

Zionism After the June 1967 War

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SINCE THE JUNE 1967 WAR, the political and ideological atmosphere in Israel has taken a tremendous leap backwards. The political leadership has revived (in Hebrew, at least) the slogans of early Zionism: More Jews, more territory, more colonies and settlements in the newly occupied areas. At the same time, the hypocrisy of the government's claim that ours is a defensive war and that our only aim is peace has become increasingly obvious. In the last election, the Labor party ran on an "unwritten platform" that outlined its expansionist plans, unwritten because it would have caused unfavorable world attention had it appeared in print, but well known in Israel itself. For example, in November and December 1970, M. Begin, leader of Gahal, published a series of articles in *Ma'ariv* which accused the Labor party of betraying its "unwritten platform" by joining the Jarring peace talks, which are based on the acceptance of pre-1967 borders.

The war boom that followed the 1967 campaign has helped reconcile much of the Israeli public to this new-old ideology, but some cracks are starting to appear in public opinion in spite of the pressure of the beleaguered garrison mentality. Those who carry the heaviest burden of the war, the high school and university students, have started to ask questions. They have demonstrated against the colonization of the Hebron area. When Israel forbade the important Zionist leader, Nahum Goldman, to talk with President Nasser, they sent letters to the government questioning its sincerity in seeking peace. In the Fall of 1970, SIAH (Israeli New Left) members organized demonstrations in support of the Palestinian struggle against the monarchy of Hussein and for the first time in Israel's short history, they proposed to fly the Palestinian and Israeli flags side by side on the university campus. They then renamed a campus building after Jarash, an important Palestinian stronghold in Jordan.

All this is undeniably modest, and may well remain so for a long time to come. Nevertheless, the Israeli press and government officials are worried, if not by the extent, by the scope of the doubts. The youth are concerned, not with local grievances or campus problems, but with broad policy questions. They are perplexed and angered by the strange complicity of Israel and Zionism in the genocidal war of the U.S. against the peoples of Southeast Asia. Taking seriously the Zionists' claims of humanitarianism, they are outraged to learn that their Prime Minister, Golda Meir, was the only government leader in the world who congratulated Nixon on his Vietnam policy speech of November 3, 1969 which, according to her, "contains much that encourages and strengthens free-

dom-loving small nations the world over." Lately they see the Israeli papers proudly announcing that Nixon is using the aid requested by Israel in order to sugar-coat his deepening involvement in Cambodia.¹

At home, they find the government's attitudes on peace and on the occupied territories disquieting. The Zionist leadership leaves little doubt that it prefers territory to peace, and colonization of these territories to peaceful co-existence with their inhabitants. In this respect, Moshe Dayan is definitely in the mainstream of Zionist thinking. In his speech to Israeli soldiers on the Golan Heights, he said: "During the last 100 years our people have been in a process of building up the country and the nation, of expansion, of getting additional Jews and additional settlements in order to expand the borders here. Let no Jew say that the process has ended. Let no Jew say we are near the end of the road."² Clearly the Israeli army has become an army of occupation, and this inglorious role has aroused some resentment. "Why should I die for your dream of Greater Israel?" Mr. Begin was asked by high school students recently.³ But in the same measure that doubts develop, attempts are made to enforce unity. Democracy is eroding at an alarming rate, and Israeli society is rapidly becoming openly militaristic and chauvinist. This process in itself should disturb all those who are sincerely concerned with the future of Israeli society.

ISRAEL'S PROPONENTS CONTEND THAT her foreign policy and her utter dependence on the U.S. stem from her security problem. They explain that, once the Arabs let her live peacefully in the Middle East, Israel will have no further reason to give verbal and moral support to imperialism and colonialism in Algeria, South Africa, Vietnam, etc. For them, the whole problem stems from the unwillingness of the Arab states to accept Israel as a neighbor; the conflict is thus a political problem which originated and should be settled between Israel and the Arab states.

On the other hand, some Israelis, Americans, and Arab radicals see the crux of the conflict in Israel's deep ties with world imperialism. But in fact, these two aspects of Zionist policy were never separated from each other. It became clearer after 1967 that both are consequences of a deeper contradiction, a contradiction which was buried for thirty years by all sides concerned, the Big Powers, Zionism, and the Arab states: the contradiction between the Zionist colonization enterprise and the indigenous population of Palestine.

