

wrong notions about Snow's ideas, since he garbles the saturation bombing story so badly. Besides his inept summary, which is misleading enough, Mr. Fried comes to the wrong conclusion. The facts are that aside from the question of human decency involved (and Snow makes Tizard's feelings on this explicit), Tizard and P. M. S. Blackett independently came to the conclusions that Lindemann's estimate of the expected number of casualties was five (Tizard) or six (Blackett) times too high. A study after the war showed that Lindemann's figure was ten times too high. The scientific discipline involved here is operational research (in which Blackett pioneered); Lindemann's calculations were wrong, because he had made faulty assumptions and had omitted essential considerations; Tizard's and Blackett's were scientifically correct (that is, they had predicted the right "order of magnitude"). The bad *political* decision was the result of accepting bad (or wrong) science. This is all made very explicit in the Appendix to *Science and Government* (published as a separate pamphlet, and included in the Mentor edition). If Mr. Fried had not been in such a hurry to get his wrong-headed moralizing in print, he might have had time to read the Appendix.

Obviously, C. P. Snow's ideas are open to criticism—they must be: everybody is furnishing it. With regard to *Science and Government*, I for one prefer to take the word of R. H. S. Crossman, who not only approved of the book in his review in *Encounter* but also saw in it a valuable lesson for socialists, than to take the word of Mr. Fried, who doesn't even understand what the book says. Mr. Fried's article seems to me to be one more example of the annoying tendency of the left to single out as its real enemies not the Russian power elite, nor our own military, nor big business reactionaries, nor the segregationist office-holders in the South, but the likes of Sidney Hook, The Congress for Cultural Freedom, and—C. P. Snow.

JEROME S. SHIPMAN

#### Mr. Fried Replies:

Mr. Shipman's patronizing and offensive letter is hard to answer. Shall I insist that I *do* understand Snow, that my "notions" are not "wrong," "misleading," "garbled," or "ridiculous?" I wonder why Mr. Shipman bothered to write the letter.

He leaves no doubt that *he* at least understands Snow. This is strange in view of his own admission that Snow "is careful to qualify almost everything he says," that Snow's "style of delivery" is a "paradoxical combination of extreme diffidence and unbridled self-confidence." One would think, given these difficulties, that Mr. Shipman would have learned from Snow and tempered his own self-confidence with a little diffidence.

Mr. Shipman asserts that Snow qualifies each of the passages I quoted in my article and that these qualifications "give a very different meaning" than the one I gave. It is too bad Mr. Shipman does not submit any of them to the reader's judgment. I have read *The Two Cultures* many times and have failed to find any such qualifications.

Mr. Shipman is being sophomoric in asking where Snow explicitly said that Soviet Russia is the scientific society par excellence. I never suggested that he "said" it. My point was that he meant it. Snow measures England and Russia by the standard of scientific progress. England is still ruled by literary culture and has fallen far behind. Russia has raised scientific culture to preeminence and now has an increasing advantage over the West. This, I thought, was what Snow meant.

On the matter of Soviet literature I criticized Snow precisely because he was content to say *only* that Soviet novelists "assume in their audience a rudimentary knowledge of what industry is all about." It is what Snow omitted from his discussion that is significant. Is knowledge of industry the essential thing in the Soviet novel? What is the quality of the novel? Who is the novelist? Snow fails entirely to deal with these questions in the course of applauding Russia's integration of the two cultures.

Mr. Shipman finds my understanding of *Science and Government* to be "even more faulty, if possible." Happily I am not alone in my fault. So many criticisms of *Science and Government* have been made, so many people have misunderstood it, that Snow has had to write an Appendix, two-thirds the length of the original essay, answering his critics. (I did not consult the Appendix because the Mentor edition of *Science and Government*, which includes it, came out long after I wrote the article; it was not because I hurried [how would Mr. Shipman know?] "to get my wrong-headed moralizing into print.")

The Appendix qualifies the life out of the essay. In the essay Snow writes: "Scientists have it within them to know what a future-directed society feels like, for science itself, in its human aspect, is just that. That is my deeper reason for wanting scientists in government." In the Appendix he writes: "If you are going to have a scientist in a position of isolated power, the only scientist among non-scientists, it is dangerous when he has bad judgment." Who would quarrel with that empty truism?

