

gime remains obscure. If the regime does what its most prominent spokesmen say it intends to do—nationalize a large sector of the economy and establish workers' participation in the management of this sector, end private latifundia, devolve power to the grass roots in the nation's cities, launch a large scale program of economic development, the Allende regime will be an exceedingly interesting and hopeful experiment. On the other hand, if these are but tactical steps on the road to the establishment of "a regime not much different from those in Eastern Europe," the prospects are gloomy indeed.

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2. Achievements of the Allende Government

James Petras

TO THE MANY DOUBTING THOMASES the Allende government has been a surprise—a pleasant surprise for democratic socialists and a rude surprise to the apologists of U.S. imperialism.

The electoral victory of Allende in September of 1970, the successful transfer of power—despite the violent efforts made by the extreme rightwing and the economic impediments devised by the Frei-sector of the Christian Democrats—and the initiation of the first measures (a free liter of milk to all school children, the opening of diplomatic relations with Cuba, China and other Communist countries, the 45 percent wage increase and price freeze) caused a wave of popular support. In the April elections, the Marxist-led coalition receive an absolute majority of the votes cast for the two electoral blocs. During the first year the Allende government has nationalized practically all major mining and financial institutions, a number of major industries, about one-quarter of the large landed estates and has increased control over external commerce.

Needless to say, the U.S. mass media have been busy trying to bury the achievements of the Allende government below a barrage of lies, distortions, half-truths and misrepresentations. Juan DeOnis of the *N.Y. Times* has been one of the chief culprits: non-facts or opinions of the opposition are presented without any attempt to provide the government's side. Minor incidents, for example workers' strikes against employers (which are considerably less frequent than under any previous government) over wages, are presented as if they are major challenges to

the government. Indeed, a picture is painted of growing economic chaos, social disorder and a sharp decline in popular political support. Nothing is further from the truth. A detailed statistical examination of the Allende government's first year in office will confirm this observation.

THE CHARGE HAS BEEN MADE throughout the bourgeois media that now that the U.S. managers and capitalists have left, copper production has declined. The *Wall Street Journal* talks of the "lazy Chilean workers"; Onis discusses the "failures of Chilean management." Comparative statistics tell us a different story. Between January and June 1971 copper production at *Chuquicamata* (the largest mine) reached 142,052 short tons; under Frei in 1970 during a comparable period 139,632 short tons were produced. The large-scale mining concerns (as a whole) produced 331,182 metric tons from January to July 1971; during the same period 1970 production was 301,138 metric tons. There has been 9.9 percent increase during Allende's government. There are problems but the most important have little to do with *socialist* politics. The major problem has been the decline in the international price of copper from a high of 85 cents per pound to below 45 cents a pound (for each cent decline in price, Chile loses seven million dollars). The decline in copper price is a major factor accounting for the decline in foreign reserves. The decline in foreign reserves has more to do with the international market and international corporations than with efficiency of the Allende government.

Despite the *Sunday Times* tales of middle class "fears" and the *Wall Street Journal's* predictions of "industrial disaster" industrial growth is another feature of Chilean economic development under Allende. Manufacturing industry represents nearly a third of national production and *during the first eight months of 1971 industry increased 7.8 percent over 1970*. This growth occurs at a time when a number (80) of industrial plants (including textiles, cement and steel) have been nationalized or regulated and as the groundwork is being prepared to organize working class participation in management.

THE SHARPEST DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE ACCOUNTS in the U.S. news media and the actual performance of the Chilean economy is to be found in the agricultural sector. *Times* reporter Onis and others have focused on quotes from expropriated landowners, Christian Democrats hostile to the government, and they have written extensive accounts of relatively minor sporadic incidents involving a small number of peasants engaged in illegal land seizures. The Allende government has expropriated over 1,300 landed estates—as much as the U.S. showcase president Eduardo Frei did in six years—and *agricultural production increased by 5.2 percent in 1971* (almost double the growth rate of the Frei government). Despite the vast changes that are occurring the great majority of the

reforms are taking place in a peaceful and orderly fashion. As the production figures suggest change is occurring with a minimum of social dislocation. Part of the success in agriculture is due to the fact that the government—through the purchase of banks—controls 80 percent of the credit which it has, in part, directed to the land reform beneficiaries. In addition agricultural growth has been promoted by the establishment of a state National Distribution firm to aid the peasants commercialize their crops.

