

What Happened to the UAW?

Nelson Lichtenstein

AS THE UNITED AUTO WORKERS CELEBRATE THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY of the great sitdown strikes that gave it birth, the generation of Walter Reuther is passing from the union's leadership. By the mixed standards of contemporary American trade unionism, the UAW is led by honest, effective and even democratic officers and is still an important force in the liberal community and the labor movement. But one no longer looks to this generation for the dramatic social and economic initiatives that were once a Reuther hallmark. Since the late 1950s contract settlements have been uninspired, UAW membership has cyclically reflected the ups and downs of auto production, and working conditions in the plants have substantially deteriorated. Politically, the UAW has floundered, supporting "electable" liberals where possible, settling for any Democrat when necessary.

What happened to Walter Reuther and the union he did so much to shape? One opens Victor Reuther's long awaited memoir* with a sense of expectation. The youngest of the three Reuther brothers who helped organize the UAW (a fourth became a steel company executive), Victor Reuther is by far the most cosmopolitan, intellectual and left-wing. He was also the closest to Walter, working intimately with his older brother from 1930 until 1950 and then maintaining only slightly less contact for the remaining 20 years of Walter's life. Moreover, Victor is a prominent critic of the American labor establishment, George Meany especially, and a strong supporter of a more progressive brand of trade unionism. In the early 1970s he backed the insurgent movement in the United Mine Workers that eventually toppled Tony Boyle. Today he is a strong supporter of Edward Sadlowski's reform campaign for the presidency of the United Steelworkers.

Tutored in politics by their father, an immigrant German brewery worker and leader of unionism in the Ohio Valley, the Reuther brothers were Debsian socialists by the time they were adolescents. In a tradition now almost lost in the American left, Valentine Reuther instilled in his sons a drive for self-improvement and a rebellious defiance of the established order. The family was close knit and emotionally supportive: Victor Reuther's account glows with warm remembrance as he describes the stimulating environment his parents provided their children in Wheeling, West Va. In family debates Walter was "contentious and pugnacious," Roy "silver-tongued," while Victor relied on "emotional exploitation" of the subject.

* *The Brothers Reuther and the Story of the UAW, a Memoir*, by Victor G. Reuther. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1976, 523 pp., \$16.95.

Victor was also the most steadfast radical in the family. When Walter got a job as a highly paid tool and die worker at Ford's River Rouge complex and began to drift away from the socialism of his youth it was Victor (who quit college and joined his brother in Detroit in 1930) who reawakened Walter's interest in social problems. Together they worked hard for Norman Thomas' election in 1932 and then, after Walter was fired from Ford, probably for his pro-union and socialist views, the two brothers set out on their celebrated world tour scheduled to include a 16 month sojourn as skilled workers in the Soviet Union's new automotive works at Gorki. Though not Stakhonovites, the Reuther brothers were enthusiasts of Russia's first five year plan. With the penchant for rationality, efficiency and planning that would later win him fame in the U.S., Walter bombarded the authorities in Gorki and Moscow with suggestions for increasing production. Like most socialists, the Reuther brothers later repudiated Stalin's industrialization program, but Victor retains an historical point of view akin to the late Isaac Deutcher's on Soviet economic growth in the 1930s.

When the Reuther brothers returned to the U.S. in 1935, they joined their brother Roy in organizing the new United Auto Workers. Victor's autobiography makes clear how thoroughly all three still functioned, intellectually and socially, within the socialist milieu of Depression-era Detroit. Victor and Roy served for a time on the staff of the Brookwood Labor College and both Walter and Victor married women they met in the socialist movement. While the Reuther brothers were not leading figures in the organization of the UAW, as union mythology would later claim, they played important roles as secondary leaders. Roy was a superb public speaker, Victor often handled the sound truck, while Walter skillfully negotiated with management. Within a year Walter and Victor had helped organize more than 30,000 workers on the West Side of Detroit into Amalgamated Local 174 that would long remain a bastion of Reuther strength in Walter's climb to the UAW presidency.

