


## ***Two Lines in Foreign Policy—***

# **Political Warfare versus “Stabilization”**



THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL WARFARE<sup>1</sup> points to a distinctive line of foreign policy, an approach which offers an alternative both to the main line of the Establishment and to the main line of the existing peace movement.

The relationship can be best seen if we begin by setting out the choices available. What are the possible policies among which one must choose?

The main demarcation is not for or against peace. It is indeed one of the confusing peculiarities of the peace issue that *everyone* is for peace, or nearly everyone worth discussing in this connection. And sincerely so; they sincerely desire to prevent the outbreak of another world war. This has been as true of Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson as of Khrushchev, Malenkov and Stalin.

Hitler was for international peace also: when he invaded Poland in 1939 he did not want a world war, he merely wanted Poland. When Moscow's camp invaded South Korea, it did not want a world war, it merely wanted all of Korea. When England and France invaded the Suez Canal Zone in 1956, they did not want war—merely Suez. When Kennedy invaded Cuba in 1961, he did not want to unleash a world war; he merely wanted to leash Cuba. When war breaks out in spite of the intentions of all the statesmanlike peace-lovers, it is not because they want war but because they want that which cannot be obtained, in the last analysis, except by the clash of interests whose only arbitrament is force.

In this sense we can be quite sure that, say, Herman Kahn is as sincerely for peace as anyone else; that most likely Barry Goldwater is also; and possibly even Dr. Edward Teller.

For meaningful lines of demarcation, then, “for or against peace” is asking the wrong question. This can be even worse than giving the wrong answer.

Let us take a different demarcating question: how to end the Cold War. This phrasing excludes two viewpoints. One is the solution of preventive or “pre-emptive” war, though in a sense this is indeed the only certain way to end the Cold War. The other is the viewpoint that an end to the Cold War is not possible, that the only problem is how to live with it permanently.

1. See my previous article, “The Secret Weapon: Political Warfare” in *New Politics*, II:3, for a considerable discussion of this concept.

"How to end the Cold War" gives rise to three possible types of foreign policy in broad outline:

(1) Ending the Cold War through facilitating the victory of the *other camp*, in this case the Communist camp. This, of course, unites the various types of pro-Soviet advocates in foreign policy: not only the Communists and their supporters but also, in basic politics, neo-Trotskyism and its sophisticated relative, the political tendency represented most prominently by Isaac Deutscher.

(2) Ending the Cold War through a negotiated deal between the two camps which will *stabilize* the balance of power so that they can coexist without war. This means for both: satisfying "legitimate aspirations," ending "misunderstandings," dividing regional hegemonies fairly so as to ease tensions. Historically speaking, it is in the traditional groove of maintaining imperialist peace as the alternative to imperialist war, through the balancing of spheres of influence, etc. Whatever the terminology invented, the key idea is *stabilization*. We will see later the two main branches of this viewpoint.

(3) Ending the Cold War *by winning it*.—This approach has been made virtually the exclusive property of the ultra-right, like "Liberation"; but both phrases are given only a purely demagogic content. We know that their "liberation" of Cuba really means its subjection to American overlordship; yet there *is* such a thing as the real liberation of Cuba from the Castro dictatorship which the Cuban people themselves will one day achieve; likewise the real liberation of the Eastern European peoples.

Similarly, by their talk of "winning the Cold War," the reactionaries wish to hint at preventive war, or at measures of military adventurism just short of preventive war, or at saber-rattling and bomb-brandishing gestures designed to threaten such measures. We can suppose that this approach is intended to ensure that the U.S. win the inevitable hot war; but it does not even have a conception of what winning a *cold* war means.

Winning a *cold* war means winning in political warfare.

There's the rub. We have already tried to explain why the very concept of political warfare is inaccessible to almost all American thinking on foreign policy, while at the same time it is the main weapon of the Communist camp in the Cold War. "Political warfare is not an arsenal of implementing techniques," e.g., propaganda gimmicks, subversion, tricks, etc.; "it is a question of a regime's or a society's social and political policy itself." If American representatives are getting thrown out of countries from Panama to Cambodia, to Zanzibar, to Ghana (examples I take only because they are happening as I write this), it is not because of the superior devil-power of Communists or Castroites on every continent, but because the dynamic force they ride is *anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism*. The revolution of our times is powered by these two related *anti*'s, and the side that can plug in on this source of power has the power to win. The side that is identified with capitalism and its imperialism is the United States.