Israel's foreign relations and her programs and actions in the Middle East are cut from the same piece of cloth. The maxim of Zionist foreign policy was stated quite early by Theodore Herzl's deputy, Nardau: "Our aspiration points to Palestine as a compass points to the north; thus our policy will rely on those powers under whose domination Palestine happens to be."⁴ At the same time, the Zionist leaders recog-

nized from the first the reciprocal service their movement could provide to imperialism. Herzl pointed this out in 1900: "The Asia question is becoming more serious by the day, and I'm afraid that for a certain period it will also be a bloody one. However, from this grows the interest of civilized nations that on the shortest way to Asia a new civilized bridge-head or station will be created, this is the state of Palestine; Great England, Free England, who see all the seas will understand us and from here will emerge the Zionist idea." And Nardau stated that the Jews wanted very much to become Britain's guards on the Suez, on the long hazardous way that leads through the Middle East to the Far East.⁵

So we see that Golda Meir's letter to Nixon does not set a new precedent by appearing to place Zionism at the service of the predominant imperialist power. Nor should the letter be seen as merely a gesture of good will. This was made clear in a speech by the Israeli Ambassador to the United States (and Chief of Staff during the Six-Day War) Itzhak Rabin, to a meeting of Israelis in Boston on December 5, 1970.

"The invasion of Cambodia by the U.S. was in the interest of Israel, no matter how unpopular it may sound," he stated. In elaborating this point, he said that anything that keeps the U.S.S.R. off balance will reduce the chance of a deepened Soviet involvement in the Middle East. "Unfortunately for Israel," he continued, "the people of America are not in the mood to take further international responsibilities. (Sic!) Thus our true ally is not the American people but rather the American regime, undemocratic as it may be."

Rabin said that he is aware that the decision to invade Cambodia was made by a narrow executive circle, without consulting the Senate (not to mention the people), "but the Russians see this dictator and are frightened. We, from our narrow point of view, do not care about the democratic nature of America." He added that, in fact, a dictatorship in power in the U.S. would frighten the Russians more, and that "the moment the Soviet Union stops fearing the U.S. we are lost; this fear may determine the fate of Israel more than everything else." Thus the Israeli government clearly emerges on the side of the most reactionary political elements in the United States.

The effects of the shift in Israeli politics can be seen in the American Left as well. Ever since the 1967 war, the Middle East issue has split the American anti-war movement, as the unconditional supporters of Israel felt called on to mute their opposition to the Vietnam war. Ultimately, they know, Israel may ask the United States to send troops into the Middle East; at that point a strong, popular- anti-interventionist movement might prevent the Administration from responding. Thus, to give one example, M. S. Arnoni's *Minority of One*, once an important anti-war publication, quietly left the stage after 1967.

More recent events are forcing a fateful decision on those Americans who sympathize with Israel but want to oppose the Administration's policies. This year's combined military aid bill to Israel and Cambodia is only a small example. Noam Chomsky observed some time ago that many Zionists now have a clear interest in the renewal of the cold war, and many of them are working toward that end. Rabin's talk confirmed this insight. These people in America sense very well that the Six-Day War, far from solving any of Israel's problematic relations with the Arab world made Israel dependent on the West, on the existence of an arrogant, undemocratic American power and on constant tension between the U.S. and Russia.

Incidentally, this is not the first time that the Zionists have been driven by history to support the most reactionary elements of a country. It happened before in both France and Germany. During the Algerian War, the Israeli government aided the rebellious French army in Algeria. It is widely known that Ben Gurion did not support Algerian independence. What is less widely known, due to the "self-censorship" of the English translation of Bar-Zohar's biography,⁶ is the similarity he saw between Algeria and Palestine. The following passage, which appeared in the French edition, was omitted from the English: "Was the solution to the Algerian problem near? Ben Gurion brought with him a plan that he would argue for untiringly with all his French interviewers: partition Algeria; regroup the French population along the Mediterranean coast and in the Sahara, organize the emigration of a million French to Algeria. 'Three things are important' he would tell them, 'to assure the end of the war and the survival of the French community, to preserve access to the Sahara, and to safeguard the French presence in Africa.'"⁷ DeGaulle's reply to this plan was apt: "*Ma foi*, you are trying to create a new Israel in Algeria."⁸

