

help their allies chiefly with money and ammunition; and such assistance, while it might be decisive, would not count strongly as compared to the human sacrifices contributed by even the minor European nations. The effectiveness of the moderating American influence would depend chiefly upon the extent to which the several Powers were loyally seeking a just settlement; and if they did really want to treat their allies and even their victims with fair consideration, the American judgment as to the justice of any proposed redistribution of territory would count for as much in case it were that of a neutral as in case it were that of a belligerent. A nation can hardly participate effectively in so vast a conflict without paying a price and entering into engagements which make extremely difficult a genuinely disinterested attitude towards the problems of the settlement. It will be well for the world to keep one great Power disinterested. The United States ought to be that Power.

## The Higher Imperialism

**W**HEN the Socialists in the belligerent countries voted for the war budgets and took their seats in the war cabinets, their whole attitude towards war underwent a fundamental change. It is true that in Germany and elsewhere the Socialists berated the capitalists and militarists for bringing on the conflict, but having made this protest, they acted exactly as did everyone else. They excused themselves on the ground that the war was defensive. But the Kaiser and the Czar and the President of the French Republic all made the same excuse. It was not that the Socialists did not have power to put obstacles in the way of their governments. They did not have the will. They were forced into a painful position, where their love of country struggled against their adherence to the proletariat of the world. Despite themselves they were moved by idealistic considerations, which according to their theory should have had no weight.

For according to socialist doctrine the great events of the world are determined by economic factors. The idealists may speak of national honor and national duty, of the inviolability of treaties and the sacred rights of small nations, but the cause of all wars is really to be traced to the clash of economic motives. If we are to establish peace, we must found it on the customary reactions of selfish men, who want things and are willing to fight for them. Peace must be a peace between men as they are. It will not come by preaching, nor by nations surrendering their ambitions. It will not come through non-resistance, through the submission of the meek to the overbearing. It will

not come through the nations joyously disarming as the light of reason breaks through the clouds. Reason is not so simple nor so unrelated a thing, for the material things that each nation wants, and the means by which the nation gets them, seem to the nation preeminently just and reasonable. However pompous the superstructure of ethics and ideals, the solid foundation of war, as of other social developments, is economic. So long as nations, or at all events their ruling groups, have conflicting economic interests, war is inevitable.

According to the Socialist, therefore, war and capitalism were inseparable. War must continue so long as the wage-system continued. The argument was simple. The great owners of capital, earning more than they could consume or profitably invest in home industries, were compelled to send their surplus to colonies and dependencies, where a new profit could be made. With the rapid increase of capital, however, the competition between the industrial nations for the possession of these agricultural dependencies became keener. Such competition meant war. As capitalism approached its climax wars were bound to become more frequent, destructive and violent.

If this theory had been true it would have followed that the interests of capital would make for war and the interests of labor would make for peace. The day laborer, with no money in the bank, would not be interested in capital investments in Morocco, Manchuria or Asia Minor. He would have no national interests whatever. But, as we may read in the admirable book on "Socialists and the War," by William English Walling, a few Socialists have for some time begun to recognize that wage-earners do have special national interests and that these interests may be directly opposed to the interests of wage-earners in an adjoining country. If Serbia is completely shut off from the sea, her wage-earners suffer as acutely as do her peasants. If Switzerland is surrounded by a wall of hostile tariffs, if Holland and England are deprived of their colonies, the loss is felt not only by great capitalists but by the man who works with a trowel or a lathe. The ultimate interests of German and British wage-earners are identical, but if their immediate interests conflict, there will grow up a spirit of nationalism in both countries, and wage-earners will clamor for a national policy which may lead to war.

This seems to shut a door that leads to peace. But in shutting this door the newer Socialist thought has opened another. It assumes that the capitalists themselves are increasingly likely to profit by peace, to desire peace and to achieve peace. According to the German Socialist, Karl Kautsky, we are approaching a new stage in the industrial

development of the world. At first capitalists exploited the resources of their own country. Then they competed nationally for the exploitation of colonies and dependencies, and this policy led to imperialism and war. Now they are beginning to unite for the joint exploitation of all backward lands. Competitive imperialism is making way for imperialism by combination, just as competitive industry gave way to the trust. English, French, German and Belgian capitalists will unite to exploit dependencies, will have joint spheres of influence, and the result will be peace with profits. Imperialism in the old sense will die out, and its place will be taken by a pacific super-imperialism, a higher imperialism.

What this theory actually means is that the normal development of industry and finance will automatically bring about international peace, and that socialism and even democracy are quite unessential to that end. Socialists may cry for peace, but they might as well cry for free air. But the theory concedes too much and goes too far. It is tainted with the same ultra-rationalistic spirit as is the earlier socialist theory, from which it is a reaction. War is not fought for economic motives alone, although these are important. Serbia would have been less vindictive had Austria conceded her an outlet for her trade, but in any case Serbia would not willingly be ruled by Austria, nor Bulgaria by Greece. Racial pride, religious prejudice, ancient traditions of all sorts still divide nations irrespective of economic interest. You cannot reduce a nation to a single unit thinking only in economic terms.

Moreover, even on the purely economic side there are infinite chances for war in the distribution of the profits of joint enterprises among the capitalists of the various nations. We all know how "gentlemen's agreements" are broken as soon as it is profitable for the gentlemen to break them, and we cannot wholly trust irresponsible magnates, whether industrial or political, to be even intelligently selfish. Moreover, in the present state of the world the higher imperialism is a policy fraught with the very dangers and difficulties which it seeks to evade. If the capitalists of Europe were determined to exploit South America under a joint European control, the decision might directly lead to war. There are too many vested national interests in colonies, dependencies and spheres of influence to make internationalization of investment an immediate specific against war.

