





"Monopoly," lithograph by Grunbaum.

love, and their impulse to attain pleasure and avoid pain. . . . For sociology, which deals with the behavior of man in society, can be nothing other than applied psychology." (*New Introductory Lectures*, p. 244.)

Thus Freud not only neglected the social situation as a motive for behavior, but stood everything on its head by regarding social situations as the expression of people's ideas or unconscious strivings. From this point of view war,

for example, is the expression of aggressive instincts, and social feeling the expression of latent sexual feeling.

2. As a result of Freud's conviction that outworn, unconscious ideas dominate action, *his scientific method for understanding human behavior is essentially antiquarian and biological.* That is, he is much preoccupied with unravelling an individual's past, and in evaluating the strength and interplay of his instinctive biological drives. This antiquarian and biological interest is fostered—as we have just seen—at the expense of sociological interest. In actual treatment of an individual case this means intensive biographical investigation and personality probing and dissection with only cursory attention to the problems of conduct and practical life. As a result of this concern with the past and with the world of ideas, psychoanalysis has become too descriptive and abstract: a great deal of space and attention is devoted in its literature to descriptions—often very acute and subtle—of the devious complex ways in which ideas become interrelated or changed by their impact on each other. Much of the fascination of psychoanalysis lies in this skillful pursuit and capture of changing or developing ideas, a pursuit which too often loses its relation to the hard facts of life, and affords a kind of relief to the patient which is not basic and therefore not sustained.

3. Freudianism, which arose as a progressive influence at a time when psychiatry was dominated by the mechanical material interests of the pathological anatomists, *has almost completely lost interest in the material physiological basis of mental function, and has gone over to the other great extreme* of depicting all nervous disorders as psychological problems, and even in regarding many organic diseases as mainly psychological disorders. The current interest in "psychosomatic" medicine is dominated by this Freudian point of view. It is true that the psychological level of integration has its own independent laws, and justifies a separate scientific discipline, but the psychological level stands in constant and intimate interrelationship to both physiology and sociology, with influences moving back and forth between all levels.

4. Freudianism has a social orientation that is much too narrow. Though it sometimes disclaims any interest in morals or ethics, it has an implicit acceptance of most contemporary middle-class standards. This is revealed in its attitude toward women, in its notion of

what is normal, in its standards of success and failure, in its attitude toward social progress, and in its fundamental pessimism.

IN RELATION to the social advance toward a better life it can therefore be said that the psychoanalytic tradition is characterized by certain evasive or reactionary tendencies. It is fascinated by the past at the expense of the present, and imputes excessive—at times almost magical—powers to the force of analytic insight, at the expense of action.* Although the whole range of schools of psychoanalysis recognize to some degree the interdependence of social relationships and ideas, the psychoanalytic tradition always greatly overvalues the primary influence of ideas. To make matters worse it endows ideas with an abstract independent existence, as “instincts,” or makes them relatively independent by relating them to experiences long past, or derivative from an abstract cultural tradition. It minimizes the basic fact that ideas are derivative from social relationships, and are continually modified by changing relationships.

As a consequence, psychoanalysis is very attractive to many troubled people who are unable, unwilling, or otherwise unprepared to undertake the action necessary for their social adjustment. It is no accident that psychoanalysis makes a particular point of being independent of ethical considerations and that psy-

choanalysts are often scornful of the kind of psychiatry that gives advice.

Even the advanced psychoanalysts leave big loopholes for the orthodox point of view. A crucial point concerns the changeability of human nature. The instinct theory makes human nature relatively fixed. But so does an undue emphasis on childhood experience. This aspect of psychoanalytic theory can be regarded as a scientific expression of the popular notion that the tree's inclined the way the twig is bent (which, by the way, does not accord with the botanical facts). “There is no doubt whatever,” writes Horney (*New Ways in Psychoanalysis*, p. 152), “that childhood experiences exert a decisive influence on development . . . with some persons this development essentially stops at the age of five, with some it stops in adolescence, with others at around thirty, with a few it goes on until old age.” Robbins, for example, attacks Alexander for his insistence on the biological origin of certain human attitudes, but in the course of his attack shares the assumption that neuroses are based upon childhood experiences. “The question is clear,” he wrote, “what are the conditions in infancy and childhood out of which neuroses evolve?” (*Science and Society*, 6: 376, 1943.) Other analysts discard the instinct theory, but regard the need for sexual gratification as a “basic biological drive,” like hunger and thirst, and proceed to exaggerate its social

function. This reminds one of the man who was a staunch vegetarian, except for veal cutlets, which he liked.

As scientists and physicians it would be absurd for us to take the view that we are opposed to the analysis of neurotic symptoms. In the plain English meaning of the term analysis we certainly recognize the frequent necessity for the careful, detailed and painstaking unravelling of mental symptoms or personal problems. We must also recognize that free association, dream analysis, the understanding of symbols and of mental mechanisms are all invaluable aids to such analysis. But we do not regard the analysis as an end in itself. The end point of every analysis of a neurotic symptom should be an understanding of the social relationships that both initiated and maintained the symptoms or disorder, or an understanding of the physiological derangement involved. In either case the analysis must lead to a line of action that would serve to adjust the social relationships or relieve the physiological derangement. The analysis in other words is a preliminary to treatment and is not in itself a treatment, just as historical analysis is a guide to social action but no substitute for it.

* The following quotation from the writings of Karen Horney is illustrative:

“Sometimes the mere uncovering of a neurotic trend is sufficient to cure a neurotic upset. A capable executive, for instance, was
(Continued on page 31)

LISTEN TO THE RUMBLE

Pittsburgh.

“WHY do you have to let them in?” the little girl squealed in an excited voice.

“Nothing we can do about it—equal rights law,” the ticket man told her.

I handed the man my ticket, but before I had reached the door of the dressing room, another little girl ran up to me and said, “Say, lady, you don’t want to go in the pool today. They’re letting colored people in.”

“I don’t mind,” I told her quietly. “They’re exactly the same as you and I. Their skin is just a little darker. That’s the only difference.” The child was too surprised to answer. She just stared after me.

The dressing room was filled with a sense of excitement. The basket woman shoved an empty basket out the window for me. She was in a hurry to rush to the other end of the room so that she could see out to the pool. Slowly I walked back to the benches to change into my bathing suit. I remembered the bloody race riots here at Highland Park a number of years ago when Negro people had attempted to go into the pool. The pool belongs to the city and when I was in High School I used to spend practically all my sum-

mer afternoons here. I remember as I undressed that my mother always used to warn me, “Remember, if there are any signs of a riot, get dressed and come right home.” In those days I surely would have turned around and left. Now I undressed quickly.

As I stepped into the bright sunlight I was struck by the sight of at least twenty-five uniformed cops standing and walking around the pools. Casually, I walked over to one of them and asked, “How come all the police today?”

“Just getting a little fresh air and sunshine,” he answered.

I sat down at the shallow end and watched the kids splashing around. There were three or four Negro kids playing. I wanted to go in and dance around with them. We were so happy, the kids and I. They because the water was cool and fresh and the sun so warm on their bodies. And I with a feeling of pride and victory. Let the cops mill around. Let the ignorant ones get dressed and go home. The Negro kids were here for the first time. And for the present that was the big thing that counted most.

A loud conversation was going on behind me. “I’m getting out of here,” one girl was saying. “I’ll be