There is no lack of opportunity to direct an anti-imperialist potential against the Russian camp, as has been recently demonstrated by the protests of African students in Moscow, as well as the brutal national suppressions in East Europe. But the United States is in part incapable of taking advantage of revolutionary strivings, and in part unwilling to, even when they are directed against an enemy. It will have to be socially and politically transformed before victory in the political war is a possibility.

VICTORY IN THE COLD WAR means, politically speaking, implementing a radical-democratic and anti-imperialist foreign policy which can win the support of the peoples of the world and strike blows against the Communist camp. For example:

(1) *Unilateral initiatives.* There are a whole family of measures looking to the preliminary easement of military tensions which are familiar proposals of the peace movement: bomb test bans, armament control agreements, etc.—typically the immediate objectives of SANE or Turn Toward Peace. There is no need to repeat there the powerful case for them. The argument is that the U.S. should unilaterally move in this direction, and it is this aspect which we want to highlight; for the concept of political warfare puts unilateralism into an entirely new context and puts a brand-new value upon it.

To be sure, unilateralism fits nicely into the absolute-pacifist ideology; it can be advocated also as a means to stimulate Moscow to go and do likewise as a preliminary to coming to a negotiated deal; it can even be cheerfully advocated by those whose real objective is the victory of the other side. Its concrete meaning does not lie in itself but in the policy which it is used to implement; and its implementation can be quite different depending on its policy-context.

An America capable of launching a real peace drive—not merely counterpunching embarrassedly at each new proposal from the Kremlin—would be one capable of political warfare. In this world, peace proposals are ammunition in political warfare, and there is no use decrying the fact. The more sincere the proposals, the more effective they can be. The Kremlin has made hay even with demagogic ones mainly because it could rely on the U.S. not to call its bluff. The term commonly used, “peace offensive,” underlines the political-warfare character of these weapons.

The “peace offensive” is by its very nature a “unilateral initiative” even where it is, at least formally, directed toward “negotiations.” For some in the peace movement, the proposal for a unilateral cessation of bomb tests by the United States is justified *only* if it is presumed to lead eventually to an agreement with Russia. From the view of political warfare, this is not so. To be sure, multilateral agreement to end bomb tests is a consummation devoutly to be wished, for its own sake; this is not questionable. But *even* if a unilateral initiative does not lead to a multilateral agreement or other response in kind, its value is not thereby negated, for political warfare gives it another dimension. Its aim is not

merely to convince the Kremlin; its aim is to win the world. A radical foreign policy of anti-imperialist political warfare would consider constructive tension-easing agreements as by-products along the road; the road itself aims not at a lasting accommodation of super-powers but at political victory over the enemy.

(2) *Anti-imperialism*. One way in which political warfare differs from "propaganda warfare" is that it is a war of deeds, not words. "The peoples of the world," said Emerson, "cannot hear what we say because what we do keeps dinning in their ears." No amount of extra power or money for Voice of America broadcasts can counterbalance the impact on the world when even a conservative regime in Panama has to denounce the U.S. as colonialist. Even if Washington now agrees to renegotiate the canal pact, it will gain little credit. From the point of view of political warfare, a militantly anti-imperialist foreign policy was pointing to Panama years ago. Here was a chance for the U.S. to seize the imagination of a world most of which is painfully struggling out of colonialism; and cheaply, since the canal is now of little military or financial benefit. Yet, aside from the residual vested interests involved, even an enlightened ambassador's urging could not move this United States in that direction. To have done so would have put inconvenient ideas also in the minds of other governments: Bolivia, Venezuela, etc. where U.S. interests are involved.

Political warfare is not simply a "device" that a government can adopt or not adopt; its roots are deep in the social possibilities and impossibilities of the system. Thus Russia's political warfare can exploit uninhibitedly the vast potentials of anti-capitalism that lie all over the world just beneath the surface or on it, even though it is more and more often tripping over its own imperialistic constraints.

In Vietnam, U.S. policy fears neutralization for political reasons, not military. Washington is afraid that a neutral Vietnam will be taken over politically by the Communists, not by terror, just as the Vietcong has been winning in the struggle for the peasants' allegiance in the guerrilla war. And its fears are well-grounded, for in the political warfare that neutralization invites, what reason have the little people been given to support whoever is the latest general favored by the U.S. as against the promise of an agrarian revolution?