Some other “details” that never appear in the press that claims to print “all the news fit to print.” The construction industry has grown by 9 percent having initiated the building of 83,000 houses, several times the output of the last year of the Frei government. The consumer price index rose 35 percent during 1970 (under Frei). Under Allende through September 1971 it had risen to 13.8 and will end up around 17 percent—half of the increase under Frei and the Christian Democrats.

Some shortages have *persisted* under the Allende government (Onis apparently doesn’t remember the “meatless” weeks under Frei). Many factors have caused shortages including extensive hoarding by the rich and the middle-class (some basements look like food warehouses; some freezers resemble meat markets).* Shortages have resulted from the common practice of expropriated landowners slaughtering animals—including stud bulls and pregnant cows—to cause the government and people hardships. Nevertheless, the major reason for shortages is the increased purchasing power of the people: beef consumption has increased 15 percent, fowls 16 percent, potatoes 55 percent, onions 54 percent, condensed milk 10 percent, etc. While wages were increased, prices and profits were frozen—as a result the salaried and wage proportion of national income has increased from 51 percent in 1970 to 59 percent in 1971.

UPON LEAVING OFFICE THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS tried to provoke economic and political chaos: security was lax, capital was allowed to flood out of the country, production was paralyzed, and unemployment soared. The Christian Democrats and Frei hoped that the serious economic crises which they cultivated would lead to the downfall or overthrow of the Popular Unity government. Both their political calculations and their economic sabotage failed: the economy, stimulated by government investment and the increased purchasing power of the masses, began to expand. Unemployment declined from 8.3 percent in December of 1970, a month after Allende’s inauguration, to 4.7 percent in September of 1971. There are already labor shortages in some provinces of the country.

In education, 94 percent of the school age children between 6 to

* In my opinion the government would be wise to restrict the consumption pattern of the rich through rationing, limiting purchases of plush restaurants and nationalizing all the luxurious private clubs (Club Espanol, Club Israelita, Club Union, etc.) and thus make them available for all.

14 are now in school; and 35 percent of those between the ages of 15 to 19, a substantial increase over previous regimes.

The government is carrying out a policy of deficit financing to absorb the unused manpower and resources, to increase the purchasing power of the poor and to substantially broaden public investment. The increase in public investment has compensated in great part for the decline in private and foreign investment. In 1972 the government will give greater emphasis to the accumulation process with its base primarily in the internal surplus and in economic cooperation with the Communist countries, West Europe and Japan.

Probably the most popular measure adopted by the Allende government was its decision not to pay compensation in the course of nationalizing the copper mines. Every Chilean school boy knows how many billions of dollars the companies have taken out of the country over the years and no Chilean has any sense that they owe the U.S. companies anything. On the contrary many feel that the U.S. companies not the Chilean government should assume payment for the 700 million dollar debt incurred by the companies during their expansion period.

Chileans (not the U.S. investors) now control strategic sectors of the economy such as mining; the peasants have received 2.84 million *hectareas* of land (about 6.8 million acres) in one year; the banks serve the public sector and small and medium entrepreneurs. More important these changes occur with the maximum of freedom for the opposition. The anti-government coalition of Christian Democrats and the National Party still control the majority of the mass media of the country and spend enormous amounts of time and money financing publicity campaigns to sabotage Government programs through public meetings and demonstrations.

The problem in Chile is not lack of freedom but overpermissiveness. Christian Democrats who shot over 30 miners in a wage dispute in *El Salvador* in defense of their U.S. partners while in the government now agitate copper workers to double their wage demands against *government owned mines* at a time when Allende is trying to develop the economy and provide jobs for Chilean workers earning less than one-fifth the salary of the copper workers.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED Socialist president is in stark contrast to its policy to the authoritarian military dictatorship in Brazil—toward the former unmitigated hostility, to the latter lavish praise and aid. The strategy of U.S. opposition to the Allende operates on three levels of policy making: (a) an “outsider” strategy; (b) an “insider” strategy; (c) a regional strategy.

