

of the crews, and this custom gradually crystallized into a tenet of international law.

But submarines are different. "Our poor submarines," von Jagow called them. It is not ridiculous to call them "poor" submarines. They are brittle shells full of machinery. Suppose one comes up—as von Weddigen is believed by Germans to have done—to halt a Swedish ship. He fires his little gun; it halts. Suddenly, without warning, a concealed gun is fired from the supposed Swede; a shell hits the submarine; and down she goes, with all on board, like lead. In the old days, a single shot fired like that at a cruiser would have done her little harm, would certainly not have sunk her; and the chances are that those who fired the shot would be swinging soon at the yard arm.

Under present conditions, if merchant ships receive orders to resist submarines by force, or if auxiliary cruisers disguise themselves as merchantmen, then submarines will surely attack without warning, international law or no international law,

for that is human nature. But I personally believe that within a few years a type of submarine will be constructed which will be as safe from attack by merchantmen as a cruiser is. We shall have in all likelihood submarine dreadnoughts of five thousand or ten thousand tons, which no single shot could possibly sink.

In conclusion, I do not believe there is more than the barest chance that Germany can seriously interfere with Great Britain's control of the sea, but Tirpitz at least believes that this chance is Germany's best chance to win the war; and Tirpitz is a great political power. Therefore Germany will not give up her submarine war, and she will continue to torpedo British merchantmen without warning—whether Americans are on board or not—unless England agrees that neither her merchant ships nor her auxiliaries disguised as merchant ships shall offer any resistance save the solitary one of flight.

GERALD MORGAN.

A COMMUNICATION

"A New Kind of War"

SIR: Having been cut off from newspapers for some weeks I have been unable to deal with Professor Usher's criticism in your issue of August 7th of some proposals made by myself in the preceding issue.

In order to render the discussion intelligible it is necessary to recall the proposal. It was this:

That as an alternative to joining the Allies in their military operations against Germany, America should settle her present blockade and contraband dispute with England by offering to coöperate with her to control overseas trade for the express purpose of preventing Germany securing supplies during the period of military operations, and so of creating something wherewith to bargain, and some means of coercion other than military power, even after the military operations were brought to an end. Out of the arrangements made between the enemies of Germany—among whom in this hypothesis America would in an economic sense be included—for dealing with the problem of supplies in wartime might grow international machinery for dealing "not merely with matters of exports and imports, with trade between them, but with financial arrangements as well—with exchange and credit difficulties, loans, censorship of mails and all the thorny problems that have arisen during the war. From these matters the international body might perhaps proceed to deal with such problems as the disposal of German property—interned ships, businesses of various kinds, royalties on patents, bank balances and so forth—and, it may be, more remote arrangements as to the future control of German action in the world: tariff arrangements; the conditions upon which Germany should at the peace be once more admitted to the community of nations, whether or

equal terms or not; whether the most efficient means of exacting some indemnification for damage done might not be by sequestration of German property throughout the world and possibly some surtax by tariff, ship and mail dues, all of course subject to due legal judgment of an international court. In short, there would be in the bodies so created, the beginnings of the world organization of our common resources, social, economical and political, for the purpose of dealing with a recalcitrant member of international society by other than purely military means—a starting point whence international law might be made a reality, a code, that is, not merely expressing the general interest but sanctioning processes which furnish means of enforcing respect for it."

To this proposal Professor Usher objects:

Under this specious guise of an international council controlling the overseas trade of the world with all countries except Germany, Mr. Angell proposes to strip England of her control of the seas. . . . In return for such cession of England's present authority he urges no *quid pro quo* whatever, and does not even discuss the necessity of granting one to secure the cessation itself. . . . But does not this scheme require England to cede to others that very control of the seas which she regards as the foundation of her national independence? Is it not this the control at which the German fleet is aimed and which every effort of England has been made to insure beyond peradventure? Must not its loss seem to Englishmen the very greatest possible blow (short of invasion) which a crushing defeat of the Allies by Germany might deal them? Moreover, is not this arbitrary exercise of authority by England, of which Mr. Angell writes, the very right which the English are supremely anxious to

preserve? How, too, can it really be transferred to others while the English fleet outnumbered the fleets of its allies and all neutrals combined?