On the other hand, the Communists not only promise but also do carry through a social revolution on the land, where they have power—as a preliminary to imposing their own bureaucratic-collectivist strait-jacket. The U.S. stands pat with the landlords. Can it do otherwise? that is, has anyone even seen a regime that promoted social revolution while basing itself on the old status quo?

In a good part of the world today, successful political warfare means *promoting social revolution*. This has two consequences among others: (a) It is one reason why the Communists are ahead on points in winning the Cold War; and (b) it means that those Americans, whether of the Establishment or of the peace movement, whose peace goal is a "stabilization" deal are mistaking the nature of the problem.

I have been giving illustrations only;<sup>2</sup> the limits of a radical-democratic foreign policy of political warfare are set only by the hot spots in the world, and there will be no lack.

(3) *Withdrawal of troops and bases.* It is increasingly being admitted that the clots of American troops stationed abroad, as well as U.S. air and naval bases ringing Russia, are there for symbolic purposes only. That is what it amounts to. What is it that is thereby symbolized? It is the nature of U.S. foreign policy, which understands "containment" in military terms. If, for example, the presence of American troops in West Berlin is made a symbol of "our determination not to surrender the Berlin people to the Communists," then, naturally, to withdraw these troops becomes a symbol of capitulation. But the latter is true only insofar as it is U.S. policy to create such a military symbol.

U.S. troops and bases abroad are also political symbols. Those established near Russia's borders, bristling with SAC bombers and U-2 planes or their successors, were put there as visible threats of nuclear striking power. Their main actual use is as subjects of Russia's political warfare; they make easy any argument that Russia is the persecuted underdog surrounded by encircling capitalist guns, since the same country that puts them there has made clear that foreign missiles 90 miles from its borders are a deadly threat.

Other bases are mainly useful as evidence of U.S. overlordship and arrogance, e.g. Guantanamo and the Canal Zone. Still others have been irritants in newly independent countries, e.g. Morocco, Zanzibar. They are clearly more important for political-warfare purposes than for military purposes—but not the U.S.'s political warfare.

American troops in Germany—of course, together with American policy on Germany—have been symbolic of Washington's determination to remilitarize that country. In 1956 one of the main forces restraining the Polish revolution within bounds tolerable to Moscow was the Poles' fear of the threat on the Western side, which was used to balance the threat from the East: the fear of reborn German militarism backed up by U.S. troops. When Russian power was tottering on its marches, the greatest aid that the West could have given to the anti-Stalinist revolution would have been a neutral and demilitarized Germany. This is one of the potentialities of political warfare.

Instead it is Khrushchev who has made mileage on this issue. More than once now, it is Khrushchev who has offered to withdraw, or seemed to be offering to withdraw, Russian troops to within Russian borders if the United States did likewise. He was able to do this, I believe, because he was confident that Washington would not call the bluff. Political warfare means that the U.S. would mount a great "peace offensive" around this proposal.

The power of such a peace offensive would not depend on the possibility of agreement with Moscow. *Unilateral* withdrawal of troops here demonstrates its political potential. As long as Moscow maintains its

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2. Another and very important illustration is a program of political warfare as alternative to the Kennedy policy on Cuba, detailed as part 5 of my article on the Cuba blockade crisis, *New Politics*, 11:1, p. 36ff.

troops in Poland, Hungary, Rumania, East Germany, etc. after this, it cannot do so on the basis of the old political capital. Its occupation is naked; its imperialism patent.

(4) *Recognition of China and East Germany.* As we have already pointed out in one case, all of the preceding measures can be carried out in different ways as parts of different foreign-policy approaches. There is, of course, no difficulty in incorporating (for example) neutralization of Vietnam into a program of appeasement; yet no one is currently accusing De Gaulle of being a Municher. It is equally obvious that the proposal for the withdrawal of American troops from Germany or Europe can be happily married into an appeasement program; yet it can also be used as a powerful weapon in political warfare to strike a blow against Russian political hegemony. It is dynamite, but dynamite can be destructive or constructive depending on what program of operations it is integrated into.

