

time there are emerging at least the outlines of order and system. Before the ashes were cold in December, the rebuilding of Hopewell began. Many of the wild sins of young democracy died in that fire, and the wise men of the town saw in it the psychological moment for reorganization. Before the fire every man was out for himself; now a government for all by all is taking shape.

Men think and act in a big way in that new town; small sums of money do not interest them. We were surprised that even the colored people scorned a fee, and yet to get the better of your neighbor in a land deal did not seem out of place. The food in the restaurants is reasonable in price, and if anybody can be induced to give you lodging, the rooms are cheap. Everyone seems too busy trying to make big money to bother about a few cents' profit here and there. They make little of shooting, and one of the reasons for accidents in the plant is that there is a feeling among the workmen that it is showing cowardice to take too many precautions against fire and fumes. Everyone appears to be indifferent to discomforts and to have cast off the manners of established communities. They rejoice

in activity and energy and the roughness that goes with it.

It will take Hopewell years to reach the degree of efficient city management that the duPont villages were endowed with at the outset, and after she has reached it she will have to spend a large part of her time and energy trying not to slip back. On the other hand, in the model villages there is a threat of danger. Nothing can overwhelm Hopewell with complete disaster, for her citizens hold their fate, whatever it is, largely in their own hands, and no matter what happens they can pick themselves up and try again. But suppose discord breaks out in Village A or Village B; suppose there should be a strike; all those prosperous families could be turned out on the hillside, the schools closed, the very streets barred, for all belongs to the company and there are well trained police to guard the properties. As long as wages are high and work is abundant all goes well, but some day the war will be over, and then it may be that Village A and Village B will turn to Hopewell for the strength and resourcefulness that come from fighting one's own battles and making one's own blunders.

MABEL HYDE KITTREDGE.

## Functions of Army and Navy

**I**N a preceding article the author considered the advantages, from the standpoint of administrative efficiency and economy, which would follow from a consolidation of the Army and Navy Departments. Independently of this proposition, it is proposed to discuss in this article certain other changes in the present distribution of administrative functions, which are urgently needed if our military system is to be made what it should be.

The first of these needed changes is that the entire responsibility for the fortification and defense of our outlying possessions should be transferred from the War Department, where it now is vested, to the Navy Department; and that the marine corps should be enlarged sufficiently to enable it to assume the additional work that would thereby be thrown upon it.

The present arrangement is manifestly anomalous, uneconomical and inefficient. The problem of the defense of our detached territories, if not primarily a naval one, is certainly one requiring a large coöperation on the part of that service. Whatever the part played by land fortifications, it is certain that any general scheme of defense will involve the use of mine fields, torpedo stations, and probably torpedo boats, destroyers, submarines, sea planes

and the like. To the extent that land fortifications are employed use must be made of vessels in the transport of troops, munitions and supplies of their current upkeep, and, during time of war, of armed vessels as convoys. Now in the navy we have an organization completely prepared for performing this work both in times of peace and times of war. In the marine corps the navy also has a force which if enlarged could easily take over the manning of the land fortifications. Should war threaten or break out the entire vessel resources of the nation would be under a unified instead of a divided direction. In solving the technical problem of the character of land fortifications and in their construction, use should of course be made of the services of the engineer corps of the army.

The effecting of this transfer would benefit both departments. The navy would be given a larger field for the training of officers and men in matters of navigation. Young officers could serve their apprenticeship in the operation of transport and other unarmed vessels before being placed in charge of vessels of war. Relieved of the care of our outlying possessions, in which are included the Panama Canal and possibly Alaska, the military forces of the country could be more largely concentrated in the United

States, where they could engage in manoeuvres involving the participation of large bodies of men, and thus gain an experience in operations similar to those that they would have to undertake were they engaged in a war of any magnitude. Finally, a great economy could be secured by the consolidation of the army and navy posts which now exist side by side, as it were, in many of our insular dependencies.

Should this suggestion that the military defense of our insular dependencies be entrusted wholly to the Navy Department be adopted, the further question would be raised whether it would not be advisable that the manning and operation of all our coast defenses should, in like manner, be entrusted to that department. The work of maintaining and operating these defenses, though conducted in great part on land, approaches more nearly to the character of operations on war ships than it does to that of an army in the field. The officers and men employed have fixed stations; their work is primarily that of the care and operation of big guns; they do not take part in great movements; they have none of the problems of transportation and supply, which are so important where field operations are involved.

The surrender of this service on the part of the army, like the surrender of responsibility for the protection of our insular dependencies, would mean relief from a duty which now immobilizes to a large extent the forces at its disposal. The administrative problems also would be simplified and the army would be able to concentrate its attention more largely upon its primary function of maintaining a force capable of taking the field and conducting operations upon a large scale.

In line with these suggestions is the former one that the marine corps be converted into a body of men prepared to act at any moment as an expeditionary force. One of the lessons of the present war would seem to be the desirability of the possession by every country of a corps fully prepared to engage in a foreign expedition. The assembling, equipping, and transporting of a corps for work of this kind presents problems of organization and operation of quite a special character. The fact that such an expedition must, with rare exceptions, be transported by water, and must operate in close coöperation with the navy is the chief reason why such a body should be under the control of the Navy rather than of the War Department. The navy, moreover, with its outlying naval stations, possesses the points from which such an expedition could be launched and subsequently supported.

Adoption of this proposal is not dependent upon the adoption of either of the two proposals immediately preceding. It could be put into force even should the decision be reached not to transfer to the Navy Department the responsibility for the pro-

tection of our insular dependencies and our harbors and sea coasts. All these proposals, however, have this important feature in common. They look to conferring on the Navy Department primary responsibility in respect to the conduct of military operations in foreign lands and water and the protection of our shores from invasion; and on the War Department the primary function of organization and operation of armies proper in the field.