I cannot believe that such a council would do more than . . . reveal in all their nakedness the fundamental difficulties which now hold nations apart. These lie in the fact that England does have control of the seas and that all other nations have something to gain from taking it away from her, and *per contra* that England has everything to lose by allowing them to do it; that nearly all neutral states, the United States in particular, are dependent upon the English merchant marine, English exchange, English insurance, for economic contact with three-fourths of the globe; that the geologic contour of the European coast, the ocean currents, and the position of the British Isles compel the commerce of the world with northern Europe to pass through the English Channel which England's harbors, for the same geologic reasons, control."

One rubs one's eyes.

Here are Great Britain and her allies, by their own repeated avowal, in an all but desperate position. They have again and again declared that their very existence is threatened; they are at this moment straining every nerve to secure the help of even minor Balkan states, not a few military critics declaring that the outcome of the war will depend upon the action of those states. However that may be, however slim the chance, that is, that Germany is likely to overcome the Western Allies, there is no visible prospect of their achieving what we have so often been told is the real object of the war: such a conquest of Germany as to reduce her military power to impotence and make it impossible for her ambitions ever again to disturb the world. If that, or anything resembling it, is ever to be achieved by the means that the Allies are now employing, it will mean a long drain upon resources that are already strained—as the present very serious credit difficulties of Great Britain show—resources which, without the United States to draw upon, would be obviously unequal to the task.

The proposal under discussion is that at this very critical juncture the United States should intervene and say to Great Britain: In order to secure a more effective coöperation of the world against a common menace, we will not only sacrifice what we believe to be our rights to very valuable trade with neutrals and with Germany, which, if insisted upon, would greatly add to the difficulty of your task; but we will also make arrangements concerning our trade and finance in the future which may render possible what your unaided efforts seem unlikely to accomplish, namely, the removal of a menace which you say threatens your existence. Such coöperation on our part involves, in fact, placing our national resources at your disposal for your present purpose and may involve on America's part great sacrifices of trade and profit over very long periods; this sacrifice will be obviously a valuable, possibly a vital contribution to the achievement of your ultimate purpose, which from the first you have declared to be essential to your continued national existence.

And this, says Professor Usher, is no service at all on America's part, "no *quid pro quo* whatever"!

In submitting my proposal I made an assumption which I believe most Englishmen would make, namely, that "control of the sea" is something which England exercises, not for the purpose of imposing her domination, political or commercial, upon the world, but for securing England's safety (which they believe in the present circumstances involves the defeat of Germany) and the vindication of what Mr. Asquith has called "the public right of Europe." If the civilized world will make common cause with her in those objects, associating itself with her for the purpose of rendering more effective that isolation of Germany she is attempting to achieve by her sea power; and, if the necessity of defeating Prussian military aggression should demand it, for the purpose also of completing and prolonging that isolation to a degree and in a way which her unaided sea domination could never do, why, in the name of all the professions with which she entered this war, should England object? Professor Usher seems to write as though the plan involved some surrender of England's power to her enemies; but it means increasing that power over her enemies by the addition of an economic ally and the prolongation into the *post bellum* period, by the consent of her allies, of blockade and contraband arrangements. What Professor Usher suggests is that when virtually the whole non-German world is prepared to tax its resources for the purpose of waging more effectively a war against a common enemy, England will stand out for controlling the employment of that instrument, not for the common purpose, but for her own advantage as against that of her allies. I do not believe that she could if she would, or would if she could. For, while it is true that England's allies and the United States may be dependent upon her in the way Professor Usher suggests, it is also true that England is very much dependent financially and industrially just at present upon the United States—a circumstance which Professor Usher's survey of the factors does not include. When he tells us that international coöperation of this kind is impossible because England would be in a position to defy the decision of her partners by virtue of her preponderant sea power, he surely overlooks the fact that those partners, notably the United States, have the disposal of things—ammunition, food, supplies, money—essential to rendering even sea power effective. The real situation is one of the interdependence with the balance as between England and the United States rather remarkably just now against Great Britain.