My point in the article was that Snow gives scientists a privileged moral status which his example of the Lindemann-Tizwell controversy refutes. Lindemann and Tizwell were scientists involved in a political decision; their political, not their scientific, attitudes determined their decision. Mr. Shipman asserts that "The bad *political* decision was the result of accepting bad (or wrong) science." Of course there is no such thing as bad or wrong science. Political decision-makers will have the science they prefer. The scientist's task, qua scientist, is to determine whether the means are adequate to the ends that have been laid down for him. The scientist who enters the kingdom of ends leaves behind his science.

The last paragraph of Mr. Shipman's letter comes out of left field. The only thing it has in common with the rest is a certain tone of contempt. Why does he think he has to choose between "socialists"—R. H. S. Crossman or me? Besides is he certain that I

am a socialist? And if he is certain does he know what kind? Except in the broadest sense there is nothing in my article to suggest my politics—not that it is a secret, only irrelevant. Mr. Shipman's last sentence joins ignorance to bad taste and is better left unanswered.

## Objects to Review

### To the Editor:

When the *National Review* attacked my book on the Spanish Civil War, I was neither surprised nor anxious to answer. The review in *New Politics* did very much surprise me. I should like a chance to reply briefly.

Two minor points. It is not correct to say that I pay close attention to the "academic view" of the political spectrum of the thirties. I pay attention to the political spectrum itself. If my analysis is academic, no wonder—I'm an academic. And it is incorrect to say that the book terminates with Hemingway and the dilemma of primitivism and progress. The text ends with a 10-page epilogue and conclusion, in which I attempt to say again what was implicit for most readers throughout the entire book: namely, our policy was mistaken. We should have lifted the embargo and aided the Republic.

A major point. Your reviewer calls me effete because I do not expose escapism, specifically the escapism of the romantic view of Spain. In the first place, the "romantic" view wasn't escapist. Those I discuss in the chapter referred to were almost all active partisans of the Republic. Secondly, American policy failed because of the liberal view and its limitations. See pp. 115-121. If your reviewer were more sensitive to irony, to tone, to implication, and to direct statements, he would have discovered that the book is an attack on the liberal position. If effeteness is the liberal's vice, a tendency to shrill polemic is the socialist's.

Let me also recommend a collection of materials on the American embargo

and the Spanish war, soon to be published by D. C. Heath for the Amherst series. The collection, which I edit, includes an ardent lecture in which I denounce American policy. I trust this will cheer your reviewer; I hope he'll not be irritated that I reprint a colleague of mine as representative of the opposing position.

ALLEN GUTTMANN  
Amherst College

## The Value of Freedom

### To the Editor:

With a certain fifteen year-old whom I know everything is "neat," from a favorite story to her kitten's eyes. She uses the word with such relish, because it is popular among her associates.

How we make words *change*, to serve and satisfy our needs.

It is Christmas now, birth of The Prince of Peace, and we celebrate with a HULLABALOO, while the word *peace* is fast becoming taboo—(you might get called before a committee).

The most popular word in the air today is *freedom*. Hardly any "right sort" of person can open his mouth without uttering it.

Well, what does it mean?

When is one free, and when is one not free?

Those who are locked up in prisons are not free.

And no slave is free, regardless of to whom or to what he is enslaved.

There have been whole ages when no one was free, the Dark Ages, when no mind dared deviate from what the Church said "think." Many in prisons today are more free than were these.

Looking closely, one sees that bondage is not so much a matter of bars and chains, as it is a matter of restrictions upon the mind, of compressions about the soul.

Seeing that the populace of whole nations can lose their freedom, with only a handful of the inhabitants being aware of what is happening, and

that millions can live for ages in stagnant servitude without knowing or understanding the tragic pity of their plight, one comes to know that freedom must be defended, first for the intellect. For without freedom of mind all other so-called freedoms are dross.

ANNELLE EASLICK

## Good for Our Morale

### To the Editor:

I want to commend you on your coverage of the Cuba crisis. You've managed to present a real diversity of points of view on the question of U.S. policy. I consider this not only an editorial achievement of rank, but a sign of moral and political vigor.