The Israeli government attitude toward German reactionaries—and the rationale behind it—can be deduced from a recent article in *Ha'aretz*: "The Brandt government, unlike the former government with which it was easier for Israel to deal because of the burden of its Hitlerian past, is not stained by its past. Israeli officials in Bonn admit that Israel got along better with those governments in Bonn that were still stained by the shadows of the past. 'They had political breast-beating.'"⁹ As the prominent Jewish nationalist Ahad-Haam said many years ago, "Zionism depends on antisemitism constantly, as an infant of his mother's milk." Today even liberal Zionists admit it: "It is, of course, not customary to talk about it in public but many of us felt a tiny bit of joy when we read in the newspaper about a swastika epidemic in Europe. . . . Today we have a mixed feeling reading about the anti-Jewishness of certain Negro leaders in America."¹⁰

AS WE NOTED EARLIER, Zionism's foreign policy and its colonizing nature cannot be understood separately. A great many people still hold the myth that internally Israel is "progressive." But a closer look reveals that Israel is the most progressive country in the Middle East in only one sense—it is the only one that historically was not exploited by imperialism. Instead it was paid by imperialism for actual and potential services. An ironic and revealing analogy is the crusading orders, which took wealth from Europe to maintain outposts (in Palestine) that protected the trade routes of the nascent Italian bourgeoisie. The Jewish community is a privileged immigrant, settler society, heavily subsidized from without. This fact raises its own problems, which we cannot deal with here. But even given these inherent problems, the most fateful decisions Zionism had to make were in setting its policies toward the Palestinian Arabs into whose midst the immigrants and settlers were to be placed.

The basic choice was made quite early. Herzl called in his diaries for the "gentle removal of the gentiles to the neighboring countries." Chaim Weitzman, the most important leader of Zionism's first half-century, explained the basic notion as follows: "It follows that the real key to the situation in Palestine will be that the Jews will be granted *as such* those rights and privileges which will enable them to make Palestine as Jewish as England is English or Canada is Canadian."¹¹

Weitz, for many years the top official of the Zionist "Jewish Agency," explained in 1940 how this task would be carried out:

Between ourselves it must be clear that there is no room for both people together in this country. . . . We shall not achieve our goal of being independent people with the Arabs in this small country. The only solution is Palestine, at least Western Palestine (west of the Jordan River) without Arabs. . . . And there is no other way but to transfer the Arabs from here to the neighboring countries; to transfer all of them: NOT ONE VILLAGE, NOT ONE TRIBE SHOULD BE LEFT. . . . And only after this transfer will the country be able to absorb millions of our brethren. There is no other way out.¹² (Emphasis added)

On this point Weitz had agreement from leaders of the Zionist Labor movement. Berl Katznelson, the popular predecessor of Ben Gurion, asked in 1943: "Wasn't Merhavia (a Mapam kibbutz) built by a transfer (of Arabs)? . . . Without this transfer they wouldn't be sitting today in many kibbutzim . . . and if this is fair for a kibbutz, why . . . wouldn't it be fair on a much larger scale, for all the Jews. . . ?"¹³

The three slogans under which the Zionists sought to build their new society were "redemption of the Land," "Jewish Labor," and "Jewish Product." In practice these read, "Redemption of the Land—from the Arab peasants"; "Jewish Labor—by blacklisting Arab workers"; and "Jewish product—by boycotting less expensive Arab-produced goods." Inevitably, every access of strength of the new society was accompanied by the further disintegration of the indigenous Palestinian society. As a

result, most of the Palestinians fled the Jewish-occupied territories during the 1948 war. Those who stayed under Israeli control immediately became strangers in their own land. Tens of thousands of them still are officially classed as "absent-present"—a Kafkaesque innovation for getting rid of a person without actually expelling him.