Professor Usher's criticism moreover seems to overlook the fact that if America joins the Allies in the ordinary way all the arrangements I have indicated will go into effect automatically during the period of the war. America in a state of war will take her own precautions to see that supplies, whether of cotton or of anything else do not reach Germany; this country will also presumably enter into some sort of consultation with her allies as to the most effective form of her coöperation in the war that they would be waging in common: whether for instance her energies should go mainly into the furnishing of supplies, ammunition, money, etc. This country would have to decide what proportion of the output of munitions and supplies would be needed for her own military purposes, and that would involve the control of exports. Obviously there can be no real and effective division of labor be-

tween the Allies in these circumstances without consultation and agreement as to such matters, and to others like the furnishing of supplies to neutrals. Would England still insist that her allies had no part in controlling those arrangements, and that such control must remain a prerogative of her absolute dictation secured through sea power? In short, would not the mere fact of America's joining the Allies bring about just those international arrangements concerning the destination of American supplies, etc., which in effect mean the internationalization of sea control?

What my suggestion amounted to was this: that since internationalization of sea control would be inevitable during the period of the war anyhow, if America became one of the combatants, this country could secure England's coöperation in a plan which may give the nations as a whole a better instrument for the restraint of a recalcitrant member than military force, exercised as it has been in the past, seems to be.

England's coöperation therein would in no wise weaken

British sea power as a defensive instrument, for a condition of its internationalization would be the coöperation of all of those who shared its control in British defence. The world as a whole under such an arrangement would stand for British integrity as much as it would stand for Belgian, and if the plan is workable at all British security would gain and not lose.

What Professor Usher's objection comes to is that England desires to retain her control of the seas, not as a defensive instrument, but as one for securing special advantage over other nations. To which I would reply that it cannot in practice be so used; and that if it could, and England does so attempt to use it to the disadvantage of others, she is destined one day to occupy the position that Germany does to-day. Rather than that, I believe that Englishmen as a whole would, if the facts were clear, infinitely prefer some such international arrangement as the one I have indicated.

NORMAN ANGELL.

NEW YORK CITY.

CORRESPONDENCE

A Better Way of Representation

SIR: I think that your readers will be interested in the news that for the first time in the United States or Canada a public body is to be elected by proportional representation. Ashtabula, Ohio, adopted the proportional method for the election of its council of seven members on August 10th.

The Hare system of proportional representation has been successfully in use for a number of years in Tasmania and South Africa. In Tasmania it elects the Provincial Assembly, in South Africa the Senate of the Union and the councils of cities in the Transvaal. The same system is prescribed also by the Home Rule Act for the Senate and some thirty-one members of the House to be established in Ireland. A system essentially the same has long been used for the election of the Senate of Denmark. Other systems of proportional representation are used with satisfaction for parliamentary or municipal elections, or both, in a number of other countries, including Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, and some of the states of Germany.

Under this system the majority of the seats in the council are sure to be won by a majority of the voters of the city, and yet no minority that can poll approximately a seventh of the votes—supposing there are seven seats—will fail to win one seat. The experience of the several countries where proportional representation is in use shows that true representation of the various interests and opinions of the community is necessary, not only in the interests of justice, but in those of harmony and stability. The first introduction of the system in Switzerland, indeed, was due to the breaking out of civil strife there on account of the failure of the old majority system to give a large group of the voters their fair share of representatives.

Monsieur L. Dupriez, Professor of Comparative Constitutional Law in the University of Louvain, who is temporarily a member of the faculty of Harvard, writes:

The first and indispensable condition of the good organization of the government of a city is "to insure before all things a constant and internal control in municipal commissions by bringing into them men of diverse origin and tendencies." I believe that a commission or municipal council elected exclusively on the principle of plurality or majority cannot constitute a good city government. Such a commission or council will understand, protect, and favor only the interests, desires, and points of view of the group that elected it. It will neglect, or even perhaps oppose, the interests, desires, and aspirations of the beaten minorities. Besides, in such an assembly of associated friends the absence of all control will permit every abuse to develop. These dangers and disadvantages will be found not only if the municipal elections are carried out and dominated by the national parties, but also if they are fought out between groups constituted on lines purely municipal.

But if municipal commissions and councils are composed of men nominated by diverse groups, which represent diverse ideas and points of view and which defend interests that are different or even opposed, each of the members will exercise an effective and vigilant control over the others.

Those who want to see the way opened for the introduction of the proportional system in New York when public opinion is ripe for it should exert their influence at once on the Committee on Suffrage of the Constitutional Convention. It was to that committee that the proposed amendment making the proportional system constitutional was referred. Unless the friends of the cause make their influence felt with the committee at once, I presume the amendment will be tabled—if, indeed, it has not met that fate already.

C. G. HOAG,

American Proportional Representation League, Haverford, Pa.