

differences between Western and Soviet democracy did not.

Thus India's Jawaharlal Nehru, who is anti-Communist, can speak of the Soviet Union with an admiration that is different from that of many American liberals; while they pay tribute to the Red Army's military exploits, he sees in Soviet growth a lesson for India herself. Marshal Li Chai-sun, who killed Communists in 1927, could say at the thirty-second anniversary of the Chinese Republic: "We had our revolution in 1911 and the Russians had theirs in 1917, yet when we compare what has happened in our two countries since, we can only hide our faces in shame." Chinese and Indian engineers and scientists, with no politics but a great sense of frustration at the imperialist domination and feudal backwardness which has made it impossible for them to use their talents, can speak of Soviet construction not only with technical approbation but with the light of admiring envy in their eyes.

The scions of warlords, such as Yang Lin-hsi, son of the old ruler of Shensi, and Chang Hsueh-shih, son of the old ruler of Manchuria, can go so far as to join the Chinese Communist Party and its armies, alongside of such diverse people as Christian pastors and the children of millionaires. So also, in India, the late famous Communist Saklatvala belonged to the family which produced the directorate of the greatest Indian capitalist enterprise, the Tata Steel Works, and the son and daughter of a British Indian Prime Minister of Madras Province, among many others, are Communists. Here friendship for and emulation of the Soviet Union, often going the whole way politically, are national phenomena, and the only actively anti-Soviet elements are those willing to continue as puppets of the imperialists. At the present time, being a puppet provides the only reason for engaging in anti-Soviet tirades in these countries. It is not necessary to be a Soviet puppet to be pro-Soviet; it is only necessary to be a patriot.

As for the workers and peasants of China and India, ask any GI who has been there and has made the effort to get their views. Ask him whether he has ever heard any of them attack the USSR, or reward him with anything but blank incomprehension if he ventured to do so. The reason for this is not Soviet propaganda—the only propaganda the vast majority of these people have been exposed to is that of their own rulers, which certainly is not

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How We See It

In connection with the twenty-eighth anniversary of the Soviet Union, NEW MASSES asked several people for their answers to the following question: What factors do you believe impede the development of good American-Soviet relations? The following are three replies received. Others will be published as they come in.

Rev. Hugh Weston

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IN AN article published in the *Journal of Liberal Religion* in the summer of 1943, I wrote that the end of the war would present to the scene of history a straining of Soviet-American relations. Some persons felt that this was a very pessimistic prediction. It is only to be regarded as pessimistic if we take it out of the context of the tremendous forces available for overcoming the causes of these strained relations.

For the end of the war has presented us, not with one, but with two sets of new factors that enter the picture of history. The first new set of factors is the deepening of the crisis in world capitalism, which naturally strains Soviet-American relations. But the second is the tremendously strengthened political conviction of millions of common people in every country on the earth who are determined to build a new world based on international unity.

It is a disconcerting fact, which can be ignored but which cannot be denied, that some American political leaders are thinking that the Soviet Union must be destroyed by American arms before we "lose" the secret of the atom bomb. When the Hearst papers dare to run such headlines as we have seen recently—"STALIN SEEN PLANNING NEW CONFLICT"—"REJECTS PEACE DREAMS"—and hear the even more blatant American fascists openly charging that Stalin is organizing to conquer the world, we can appreciate just how base the thinking of these reactionaries is. There is not the slightest doubt that the Anglo-American possession of the atom bomb has gone a long way toward swelling the heads of some of the worst of our American political imperialists. But even without the atom bomb, it could have been predicted years ago that the end of the war would see Soviet-American relations strained.

And this is so because there is a deeper reason behind the strained relations. It

lies in the fear and in the confusion with which the Truman and Attlee governments face the economic and political problems of the postwar world. Neither government as yet has had the courage to break with the old schemes of imperialist profit-getting, neither has had the bravery with which to take those steps which will lead on to the establishing of a peaceful, prospering and united world.

But—pessimism? No, there is no need and no room for pessimism. Only the mongers of a Soviet-American war need be pessimistic. For the argument is weighted in our favor. It is weighted with such things as happened here in Pittsburgh recently—half the workers coming off a shift at a mill signed petitions circulated by the Communist Party for full employment. No Red-baiting.

Because the workers want peace and security, and not war, they are ready to cooperate with Russians and Communists to get peace and security. And though the American people may still be confused, though still they may talk about "brutal methods" they believe the Russians sometimes employ, they have learned during this war that the Soviet Union is an ally, and a good one, and one we ought to keep.

