of child-rearing techniques. These, he further assumes, "are culturally patterned and will tend to be similar, although never identical, for various families within the society."

Inasmuch as the concept of the basic personality structure is the foundation of Kardiner's intellectual edifice, an examination of it should prove rewarding. Perhaps such an analysis may best begin

by questioning whether Kardiner is correct in assuming that the child-rearing techniques are basically similar throughout a culture.

In pre-literate societies, such as those presented in this work, class stratification is relatively undeveloped. As a consequence, most families in these cultures do indeed raise their children in a way that is fundamentally similar. Can the same be said of a society such as our own in which there are, not only distinct class cleavages, but religious and ethnic subgroups as well? It would seem to this reviewer that even a superficial survey of the child-raising techniques among the various American classes and subgroups reveals significant differences. We would, for example, suggest that the breast-feeding experiences of children whose mothers are employed in industry are quite at variance with those born to a middle class family. Differing urban and rural childhood experiences would also seem relevant; and the comparatively greater importance of the woman in a Negro family.

We cannot, therefore, acquiesce in Kardiner's basic assumption that the childhood experiences in *our* culture are, for the most part, fundamentally similar. Moreover, if the basic personality structure reflects the wide variety of child-rearing methods which prevail in our society, then it is no longer capable of playing the powerful role Kardiner ascribes to it.

"CHANGES [in our society]," says Kardiner, "are predicated by the needs created in the basic personality." Linton, in elaborating this view, writes that "innovations which are congenial to the personality are accepted and incorporated into the society's culture much more readily than those which are uncongenial." If, however, there is no *one* basic personality type in our culture, but instead several, as seems more likely, then the capacity of *the* basic personality structure to delimit the types of social change is considerably curtailed, or else is so broad as to be meaningless.

In the above quotations, another and exceedingly important shortcoming of this study is seen. Kardiner often draws what amounts to a direct, one-to-

one, relationship between social products (such as ideologies) and aspects of the individual personality. He finds the origins of various religions, for example, in the basic personality structure or in the family relations it is presumably derived from.

"Luther and Calvin," says Kardiner, "constructed their conception of the deity and the definition of human relations to the deity . . . out of the fabric of relations to the father in the family. . . ." This, despite the fact that Kardiner had just spent several pages demonstrating that Calvin (and to a lesser extent Luther) was "the mouthpiece for the claims of the rising bourgeois class."

At the root of Kardiner's confusion in this matter is his "trained inability" to grapple with the problem of how human groups set up or evolve rules of behavior which mediate between individual personalities. As a psychoanalytical theoretician, Kardiner tends to analyze human relations on an "interpersonal" level. He fails, however, consistently and fully to evaluate the role of social classes and groups other than the family. He sees the origins of social stability in those factors which promote harmony among *individuals*, i.e., in "interpersonal relationships," rather than in smoothly integrated *group* relationships. There can, though, be considerable interpersonal harmony within the several social classes—that is, class solidarity—even while the classes are engaged in a struggle which shakes the very foundations of the society.

Ours, says Kardiner, "is a highly unstable culture owing to the enormous anxieties under which each individual lives." The idealistic essence of Kardiner's position may be seen in this statement. Does Kardiner mean to suggest that economic crises, the recurrence of wars and imperialist adventures, or the imminence of fascist coups in our society—all manifestations of social instability—stem from anxieties which individuals possess? If so, Kardiner has the matter standing on its head. These anxieties do not evoke social instability; they themselves are a refraction of this instability through the prism of the individual personality.

Kardiner's idealism is made trans-