

The Great Galician Drive

SO far as it is possible to judge by present indications, Russian evacuation of Galicia will be well nigh complete by the time this article is printed, and the campaign in the Austrian territory will have come to an end. What is to be reviewed is a great, victorious and now completed operation. Henceforth the eastern campaign will be in Russian Poland, not Austrian Galicia, and must be studied as a whole from the Baltic to Pinsk marshes and even further to the south.

At the outset of the present review it is necessary to recall the situation in the closing days of April, when Germany began her tremendous campaign; the purposes of German strategy and the successive aims of Russian defense; the extent of the real as compared with the apparent profit to the Germans of their great undertaking.

In the closing days of April the Russian advance in Galicia had come to a standstill. From the Vistula to the Carpathians a Russian army stood on the defensive behind the Dunajec-Biala rivers. Its mission was to cover the flank and rear of the Russian forces, which were struggling to cross the Carpathians and had actually passed the crests at Dukla, but were on the Galician side further east. A third Russian force was across the Dniester and attempting to drive the Austrians across the Pruth into Bukovina. After weeks of furious fighting the situation had reached a deadlock, but the world was still expecting the eventual success of the Russians and the reappearance of Russian cavalry in the Hungarian Plain.

In this situation the immediate necessity of German strategy was to relieve the pressure along the Carpathians and thus remove the menace to Hungary. This was merely defensive. Since Italy was on the point of entering the war and Rumania was likely to follow her Latin sister, it was equally necessary to achieve a victory sufficient to produce a political effect in Rome and Bucharest; and since the Italian and Rumanian decisions would have a profound effect upon Greek and Bulgarian action, a shining German success was essential. Finally, all immediate, perhaps eventual, chance of a decision in the west had vanished; it was therefore in the east that Germany must seek a decision if she was to expect an eventual triumph in the great struggle.

Measured by what has happened up to July sixth it will be seen that Germany was wholly successful in relieving the pressure upon Austria and abolishing the menace to Hungary. On the other hand, Italy had gone too far before the Galician

campaign took form to withdraw, and her entrance was not prevented by victories along the Dunajec and the San. But Rumania was patently checked, and it must always be remembered that in the immediate present Rumania constitutes a far greater peril to the Austro-German alliance than Italy. So far Greece and Bulgaria have not stirred, but the victory of Venizelos in the recent election seems to demonstrate that the Galician campaign failed in Athens as it did in Rome to produce the results hoped for in Berlin and Vienna.

Finally, so far as there is any evidence at hand now, Germany failed to get a decision or to achieve a position which gives promise of the immediate obtaining of a decision. She defeated the Russian armies even more thoroughly than she defeated the French and British in August of last year. She conquered twice as much territory as her drive to Paris temporarily gained. She won possession of oil wells and of fertile country of utmost value to her, but the Grand Duke's army, like Joffre's, slipped away from enveloping movements, kept a line in front of the advance, and above all prevented the opening of a breach in the main Russian battle line stretching from the Baltic to Rumania.

Consequently Germany must pursue her purposes in Poland, must persist in seeking a decision, this time within Russian territory and in the face of the permanent defenses of Russia from Ivangorod to Lusk and Dubno, or content herself with her great defensive achievements and direct her masses toward the west or the south. In any event she has failed to dispose of Russia as she failed to dispose of France, and to this extent she has failed in a campaign which has been otherwise a brilliantly successful affair.

It remains to discuss the manner in which Germany achieved her great victory. The answer is found in the frank admissions in Petrograd and in London that Germany's success was due to the concentration of an overwhelming amount of artillery, furnished with unlimited ammunition at the decisive point, and to her even more astounding ability to bring superior numbers into the same field. Both her artillery and her numbers represent the work of the winter. The masses of troops came from the training camps where, since the battles of Flanders, which exhausted earlier levies, she has been preparing new armies. The artillery and ammunition are the result of the successful mobilization of German industry.