Like many trade union radicals in the late 1930s, the Reuther brothers abandoned their socialist politics as they became enmeshed in the day-to-day struggle to build and sustain their union. Walter left the Party in 1938 when he decided to stay politically in step with the UAW, then in the process of endorsing Democrat Frank Murphy for governor of Michigan. Victor and Roy probably left the party a few months later. By 1940 the Reuther brothers were advocates of a third term for FDR, aid to Britain and among John L. Lewis's most resolute opponents in the CIO. Given the personal and retrospective character of the Reuther memoir, one would have expected an account of this decisive political reorientation, which must have had an important psychological, as well as political, impact on the brothers. But Victor passes over the episode with barely a comment. Does this mean that the Reuthers' early socialism, of which Victor writes so proudly, was of no consequence, or merely a vague

humanitarianism easily squared with the New Deal? In later years, all the brothers were sensitive about their Socialist Party activity in the 1930s, so much so that Emil Mazey, who remained a socialist for a longer period, once asked the UAW President, "Walter, what the hell are you ashamed of your past for?"

THE POINT HERE is not merely to berate the Reuthers for their abandonment of socialist politics. In Victor's failure to acknowledge that their political ideas were malleable, he reveals the self-righteousness apparent in the Reuthers. Far more important, in Victor's unwillingness to admit the changing quality of the Reuther brothers' politics, he misses the very thing that was often exciting and attractive about their careers, especially in the 1940s when the brothers and their caucus fought for power in the union. Walter Reuther was a sort of open minded opportunist in this period, ambitious for power, but always aware that he had to shape his politics to appeal to a stratum of union activists and secondary leaders that was remarkably alert, sophisticated and open to new political ideas.

From the late 1930s on, Reuther's main problem in the union was how to defeat a de facto coalition of opponents that included an influential Communist grouping. In the early 1940s, Reuther defended the government's demand for production and industrial discipline within the union while, at the same time, he sought to use the collectivist tendencies inherent in wartime mobilization as a means of fulfilling a broadly social democratic program. His well known plan to convert the auto industry to the production of 500 planes a day was a bold political initiative, not so much because of its contribution to more efficient production, which Victor emphasizes and auto management eventually recognized, but because Reuther's plan proposed UAW participation in the actual management of the converted plants as an integral part of the rationalization of the entire auto/aircraft industry.

Reuther's attempt to link a progressive social program to the wartime mobilization effort proved unsuccessful: the Roosevelt Administration rejected social experimentation during the war, the union leadership acquiesced and the rank and file grew increasingly restless under the wartime no-strike pledge. Reuther had the political intelligence to recognize this failure earlier than most CIO leaders and he soon shifted to the left to accommodate growing rank and file dissatisfaction that seriously eroded his support. He opposed a Communist-backed piece work plan in 1943, then edged away from the no-strike pledge and in late 1945, contrary to CIO policy, organized a strike at General Motors despite opposition from his factional opponents in the UAW. The UAW lost its demand that GM raise wages without increasing prices but Reuther won the allegiance of most non-Communist UAW militants, the presidency of the union and a wide following among left-liberals outside union ranks. This was the Reuther brothers most leftwing phase as national trade

union leaders. Victor announced his support for the immediate formation of a labor party in December 1945 while brother Walter repudiated Truman and denounced the Democratic Party a few months later.

More than any other trade unionist of his time, Walter Reuther represented that meeting of power and intellect so rare in the history of American labor. With the self-confidence that came from an understanding of the potential power of a mobilized labor movement, Walter Reuther asserted in 1947, "We are the vanguard in America. . . We are the architects of the future."

The Reuthers never fulfilled this promise. Sometime in the late 1940s they began an accommodation to the existing structure of American politics and to the industrial relations status quo. They put off the idea of a labor party, ("now is not the time") supported Philip Murray's reactionary purge of the Communists from the CIO, called a rough truce with the auto companies and actively curbed dissent in the UAW. Perhaps no trade unionist could have resisted the powerful conservative forces at work in postwar society. The Cold War, the anti-Communist and anti-radical hysteria, the remarkable strength of big business and the growing conservative ethos of the times, all militated against an aggressive, politically oriented trade union program.

Practical and "pragmatic," the Reuthers declined the gamble, seeking instead incremental social and economic advances through an innovative collective bargaining program. At first they seemed successful. In the decade or so after the Reuther caucus took power in the UAW, each successive contract was a breakthrough: the first cost of living escalator in 1948, pensions inversely keyed to social security in 1949, supplemental unemployment benefits in 1955, monetary improvements in all these categories in the 1960s. These substantial gains would not have been achieved had a lesser man than Walter Reuther been at the union's head. But the contract "victories" did little to attack the real problem, the distribution of power and wealth in society.