For the rest of the Arab 10%, there is de facto segregation. It is not only the "socialist islands," the kibbutzim, that are hermetically sealed against Arabs. Most of the Jewish cities and towns will accept Arabs only as day laborers, not as residents. The Emergency Regulations, in full force ever since British imperialism enacted them, permit a police officer to regulate the life of any Arab citizen. Thus, mass arrests, indefinite detention without any charge or trial, confinement to one's village, are all legal and practiced daily against the Arab population. For example, many of the 200 Arab students in Hebrew University are under such restrictions. (Note the ratio: 200 Arabs out of 16,000 students.)¹⁴

The economic life of the Arabs is decisively influenced by the government's efforts on the one hand to take away most of their land and on the other hand to avoid incorporating them into Israel's economy. Most of their land has been taken already, and attempts to upgrade production on the remaining plots are frustrated by their lack of access to Jewish funds. (It should be recalled that Jewish agriculture is heavily subsidized by Jewish, as opposed to government, funds.)

Many industrial plants, especially the larger ones, accept no Arabs as permanent employees. Israel's largest foreign exchange industry, the diamond industry, seems to get a great deal more than its raw materials from South Africa; its slogan is, "No Arabs need apply."

However, the Arab problem is also a source of tension between the Zionist Left and Right. The Zionist Right has for many years wanted to turn the Arabs into a source of cheap labor, and the economic boom since the 1967 war has helped them toward this goal. Unskilled labor in roads, construction, and industry is now largely the province of Arabs. Among these, the Arab laborers from the occupied territories (5000 in Tel Aviv alone) present a special problem for the labor bureaucrats because of their extremely low wages, about one-tenth of what a Jewish laborer receives.

To quote the *Histadrut Yearly*: "Many Arab construction workers were absorbed through the labor department or succeeded in penetrating to various working places with lower wages than the official West-Jerusalem wage. The penetration of the Arab laborer to various branches of the economy is facilitated by the reduction of wages and constitutes a problem which calls for a speedy solution before passing to undesirable directions. . ." ¹⁵

Even without the expansionist policies since 1967, these contradictions would continue to undermine Israeli society. But the expansion has

its own dynamic, piling outrage on outrage. Dayan is the most outspoken representative of this dynamic, and he put it this way: "We have to establish facts in the occupied territories using bulldozers and not create noise in conferences." And on another occasion: "It is not enough to guard our new borders, we have to cause Israelization of the occupied territories in which we want to stay. We want to stay in the Golan—let's make it Israeli. We want to stay in Sharm-a-sheikh—let's build roads, aviation, civilian towns and military power."¹⁶ And on the question of Arab rights, Ezer Wietsman, former minister, former commander of the Israeli air force, and the new chairman of the Heruth party, had this to say: "From whom did we redeem our land? From porcupines? or from hinds? We redeemed this country from Shiekh Abu Kishk*. . . . Do the Arabs in Israel have equal rights? Can an Arab from Nazareth build a house in Tel Aviv? . . . If the Arabs want to be citizens let them be so but with limited civil rights."¹⁷

ZIONISM AND ITS DIRECT POPULAR OPPONENT, the Palestinian resistance movement, are the most dynamic forces in the Middle East. This fact determines from the outset the potential of such efforts as the Jarring peace talks. As long as the natural and historic rights of the Palestinians in Palestine are ignored, the Palestinian movement will do whatever it can to render futile these attempts to return to a reactionary status quo. On the other hand, the premise of the talks, a return to pre-1967 borders "with minor modifications" runs directly counter to the dynamic of Zionism. Thus Israel has been doing its best to delay the talks, not because Israel does not want "peace"; Israel may well want "peace," but on its own terms, and in any case, not *now*. First a few more feats must be accomplished, more Arabs gotten rid of, and wider areas of Palestine Israelized. So, as Israel enters another round of negotiations, "the only comfort the U.S. can offer us," reveals a cabinet minister, "is that there is no chance now for a quick peace."¹⁸

In the circumstances, it is not surprising that some Israeli youth are asking embarrassing questions of the government and even beginning to move into opposition to the government's policies. The most mature expression of the Israeli opposition is the program of the Israeli Socialist Organization (Matzpen). This program is based on the recognition of Zionism as a colonizing force, and thus gives full support to its main victims, the Palestinian people, but it is based as well on the conviction that Israeli society constitutes a national entity with national rights, even though the nation was built by a process of colonization. As regards the Palestinian movement, Matzpen's May 1968 statement says:

A conquered and oppressed people has the right and duty to resist and to struggle for its freedom. The means and methods necessary and

* [A contemptuous reference to Arabs.—ED.]

appropriate to such a struggle must be determined by this people itself; it would be hypocritical on the part of outsiders—especially if they are members of the oppressing nation—to offer pontifical advice on what it ought to do.

