

stands the test of the camera, he substituted subjective reality, that which corresponds to perception. A Picasso is laboriously, tortuously constructed from states of consciousness linked by the intrusion of nature into the mind. A violin becomes enormously significant because for the first time in art it is not taken for granted but subjected to infinite scrutiny, infinite brooding, as by the converged stare of the intellect's thousand relentless eyes. In the resultant synthesis, the transcription of the violin upon canvas, it emerges as a composite vision, a dismembered fly drowned in the amber of philosophic perplexity. I do not praise Picasso nor deride him. Once again the issue is a personality rather than a method; and it is true of Picasso that for those whose minds turn often upon themselves his art stands supremely precious in its power of evoking, as by double mirrors, the sheer unutterable meaning of common things received into the depths of experience.

From Picasso arises the school of Cubism, and indirectly, of Futurism. At first sight both these schools stand to Picasso as theology to the mystic—personality devitalized into a system. Both have felt themselves compelled to summon the aid of literature to justify an art of which it is claimed that its justification lies entirely within. Now the whole idea of subjective as opposed to objective reality is raised by Cubism and Futurism, as it was

not raised by Picasso himself. Eventually the world will accept a forceful personality at its own valuation; but a mere method, claiming philosophic authority and propagated by means of academies among whosoever wishes to learn it, can and should be met upon its own basis. In general I suggest that subjective reality has its justification not only in philosophy, but in common experience; but that subjective reality is not properly the province of framed pictures. It is and always has been the province of decorative art. Thus our reply to Cubism and Futurism is not that art may not be based upon intuition, but that Cubism and Futurism have diverted the true meaning and value of intuition into the wrong channel. Already, indeed, a school has arisen out of which decorative art will probably be restored to its rightful position, as creative as painting, but achieving its results in an entirely different way. What is more subjective than the design upon a Persian carpet or a Chinese bowl? And who would think of denying its validity? So we look for a gradual adjustment among all the forces at work in modern art; the restitution of objective reality to framed pictures, though with a new freedom of treatment, and of subjective reality to decoration, enhanced by the splendid opportunity for decorative art in the modern world, a world rebuilt and reimagined from day to day.

HORACE HOLLEY.

## CORRESPONDENCE

### Mr. Morgan's Shortcomings

SIR: I am unable to grasp the meaning of your article entitled "Mr. Morgan Stands Pat," in THE NEW REPUBLIC of February sixth. That Mr. J. P. Morgan, in his testimony before the Industrial Commission, failed to take a commanding position in "the modern industrial system," but restricted himself to the modest one of "a banker"—one among several thousands in this country—seems to be imputed to him as a civic shortcoming if nothing worse. As an illustration of his failure to come up to the scratch you say: "Questioned as to whether it was fair to refuse employment at unskilled labor to men over thirty-five he replied that this was a matter of opinion; asked what was his opinion he replied, 'I haven't any.'"

Perhaps when this question was put to Mr. Morgan the questioner was "thinking in terms of newspaper headlines," as you thoughtfully suggest, in which case the answer was appropriate, but in any case the question was one for which a sociologist might have taken a whole hour to frame an answer covering all possible conditions and circumstances.

I have read somewhere in the writings of the late Professor William G. Sumner the advice that when you are confronted with an argument that seems to you fallacious you should first dig out the major premise. The major

word system, which usually means a contrivance or design on the part of somebody. But the modern industrial system is a result of the growth of human society. It was never designed by anybody. It is no more a system than the Adirondack forest is a system. Being a growth and not a contrivance, it is for those who complain against it to prove its badness, not merely by showing bad spots in it, but by showing a working plan for a better one.

The minor premise in your article is that the system is linked with the name of Morgan. Ergo Mr. Morgan should stand up and face his responsibilities, and not skulk under the pretence of being a mere banker. The task that both Mr. Morgan and his critic have to face is that of finding a working plan for supplying the human race with housing, clothing and three meals per day. You say that Mr. Morgan ought to take the lead in solving this problem because "his position in the business world is so great that an unwillingness to lead is taken to mean an approval of the horrible abuses of modern industry."

I am not in Mr. Morgan's confidence, but I presume that he denies his responsibility for the growth of the human family to its present method of earning a living, or for the abuses of modern industry, or for tuberculosis, or the hookworm, or other evils that afflict mankind. This thought seems to have dawned upon the writer of your article at the conclusion of his discourse, where he says

for the inevitable change" from the existing practice to something else which is not delineated. Mr. Morgan's class, we may assume, consists largely of men like Jacob Schiff, George F. Baker, August Belmont, James Speyer, A. B. Hepburn and others. How can Mr. Morgan prepare the minds of these promising pupils for the inevitable change? If he should bring them together for this purpose would they not ask him what change he proposes? He would be obliged to say that "in a real sense" he does not know. Then he would naturally declare the school dismissed.

HORACE WHITE.

New York City.