THE SAME IS NO LESS TRUE of the issue of recognition of Communist China. The issue, of course, is not approval of the Peking regime; it is rather support of the Chiang Kai-shek regime. The frenzy of U.S. opposition to recognition is in proportion to the strength of its policy of supporting the ousted despot against the present one. This is the political content of the non-recognition policy, and no political warfare against the Mao dictatorship can possibly be effective as long as the alternative is Chiang. Non-recognition also implies the possibility of invasion by Chiang, i.e. it is a threat of military warfare.

Recognition of the Mao regime is necessary in order to make possible the beginning of *political* warfare against this very regime: this is the basic ground of the proposal. It could be a move toward appeasement; it could be a move toward a "stabilization" deal; it could be a move of weak despair; it need not be any of these if it is part of a move toward political warfare.

In some ways this is even clearer in the case of East Germany. It is one of the major marks of the insanity of American foreign policy that, in precisely that country whose people first rose up in revolt to throw the Russian masters out of the country, it is the U.S. which *insists* that the Russian occupation stay there. As a result of its policy (also insisted on by Bonn) of non-recognition, Washington is willing to collaborate time after time in the precipitation of Berlin crises over the question of dealing with East German personnel rather than Russian. At one point Kennedy even called out the reserves and implicitly threatened the use of troops over the issue of keeping the Russians in control there. It is the only country where the U.S. has intimated that it is willing to start World War III over the issue of *keeping* the Russians in control of a subject people!

Moreover, if you insist that Russian forces control East Germany, it is rather more difficult to object to their presence in the lands through which they must move to get to the posts in Germany which you insist on. Meanwhile, the government in Bonn which threatens tantrums if we recognize the other Germany carries out innumerable recognitions

itself in the form of formal and informal agreements, not to speak of its voluminous trade, all in the name of practical necessity.

We cannot simultaneously sympathize with, let alone support, the satellite people's aspiration to throw off the yoke of the Russian occupation, and at the same time insist that we will deal only with the Russians as sovereign power. Recognition of an East German regime is necessary simply to make possible political warfare that makes sense.

No country has ever been anxious to get into foreign war when it is at war within itself. One of the greatest forces for peace—that is, postponement of a showdown and prolongation of a breathing-spell—is the fear behind the lines of the opposed camps that the outbreak of war means the breakdown of internal cohesion. Governments precipitate international incidents to cement national unity only when the outside enemy is already unitedly seen as a threat to the nation as a whole, and even then mainly as a feint. Everything which makes the East European people hostile to the Russian power is a force for peace.

Here too a capitalist West cannot evoke effective support in East Europe where, as has been shown in each of the anti-Stalinist revolts that have taken place, the fighters for national and social freedom have evidenced not the slightest desire for a return to capitalism. This is another concretization of the view that the self-anointed leader of the capitalist world cannot carry on effective political warfare in a world dominated by anti-capitalism, where all revolutionary roads lead either to a form of democratic collectivism (socialism) or to a form of bureaucratic collectivism.



THIS VIEW, THAT THIS CAPITALIST U.S. cannot carry on effective political warfare, will naturally be denounced as dogmatic and doctrinaire by all good liberals, who are accustomed to urge the State Department to take the leadership of the World Revolution of Rising Expectations and to express heartfelt disappointment that it does not. That is all to the good; I would not have it otherwise. It is precisely the *good* liberal who, believing it possible, works for a radical-democratic foreign policy from crisis to crisis, and he deserves all support; for this is the kind of left opposition, in the absence of a real socialist movement, which helps to prolong the breathing-spell. If, as is conceivable, we are wrong and he is right, then our joint fight for such good aims will maintain the peace; and if, as is likely, we are right and he wrong, then it is only through such an effort that the issue will be tested. Hence, the good liberal who considers our conclusion to be pessimistic and narrow *and who seeks to prove this in his own struggle* is our best friend.

Quite otherwise is another kind of liberal, and most especially another kind of peace-lover, who might do us the honor of agreeing with our view, but who draws a different conclusion:

*It is unrealistic to expect this politically backward U.S. to implement such a program of political warfare on a radical-democratic basis. The proposal has the basic defect of being implicitly revolutionary, that is, it requires a fundamental transformation in the social and political underpinnings of the system before it can become realistic. And what we need now is a realistic program to keep the precarious peace, not music of the future, not utopian dreams. To be realistic a peace program must be conceived within the framework of the present political forces; it must be something that this very administration can be induced to carry out, if only we explain things clearly enough, get next to the right people in high places, frame our proposals persuasively and moderately enough...*

The realistic program which this points to is the one which we have numbered (2) at the beginning of this article: a negotiated deal between the opposing camps to stabilize the balance of power. Now the first important thing about this road to peace is that it is the common ground both of the Establishment's peace-lovers and of much of the peace movement, for the most part. This will seem surprising only to those who have an oversimplified image of both of these tendencies. But the fact is, on the one hand, the government is not staffed by warmongers aching to press the Button; and on the other, commitment to the peace movement is the laudable expression of a sentiment rather than of an idea.