In the quarter century that has passed since the UAW's heyday, it is clear that significant wage and fringe benefits were obtained only when American capitalism was at its most affluent and productive, when labor still retained the power it had won in the 1930s and the auto corporations were willing to pay handsomely to reestablish stable labor relations and regain control of working conditions on the shop floor. While Reuther made the corporations pay, he also, in large measure, gave them what they wanted, not out of any conscious or calculated "sell-out" but because it seemed least disruptive and most responsible. In 1950, he signaled a change in the UAW relationship with the corporations by signing a five-year billion dollar contract with GM, hailed by *Fortune* as the "treaty of Detroit." The union accepted the principle that advances in real wages would be pegged to increased productivity; hence the union acquired a

real stake in maintaining stable, predictable, efficient industrial relations with the giant corporation.

"The tactics and strategy employed to achieve the union's objectives," asserts Victor Reuther, "required complete cooperation between the union's leadership and a militant, enlightened membership." In fact, the liberal UAW leadership "sold" its bargaining strategy to the rank and file, carefully orchestrating convention proceedings to insure that Reuther and other top negotiators would not be boxed into support of hard and fast bargaining demands. In the 1950s and 1960s negotiations with the auto companies were invariably shrouded in secrecy until the results were dramatically revealed to the membership. Then the leadership pressed for quick approval of the contract while its details were still hazily understood and before opposition could organize.* Throughout the Reuther era the International allowed local unions to wage rear guard battles against speedup but, without the power of the International behind them, the isolated locals fought at a disadvantage. In the 1960s Reuther spent almost as much energy after each contract settlement cajoling and threatening these locals back to work as he did negotiating with the company. As a result, working conditions deteriorated and the rank and file slumped into apathy or outright hostility toward the union.

Victor Reuther recognizes that all is not well in the house of labor but, unable to see how the policies pursued by his brother might have contributed to the current malaise, he finds in George Meany a villain large enough to explain the labor movement's postwar retreat. Victor first clashed with Meany when he served as UAW, later CIO, representative in Europe. Except for the celebrated transfer of \$50,000 in CIA money to French and Italian trade unionists in 1950, the Reuthers avoided involvement in the shadier international skulduggery at which Meany's lieutenants, Irving Brown and Jay Lovestone, proved so adept. Later, Victor was among the first in the CIO to criticize Meany's reactionary foreign operations, playing an important, even courageous role in the mid 1960s in exposing the links between the CIA and AFL-CIO operations in Latin America, Africa and Asia. In hindsight Victor calls the merger of the AFL and CIO a mistake, resulting in "stagnation, multified bureaucracy, in action and reactionary behavior."

Of course, Meany's leadership merits harsh criticism but the fact is that Reuther let slip a rare opportunity to make a real impact on the AFL-CIO in the years immediately following the merger. In the united AFL-CIO the conservative building trades were, for the first time, a numerical minority while the more liberal industrial and white collar unions, both AFL and CIO, held a potential working majority. But Reuther could never decide the grounds on which to challenge George Meany's stewardship. Timid and vacillating he was easily out-foxed by

*This process is ably recorded in William Serrin's account of the 1970 GM strike, *The Company and the Union*, 1974.

Meany. He supported the civil rights movement, the farm workers and a more liberal foreign policy but Reuther's liberalism was limited by his unwillingness to confront the existing power structure either in the AFL-CIO or on the national political scene.

When Reuther finally pulled the UAW out of the AFL-CIO in 1968, the issues were rather murky. There was a complicated dispute about the International Labor Organization and Walter was dovish on Vietnam while Meany was a hawk. But even Vietnam (and Victor dates his brother's turn against the war a year too early) was not the issue for splitting a labor federation; rather it was a question that could and should have been fought out in the AFL-CIO. Confusing the situation still further, Reuther apparently did not consider the war or the other issues he raised of sufficient principle to call for like-minded unions to join him in a new labor group. Instead, he joined with the pro-war Teamsters, following his departure from the AFL-CIO, in the shaky, short-lived Alliance for Labor Action.