But in this matter of the higher imperialism we are less concerned to know how false than how true it is. It is a thing to be desired if it circumscribes war, even though it does not end war, if it tends towards peace, even though it does not by itself alone assure peace. We believe that this

present war is not unlikely to end in a combination of great nations with enormous capital, willing to enter upon foreign investments jointly. The great capitalists, who influence if they do not rule our modern industrial nations, will often discover that it is cheaper to divide than to fight. It will be better to have twenty per cent of a Chinese loan without going to war than thirty per cent—or nothing at all—after a war. They will strive for the peace of "understanding"—the peace of give and take.

If the big speculators can thus merge their interests and deal across national boundaries, the little investors who have less to gain and more to lose by war will be even more pacific. Farmers and wage-earners have a still more attenuated interest in war, and a still more obvious interest in peace. Once great liens of peace are established, moreover, many of the incitements to war will of themselves disappear. Newspapers, universities and churches may develop an increasing distaste for international murder, and jingoism may tend to drop quietly out of style. Armaments will not pay if they are not to be put to use, and they may be cautiously lessened by means of international haggling.

In the end, however, any internationalization of investment will be only a single step in the direction of peace. There are many other steps to be taken. Education, commerce, the development of an international morality, the creation of machinery for dealing with international disputes, are all essential to the evolution of peace. Industrial and political democracy are above all necessary. Men must be given a full life and a real stake in the wealth that peace provides, and they who bear the burdens of war must actually determine the national policies which make for war or peace.

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# Opportunity for Greece

PERHAPS there is no better evidence of the extent of the great war than the fashion in which the remotest periods of Greek history are being brought to mind by incidents which fill the present daily newspapers. Thus it is that in the Aegean the problem, as old as the Persian wars, of the Greek colonists of Asia Minor has become the problem of the statesmen who now rule in Athens.

To-day there is offered to Greece the chance to resume the work of forgotten centuries on the sites of Ephesus and Miletus. The kingdom of Lydia lies within the grasp of King Constantine, as Adrianople and Thrace lie within the reach of Ferdinand of Bulgaria, if only Greece could make up her mind to join the Allied camp, to send her armies to aid in expelling the Turk from Byzantium and ending the empire of the Osmanli in Europe.

Briefly the situation as it affects Greece—and at the moment the key to Balkans and the Near East is found in Athens—is this: the whole Balkan problem arises from the seizure by Greece, Rumania and Servia of territories inhabited by Bulgars and included in the Bulgarian sphere as delimited by the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty before the first Balkan war or the various agreements preceding the second Balkan war. Until the Treaty of Bucharest is revised, Bulgaria remains a menace to those Balkan states desirous of joining the Allies, and the Treaty of Bucharest cannot be amended unless Greece consents to sacrifice territory won in her recent war.

Several months ago there was made to Venizelos, the great Greek statesman, a proposition which he accepted. It amounted to a pledge on the part of Russia, Great Britain and France, that if Greece would send an army to the Dardanelles to aid the Allied fleet and consent to cede to Bulgaria the region between the Mesta and the Struma, with the port of Kavala, Greece should have Smyrna and the Aegean shore of the Turkish empire from Lesbos to Samos.

On behalf of Greece Venizelos promptly accepted the offer, his sovereign King Constantine agreeing to the sacrifice. But when the Allied fleet was repulsed with the loss of three battleships in the straits the king repudiated the bargain. He did more, he denied that he had ever consented to the cession, and there was left to Venizelos nothing but resignation.

The territory that Bulgaria demanded was not of any great value to Greece. As the best tobacco-raising region in Europe it was bound to be use-

ful in producing revenue. Kavala and a few towns on the coast are Greek, but inland the people are Turk and Bulgar. While Greece occupies this region the natural outlet of Sofia and indeed of all western Bulgaria is blocked, and the Bulgars are without their "window on the sea"—the only window that could be easily used by them.

Before the second Balkan war Venizelos had agreed that the Bulgarians should have Kavala. His decision was wise but unpopular; it might have proved his political ruin had not the Bulgarian attack upon Servia and Greece abolished the undertaking and left Greece free to take this territory. But in taking it Greece annexed a permanent quarrel with the Bulgarians, for she deprived them of coast land essential to their economic development. From the Treaty of Bucharest to the present moment the Bulgarians have frankly asserted their determination to have Kavala and its hinterland. This has been the *sine qua non* of Bulgarian acceptance of Allied wishes in the Balkans.

Venizelos perceived from the outset that for all time the Kavala question would be a peril for Greece. In taking Salonica Greece had acquired the real prize of the Near East. By retiring to the Struma she would gain a natural frontier, easily defensible, and abolish a peril as real as the Alsace-Lorraine question has proved for German diplomacy for more than forty years. He perceived also that to possess Smyrna and the hinterland, the ancient Lydia, would be for Greece the beginning of real greatness. A territory as large as the Greece of 1912, with a population as large as that of the nation before the first Balkan war, was to be had immediately. In the inevitable decay of Osmanli power in Asia Greece might hope to regain much of the ancient territory of the Byzantine Empire.

For King Constantine the change in policy was determined first by the Allied disaster, second by the intervention of his wife, the sister of the German Emperor. His own sympathies had been always German, those of his people French. But if France had served Greek ends for a century, if Great Britain had given Greece moral support and territorial expansion, he had for his German brother-in-law the argument that at the critical moment after the Treaty of Bucharest, when Austria and Russia had clamored for a revision of the treaty, it was the message of the Kaiser to him that had settled the question as to whether the treaty should be definitive.

Patently Constantine wavered. Unmistakably he