The main line of the Establishment is that the goal of stabilizing the power status quo can be achieved only through "negotiations from strength," that is, relying on military superiority and intimidation (bigger bombs, bigger stockpiles, bigger military alliances) to bludgeon the other camp into being "reasonable." Being reasonable may be defined as being willing to accept a stabilization deal on terms satisfactory to Washington. There will, of course, be a spectrum of differences on how much crow the other fellow has to eat before the terms are satisfactory. Meanwhile, peace will be preserved through the Nuclear Deterrent. Eventually, an end to the Cold War may become possible if, say, a new Peaceloving Dictator takes over in Moscow, or the long-heralded "mellowing" of the Russian despotism sets in, or our two systems converge into greater similarity with the eons, or some windfall crops up.

The main line of the peace movement is that a negotiated deal to stabilize the power status quo can be achieved by *less risky means*. At this point I am in danger of seeming to derogate what is in fact the great contribution of the peace movement: its development and popularization of non-military alternatives to the primarily military-based foreign-policy thinking of the Establishment and to the whole philosophy of the deterrent. As I have already indicated, the greatest portion of these ideas form a natural part of a program of political warfare, and in any case the peace movement has also played the role of a left-opposition to Establishment politics with an invaluable cautionary im-

pact on our rulers. I should prefer to assume that it needs no defense here.

The underlying philosophy, however, can stand examination. Insofar as non-ideologically-inclined "peaceniks"<sup>3</sup> are unaware of holding any underlying philosophy, this merely means, usually, that they do not recognize the assumptions on the basis of which they form opinions.

The more conscious and systematic exponents of the "stabilization" approach, however, form a distinct and noticeable current in the peace movement and display the viewpoint in especially consistent form.

One of the strong ingredients which crops up, more or less explicitly, is the idea of a negotiated division of the world. This has a most respectable past, being a favorite nostrum of peace-loving empire-builders, but a less tolerant climate in recent times has tended to make its traditionalistic holders embarrassed about blurting it out. An exception is Bertrand Russell who, when the U.S. alone held the atom-bomb, publicly looked forward to a world of peace bossed by one gendarme-government, that of Washington; he has less reason now to be chary of a fractious world divided between *two* giant powers (double the number) who can keep the peace between them. If peace, simple peace, is the be-all and end-all, then there is a case for a modern variant of the traditional kind of imperialist peace: the Pax Russo-Americana.

One of the earlier formulations of the Divide-and-Pacify theory came from Henry Wallace. Back in 1946 Wallace declared: "... the Russians should stop conniving against us in certain areas just as we should stop scheming against them in other parts of the world." "On our part, we should recognize that we have no more business in the political affairs of Eastern Europe than Russia has in the political affairs of Latin America, Western Europe and the U.S." He proposed "practical regional reservations" (i.e. spheres of influence) for each of the two giants while the UN held the reins on the rest of the world outside these assigned regions. In a 1948 book *Toward World Peace* Wallace peacefully proposed the Anglo-Russian division of Persia in 1907 as a model for a Washington-Moscow agreement on the "limits of expansion and intervention," together with other anti-war thoughts.

I vividly remember a film short that I saw, some time in the middle 1950s, at a pacifist camp I attended in New England; it had been made by a Friends organization (which one I am not now sure) to explain the conclusions of a Friends peace delegation recently returned from a trip to Russia. Most of it was an excellent popular presentation of the danger of war and the need for peace. It ended with the Way Out. Here it broke into an animated cartoon illustrating the great American tradition of the horse trade: the farmers jawed some back and forth but it all came out right with a peaceful deal and nobody got hurt. The moral was that we too should ensure peace by negotiations

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3. This ungainly term has been making its way inside and outside the peace movement because it fills a need. The term "pacifist" in Marxist writing used to mean not one who was for peace, not one who was an absolute-pacifist, but one who viewed the peace problem as a *separate* question, abstracted from other social issues, particularly from the nature of the social system. This, of course, is characteristic of non-radical peace movements. No one would now understand the term "pacifist" in this sense. This is what "peacenik" is now used to mean.

with Russia. The horse trade is a powerful model for a negotiated stabilization, except for one difficulty: nowadays the "horses" object.