While recognizing the unconditional right to resist occupation, we can support only those organizations which, in addition to resisting occupation, also recognize the right to self-determination of the Israeli people; on this basis, the struggle of the Palestinian people can become a common struggle of Arabs and Jews for a common future in this region.

But the ISO goes beyond this recognition of the *right* of self-determination of both peoples to propose a common struggle for a common socialist homeland:

We believe that the socialist-revolutionary solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict remains valid—in fact, more valid than ever—in the new post-war situation. The de-Zionization of Israel, and its integration into a socialist union with the Arab countries—that is the solution.

Instead of the chauvinism and nationalist hatreds which are engulfing the Middle East in futile and endless wars, we hold out to both sides, Arabs and Jews, the socialist perspective of economic prosperity, social progress and fraternal relations between peoples.

FOOTNOTES

1. For example, *Ma'ariv*, October 1970.
2. *Ibid.*, 7. 7. 68.
3. *Ibid.*, 12. 11. 70.
4. Merchavia, *Zionism, The Political Documents*, Sec. 289.
5. *Ibid.*, Sec. 712.
6. M. Bar Zohar, *Ben Gurion, the Prophet Armed*, 1968.
7. M. Bar Zohar, *Ben-Gourion, le Prophete Arme*, Les Grandes Etudes Contemporaines Fayard, 1966. P. 357.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ha'aretz*, 8. 7. 70.
10. *Yediot*, 2. 9. 69.
11. *Jewish Chronicle*, 5. 20. 21.
12. *Davar*, 9. 29. 67.
13. *Yediot*, 11. 14. 69.
14. *Ha'aretz*, 11. 27. 70.
15. *Histadrut Yearly*, Sept. '67-Sept. '68.
16. Official Labor party proclamation, *Yediot*, 10. 8. 69.
17. *Ma'ariv*, 6. 2. 70.
18. *Ma'ariv*, 11. 27. 70.

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Two Views of Allende's Victory

I. James Petras

FOR MANY YEARS US AND LATIN AMERICAN sociologists circulated the notion that support for Marxist socialism was largely a product of the economic backwardness and "traditionalism" of Third World countries; that modern urban industrial cities served to "moderate" the outlook and behavior of the working class—especially the better paid industrial workers. Some sociologists who accepted this view began to speak of "integrated" sectors or classes (including urban industrial workers) and "marginal" classes. The notion of a "bourgeoisified" industrial proletariat even shaped the outlook of leftwing intellectuals who began to speak of a "labor aristocracy" and to look to the peasantry as the sole basis of hope for a revolutionary transformation. The idea that the working class could combine and act as a class in favor of a socialist society against capitalist exploitation and inequality seems to have eluded scores of US investigators who claim to study the lower classes in Latin America. A careful analysis of the political behavior of the Chilean working class refutes the "integration" thesis.

From its formation in 1956, the Marxist Popular Action Front (FRAP) directed its political activity toward gaining the support of the working class. In 1958, the FRAP candidate, Salvador Allende, lost by a margin of 35,000 votes out of a total of 1.3 million. In the 1964 elections, in a virtual two way race, Allende gathered 39% of the vote (about 45% of the male vote). In 1970, Allende, the candidate of the Marxist-led Popular Unity, won the election with 36.2% of the vote. The major base of support for this was the industrial proletariat located in the modern urban-industrial centers.

As Table I indicates, in 1964 FRAP obtained the support of the municipalities (*communas*) which had the highest concentration of industrial workers. The higher the proportion of industrial workers, the higher the ratio of votes in favor of Allende. Obviously, the experience with a Christian Democratic government did not change the workers' political loyalty; on the contrary, the voting ratio of Allende to Alessandri, and Allende to Tomic, seems to have increased. The Presidential voting results suggest that the Christian Democratic "reform" government completely failed to win over the working class, as many of its supporters both in Chile and in the US had hoped. The industrial workers chose to maintain their loyalty to the Marxist candidate and to reject the Christian Democratic alternative.

The Christian Democrats, proponents of a "third way" between socialism and capitalism, found little support among the class conscious