

policy of the business, they have generally to threaten revolt, and every important difference is solved by a trial of strength. As business is conducted to-day, the demands of the workers are *prima facie* illegal, for industry has not yet developed representative government under constitutional forms.

The problem of law and order is to develop for business some constitutional representative government. In the protocol trades of the garment manufactures we see the beginnings. There an actual assemblage has been created, and those interested have an opportunity to legislate for their industry. No one supposes that the protocol is a final blessing; the habit of representative government in industry is so little developed that all sorts of difficulties constantly arise. Moreover, while citizenship in industry is newer and more untried than citizenship in the state, the problems of industry are as technical as the problems of politics. But at least the protocol is something to work on, something to evoke loyalty. It enables us to speak of law and order without blushing, for there is some law and some order. But in the Colorado mines, for example, the autocracy is absolute, no glimmer of representation exists, no responsibility is permitted to the men, there is no government by consent, and nothing but brute force to compel obedience.

These believers in absolutism persist. They may smother rebellion, it will break out again; and all they will have done is to delay the time when men can begin to learn the difficult art of governing industry. By refusing any representation, they are closing the school in which men practice and grow to democracy. By refusing responsibility to the men, they make them irresponsible. By making it difficult to remedy abuses or express dissatisfaction except through revolt, they breed the habit of rebellion. They are doing what every foolish autocrat has always done—they are trying to purchase temporary absolutism, and they will pay for it by constant disorder and fearful waste.

We have no idea that a fine civilization can be produced by riots, or beating "scabs," or by heroic men in the mountains. An industrial democracy will have to be based on long experience in an atmosphere clear enough for reason to live. This experience can be got only in one way, by creating recognized channels in which it can develop. We do not expect to jump straight from the present absolutism into a cooperative democracy. Industry will have to pass through the intermediate steps, through limited monarchy, through representative government, before self-government is possible. By those steps men must learn. But we must begin sometime to take those steps. We must at least

Socialist Degeneration

THE election of 1914, like that of 1912, reveals the fact that the Socialist party of America is ceasing to be a Socialist party, or a revolutionary party, or even a party of wage-earners, and is becoming a vague, ungeneralized, democratic organization. It is appealing to farmers, middlemen, and small capitalists as well as to wage-earners, is minimizing or even denying the class struggle, is ignoring the social philosophy of which the party is supposed to be the representative, and is manifesting a willingness to exchange old principles for new votes. For better or worse, the Socialist party suffers that democratic "degeneration" which the Syndicalists maintain is the fate of all political parties.

This thesis could be maintained by a mass of evidence so large that it would overflow these pages and spill over incontinently into future issues. But a very few figures from the electoral returns of 1912 (those for 1914 being still too fragmentary) will suffice. If the Socialist party were the party of the wage-earners, it would be strong where the wage-earners are many, and weak where the wage-earners are few. But it is in the great industrial states of the Union, with cities and factories and dense masses of workmen, that the Socialists are the weakest. In New York State, after more than forty years of propaganda, the Socialist party vote (1912) is only 4 per cent of the vote of the State. In other words, only one voter in every twenty-five votes the Socialist ticket. In Massachusetts, a typically industrial state, only 2.6 per cent of the votes are Socialist; in Rhode Island only 2.6 per cent; in New Jersey only 3.7 per cent; in Maryland only 1.7 per cent. In many densely settled industrial states, covered with great factories employing armies of wage-earners, the great mass of workmen hold aloof, and the Socialist party remains weak.

On the other hand, in certain agricultural states, where there are few wage-earners, and where farm owners and tenants who wish to become farm owners do not even know what wage-slavery is, the Socialist vote is comparatively strong. In Kansas, in Minnesota, in Texas, in several other preponderantly agricultural states, the proportionate Socialist vote is much larger than in New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and other industrial states. In the South, where there is hardly any industrial proletariat, the Socialist vote is growing. In Florida, 9.3 per cent of all the votes cast in 1912 were for Mr. Debs. The Socialist proportion of votes in Florida was considerably over twice as great as in New York and over three times as

the Socialist vote is the strongest of all. The state with the largest proportion of Socialist votes is not New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Illinois, Ohio, New Jersey, Michigan or Connecticut—which are the eight greatest industrial states, comprising over 63 per cent of all wage-earners employed in manufacturing—but brand-new, corn-growing, hog-raising Oklahoma. In that state 16.6 per cent of all voters vote the Socialist ticket, or more than four times the proportion of New York and more than six times the proportion of Massachusetts. After Oklahoma the states which have the largest Socialist vote are the sparsely settled agricultural and mining states of the far West. The only states which have 10 per cent or more of their votes Socialistic are the seven Western states, Oklahoma, Nevada, Montana, Arizona, Washington, California and Idaho.