Theorization about a peaceful (as against forcible) redivision of the world to stabilize the distribution of power is common in the peace movement, not as a matter of brutal cynicism or callous pro-imperialism, but typically as the result of a virtuous and even idealistic search for a "realistic" basis of accommodation between the power blocs. If this search slides into a wellworn groove, it is because reality permits no other outcome, once the alternative of revolutionary transformation has been rejected.

ONE OF THE MAIN CENTERS of this approach has been the interesting group called the Council of Correspondence (originally Committee of Correspondence), whose founding core in 1960 consisted of David Riesman, Erich Fromm, a teaching assistant of Riesman's named Roger Hagan who became editor of the group's *Newsletter*, and Robert Gilmore, then peace secretary of the Friends. While the *Newsletter* prints a variety of viewpoints as part of its free-for-all discussion, there is no mistaking the core viewpoint which gives this tendency its character, especially in the let's-think-aloud pieces which make the *Newsletter* one of the most interesting vehicles of pacifist discussion.

In one, for example, Riesman mused over the "overwhelming feeling in the country" that the Communists are pushing us around and winning the Cold War; he is afraid that this tends to bolster desires for a hard showdown stand. His reaction is to argue that the Communists have *not* done so well; and

Moreover, few Americans never [ever?] did really want a monopoly of power or imagine running the world from Washington. Arguably, Khrushchev is right when he tells us that the Russians and Americans could sit down and make a deal and divide the world. We are still immensely rich and strong. . . . (July 21, 1961)

The train of thought is interesting. To admit the fact that the Communists are winning the political war (which is the one actually going on) is a threat to peace. The alternative that comes to mind, in this stream of consciousness, is an *American* "monopoly of power" (*vide* Bertrand Russell), and who wants that? After victory in the political war for either side has been rejected, the next thought is the deal to divide the world.

Now, it is perhaps unfortunate that the very word Munich, with the accompanying cuss word "appeasement," has been covered with such an accretion of connotations. Both words now imply vicious insults: even pro-Nazism, certainly at least capitulation to totalitarianism, and other execrable sins. The verdict of history is hard on policies that fail. But Chamberlain and Daladier (enthusiastically supported by Franklin D. Roosevelt) were not pro-Nazi, did not want to capitulate, and merely thought that they were stabilizing world peace by a deal to keep the hostile rapacities from colliding. They did not want to "appease"; they merely wanted to be realistic in preserving Peace in Our Time. Their crime was that they were wrong; but who then can remain innocent?

Hence, in this article we shall continue using the term "stabilization deal" rather than the loaded word "appeasement."

Riesman is also sensitive about "Munich" as he discusses this country's emphasis on military preparation against Communist pressure:

Like a child who has been burned by a hot stove and decides never to touch any, we have learned the lesson of Munich all too thoroughly, or rather are applying it in a new situation where it does not fit. (Aug. 24, 1961)

In what respect now must we unlearn the lesson of Munich, in Riesman's view, or rather: does it fit our new situation at all—is it relevant to us today? Or must we put Munich out of mind altogether in order not to be tempted to adopt the bisymmetric opposite of Munichism, viz. militant adventurism?

The Berlin crisis of the year 1961, with its consequent soul-searching among peace advocates, brought much of this thinking to the fore. It strongly highlighted the issue of recognition of East Germany. As already stressed, this can be part of a program to stabilize Russian power in Europe, or it can be part of a program of political warfare. For Erich Fromm (December, 1961) the de-facto recognition of East Germany was desirable because "the stability of the Soviet system would be less threatened."<sup>4</sup> His stance is that of the hard-headed realist:

Quite regardless of the question of the moral justification for the existing borders ... the existing power structure is a fact, and Khrushchev, like any other leader of a powerful nation, could not keep his political position if he surrendered any of Stalin's post-war gains. But just because the vast majority of the East German population is against the Communist régime (like the majority of some other satellite states), Eastern Europe is the Achilles heel of the Soviet system, and Khrushchev understandably wants to stabilize it as much as possible. (July 21, 1961)

*This* is why Fromm is for de-facto recognition of East Germany, he says. He takes up "a number of misleading arguments," including "one, that a Russian peace treaty with East Germany prevents final German unification." My answer would be the simple one that German unity is prevented not by a Russian peace treaty with East Germany but by the fact of Communist control over East Germany, among other things, and that a peace treaty *which is an element of political warfare* can be part of a program to change the reality. But Fromm's reply is simply this challenge: "What is *our* concern with German unification?" None, he indicates, because it can be achieved only by war.