Victor Reuther's defense of both his brother's conduct in the contest with George Meany and his "democratic management" of the union is uncritical. While he recognizes the erosion of internal democracy in other unions and in the AFL-CIO, Victor Reuther is unable to detect the same problem in the UAW. His very words sound a paternalistic note: "The democratic process was always a Reuther obsession. Walter was well aware that those at the top of a large organization can all too easily lose touch with the needs and sentiments of the rank and file, and fall victim to bureaucratic practices that deny others their fundamental rights." He cites his brother's personal honesty, the union's quasi-judicial but limited, Public Review Board and the formal right of UAW members to approve contracts as evidence of the healthy state of democratic life in his union. But the right of oppositionists to organize freely, circulate material and command even a fraction of the resources of the international executive board "caucus," essential keystones to authentic union democracy that the Reuthers used so effectively in their drive for power, have long since been reduced to mere formal rights in the UAW. No officer of the UAW has ever been seriously challenged for reelection since the Reuther caucus, itself now a showpiece shell, won control of the International Executive Board in 1947. Only a handful of regional directors has been defeated and all of them by other Reuther loyalists. In 1970, after a tumultuous three years when militant black workers made large inroads in several important locals and led effective wildcat strikes, Reuther was still able to win reelection with an embarrassingly high 98% of the vote at the union convention. Reuther's successor, Leonard Woodcock, won election in his own right two years later with 99%. This unanimity is highly suspect, especially when one observes the bitter contests for union office that have broken out in such otherwise ossified unions as the United Steel Workers, the United Mine Workers and the National Maritime Union.

FRANK MARQUART'S AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL *An Auto Worker's Journal* (subtitled "The UAW from Crusade to One Party Union")* gives something of the feel for methods used by the Reuthers to build their eminently effective machine and the decline of democracy in the UAW. Lured to Detroit by Henry Ford's promise of \$5 a day, Marquart began work in a low wage parts plant in 1914. For many years he was what the Wobblies called a "scissorbill," a racist, semi-literate production worker. However, Marquart had the good fortune to fall in with a group of radicals and in the early 1920s he began his self-education, became a socialist and took an active part in the efforts to organize the industry. After a lengthy stay in a sanitarium for tuberculosis, which gave him time to write, Marquart began a 30-year career in workers' education, first with the WPA, then in some of the most militant and active locals of the UAW, including Dodge Local 3, Ford 600 and Briggs 212. Since the education departments of the local unions attracted the newly militant and intellectually hungry, his classes were wide ranging and highly political. A class on grievance procedure could turn into a debate over the Cold War or the nature of the Democratic Party. Before the Reuthers consolidated their control of the union, UAW education functions were an important ideological battleground for the power caucuses and the Communists, Socialists and Trotskyists in the union. The International education department was considered such a strategic post that when Walter Reuther assumed the presidency in 1946 he made important organizational concessions to former president R.J. Thomas so that Victor could take command of the union-wide department.

After 1947 the scope of union education was progressively narrowed and refined to conform to CIO policy and the current UAW "line." When Marquart brought socialist academics like Lewis Corey or Robert Lynd to his classes he was sharply reprimanded by his superiors. Authentic political debate was suppressed in favor of prepackaged classes and discussions on assigned issues. The Reuthers themselves became ultra-sensitive to criticism from the left. Marquart reports that when one student used the term class struggle in a discussion on UAW political action, Roy Reuther, in charge of UAW-Democratic Party relations, shot back, "Don't use that kind of sectarian Marxist crap in this school."

Reuther and his top aides were sensitive to these political questions because their power in the union rested not on the neo-feudal relationship of most national union leaders with their underlings, but rather on a subtle combination of pressures, both ideological and administrative, that insured the solidity of their one party system and the relative impotence and isolation of their opponents. Marquart describes how in the early days the Reuthers co-opted many of their former opponents—Communists included—to the international staff and recruited other potential dissi-

**An Auto Worker's Journal, the UAW from Crusade to One-Party Union*, by Frank Marquart. The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park and London, 1975, 161 pp., \$10.

dents to the leadership as they emerged from the ranks. Careerism played its part, of course, and there was the understandable reluctance to return to the shops but equally important in the rapid demise of an organized opposition was the genuine liberalism of the Reuther leadership that made his caucus an attractive ideological home for a generation of ex-radicals and oppositionists in the late 1940s and early 1950s. As the union membership drifted into apolitical apathy during those years, writes Marquart, the cliché that “the top leadership is more progressive than the rank and file” provided a convenient rationalization for those who came to terms with Reuther’s tight control of the UAW.