The foregoing proposals have concerned chiefly the fundamental problems of the manner in which the various operations involved in meeting the single function of national defense should be distributed among services under one or two departments. There remain many other features of organization which require drastic action if economy and full military efficiency are to be secured. Among the most important of these is the relieving of both the War and Navy Departments of the purely civil duties with which they are now burdened.

A survey of the activities of these departments shows that they now have the administration of the following services which are of a strictly non-military character. The War Department has charge of the great work of river and harbor improvements, the conduct of the Great Lake Survey, and the supervision of our insular dependencies. The Navy Department has under its jurisdiction the Hydrographic Office and the Naval Observatory. The writer had occasion, a few years ago, as a member of the President's Commission on Economy and Efficiency, to make a detailed study of all the activities of the federal government and the provision made for their performance. The result of this study was to convince him that a radical redistribution should be made of services among the several departments. This redistribution should mark out distinct fields of activities for the several departments and assign to each all the services falling within its respective field. The War and Navy Departments should be relieved of civil services and confined to their purely military and naval duties.

In the Coast and Geodetic Survey the government possesses an excellently organized service for the prosecution of marine surveys and the collection and publication of hydrographic data. There is absolutely no reason why the War and Navy Departments should each possess a service for conducting operations in the field. Not one argument can be adduced why the work of prosecuting the survey of the Great Lakes, the preparation of charts of their waters, or why the collection and publication of hydrographic data regarding them should not be entrusted to this civil service. The same is true in respect to the survey and hydrographic work done by the Hydrographic Office of the Navy Depart-

ment. In the National Museum, with its subordinate services, the Smithsonian Institute, the Bureau of American Ethnology and the Astro-Physical observatory, the government has the nucleus of a Department of Science. No reason can be alleged why this organization should not be entrusted with the administration of the National Observatory. When our insular dependencies were under military administration there was justification for the establishment in the War Department of a Bureau of Insular Affairs to have general charge of matters affecting their government. Now that these islands are under a purely civil administration no reason remains for the continued maintenance of this bureau. The Interior Department has general supervision over the conduct of affairs in the territories, and to it should be entrusted a like supervision over affairs in the dependencies in so far as any supervision is required.

As long as the government had entered the field of public works to only a slight extent there was justification for entrusting work of this character to the engineer corps of the army. Now that the government is engaged upon public works of great magnitude and variety, the construction and operation of an inter-ocean canal, the building of railways in Alaska, the construction and maintenance of irrigation and reclamation projects upon a large scale, the promotion of the building of good roads, the time has come when provision should be made for a Department of Public Works to have charge of these allied activities.

This transfer of civil duties to civil departments, and the consolidation of services performing the same classes of work, are required in the interests of efficiency and economy. From the standpoint of the present study, the important point is that such a redistribution of duties would add greatly to the efficiency of the departments.

We have left to the last reference to one reform which is of the utmost importance and urgency; that is, the need for the abolition of army posts, navy yards and other stations which are no longer required by the two departments. It is not our intention to dilate upon the necessity for taking this step. It is generally agreed that many posts and stations are now being maintained that not only contribute nothing to the military preparedness of the country but constitute a serious obstacle in the way of such preparedness. It is not merely that the maintenance of these useless posts entails an enormous unnecessary expense, running into millions of dollars annually, but that they prevent that concentration of military forces which is essential for efficiency.

In the foregoing the writer fully realizes that he has been able to touch upon but few of the many questions that are presented in attempting to put the

country upon a better basis for defense. The country feels that it is not now getting anything like an adequate return for the enormous expenditures it is making for military and naval purposes. It is satisfied with the efficiency of its military and naval officers and the bravery of its enlisted men as individuals. It is not satisfied, however, in respect to the character of the organization and the business methods that are employed for their enlistment, training and handling. We have pointed out that the matter of organization constitutes the foundation upon which the whole structure of national defense must rest. Such is its importance that the country might well rest content did the present Congress do nothing more than apply itself to the working out of a satisfactory solution of this fundamental problem.

WILLIAM F. WILLOUGHBY.

## Catherine Herself

**A**FTER a hundred years of discreet suppression, the Russian government has at last broken the seals and published the memoirs of Catherine the Great. The official Russian edition was immediately followed by a German edition, which restored some nine or ten judicious cuts in the Russian version, passages in which the intrepid Catherine rather too frankly discloses the real eugenics of the Romanoff family.

The memoirs were the talk of literary Germany during the year before the war, and Bernard Shaw, who was staying in Hellerau that summer learning to dance, caught the fever also. He went home and presented his "Great Catherine" the same fall. But the public was scandalized and estranged by the levity with which the august Empress was handled. Besides, it seemed like carrying the joke altogether too far when the play implied, as it certainly did, that the Empress, who was no better than she should be, was after all not so funny as the British Ambassador, who was so much better than the circumstances required. In short, the play was sufficiently true to the realities to be highly unflattering to all concerned. In the meantime, it remains the first wave of the Catherine the Great revival to reach the English shore.

Like Marie Bashkirtseff, Catherine as a child was set on being famous. She records that she felt the first stirrings of ambition when she was seven years old. From this age on, she always expected to wear a crown, and the precocious little Mädchen undertook to make up for her lack of good looks by hard study and self-discipline. When at last the proposal of marriage came from St. Petersburg, her parents were half afraid to accept it. Warned