Of all the articles on the Cuba question, I think Hal Draper's is the best. I am completely in sympathy with his stand, and I share his anger.


Enclosed is a small donation to further your efforts.

HORST BRAND

### To the Editor:

Congratulations on the wonderful articles you are printing which should help to prevent war. Promoting Enduring Peace believes that face-to-face contacts are also important. Next summer, leaving New York on July 7th, we are conducting two non-profit International Goodwill Seminars abroad. One tour is under the direction of the noted expert, Karl Baehr, and goes to Egypt, the West African countries, to Israel, Lebanon and Greece. The other goes to Scandinavia, Russia, taking in the major cities including Turkestan, and also goes to England and France. Anyone interested should write to me and I will send full details.

JEROME DAVIS,  
489 Ocean Avenue,  
West Haven, Conn.



**THE CORRUPT JUDGE: An Inquiry into Bribery and Other High Crimes and Misdemeanors in the Federal Courts.** By Joseph Borkin. Clarkson N. Potter, Inc., New York, 1962. 310 pp. \$6.

THIS IS AN exciting foray into that area in which legal "justice" and bourgeois profiteering collide. Joseph Borkin presents studies in depth of three Federal judges who became corrupt—and attempts to show both why they did and how they operated. In doing so he offers one of the few serious studies (neither "sensational" nor platitudinous) of the corruption problem in the Federal courts.

He delimits his field sharply. He pays no attention to corrupt State judges (who, after all, are numerous beyond counting) and concentrates instead upon two Federal Circuit Judges (Martin T. Manton of the Second Circuit and J. Warren Davis of the Third) and one Federal District Judge (Albert W. Johnson) who resigned from the Bench, faced with impeachment, in 1939, 1941 and 1945 respectively. Two of these, at least, are well-chosen. Johnson seems to have been included for comic relief but the others are the stuff of which high tragedy is made. Before their fall, Manton and Davis were among the brightest and most influential stars in the Federal appellate judiciary. Both became corrupt in the early thirties but were not exposed until 1939. Their tragedies, sketched with lucidity and insight, give Borkin's book its excitement and its social importance.

The Manton and Davis stories fit a common pattern. Its motif is three-pronged: each judge was financially ruined by the 1929 crash; each played

an at least suspicious role in bankruptcy proceedings involving the movie magnate, William Fox; and each subsequently received large bribes in connection with certain major patent litigations between 1932 and 1939. The first of these three prongs provides motivational background, or a view of what set the judges up for corruption, and the second a glimpse of a field (bankruptcy proceedings) in which comparatively small-scale corruption has been notoriously rampant. But the third is what "makes" the Manton and Davis stories, for it was this aspect of their lives that involved them in the monopolizing struggles of giant capitalist corporations. But for such involvement, their corruption would have been of no world-historical import and would probably never have been detected.

Borkin's conclusions are prosaic: he wants the Supreme Court to supervise the business involvements of Federal judges and he points out the utter inadequacy of the current removal (impeachment) procedures. As to the connection between monopoly capital and judicial corruption he has little, conclusion-wise, to say, perhaps because he can see no cure. But though his *proposals are tame, his facts are dynamite*.

B. H.

**THE SOVIET HIGH COMMAND.** By John Erickson. St. Martin's Press, 1962, 889 pp. \$15.00.

SEVENTY YEARS AGO Count Alfred von Schlieffen said: "The Russians can no longer be taken by surprise." The Count had not really anticipated Stalin. On that early Sunday morning of June 22, 1941, Soviet soldiers sent urgent radio messages to their commanders: "We are being fired on.

What shall we do?" And the first replies from headquarters were sharp and disdainful: "You must be insane. And why is your signal not in code?"

But to blame Stalin alone, or his psychopathic appeasement of the Nazis in the spring of 1941, for the debacle of that fateful summer is far from sufficient in the author's opinion. Erickson holds that: "Basically Stalin's method did not encourage independence of mind in any field. The Red Army and its command were shot through with the failings of the Stalinist system."

Erickson has written a detailed and authoritative military-political history of the Soviet armed forces and their command. He carries the engrossing narrative from the formation of the first Bolshevik military organizations in 1917 to the Battle for Moscow: November-December 1941. If the Nazi panzers achieved a stunning success in the fighting which carried them to the suburbs of Moscow the Red Army "counter-stroke before Moscow was an undeniably remarkable undertaking by an army which had been so terribly and continually mauled."