The people are ready—for peace. They want all the help they can get in finding out how to organize and establish it.

James P. Warburg

Author of "Foreign Policy
Begins at Home"

THE factors which impede the development of good relations between the Soviet Union and the United States relate in part to the two peoples and in part to the two governments.

The two peoples have not yet learned fully to trust each other. This is because they do not as yet fully understand each other. They are each more familiar with past strains and antagonisms than with the realities of their present common interest.

The Russian people remember our military intervention against the early Bolshevik regime. We remember Russian attempts to launch a world revolution, and our memory is kept alive by the continued existence of an American Communist Party which was originally

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Who's Intervening Now?

By The Editors

ON SATURDAY, October 27—Navy Day—President Truman laid down "the fundamentals" of the foreign policy of the United States. On that same day American airplanes, piloted by US Army flyers, were landing 3,000 Kuomintang troops in Peiping. During a nine-day period, including Saturday the 27th, they flew 27,000 troops of the Chungking dictatorship into an area which had already been virtually liberated by China's 8th Route Army but from which Chiang Kai-shek's forces had kept a safe distance during the war.

There was other American-Chinese activity on Saturday October 27. A large flotilla of American transports and LST's were en route along the China coast north from Shanghai to Chinwangtao, a city which commands the narrow land passage between Manchuria and that part of China which lies south of the Great Wall. They carried more Chungking troops and they were manned by American naval crews.

The transportation, by air and sea, of Chiang Kai-shek's soldiers was not the limit of American intervention into China's internal affairs. By October 27 about 62,000 American soldiers, mostly Marines, had been landed in Chinwangtao and other points on the Gulf of Pechili and along the Shantung Peninsula. This number far exceeded the combat force which the United States had put into China before the Japanese surrender. But that occasioned no surprise, for the American government had made it plain that what it was interested in was not the eradication of the sources of Japanese aggression but the prevention of a democratic upsurge on the part of the Chinese people.

It was therefore strange to hear President Truman on Navy Day list the following as the fourth of "the fundamentals" of American foreign policy: "We shall refuse to recognize any government imposed upon any nation by the force of any foreign power. In some cases it may be impossible to prevent forceful imposition of such a government. But the United States will not recognize any such government." What else is the American government doing in China if it is not forcing upon the Chinese people a government which the great mass of them have repudiated and which, if it were not for our intervention, they would have eliminated some time ago?

Obviously if the Truman administration finds it impossible to prevent this forceful imposition of a discredited and hated dictatorship upon the Chinese peo-

ple it will find itself in the exceedingly embarrassing position of having to deny recognition to the very government it has set up! Either that, or the American government will be violating one of "the fundamentals" of its own foreign policy. A very awkward situation indeed!

The policy is hardly clarified by Lieut. Gen. Wedemeyer's statement that American troops would not intervene directly in the Chinese civil war. One wonders what the general is talking about. The use of 62,000 American soldiers at the scene of strife, the transportation of Kuomintang armies by American planes and ships, manned by Americans, and the training of some nineteen of Chiang Kai-shek's divisions by American officers and equipping them with American arms sounds to us like direct intervention, no matter how the general puts it.

By what conceivable mandate does the American government undertake this armed intervention against the democratic aspirations of the Chinese people? Certainly the American people have not given such a mandate. The American people approved overwhelmingly a mandate to President Roosevelt based upon the unity of the United Nations and particularly of its leadership by the Big Three. Such a foreign policy would encourage democracy, not obstruct it. Instead of betraying us it would serve the Chinese people as well as ourselves.

WE THEREFORE hold strongly with the appeal being made by the newly-formed Committee for a Democratic Policy Toward China, which under the heading "ACT NOW" urges you to (1) write a personal letter to President Truman and to your Senators and Representatives demanding the immediate withdrawal of American troops and war material from China; (2) to demand a policy toward China which will avert civil war and encourage the formation of a genuinely democratic government representing all political groups; and (3) to urge your own organization to take action on this matter immediately.

To this timely appeal **NEW MASSES** adds one further point: all democratic Americans must organize great mass protest against the American "gun-boat" policy in China, against American imperialism wherever it is today disturbing the postwar world, and in favor of a democratic foreign policy based upon the Anglo-American-Soviet coalition.