## As to Arizona

**SIR:** If there is any question that needs the application of common sense, it is the liquor question.

Mr. Carleton H. Parker in his article in your issue of January sixteenth gives a number of cogent reasons "Why Arizona Went Dry." He might have added to them the fact that many people voted dry because they believed that prohibition had left the state; and, above all, the religious account of the suspension of the copper mines in the state and the strike, many miners who would have voted against prohibition had left the state; and above all the religious issue. It was believed by many of the most prominent Catholics in the state that the liquor men were using their church to assist in the contest and they resented it by voting for prohibition. In addition to this the many anti-Catholic organizations in the state, such as the "Orangemen" and the "Guardians of Liberty," looked upon prohibition as an opportunity to slap the Catholic Church, in that the proposed bill prohibits the introduction into the state of wine for sacramental purposes.

If you will investigate the elections throughout the country where prohibition was successful, you will be convinced of the truth of your statement that the voters favoring prohibition are "about equal in number to those who stand for American personal liberty." And if you get at the actual cause of success for prohibition you will find that in most of the elections it was a series of accidents or prejudices, just as in Arizona.

A. J. SUNSTEIN.

Pittsburgh, Pa.

## The Jew in Poland

**SIR:** The short editorial on the Poles in your issue of January twenty-third was admirable in tone but based upon unauthenticated premises. "We shudder at the gruesome stories which come to us from Russian Poland," you say. Is there any more foundation for these than there was for the stories of German atrocities? Judgment on the Poles in this connection should be held in abeyance until facts are at hand.

It is possible, however, that these stories are quite true. Anyone acquainted with the part that the Jew has played in the history of Poland and of Russia knows that the Russian and the Polish peasant's hatred of the Jew is as intense as the Southerner's hatred of the negro, and perhaps more logical. Why? Because it is a hatred begotten not so much by a difference of race and antipathy as by an economic struggle. Given sanctuary in Poland in the eleventh century from religious persecution in other lands, how did the Jew repay this religious tolerance? Instead

citizen in the broader sense, he held aloof. He became, as everywhere, the financier of the village. Note that most of the cases of Jew-baiting take place in the small town or village. His exorbitant rates of interest on the money he lent—and still lends—to the poor Russian and Polish peasant, and other acts of financial oppression have brought down hatred on the Jew. Add to this the Russian bureaucracy's desire to win mob-approval for its autocratic acts, and you have a complete explanation why Jew-baiting, with government approval, takes place in Russia. If our Federal government incited lynchings, would we not have even more of them? We feel quite peeved when we find that most foreigners believe that lynching is part of our daily routine; we think them illogical when they turn into a national characteristic a thing that rarely happens, and in certain localities only. Let us not make the same mistake.

I hope I have been able to show that these outrages, if true, are the result of a struggle due as much to the Jew as to the Pole, and that the uneducated Polish or Russian peasant is more of a pawn than a player in this game. Likewise it is a particularly ironic instance of Fate's interpretation of the cruel Hebrew *lex talionis*.

THADDEUS GORECKI.

Philadelphia, Pa.

## The Right of Labor

**SIR:** If you are in any doubt about the value of THE NEW REPUBLIC as a "journal of opinion" this doubt should be dissipated by the number of letters that reach you. It is of no special importance what kind of feelings you engender so long as you do not leave us indifferent.

For example, I am not at all indifferent to the wholly misleading characterization you give to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case involving the so-called coercion law of Kansas. This decision, you say in your issue of January thirtieth, is "profoundly reactionary" and upholds "the doctrinaire conception of liberty." One might accept this opinion without much question if he had not read Justice Pitney's opinion.

So successful has been the trades-union propaganda and so potent is the influence of "labor" with our legislators and newspapers that we are really very much muddled as to the rights of labor and capital, or better, employer and employee. Each claims more "rights" than he is entitled to; you and I are only interested in seeing that the actual, not the impudently asserted rights of each be secured.

Justice Pitney's decision clears up the whole question in that paragraph in which he says:

"Just as labor organizations have the inherent and constitutional right to deny membership to any man who will not agree that during such membership he will not accept or retain employment in company with non-union men; and just as a union man has the constitutional right to decline proffered employment unless the employer will agree not to employ any non-union man, so the employer has the constitutional right to insist that the employee shall refrain from affiliation with the union during the term of the employment."

If, as it clearly appears, this puts employer and employee on exactly the same basis, how can it be truthfully said that it is reactionary or that it embodies a doctrinaire conception of liberty? The notion that a member of a labor union has "rights" superior to those of other human beings is intolerable to any but a "gomperic" mind.

## A New Shakespeare

*A Midsummer Night's Dream, produced by Granville Barker at Wallack's Theatre, New York, February 16, 1915.*

THERE are certain aspects in which Mr. Granville Barker seems unhappily to resemble Titania's "lovely boy, stolen from an Indian King." If our Stage Society could be conceived as the fairy queen, it might well be said that she "never had so sweet a changeling." She "crowns him with flowers and makes him all her joy." Of this adoption the American Oberon appears to be frankly jealous. He speaks slightly of his wanton Titania, and, if protective patriotism can do its work, it will go hard with the changeling child.

