Paris after the disaster of the Franco-Prussian war as one means of giving vitality to French popular political institutions. It is a singular commentary on the limitations of American educational ideas that in spite of the enormous sums dedicated by Americans to education, such a school has not as yet been founded in this country. The lack of it is all the more singular because in the minds of most American educational benefactors our democratic political institutions were the sufficient excuse for making such a generous provision for education. A national school of public administration will be started as soon as Americans seriously begin to prepare for the fulfillment of their own national ideals.

**HAVE** no objection to being cleaned up in reason, but if I had to choose, I had rather be human and dirty than inhuman and clean." Why choose? At what point does cleanliness cease to be human? Perhaps where it adjoins godliness. Yet this can hardly have been the meaning of the venerable Archdeacon Hudson Stuck of Alaska. Nor can his words be reminiscent of the petulant small boy who is told to wash his hands before eating. Let us dig further. "I have always had a sort of dread of trained sociologists, of anthropologists. . . . With their experimental laboratories, their card indexes . . . they are always in danger of evacuating the human personal element out of their work and thinking of men and women in algebraic formulæ. . . . As soon as philanthropy becomes professionalized. . . it no longer evokes gratitude." Evidently the Archdeacon would rather practise personal benevolence than wash the reluctant or keep a card index. So would almost anyone. But is he quite fair to those who choose heroically to do permanent service for the unfortunate rather than enjoy the luxury of private charity? The warfare of science against dirt and disease is no less honorable because it is laborious and plodding. No matter how inhuman a small boy may regard being cleaned, it is sometimes more important to wash him than to win his gratitude.

A NYBODY who owns a book of quotations is tempted, almost as often as he hears a baccalaureate sermon, to quote these words from Charles Lamb: "A puritanical obtuseness of sentiment, a stupid infantile goodness, is creeping among us." Yet to turn off even a passable baccalaureate sermon is so difficult that much is annually forgiven the preachers. On the list of forgivable sins are platitude, routine laments for the good old times, routine sarcasm, routine playfulness, virtue of both the sawdusty and the watery variety. But historical inaccuracy is unforgivable, especially in a col-

lege president. That is why we cannot forgive the Reverend Charles Alexander Raymond, president of Union College, for saying something like this to the graduating class at Vassar: "' Be good, sweet maid, and let who will be clever ' used to be quoted on such occasions as this. Now we say, 'Be clever and let who will be good.'" We challenge the historical accuracy of this statement. The passion for cleverness is nowhere near so devastating as it was about twenty years ago, in the nineties, when ambitious persons tried to write dialogue as smart as Oscar Wilde's, and less ambitious persons tried to write dialogue as smart as Ellen Thorneycroft Fowler's. For one youngster who goes in for cleverness nowadays you will find ten who go in for naturalism, symbolism or vers libre, for liberty or uplift.

THE NEW REPUBLIC regrets that it attributed to Mr. Frank H. Simonds a New York *Tribune* editorial which criticized President Wilson's speech of May 27th at the dinner of the League to Enforce Peace. The editorial was not written by Mr. Simonds, to whom we offer our sincere apologies.

## Sovereign Mexico

THE administration has its own record to thank for the ambiguities and the difficulties which arise from the occupation by an American army of the Mexican border states. The demand for immediate withdrawal is entirely justified on the principles which are supposed to determine the President's Mexican policy. He has been pretending to treat Mexico as a wholly independent sovereign state, which is fully entitled to manage its own affairs without outside interference. The pretense has become absurd. The presence of General Pershing's troops on Mexican soil is manifestly a violation of Mexican sovereignty. They crossed the frontier without the unequivocal written consent of the Mexican government. As long as they remain they constitute a flagrant menace to Mexican liberty. Any nation which valued its own independence would resent their presence just as the First Chief is now doing. Any nation whose sovereignity was still intact would either expel them by force or at least resist to the full extent of its ability the violation of its territory. As it is, Carranza is resentful without daring to resist. The administration continues its illegal violation of Mexican territory without being able to find any sufficient defense for its behavior in its professed principles. The situation is rapidly becoming a stalemate. All the efficient force is on one side and all the apparent right on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED the other. Carranza cannot be expected to break out of the circle, because the abandonment of his principles or the attempt to enforce them would be equally fatal to his government. But President Wilson can break out. He can frankly declare that Mexican sovereignty, instead of being wholly intact, is a legal fiction, which should no longer be allowed to determine the policy of the United States towards Mexico, and consequently of Mexico towards the United States.