The danger of war is too great to indulge in the type of thinking which does not try to understand the opponent's position. . . . Such a solution [in terms of recognition, Rapacki proposal, etc.] can be found if we stick to the political reality that (1) The Russians cannot relinquish any piece of their present sphere of interest; (2) we cannot and are decided not to relinquish West Berlin. (*Ibid.*)

This injunction to "stick to the political reality" is the operative part of the approach, for the existing political reality *is* the struggle to redive the world. For Fromm is not in the least interested in strengthening Russia's position; as a good social-democrat he holds out

4. For similar views expressed by Fromm in his book *May Man Prevail?*, see Julius Jacobson's article in the symposium "American Socialism and Thermonuclear War," *New Politics*, 1:3, and the subsequent exchange with Fromm in 1:4, p. 173f.

the hope that if the situation is made more secure, oppositional elements in East Germany will have a better chance to fight for change; in other words, his intentions are of the best.

In a discussion between Seymour M. Lipset and Fromm, Lipset writes:

Peace can be made with a totalitarian and wicked enemy only when it is in the *interests of both sides to make such terms*. And we may be forced to recognize that one of the prices which we have to pay for such terms is to give the Russians fairly iron-clad agreements which enable them to keep complete control of all that they have gained. Whether our ritualistic orthodoxies will permit American politicians to make such agreements is obviously a moot question. [April 27, 1961]

It is not altogether clear whether Lipset, who does not like ritualism or orthodoxies, is or is not in favor of giving Russia iron-clad agreements enabling it to keep complete control of East Europe and other countries. Fromm did not comment directly but offered another formulation linking up recognition with the traditional terms for the division of the world: "The whole issue of Berlin deals, in fact, only with the question of the acceptance of the Russian sphere of interest by the Western alliance, and I believe there is little doubt that there would be no Berlin problem as soon as East Germany is recognized by the West." When we find the peace of the world explicitly based on the acceptance of imperialist "spheres of interest"—as close to the traditional "spheres of influence" as one can get—then it is clear that the underlying philosophy involved is now not lying too far from the surface.

Michael Maccoby made a contribution (July, 1962) in squarely posing his alternatives in foreign policy as "world stability or decisive victory in the Cold War." These correspond to the alternatives of "political warfare" or a "stabilization deal" which we are considering here. Of course, Maccoby sees only a military-adventure content in "decisive victory," since political warfare is not embraced by his area of vision; hence only "stability" remains. He accepts "the well-documented contentions of D. F. Fleming, Erich Fromm and George Kennan" that Russia is a conservative, non-revolutionary power, and concludes:

If we saw the Soviet Union in this way, as a power jealous of its interests but not insatiable, it would be clearly in the best interests of peace to reach an accord with the Russians. An agreement to maintain the status quo would not keep us from competing with them in economic development and in backward nations.

That Russia's interests are "not insatiable" is vital to the theory; the phrase means "appeasable." Now all previous world-power conflicts have also been between appeasable non-revolutionary powers, and to demonstrate that Russia is now conservative and not revolutionary puts the problem into the same class as the traditional inter-imperialist wars and tensions. It's nothing new, we are told. The road to peace that follows is also nothing new: the good old mixture of spheres of influence, balance of power, deals to divide the world, pacts to maintain the status quo, iron-clad agreements to ensure imperialist control—in a word, world *stability*, the same stability that has preceded every world war.

Only now this old stew is the brand-new recipe of an important

tendency of the peace movement; and it flavors a good deal of what I have called the main line of the peace movement, insofar as an underlying philosophy is implied.