Despite their political differences both Frank Marquart and Victor Reuther describe the UAW from much the same perspective, that of the politically engaged, active leadership cadre. Where Victor sees dedicated, democratic union leaders about him, Marquart finds subtly corrupt ex-militants and arrogant national officers. Both ignore the shop workers or see the UAW membership as an undifferentiated mass of unionists responsive to the “correct” political appeal.

PETER FRIEDLANDER’S *Making of a UAW Local** is also written from the point of view of a politically motivated unionist, but the focus of his remarkable and ambitious book is resolutely downward into the sociological and cultural structure of the working class itself. And it is there, among the masses, that he finds the kernel of union conservatism and bureaucracy that Marquart condemns and Reuther denies.

Friedlander, a young radical scholar in Detroit, writes of the growth of union consciousness in a 500-man parts factory in predominantly Polish Hamtramck. His book would have been impossible without the collaboration of Edmund Kord, UAW Local 229’s founder and president for many years. Little in the way of the usual historical record exists about the early days of the union, so Friedlander conducted a series of intensive, analytical interviews with Kord over a 15-month period which generated the “data” on which the book rests. (Most of the names of the workers with whom Kord associated have been changed to protect their anonymity.) Kord provided Friedlander with an intimate portrait of the social geography of the plant and it is essentially from Kord’s union building perspective that the story of the organization and growth of union consciousness in the Detroit Parts Company is told. Most of the employees in the plant, like the majority of auto workers in the 1930s and 1940s, were from what Friedlander calls “prebourgeois” cultures: first and second generation Polish Catholics, white Appalachian Protestants and a few rural Southern blacks. While these ethnocultures were beginning to disintegrate under the hammer blows of industrial capitalism, they nevertheless predeter-

**The Emergence of a UAW Local, 1936-1939. A Study in Class and Culture*, by Peter Friedlander. University of Pittsburg Press, Pittsburg, 1975, 155 pp., \$9.

mined the UAW's subsequent drift toward conservatism, Friedlander argues.

Kord and a group of union militants began organization of the plant in the Winter of 1936-7 as the great strikes and sitdowns at Flint, Midland Steel and Chrysler swirled around them. With a level of detail, sensitivity and insight rarely matched, Friedlander shows how the social terrain over which militants and management fought determined the tactics of the battle, the pace of unionization and the character of the victory. The organizers, five to 15 in number, were more sophisticated than the rank and file, usually anti-clerical and motivated by "ideals of a broadly democratic nature." Kord, a part time student and a socialist, was nicknamed "the professor." Over the two years it took to unionize the company, he recruited several among the organizing cadre to the Socialist Party.

The largest group of workers in the plant were immigrant Poles and Ukrainians, many of peasant origin, who were timid and deferential toward authority. Kord reports that "when the foreman came around they would speed up their work and hastily crush out their cigarettes. . ." In contrast, the second generation Poles were more highly skilled and more assertive. As the union eroded management power, Kord and his associates spread their influence through every skill level, social subgroup and department of the plant, finally achieving a solid organization, not so much with their first contract, but with a dues strike against the non-union holdouts, followed by a highly disciplined slowdown that won vacations with pay.

Friedlander's ethnocultural focus opens up a new sense of how working class consciousness was shaped and unions built, but it also provides the basis for his thoroughgoing determinism. "One is struck by the spontaneous inevitability of the process of bureaucratization," he writes. The immigrant workers transferred their passivity and deference to authority from the company to the union leadership, while the gap between the mass of the workers and the politically alert cadre remained as wide as ever. As a consequence Kord and the other officers of Local 229 formed a self-perpetuating clique that monopolized the political life of the local, despite their efforts to widen the base of decision making, despite their democratic and socialist ideology. "Composed of the most active and aggressive part of the working class," writes Friedlander, "the bureaucracy, in the last analysis can perhaps be considered the chief product of working class struggle itself. . . the transference of patriarchal attitudes toward authority on the part of a larger number of workers provided the historical and psychological nutrients out of which bureaucracy could grow."