It almost seems as though the Socialist party is weakest where it has been longest in the field, where its propaganda has been the most active, and where conditions seem ripest for the inevitable economic revolution. Thirty-six years ago, in 1878, when there were already twenty-four newspapers "directly or indirectly" supporting the Socialist party and the Socialists were piling up large votes in Cincinnati, Cleveland, Chicago, and St. Louis, Oklahoma was not even on the map, and the hope of the party seemed to lie in the industrial states of the East and Middle West. But the party growth did not keep pace with the industrial development of these states. Year by year an ever smaller proportion of the total Socialist vote was to be found in these great industrial commonwealths, and in several states an increased vote has been followed not only by a relative but by an absolute decline. In Massachusetts, where the decline has been greatest, the Socialist party vote was 33,629 in 1902, and only 12,616 ten years later.

What we find everywhere is a deproletarianization of the Socialist party, and an opening of the party doors to all sorts of voters, proletarian, non-proletarian and anti-proletarian. We find Socialist candidates for mayor elected by non-Socialist votes and carrying out after election non-Socialist programs. In the late election Mr. Meyer London of New York was sent to Congress by a coalition of groups, some of which wanted the cooperative commonwealth, while others wanted London or did not want Tammany. To gather in the non-proletarian voter the Socialist party platform is progressively watered so that the flaming red of a generation ago becomes a delicate pink. The old program which threatened the farmer with the loss of his farm is tactfully altered, and we know not what promises of "private property in the means

attitude towards voteless proletarians, especially Southern negroes, and also a change in attitude towards voting non-proletarians, who are perfectly willing to vote with the Socialists if only they will drop their Socialism. And finally, after the class war has been abandoned, except in words, a party referendum almost entirely omits the words, so that the way may be open to complete conversion of what was once supposed to be a revolutionary party into a frankly democratic and progressive party.

How this development will work itself out, what are the ultimate chances of success of this new semi-progressive party, is a question of engaging interest. It is difficult to prophesy how it will modify its tactics and its leadership in an effort to gather in the vaguely radical vote. We shall not now enter into that phase. The present emphasis is on the mere fact of this inevitable and foreseen transformation, a process which the Syndicalists and the more advanced Socialists, stranded by this recession of the revolutionary tide, call Socialist degeneration.

The New **REPUBLIC** *A Journal of Opinion*

PUBLISHED WEEKLY AND COPYRIGHT, 1914, IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY THE REPUBLIC PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC., 421 WEST TWENTY-FIRST STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. HERBERT CROLY, PRESIDENT. ROBERT HALLOWELL, TREASURER.

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YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION, FIFTY-TWO ISSUES, FOUR DOLLARS IN ADVANCE. SINGLE COPIES TEN CENTS. CANADIAN SUBSCRIPTION FOUR DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE. FOREIGN SUBSCRIPTION FOR COUNTRIES IN THE POSTAL UNION, FIVE DOLLARS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE.

REMITTANCE TO BE MADE BY INTERNATIONAL POSTAL MONEY ORDER. APPLICATION FOR ENTRY AS SECOND CLASS MATTER AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK PENDING.