Against the Russian army holding the Dunajec-Biala line there was flung a huge army, and the way

for the army was opened by the massed fire of the artillery. To meet this artillery fire the Russians had few guns and less ammunition. For months their ports had been sealed up by winter and domestic production was inadequate. The attack was timed at the exact moment when the stock would be lowest, after the terrible weeks of battle in the mountains and just before the coming of warm weather opened the northern harbor of Archangel.

Before this artillery fire the whole Russian army on the Dunajec seems to have been swept in headlong rout. Its defeat opened the rear of the Carpathian armies, and one division, at least, trapped in the Dukla between the Germans moving east and the Austrians coming north from Hungary, was captured. By swift retreat the troops in the other passes seem to have escaped practically intact. But the main captures, which according to German claims amount to more than 500,000, were made in the early days.

Once the Dunajec line was broken, the purpose of German strategy was to pour a huge army eastward along the Cracow-Lemberg railroad, prevent the Russians from rallying in front of it and ultimately to open a gap in the main Russian battle line which would separate the army in Russian Poland from that in Galicia. Russian strategy was now comprehended in the single purpose to keep a line in front of this great force, to prevent the opening of the breach, with the subsequent envelopment of the two fragments. The same peril threatened the French when their center was assailed at the battle of the Marne. A Russian stand at the Wislok east of the Dunajec was promptly beaten down, another at the San fared equally badly. Without serious delay the main German force took Jaroslav and crossed the San. They were now east of Przemyśl. Here they halted for the moment.

Meantime Austrian forces coming north through the Carpathians had reached the rear of Przemyśl and were striking north to join hands with the first army and surround Przemyśl. These armies were like the jaws of a pair of pincers closing on the Przemyśl-Lemberg railroad. After stubborn resistance the Russians abandoned Przemyśl, slipped between the pincers and fell back rapidly upon Lemberg. Meantime, farther south along the Dniester, a Russian counter offensive drove a third Austro-German army back in defeat and abolished the menace it constituted to the Russian lines of communication from Lemberg east to the frontier.

But the German drive could not be stopped, and the first German army moving east and north from Jaroslav began again to threaten to split the Russian battle line and open a breach between the forces

in Poland and those in Galicia. To prevent this it was again necessary for the Russians to retreat. Their wings along the lower San and the Upper Dniester were holding, but their center was incapable of withstanding the drive. With the evacuation of Lemberg Galicia was lost. The next line of possible defense was in Poland, between Lublin and Dubno, covering the railroad from Ivangorod to Lusk and in front of the fortified camp of Brest-Litowski.

With the Russian retreat from Lemberg the whole purpose of German strategy changed. Originally the main German force had been moving from west to east. Now the front had changed and the Germans were facing north. Their objective had become the fortified line covering the rear of Warsaw. They were no longer aiming to clear Galicia but to envelop the Russian forces in Poland, cut the Moscow railroad west of Brest-Litowski, and compel the Russian retreat from the Polish capital. This was a repetition of the effort of the Austrian armies in the opening days of the war, which collapsed at Tomazov after a preliminary success at Krasnik.

As these lines are written the Germans have passed Krasnik and are approaching the Ivangorod-Lusk railroad at Lublin and Cholin. Unless the Russians can hold this railroad or the line of the Wierpz River behind it, the fate of Ivangorod and Warsaw seems sealed and the Russians will have to retire from the Vistula to the Bug, surrendering to the Germans practically all of Poland. Plainly a new crisis is approaching in the Eastern campaign, and the true measure of Russian defeat will not long be concealed.

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Safety in Numbers

NOT until close upon John Florian's death did his friends get a clue to his deportment, courteous always, yet as preoccupied as that of an inventor on the brink of discovery. We all noticed this, of course, as we had noticed his aversion from women's society, in which he would have been so well fitted to gain pleasure by pleasing. He was commonly understood to be a married man, although no one knew whether it was by death or otherwise that he had lost his wife. A portrait in his library, painted years ago in a rather niggling manner, and with that air of being a good likeness which is so unmistakable when you haven't seen the original, represented a woman with abundant bright hair, untroubled shallow baby-blue eyes, and matchless placidity. It was this air of placidity, more than anything else, which