That Mexican sovereignty has become not only a fiction but a baleful fiction is written on the face of the record. Its government is unable to perform those essential functions which entitle it to respect and consideration. It is unable to afford even semisecurity to the lives and property of aliens resident in Mexico. It is unable to prevent marauding outlaws from making murderous forays into American territory. If it were not for the European war its egregious failures would have already provoked demands from European governments, injurious to its national integrity. As against the future threat of European intervention it must rely on the United States to protect its supposed independence. It is as incapable of planning and carrying out a healing domestic policy as it is of meeting its foreign obligations. Thus while it is insisting on all the privileges of a sovereign state it is ignoring most of the responsibilities. If it is allowed to continue on this course, the situation in that distracted country is likely to go from bad to worse. Mexico needs outside assistance to an extent which is bound to bring with it outside interference. If President Wilson wishes to make any headway with his Mexican policy he should discard the fiction of Mexican sovereignty, well documented though it be, and should announce without ambiguity that the American army will remain in northern Mexico not only until order is completely restored, but until the continuation of good order is guaranteed by an authoritative and dependable Mexican government.

From the point of view of the administration, there is one serious objection to such a policy. It may well bring about a collision between the American and the Mexican armies; and the President has been anxious to avoid bloodshed and coercion. He is, of course, justified in wishing to avoid bloodshed and coercion and in sacrificing a great deal in order to do so, but what he cannot sacrifice are the objects for which he has been interfering in Mexican affairs. Mexico is a distracted country, in which bloodshed and coercion are the most effective arguments used in domestic controversy. If interference in Mexican affairs is justified in part by the long frontier between the two countries, in part by the necessarily close economic relations between the two countries, in part by the express obligation assumed by the

United States to protect Mexico from European intervention, and in part by the undoubted ability of the American government to help the Mexicans in the work of recuperation, as in our opinion it has been and is, it may be necessary to use the familiar Mexican arguments of bloodshed and coercion, in order to make the interference effective. And unless it is effective how can it be beneficial? Hitherto the interference has not been beneficial precisely because it has not been effective. The President could not avoid interfering, and yet when it came to the point, he shrank from supporting his policy with the kind of arguments which the Mexicans in their present state of mind are ready to understand. He was so anxious to avoid the killing of Mexicans by Americans that he would take no sufficient steps to prevent the killing of Americans by Mexicans. He has been so much opposed to the use of force in Mexico for the benefit of American interests that he was afraid to use it for the benefit of Mexican interests. He has been obliged to use force in Mexico, but he has always done so with a bad conscience. He has never properly appraised his own policy as one which might fail unless he was prepared to enforce it at the proper time and in the proper way.

The President's attempt to preserve the fiction of Mexican sovereignty has been to some extent the by-product of Pan-Americanism. The South American statesmen are the great exponents of a rigid legalistic nationalism, which they have been seeking to impose on the country as the essential principle of Pan-American internationalism. According to this principle all states are equally independent and deserve to be kept equally inviolate, no matter how well or ill they used their independence, and no matter how capable or incapable they were of defending it. Although Mexico was torn by internal dissensions, although her recuperation was scarcely possible as long as her government failed to inspire confidence abroad, although she was as a matter of fact helpless against internal and external enemies, she must still be treated as though her sovereign integrity was flawless and perfect. In so treating her the American government was supposed to be acting according to particularly idealistic standards, which would establish new and precious international precedents.