Friedlander is so taken by this insight that he sees politics and political ideas as essentially irrelevant to the evolution of both the local and the UAW as a whole. The conservative drift in national politics, the new collective bargaining environment generated under wartime and

postwar conditions, the consolidation of Reutherite control in the UAW, routinization of grievance procedures and industry wide bargaining, the particular receptivity of the Polish community to anti-Communist appeals, suburbanization and 1950s affluence are all omitted from Friedlander's history of UAW Local 229. It is as though one were to write an account of black auto workers in the 1960s with no mention of the civil rights movement, the war in Vietnam or the assassination of Martin Luther King.

He also provides a cultural explanation for the failure of radical politics in the UAW. To men like Kord, the socialist movement was important, not for its ideological content, but for the "education, cultural experience and sense of community. . ." it provided. "Inextricably bound up with their democratic idealism was the desire for education and self-improvement." Consciously or not, many of the most intelligent and aggressive workers were attracted by radical politics not out of a sense of political mission but to escape the limitations of their background. Accommodating to the needs of their new trade union comrades, groups like the Socialist Party became more reformist and less radical. (Friedlander argues that the same was true for the Communists, but here he is empirically wrong.) The author considers this phenomenon an ironic twist of history, a joke played on the radical parties who so desperately sought ties to the working class.

In emphasizing the sociologically sealed quality of this experience, Friedlander ignores the dynamic possibilities inherent in the situation. Suspended between the immigrant world and the cosmopolitan milieu offered by the union, strategically placed, politically alert secondary leaders like Kord—and the generation of students who sat in Frank Marquart's classes—held the key to the UAW's historic potential. Just as Local 229 dispelled the immigrant Poles' fear of the foreman by changing the power relationships in the plant, so these unionists had the potential for transforming the culturally insular consciousness of the auto worker rank and file by fighting to change the power relationships in society. Walter Reuther and his brothers might have led this movement but their drift away from radicalism to acceptance of the existing order did much to reinforce the rank and file conservatism and passivity that Friedlander rightly considers so important in the bureaucratic development of the Union.

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ILGWU: Its Enemies and Its Friends

Burton Hall

READERS WILL RECALL FROM THE LAST ISSUE OF *New Politics* that "Gingold's Law" is the doctrine, enunciated by ILGWU Vice President David Gingold, that regardless of what the courts say, and regardless of what the ILGWU Constitution says, members are forbidden—by his ruling—from making a record of ILGWU disciplinary or appeal proceedings in which they are involved.

Three members of Cutters' Local 10, ILGWU, have challenged Gingold's Law, both within the ILGWU and (more recently) in the courts. They have won at least the first round. On September 20, 1976, Federal District Judge Constance Baker Motley ruled that

The court is convinced that the question of the member's right to make his own record of the proceedings for the purpose of intra-union appeals is a serious one, irrespective of the absence of any such provision in the union's constitution. . . . Particularly since, in this case, two prior Local union findings of guilty have been reversed on procedural grounds by the union's appellate bodies, the court finds a substantial basis for plaintiffs' contention of procedural impropriety in the defendants' failure to allow plaintiffs the use of a tape recorder or stenographer to make their own record of the disciplinary proceedings. Even if this were the only ground alleged by plaintiffs as the basis for injunctive relief, the court could find that they have raised "sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation".

Back in January 1975, the three members—Tomas Rosario, Ovidio Vega and Ray Cabel—had been invited into the office of Local 10's Manager, by the Manager himself, Abe Dolgen. While they were protesting to him against the discrimination by Local 10 against rank-and-file oppositionists in job referrals, Dolgen and three business agents left the room. He returned with two police officers and had the three members arrested (they were held for some five hours in the police station). Then he failed to show up in criminal court to support his charges. Instead of appearing in court, Dolgen filed charges against the three members within the union, alleging that they had "obstructed" his office, "interfered" with his functioning, and "sought to provoke physical action against the elected administration" (this last charge being, in substance, that Cabel had told other members what was going on).

The further history of those charges has revealed the character of ILGWU's internal procedures—and has highlighted, in particular, "Gingold's Law." The three members were first brought to trial in February 1975 before the local's executive board augmented by Dolgen himself (who acted *de facto* as chairman) and by the three business agents. Dolgen