The “outsider” strategy includes basically three types of policy moves: (a) symbolic hostility; (b) veiled threats; (c) overt hostility.

Symbolic hostility has taken the form of not extending to the Allende government the usual courtesies on ceremonial occasions: Nixon snubbed Allende after his electoral victory; the Executive Branch cancelled (over the objection of some military officers) the scheduled visit of the naval vessel *Enterprise* to Valparaiso. These symbolic gestures are meant to pressure the Chilean government and to encourage internal opposition. In fact they have strengthened the image of the government as an independent force and have alienated sectors of the patriotic lower middle-class.

The speeches of Rogers, Laird and Connally regarding Chile's nationalization policies have been full of threats of U.S. economic reprisals. The purpose of these speeches is to make other countries aware of possible negative reactions from the U.S. if they follow the Chilean route. The effect of these speeches was to rally a substantial sector of the Catholic Church in defense of the Allende government. Some Churchmen raised the question of the possible justice of *all* underdeveloped countries nationalizing foreign enterprises without compensation.

Overt hostility has taken mainly economic form: cutting off of U.S. loans and credits—while demanding payments on back loans accumulated by previous “friendly” bourgeois governments; cutting off Export-Import Bank loans, specifically blocking Chile's purchase of Boeing airplanes (the Chileans will now purchase them from the USSR); shutting Chile off from “international” bank loans, i.e. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and World Bank loans (to pressure the Chilean government to meet U.S. corporate compensation demands). The U.S. can (and does) manipulate these “international” banks since it has sufficient representation to block any proposed loan.

The “insider” strategy is basically directed toward maintaining ties and strengthening potential replacements of the Allende government through the selective channeling of resources. Thus while the U.S. has cut off all development loans it has granted the Chilean military five million dollars worth of credits to purchase military equipment.

In addition the U.S. is in constant consultation with the titular leader of the opposition Eduardo Frei, who has made several unpublicized visits to Washington, New York and curiously enough to the CIA financed Center for International Studies at MIT. The Catholic University, stronghold of the rightwing, received a substantial loan from the IDB—thus increasing its base for anti-government activity.

It is interesting to note in this regard the way in which Juan DeOnis of the *Times* gives full, extensive coverage to Christian Democratic statements and charges—and hardly if ever bothers to present the government's position. One would think that the Christian Democrats were actually running the country instead of the Popular Unity coalition. The selective channeling of money to political allies, the attempt to keep in close

touch with the military, the publicity given to the opposition is exactly the same pattern that the U.S. followed prior to and leading up to the overthrow of the national-popular "Jango" Goulart government in Brazil.

THE REGIONAL STRATEGY THAT U.S. policy-makers are developing has two basic ingredients: (1) strengthening Brazil as a counter-revolutionary center and possible source of military intervention if not directly in Chile at this time—at least on bordering countries (Uruguay) if that country decides to go the Chilean route; (2) isolating Chile on its borders—especially with regard to Peru and Bolivia. In part this strategy has already brought about some immediate pay-offs: two days before Chile and Bolivia were to open relations the U.S. military and embassy (along with Brazil and Argentina) provided logistical support, intelligence reports and medical supplies to aid the Bolivian army in its overthrow of the national-popular Torres government. The U.S. now has a loyal flunky government in Bolivia led by Hugo Banzer, has increased border pressures on Chile and has a passageway from Brazil through Bolivia to Chile. Regarding Peru, the U.S. has moved in the direction of closer relations—there are agreements on most issues which have been pending, especially since the "nationalist" Peruvian military have come around to seeing the "need" for foreign investment in economic development. To the extent to which U.S.-Peruvian differences narrow, the U.S. may be able to push the Peruvians into a more distant relationship with Chile.