But if the political experience of the past two years has taught anything it has taught the danger and futility of any such theories of absolute national sovereignty. The South American diplomats have been advocating it as a means of giving small and weak states a secure legal protection against aggressive attack; but it provides no such security either in theory or in fact. International security must be provided by an organization of international force, and the only theory on which such a force can be organized is that of a qualified national sovereignty for both large states and small. If small and weak nations are to be immune from all interference, even though they repudiate their obligations to other nations, large and powerful nations can also claim immunity from interference even though in the exercise of their sovereign discretion they override the rights and interests of their smaller neighbors. A community of absolute sovereigns is a contradiction in terms. So far as they believe themselves to exist, there would be warfare among them, not international government and coöperation. If the smaller nations want the benefit of security, purchased at the expense of their more powerful associates, they must be willing to submit to certain essential minimum standards of good behavior. It is standards of this kind which Mexico has fallen far below. The United States, as the neighborprotector and the honest friend of Mexico, is justified, in the absence of any recognized source of international authority, to interfere in Mexican internal affairs sufficiently to restore to that country some measure of actual domestic independence and of recognition and confidence from other nations.

Mexican sovereignty is not a sacred legal abstraction; it is a living political instrument which must be justified by its fruits. At present it is working badly because it has not the military, economic or moral resources with which to meet its necessary obligations. Because it is working badly it does not deserve to be suppressed; but it has forfeited its right of complete immunity. If it is to do its work better it must have some assistance, and this assistance must be rendered with Mexican consent if possible, but if not, in spite of Mexican opposition. One of the tasks which the Mexican government is unable to accomplish is that of restoring order in the northern states. An American army has occupied territory in these Mexican border states in order to protect American citizens from murderous assault. There they should remain. The northern states are easier to police from the United States than from southern Mexico. The American government should assume this work, and should not withdraw the American troops until the country is pacified and until a similarly efficient Mexican police force can be substituted for them. Now that the troops are in Mexico they should be used partly for police work in that country and partly to bring pressure upon the Mexican government to accept American advice and assistance. Without such advice and assistance Mexico must remain for an indefinite period helpless and distracted, no matter how proudly Carranza flourishes the legal emblem of Mexican sovereignty, and no matter how much South American diplomats would like to have it reverently saluted.

## The Close of the Brandeis Case

HE Brandeis case is closed. The country has been spared humiliation, and the authority of the Court has been immeasurably strengthened. Mr. Brandeis brings with him not only his native gifts, but the renewed confidence of liberal people and humble people throughout the United States. The issue which his nomination represented was one that reached to the depth of American life. It touched the sources of power. It uncovered an aggressive class feeling as threatening to American unity as the attempts of hyphenated politicians. It showed great numbers of well intentioned and respectable men retailing gossip and malicious rumor and losing in the end all sense of fair play and the essentials of decent controversy.

Almost everyone will want to forget all this and let bygones be bygones. For the moment it is better not to forget it, but to look at the situation squarely. Now that liberalism has won the day there are a few things to be said which could not be said while the fight was on. It would have looked as if the supporters of Mr. Brandeis were afraid to meet the attack. They have met it successfully and thwarted it with quiet dignity, and no one can say they have done a thing which the most scrupulous respecter of the Court's tradition can impugn. They have fought in an irritating battle with perfect self-control.

Had Mr. Brandeis's supporters wanted to use the case in all its possibilities they could have developed an agitation of almost unparalleled bitterness. They needed only to pursue the methods of the opposition. If in fighting an appointment of this sort the rich and the powerful hire attorneys, influence newspapers, organize a nation-wide propaganda, and employ elusive slander and insinuation, the counter to it is a blaze of publicity. That means that the Supreme Court is to be in politics with a vengeance. It means that a most dangerous precedent has been established, and that the next time a contested appointment is made we may expect press agents, campaign funds, mass meetings, oratory and political jobbery.

Mr. Brandeis's enemies have done more to drag the Supreme Court into politics than the most extreme radical. They have shown themselves completely obtuse to that restraint with which the American people have always wished to surround their highest tribunal. For the first time to our knowledge an appointment to the Supreme Court has been dealt with through the ordinary methods of agitation. The precedent has been created by the very men to whom the Court is alleged to be sacrosanct, by the very men who are popularly supposed to be the sources of dignity.