Considering the disadvantages which Stalin and the Stalinist system had created for the Red Army, the heroism of the Soviet soldiers and the skill of commanders such as Zhukov are all the more notable. The purges of the thirties had stripped the Soviet army of leadership at all levels. It was a massacre unique in history. The interests of the Red Army were subordinated to the political-personal control which Stalin was determined to achieve. Even more ominous was the degree to which this clutching for control jeopardized the interests of the Soviet Union.

The painstaking research that went into the writing of this history is indicated by the 90 pages of notes. In almost all cases the author has used primary sources and checked these against most available evidence. Where there is a question about the reliability of a source Erickson points this out. In addition to the historical narrative he provides a biographical in-

dex to the leading military personalities. In the appendices Erickson gives detailed figures on the strength and composition of the Red Army, 1918-1941. These also include documents on the formation of the Red Army, tables of organization, and other valuable data about the development of the Soviet armed forces.

There is considerable objectivity in the entire work; but one might desire a somewhat sterner appraisal of Pilsudski's aggression in 1920 and of the White Guard cabal. Though the ground has been covered before, the account of the struggle between Trotsky and Stalin is vivid and informative. This will in all probability remain the standard reference work on the history of the Red Army.

J. C.

THE PEN AND THE SWORD. By Michael Foot. New York, Monthly Review Press, 1962. 387 pages. \$7.50.

FIFTEEN MONTHS DURING the first quarter of the 18th century are put under the microscope in this detailed evocation of a political crisis during the reign of Queen Anne. The week-by-week, or even sometimes day-by-day, course of events is laid out with something of the breathless anticipation of periodical journalism. The focus is on the point where literature intersected politics, where Grub Street confronted Whitechapel, in the form of political journalism.

Now the author is one of the best political journalists in England today (long editor of the left-Labor weekly *Tribune*), and so it is easy to understand the preoccupation of the book. The title tells it: the pen was Jonathan Swift, not yet the author of *Gulliver's Travels* (he was learning how to write it); and the sword was the Duke of Marlborough, the greatest soldier of England, powerful and able statesman, and mainstay of the Whigs. If Swift is in some sort the hero of Foot's book (though Foot might not agree), the same period was written up with a different hero in the biography of Marl-

borough by another political man, Winston Churchill, his descendant.

And the pen was mightier than the sword. So Foot seems to be saying. For Swift's Tory side won out. Swift's pamphleteering services to his patrons were no doubt great; among other things he thought up the arguments they should use when they could not think of them themselves, in the traditional relationship of indentured intellectuals to the men of power. Grub Street showed itself a political force, and this seems to be the main moral of the episode to the author from the viewpoint of social history.

It all makes a fascinating story, told with skill and style and suspense.

Part of the suspense is due to the fact that we never find out what was under the surface. The intrigue, the wire-pulling, the games of political musical chairs all take place in an historical vacuum, where anything can happen. When finally Queen Anne pulls the rug from under the Whigs by packing the House of Lords with Tories, she is nothing but a *dea ex machine*, and one feels like kissing the playwright for a trick.

It is perhaps strange, but left-Labor editor Foot does not have the slightest interest in what the fight between the Tories and the Whigs was all about, that is, not in this book. Even the surface issues, the ones they debated, are referred to only glancingly, as they obtrude on the story; any deeper issues are scarcely raised. This is underlined heavily when Foot adds a special appendix "Whigs and Tories"—and confines it to a technical discussion of the propriety of using the *terms!*

If a book should be criticized only in terms of what it sets out to do, however, Foot cannot be chided. Swift as Tory penman does not make a very savory hero, either politically or otherwise, and Foot could hardly have gotten so deeply involved in the exciting story if he had approached it another way. But perhaps it could have been written with less involvement and more penetration.

H. D.

TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY IN WESTERN EUROPE. By Walter Galenson. University of California Press. Berkeley, 1961. 97 pp. \$2.25.