For the peace movement *as a movement* this a lesser defect, simply because underlying philosophy has never been its strong suit; its real impact on society and politics comes from another direction, viz. from below. On the periphery of the peace movement, however, are semi-political tendencies whose self-seen role is to develop ideologies for the movement, and who see their task as one of permeating the Men of Power with their program. What they are developing is a more sophisticated social-imperialism as a substitute for the notoriously crude military-oriented foreign policy of the American Establishment. They do this in the best interests of peace, not in the interests of social-imperialism. This is indeed how the most effective social-imperialisms have come into being.



IN CONTRASTING THESE TWO LINES of foreign policy in this article, I am conscious of presenting a hard choice. The concept of political warfare based on a radical-democratic and anti-imperialist foreign policy assumes a revolutionary approach to the problem of peace; it is, in fact, the operative side of a Third Camp view of the preparations for World War III. It seems to scant the deep feeling that something-has-to-be-done *now*, that the world must be saved from obliterative war *now* while the old powers are still busy juggling the status quo, and that there is simply no time to "wait" for revolutionary transformations.

This represents a complete misunderstanding of the revolutionary approach to social problems, peace included. Insofar as the American temper is far from revolutionary, a peace movement has developed in this country on a "peacenik" basis, and a mass peace movement could not have developed otherwise. It performs an important role in a situation which it did not create. But insofar as out of such a peace movement, or outside of it, an opposition can be developed with revolutionary aims, the pressure from below is strengthened. What the Establishment needs to keep it restrained from military adventures even in the short run is in the first place, a militant and threatening left opposition in the country, not clever advisers who can teach how to put a "peace" veneer on power politics. There has never been a peace movement in any country that has been worth a damn as long as it is "respectable," that is, as long as it has seen its role as collaborating with the status quo, rather than building an opposition from below against the powers that be. This is the fundamental line of demarcation between the forces of revolutionary transformation and the theoreticians of stabilization.

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## Controversy:

# Eichmann and the Jews

## I. Robert Olson

GERTRUDE EZORSKY IN "Hannah Arendt Against the Facts" (*New Politics*, Fall, 1963) commits herself to the view that Eichmann was a "moral monster," by which she presumably means that he possessed vices to be found in only a small number of human beings. More specifically, she appears to argue that Eichmann was a fanatic and a sadist. The contrary view, i.e., that the horrors of which Eichmann is guilty were performed by an ordinary man with ordinary vices, she regards as not only false but also dangerous in that it tends to undermine faith in the ordinary man and consequently in the possibilities of effective, organized political action. With respect to Eichmann himself, Miss Ezorsky may be right, speculation about the motives of any given individual being always highly conjectural. But it does not seem to me either that she has established her case so far as Eichmann is concerned or that she is right about the larger issue, which seems always to lurk in the background of this controversy. With Miss Ezorsky's position on the role of the Jewish leaders in occupied countries, I shall not be concerned. Her arguments on this issue elicit my full consent.

Properly speaking a sadist is someone who takes a sexual pleasure in tormenting others, although the absence of an English equivalent for the German *Schadenfreude* often invites us to use the term "sadist" of anyone who takes any kind of satisfaction in the suffering or misfortune of others. In this looser and broader sense of the term, however, sadism is a fairly common vice; and unless Miss Ezorsky can show that Eichmann was either a sadist in the narrower meaning of the term or else unusually given to the experience of *Schadenfreude*, she cannot justify her claim that Eichmann was a monster. Now, the concrete evidence she presents to show that Eichmann was a sadist in the meaning required to establish her thesis consists of certain selected pieces of testimony by psychiatrists quoted in an article by Eichmann's prosecutor. But surely Miss Ezorsky is aware that prosecution and defense can both play this game. Conflicting psychiatric testimony is the rule in cases of this kind. Moreover, there are certain reported facts which, if true, strongly suggest that Eichmann was not a sadist. For instance, it is said that despite his almost unlimited opportunities Eichmann spent very little time as a spectator in the extermination camps and that in his occasional spectator role he experienced revulsion and faintness rather than pleasure or excitement. Also, if Eichmann were a sadist, it would be reasonable to expect that evidence showing he actually inflicted physical pain upon some of his victims be available. That kind of evidence apparently does not exist.

I do not wish to imply that Eichmann did not derive satisfaction from his work or that sadistic pleasure cannot be derived from non-physical forms of cruelty. I am trying to say only two things. (1) However evil the satisfaction Eichmann experienced in his work, we have no reason to believe that it was