In virtue of Mr. Barker's enterprise, this animus is peculiarly unfortunate. As a theatrical producer, Mr. Barker has not chosen to follow the line of least resistance. On the contrary, he has picked out a strait and flinty path, and whether he stumbles in it or not he is entitled to understanding. Probably the youngest producer in England, he has chosen among other things to attempt a difficult, heroic task, the fresh interpretation of Shakespeare. Easy as it may be to criticize his result, it was a splendid enterprise and full of suggestion for American playgoers and managers. This is not to say that Mr. Barker is immune from criticism. It is only the Gushingtons who can offer such immunity. Mr. Barker stands or falls by the beauty of his creation. But in all departure from tradition, all pioneer enterprise, there is a special claim on the imaginative. To acknowledge the strength of Mr. Barker's claim is the first necessity of criticism. It may not be he who will bring the experiment to perfection, but he has had the will to make a fine experiment, and it is for its potentiality as well as its accomplishment that one must take his "Midsummer Night's Dream."

As an accomplishment, however, the present performance is, for me, but dubiously successful. With a great deal of charm as a spectacle, somewhat less charm as a comedy of feeling, and almost no charm as a lyric, the cast never seemed to me to blow the perfect ring. And, for the source of this dissatisfied view, I venture to go back to my own idea of Shakespeare's fairy play.

In reading "A Midsummer Night's Dream," the intensest charm is the charm of the elfin wood. Written by an Englishman to whom nature was the source of infinite suggestion and delight, the comedy owes its dewy freshness to being imagined under the greenwood tree. Its fairies are fairies of the brake and dell. They "hop as light as bird from brier," and "dance it trippingly, hand in hand, with fairy grace," as the sunbeams dance, or the scallops of the waves. The elves for coats "war with rere-mice for their leathern wings." The sprites take their names from the living fields—Peaseblossom, Cobweb, Moth, Mustard-seed, sweet with the sweetness of wild outdoors. This is no lyric affectation. It is the note of merrie England, "full of old woods, leafy wisdoms, and frolicsome fays; passions and pageants; sweet love singing bird-like above it." And "A Midsummer Night's Dream" is, above all, woodwind music, for the sake of which a story is told.

But it is precisely this charm that is lacking in Mr. Barker's production. Desiring for excellent reasons to conventionalize the fairies, he conventionalized the

mental things. For picturesqueness, nothing could excel the gold figurines that did duty in Mr. Barker's compositions; but they were solid, immobile, statesque. Even when they danced, they danced like little gods descended from Buddhistic pedestals. The small fairies gave, in their childish voices, the right suggestion, but even their gold faces, golden locks, golden limbs, were heavy and still. They were attendants at a court of some remote Eastern clime, some fanciful golden age, not sprightly. One felt that they had come from the antique shop rather than the antique wood.

In depicting Titania's bower, a fine suggestion was achieved, and there were passages in Cecil Sharp's folk-music that had the lilt of faëry. But for the sake of irrelevant spectacle, the spirit of the Shakespearean lines was largely sacrificed, and, as a consequence, the lines themselves went the same way. It may seem dull that people should still wish to linger over the intentional poetry, and certainly the poetry was out of key with the new decoration. But, however slavish was the old recitative method, it did give one a pleasure that is not communicated by, for example, the yapping of Mr. Cecil Cameron as Puck, and Mr. Cameron is only one of a large cast who declined to Fletcherize their lines. Nor was unintelligibility the only blemish. Of the romantic cast Miss Lillah McCarthy alone seemed to attune her voice to the meaning as well as the rhythm of her part. "Dulcet and harmonious," she came not only to please on her own account but to afford blessed relief after the strained vocalization of Miss Boyne and the monotonous vociferation of Mr. Walter Creighton. Indeed, of his inferior chromo school of acting, Mr. Creighton is an inferior example.

Bottom and Puck are the two decisive characters in this comedy, Puck in communicating the fantasy of the woods, Bottom in restoring the humor of the rude and obvious world. As the "mad spirit" of Oberon, Mr. Cameron was amusing in gesture, and managed to be very funny with his shock of yellow hair. But by slighting his lines, in an effort to be effectively brisk, he almost limited his part to one of pantomime. It was good pantomime, though neither airy nor maliciously gleeful. Mr. Ernest Cossart's Bottom, on the other hand, was honestly though conventionally humorous. He made an amusing ass to Miss Jean's alluring Titania, and Mr. Wilkinson was very happy in the costumes for the "mechanical" troupe. In these, as in the gay hunting costumes and the robes of Helena and the suitors, there was a welcome novelty.

Throughout the performance there was a constant effort to establish beautiful tableaux. In aid of this effort, presumably, the actors spoke most of their lines facing the audience, or with their backs directly turned; and in addition the pose of the fairies was decoratively rigid, with palms parallel to the ground. A certain pleasure could be derived from this spectacle, but it seemed to insist on the artificial nature of the entertainment and to substitute an exterior for an interior excitation. In the quarrel scene, where the convention of direct address was abandoned, the illusion was much greater; and personally I felt most illusion when Oberon and Titania spoke to slow music, that supposedly odious device.

Ingenious and brave, this production should be seen by everyone who wants Shakespeare in the current theatre. But it cannot be acclaimed as a perfect marriage between the old and the new. It is only a first step.