The overall purpose of U.S. policy-makers to which their "insider," "outsider," and "regional" strategies are directed is to create economic dislocation and provoke a social crisis that could lead to either the overthrow of the Allende government by a civil-military coalition made up of the Army, the Christian Democrats and the extreme rightwing National Party or the discrediting of the government and its defeat in the 1973 congressional elections thus undercutting the basis for future changes.

In general the U.S. has had very little success in shaping a hostile environment (with the exception of Bolivia): Argentine-Chilean relations were never better. The Andean countries (Chile, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia) have been working closer together. More important the internal pressures building up in Argentina, Uruguay and Colombia are all in the direction of nationalist-populist and even socialist politics. In addition the surcharge and other trade restrictive measures have alienated bourgeois elites and their governments who feel "betrayed" by their *patron* Nixon. Many members of the Latin elite feel that the U.S. "owners" do have some responsibilities and obligations to maintain regarding the upkeep of the client-states. Thus Allende has scored a number of diplomatic victories while U.S. attempts to build a wall of hostile countries around Allende has met with little or no sympathy.

U.S. pressures have been counter-productive in terms of their impact on Chile and have proven to be embarrassing to faithful conservative followers within Chile. In brief U.S. opposition has strengthened national unity behind Allende—it weakened the internal opposition. Middle-of-the-roads, the Church, and even sectors of the military find U.S. bullying tactics an affront to their sense of national dignity and perceive Allende as a defender of the national patrimony.

While U.S. propaganda has not had much impact within Latin America, the story may be somewhat different within the U.S. The heavily biased and unfavorable accounts presented in *Newsweek*, *New York Times*, and *Time* and the Stalinophobic descriptions presented by some self-styled liberal writers who publish in radical journals have raised a serious question concerning the ability of the American public to receive information in order to respond in a way to avoid the pitfalls of our criminal policy toward Cuba. One only hopes that Chile can overcome the tragic difficulties that befall a nation which stands up to the U.S. empire and is forced to go it alone.

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BEYOND SKINNER AND SKINNERISM

Ian McMahan

AMERICANS HAVE A PENCHANT FOR SEEKING technological solutions to social problems, so when one of our best-known academic psychologists announces that science can resolve all our difficulties if it is only permitted the opportunity to do so, it is not surprising that his book* becomes a best-seller. And since the book, whatever its weaknesses, is not blind to the existence of these problems, it is no more surprising that Vice-President Agnew was moved to denounce its author before an audience of three thousand bewildered farmers.¹

Skinner's basic claim is that contemporary social problems can be understood by means of a "science of behavior" and solved through the application of a "technology of behavior." (p. 24) This is a large claim, made, as Skinner tells us, "from a scientific point of view." (p. 22) If it can be upheld, then clearly all those who want our social problems to be solved are obliged to rally to Skinner's banner and join the good fight. Before enlisting, however, they would do well to examine both Skinner's science of behavior and Skinner's method of using that science to analyze social phenomena.

I.

BEHAVIORIST APPROACHES TO PSYCHOLOGY start with the undeniable fact that thoughts, feelings and other so-called mental events are private and cannot be observed and verified by others. Environmental events and overt behavior, however, can be observed and measured, as can any regularities that may appear in the relationships between events in the environment (stimuli) and overt behavior (responses). These regularities may suggest various internal, unobservable processes that mediate between the environment and the person's behavior, but the proof must lie in publicly observable events. An introspective report, for example, is of no greater validity than any other piece of overt behavior. These methodological tenets of behaviorism are adhered to, at least *pro forma*, by the vast majority of researchers in psychology today.

In the spectrum of behaviorists, however, Skinner is an ultra-leftist. He denies the need for any mediating processes:

Physics did not advance by looking more closely at the jubilation of a falling body, or biology by looking at the nature of vital spirits, and we do not need to try to discover what personalities, states of mind, feelings, traits of character, plans, purposes, intentions, or the other perquisites of autonomous man really are in order to get on with a scientific analysis of behavior. (p. 15)

* *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, by B. F. Skinner. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971.
1. New York Post, Nov. 18, 1971.