

and Mr. Bertrand Russell have just taken Holy Orders, converted by the Bishop of London's volume on "The Militarism of Jesus," "which proved so conclusively that our Lord was in favor of Compulsion of Married Men." The Museum is still usefully employed as a depot for military stores, and proposals for reopening the University Library are habitually vetoed. Is the *Cambridge Magazine* a symptom of "the peacefulness of being at war"?

A Luncheon and a Moral

MR. ROOT and Mr. Roosevelt have lunched together, have announced that they have lunched together, have even told us what they talked about. They talked about preparedness. Many people seem in doubt as to whether they really talked about preparedness, but for our part we believe it. Does any one suppose they talked about the Convention of 1912, or the recall of judicial decisions, or woman suffrage, or Mr. Gifford Pinchot's views on conservation, or the necessity for drastic inheritance and income taxes, or the elimination of sweating and tenant farming, or the educational value of the labor union? They talked military preparedness with perhaps some reference to foreign policy.

What we are witnessing is the attempt to form a coalition government in time of great national emergency. This at least is the way the matter looks to those Republicans and Progressives who are preparing to unite. A vigorous foreign policy established by increased armaments has become the paramount issue, beside which all other considerations are for the time being negligible. What internal question, they ask, is even comparable to the need of reassuring American prestige in the world and of organizing American military power?

The man who is elected next November will take office in March, 1917. The war will be over or just drawing to a close, and the administration will have two supreme problems before it: the adjustment of American foreign policy to the situation in Europe, and the reconstruction of American social conditions to meet the revolutionary changes in Europe. However unimportant domestic issues may look at this moment, they will wear a different aspect in the next five years. This is the decisive reason why liberals must remain uncompromisingly critical of the Progressive-Republican coalition.

There is little doubt in our minds that Mr. Roosevelt represents a larger measure of qualification for the task ahead than any other man in public life. His grasp of international affairs is surer, his in-

stinct for organization is better. But he is an extremely impressionable man altogether too likely to take his color from the people he is most intimately associated with. Put him with reformers, and he is aglow with enthusiasm. Surround him with defense leagues, and he will go the militarist one better. Great leader that he is, there are few men so easily led, and the kind of President he would make will depend largely on the kind of people who have access to him. He is capable of standing for the whole formula of conscription-imperialism-and-the-right-of-wealth-to-govern. He is capable of courageous and ingenious assertion of the popular and national need against selfish interests.

It is the business of the Progressives to do something more than nominate Theodore Roosevelt. It is their business to fight for the possession of his soul. If they elect him, they will have to keep on fighting within the coalition. That is why they dare not be hero worshippers believing in Roosevelt at any price. To be sure they will not gain his personal affection if they insist on their own independence. Mr. Roosevelt demands a kind of loyalty which many who admire him will not give. But they are pretty gullible citizens who are so blinded by Mr. Roosevelt's virtue that they cannot remain openly and good-humoredly critical of him.

The Archaic Two-Party System

ORDERLY popular government is no doubt in a measure dependent upon formal constitutional and legal systems. It is also dependent upon the number and character of political parties, and the relation of party organization to social forces. Who has not drawn contrasts between the political cosmos of Anglo-Saxon politics and the political chaos of the states of continental Europe? In the Anglo-Saxon cosmos we find the two-party system, Government and Opposition. The party in power exercises a constructive function while the opposition devotes itself to criticism. The two parties change position and function often enough to prevent the party in power from waxing fat and corrupt, and the opposition from waning into inanity and destructiveness. In the continental chaos, on the other hand, we find a multiplicity of little parties, arranged in semicircle from extreme Right to extreme Left—baffling terms, indicative of relativity and want of principle—and actual government conducted by *blocs* of elements constantly coalescing or drawing apart, with much futile noise and flashing, like April thunder-caps.