C O N T E N T S

VOL. I SATURDAY DECEMBER 12th 1914 No. 6

	Page
Editorial Notes	3
Leading Editorials	
Pacifism vs. Passivism	6
The Reformer	7
A Substitute for Violence	9
Socialist Degeneration	10
The Economic Outlook in France..... Robert Dell	12
Norman Hapgood..... P. L.	13
How England Organised at Home..... S. K. Ratcliffe	15
The Defect of the German Defense..... Roland G. Usher	17
Stretching Contraband..... C. T. Revere	18
In a Moscow Hospital..... Hugh Walpole	19
Dramatic Issues..... Alfred Kuttner	20
Correspondence.....	22
Within Our Gates..... Francis Hackett	24
Books and Things..... P. L.	25
Maurice Barrès..... Elizabeth Shanley Sergeant	26

The Economic Outlook in France

THE economic results of the present war seem likely to be as unprecedented as the scale of its military operations. It is the first war that has been fought under a system of universal military service in all the countries engaged except England, and that fact alone makes its economic effects much more grave than those of any previous war in modern times. Whatever may be the result, it is already evident that France will suffer far more than she did from the war of 1870.

At the very beginning of the war all the men up to the age of thirty-nine were suddenly taken away from their occupations, and a few weeks later all the men up to forty-five had followed them. Men who were not called out have tried to keep their places of business open with the aid of elderly employees and boys, but, now that the classes of 1914 and 1915 are called under the colors, only boys under nineteen are available for civil employment. The economic effect of this sudden withdrawal from all civil occupations of between four and five million men in a country of rather less than forty million inhabitants must obviously mean the dislocation, and indeed the paralysis, of trade and industry.

All parts of France have not, of course, suffered equally. There is more business in Marseilles, Toulouse or Bordeaux than in Paris, and agriculture, one of the most important industries of France, has suffered less than the others. It has been possible to get in the crops; even in Champagne, which is in the invaded area, the vintage has been taken as far as military operations would allow. The Germans have not destroyed the vineyards, and it would appear that agricultural land generally has suffered less than might have been expected in the invaded area.

But production, other than agricultural, is almost at a standstill all over France. The invaded area, although it is not a very large proportion of the whole area of France, is the wealthiest part of the country and the most industrial, the district of mines, textile trades, sugar factories, and most of the principal industries. At present it is almost uninhabited; those towns and villages that have not been partially or wholly destroyed by the guns of both armies are practically deserted, and the few inhabitants that remain are condemned to idleness. Moreover, the Germans have systematically burned down factories and works, wrecked mines, and destroyed industrial machinery. The State will, of course, come to the aid of the invaded districts, but it must be long before French industry recovers from the catastrophe.

In Paris the state of affairs is only less serious. There has, of course, been no destruction, but the vast majority of factories, workshops, offices, large

the war. It might have been expected that there would be a demand for the labor of the men who are too old for military service, but the majority of these are out of work, and so are nearly all the women. The trades which employ chiefly or exclusively women are among those which have suffered most. Paris depends to a great extent on the *commerce de luxe* which is at a standstill; there are no Paris fashions this year, and there is no demand for dresses, hats, feathers, artificial flowers. Most families are in mourning, and the very few dressmakers' and milliners' shops that are open show nothing but mourning in their windows.

Most of the working-class families whose male members are at the front are living on the allowance of 1 fr. 25 c. a day, with 50 c. a day for each child, given by the Government, eked out by soup kitchens, free restaurants, and other forms of assistance. Those single women who were able have gone to their families in the country; others exist as best they can. Most of the very small shops remain open, those that can be run by the women of the family, without employees, but their custom is much reduced. The return of the Government from Bordeaux, followed as it will be by the return of the wealthy classes who are still almost entirely absent, will no doubt cause some retail shops to be reopened, and make some improvement in the economic situation. The reopening of theaters and music halls will employ a certain number of people; but it will not be possible to open many, for they could not be filled. These, however, will be but trifling improvements.

The crisis has been accentuated by the various necessary measures which the Government has taken to prevent general bankruptcy. The moratorium, which has been prolonged until December thirty-first, is slightly modified, but it will not be possible to put an end to it entirely before the war is over. The men at the front cannot be called upon to pay their debts, and they are the majority of the men in the country. The moratorium at present suspends the payment of bills of exchange and all trade debts with this exception, that after November thirtieth a debtor who is not at the front and does not live in the invaded area can be made to pay only if his creditor can prove to the satisfaction of a judge that he is able to do so. For the ordinary legal procedure is substituted a kind of amical inquiry by a judge, without fees of any sort, in which the parties cannot be represented by counsel. It is evident that very few debtors will be able to pay, especially as no debts can be recovered from men at the front or persons inhabiting the invaded

The moratorium has also been modified in re