DESPITE ITS TITLE, Prof. Galenson's brief study appears to be concerned mainly with trade union democracy in the U.S. Nonetheless, it is a very useful summary of trade union practices in Western Europe. That in itself is its value.

Unfortunately, it is not easy to sift out Prof. Galenson's conclusions about the determinants of trade union democracy. At one point it is "if there is one lesson to be learned from the European experience it is that union security, in broader sense, is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for internal democracy." But at another place it is that "most of the specific devices for the regulation of union government . . . are not necessarily conducive to greater worker welfare."

However, Galenson does look with some favor upon greater union rivalry, not only in organizing, but in raiding—such as exists in Belgium, Holland and Austria—as a possible source of greater democracy. Also he finds some merit in the British system of a permanent general secretary for "if the outcome of a factional victory were a change in union policy rather than in job holders, differences of opinion might be less suspect."

Perhaps the difficulty with the book is that it tends to treat trade union democracy as susceptible to a series of mechanical solutions—no one of which is particularly favored.

There is repeated emphasis that if this or that proposal were adopted in the U.S., it would be necessary to give unions greater security from business attacks. This seems strange in view of the fact that nowhere in Western Europe is there the equivalent of the National Labor Relations Act which gives a union exclusive bargaining rights protected by law.

S. B.



NEW HORIZONS FOR AMERICAN LABOR. By Joseph A. Beirne. Public Affairs Press, 1962, 89 pp., \$3.25.

ONE WISHES THE PRESIDENT of the Communication Workers of America had been able to develop the questions he touches on in this slim volume. Beirne deals with automation, industrial growth, the changing composition of the American labor force, organizing the white collar workers, labor participation in community affairs, organizing the unorganized and other urgent problems facing labor today. But in each case he poses the problem, shows the need of a new approach, and leaves it to the reader to figure out how this new approach will be achieved, or exactly what it is. The author does make one point quite clear—that the national labor center must occupy a much more important role than it does today in labor activities. To allow local autonomy to interfere with the necessary action that must be taken to solve the new problems facing labor is to weaken the labor movement.

STUDIES OF WAR. By P. M. S. Blackett. Hill and Wang, 242 pp., \$3.95.

THE DISTINGUISHED BRITISH Nobel prize winner has assembled a number of his essays and articles written between 1948 and 1962 on military strategy. He regrets the decisions made in the past to reply primarily on nuclear weapons for defense. Professor Blackett urges that conventional military forces should not be neglected by the West. Indeed, it is a puzzling aspect of the popularity the author enjoys in rather rigid left-wing circles, why there is so much enthusiasm for increasing our armed forces. Blackett does indicate that both the Soviet Union and the United States wish to avoid nuclear warfare. He suggests that the reason Russia fears inspection is "because they had so little to inspect." One wonders. And one also wishes that Professor Blackett was as much concerned with history as with military strategy.

But his views are always expressed in lucid style and contribute to intelligent discussion of the big issue of our time.

PREVENTING WORLD WAR III: Some Proposals, edited by Quincy Wright, William M. Evans and Morton Deutsch. Simon and Schuster, New York. 460 pp. \$6.95.

THIS COLLECTION OF ESSAYS starts from the proposition that although the military is an old and respected profession, there is no profession concerned with the maintenance of peace.

Twenty-eight prominent social scientists contribute to this symposium organized around three categories: stopping the arms race, reducing international tensions and building a world society. The editors do not claim that these contributions are complete or exhaustive plans of action, rather they are an inventory of "original and significant proposals which, if implemented, would lessen the chances of World War III." As wide a range of schemes as it is possible to imagine emerges from a multitude of academic disciplines converging on the problems of the arms race and the balance of terror—political scientists, economists, sociologists, lawyers, psychiatrists, international relations specialists, English professors, linguists, philosophers, chemists, physicists, industrial engineers, and mathematical biologists.

Among the arms inspection proposals offered are: the use of lie-detector tests administered by UN technicians, armed arbiters to settle differences between the two nuclear-armed blocs, the use of hostages to deter attacks. There are discussions of the economics of disarmament along with proposals for arms control, graduated unilateral initiatives, unconditional unilateral disarmament and proposals to study the use of nonviolent techniques against any transgressor of the disarmament agreement.

Reading further one encounter proposals for converting fights into de-