In Anglo-Saxondom there are, to be sure, periods when a third party appears. But such a third party

lives only so long as it has a working chance of becoming the second party or the first; and in the event that it succeeds, the dissolution of the old party crowded to third place follows infallibly. The Populist party died not because of evaporation of principles but because of the fatal discouragement of third place. The Progressive party is dying or dead, just because it was forced to third place in the last Congressional elections. Only the Socialist party lives on in insignificance. We can't account for the fact; let us treat it as a freak of nature.

It appears then clearly that the two-party system is founded in right reason and democratic principle. But wait: something seems to depend on what the two parties stand for. Suppose that their principles are diametrically opposed: the one stands for free labor and the other for slavery. How then does the charmed alternation of power and opposition work? With what spirit does the party in power surrender the government to its opponents? With the ugliest and most ominous spirit in the world; with open threats of recourse to civil arms. Our own history shows where such a partisan struggle ends. Suppose that at some future time the two great parties, in England or the United States, are the Labor party and the Capital party. No one need doubt that the strife between them would take the form of war without quarter. The one in possession of the government would yield only after exhausting all the resources of force and fraud.

A two-party system is compatible with orderly and efficient government only when the two parties share a large common capital of principle, or to put it baldly, stand for practically the same things. And this condition obtains only where one class is fully dominant in society, and the two parties merely represent different methods of advancing the interest of the class, or where society is essentially homogeneous. For a century and more the middle class has been dominant in British life—a consequence of England's position as mistress of the seas and workshop of the world. Both great parties have aimed at the same object, to advance British business interests at home and abroad. To the outsider not interested in personalities, there is little visible difference between the country saved under the one party or lost under the other. In the United States, except for the period of the slavery struggle, partisan differences have been mostly fictitious. There is a very narrow margin of practical fact between Democratic free trade and Republican protection, between Republican extravagance and Democratic retrenchment. Filling the offices has for years been the chief object of political strivings.

But homogeneity and undisputed class control are transitory phases in national development. In England labor has already broken with the middle-class

politics that pretended to represent it. Land reform is likely to produce another political force not easy to compromise with tradition. In the United States neither the labor nor the agrarian interest is anywhere near organized self-consciousness. The laborers and the farmers are fairly distributed between the two great parties, and their particular claims are stilled by sops. The farmers get protective duties against the importation of farm products of which we have an excess, widely distributed literature on cut-worms and live-stock diseases, etc. The laborers get concessions, chiefly illusory, like the labor clause of the Clayton act, and the Tannery bill throwing scientific management out of government arsenals. But at almost any time something may occur to shock the farmers or the laborers into political self-consciousness. We may recall the signs of agrarian factionalism in the opposition to the Payne-Aldrich tariff and Canadian reciprocity. We shall see more of them as we advance to the stage of a food-importing country. As for labor, no one knows when a reactionary judicial decision, or an unfortunate arbitration in such a matter as a railway strike, will create a labor party here, as the Taff Vale decision created one in England.

Economic evolution has already progressed far beyond the homogeneous state in which we developed our political traditions, and there is every indication that the trend toward social heterogeneity is strengthening. We cannot confine governmental activity to the field of common interest; we must accept the necessity of compromise. If we had each interest represented in Congress and the legislatures by a party under the discipline of its own leaders, we should have the machinery for effecting compromises, of bringing conflicting forces to an equilibrium. If, for example, labor were directly and adequately represented in the New York legislature to-day, it would not necessarily confine itself to an attempt to kill the State Police bill. It could take into consideration the possibility of accepting a state police, in exchange for concessions of superior value. If the labor representatives in Congress were independently organized, and as numerous as they ought to be in view of the magnitude of the interests they have to defend, they would not necessarily seek to exclude scientific management from government works, but could consider under what regulations this new force might be utilized for the benefit of labor. The function of class representatives attached to the fringe of a traditional political party is essentially negative. They can interfere with the enactment of bad measures, but they have little power to secure the enactment of good ones. Unionists in Congress can help to keep conditions as they are; but labor cannot be content with conditions as they are. It may be very well for the