

arranged to introduce a uniform bill next fall into each of the New England legislatures. What can the reactionary element among employers devise to dodge interstate coöperation?

The Mexican Tangle

IT may still be possible to avoid war with Mexico. It is even possible that the present exchange of menaces may lead to better relations between the United States and Mexico. The American danger is uniting all factions in Mexico, and this enforced unity may result in the establishment of a more stable government, with which conclusive negotiations could be conducted. This is possible, but it is more possible that conditions on the border will go rapidly from bad to worse until the only solution remaining is war. Our government does not want war; still less does that of Mexico. But the calculations of both governments are confused by a force over which neither has adequate control—the intense popular antipathy to the United States prevailing in a great part of Mexico.

Whether this anti-American feeling is chiefly due to the misbehavior of Americans in Mexico, to mistakes in our policy toward Mexico, or to the machinations of Mexican factional leaders, is for the present an academic question. It exists, and we are forced to shape our policy in recognition of its existence. That we have designs upon part or the whole of the territory of Mexico, or at least upon all the fruitful sources of Mexican wealth, is an opinion which many of the educated Mexicans share with the great mass of the illiterate. So long as our army remains on Mexican soil, the proof of our selfish designs will be held to be absolute, in spite of any explanation our government may make to that of Carranza. If we withdraw, it will not be believed that we have abandoned our designs. On the contrary, it will be believed that we have merely yielded to superior force. We shall be credited with both cowardice and greed. It is the current view in Mexico that our retirement from Vera Cruz and our failure to take vigorous action after the Parral incident were actuated by fear.

Now, the dogma of the cowardly Gringo is obviously one that we can not permit to go unchallenged. This dogma has already cost American lives. Belief in our impotence lies at the bottom of the border raids; it also lies at the bottom of the persistent sniping to which General Pershing's columns were subjected in their southern march. Manifestations of hatred and contempt towards Americans are common enough along the boundary line, and our own nationals are not slow to repay insult with injury. To withdraw the Pershing expedition

under the threats of Carranza and his generals would make a bad situation intolerable. It would multiply outrages on both sides of the line and give a great impetus to the movement, already by no means negligible, for the establishment of permanent American control at least in the northern states of Mexico.

But if it is impossible for us to yield to the Mexican demand for the withdrawal of our troops, it is equally impossible for the Mexican authorities to refrain from making demands for withdrawal. Every Mexican knows that the forces subject to the command of the First Chief are numerically greatly superior to ours, even when reinforced by our entire national guard. Most Mexicans believe that their national forces are superior also in bravery and in military training. On these assumptions, what explanation could be given for a policy of tame submission to American violation of Mexican soil? Weakness or corruption. Carranza might assume an attitude that seemed reasonable to us; immediately Mexico would turn to Obregon; and if Obregon also proved "weak," he would be displaced by Trevino or some other military leader bold enough to pursue his ambitions for political power even through a disastrous war with the United States. At the close of such a war somebody would have to rule at Mexico City. Who, if not the general who led the country even in a hopeless war against the United States?

If then it is incumbent upon us to hold to a strong policy against Mexico, it is equally incumbent upon the Mexican leaders to hold to a strong policy against the United States, and these opposing strong policies may at any time lead to a war that no one in responsible position has really willed.

If war must come we should accept its costs and losses with sufficient resolution, provided that we felt certain that we had exhausted every practicable means for attaining a peaceful solution of the difficulty. Have we really done this? The Mexican intellectual is legalistic by training. In the present crisis, what blurs his vision to our necessity of defending our borders through occupation of Mexican soil is the conviction that under international law we have no right in Mexico without the consent of his government. Has it ever been intimated to the Mexican government that this question of legal right is one that we should be willing to submit to arbitration, and that in case the award was against us, we should accept liability for such reasonable damages as might be assessed? We should still hold our lines in Mexico, and extend them so far as the necessities of border defense might require. We should retire in our own good time, when the taunt of weakness had lost its force. The agreement to arbitrate might very well allay the prevail-

ing anti-American feeling. And with harmonious relations between the governments restored, we might find it worth while to address ourselves seriously to the question whether we can not now contribute to the rehabilitation of Mexican finance and industry, without which the establishment of internal order is impossible. This we shall have to do at all events after the war, if we must make war.

Woodrow Wilson

PRESIDENT WILSON has had his day at St. Louis. His Democratic associates have renominated him with every indication of loyalty and satisfaction. They allowed him his way about the platform and about the proceedings of the convention. The delegates did not entirely agree with Mr. Wilson in the emphasis he wished to place upon the issues of the campaign; but they did not permit their disagreement to become embarrassing. It was his day, and they knew it. They owe their success to him. If they had elected William J. Bryan or Champ Clark to the Presidency in 1912, they would have long since been floundering around in a wilderness of difficulties. The Democracy of to-day is even more deeply indebted to Mr. Wilson than its forebears were indebted to Jefferson and Jackson. The elder statesmen dominated and led the party during a period in which it was far more homogeneous than it is now—far more united in spirit and purpose. The contemporary Democratic party is preserved by no similar bond of class interest and feeling. It is an exclusively political organization whose members are associated for the purpose of getting and keeping control of the government. Its existing vitality is the creation of Mr. Wilson's leadership. The Democrats cannot get along without it. They have no substitute for Mr. Wilson, no alternative to his policy. For the time being they are not merely a Wilson but a Wilsonized Democracy.

Mr. Wilson has not been a great President; he has been a great party leader. His eminence as a party leader is a clue to the policy of his administration and to the larger part of its successes and failures. From the day of his first nomination, his unwavering purpose, his absorbing preoccupation has been the resurrection of the Democratic party as a capable organ of government. In his devotion to his party he has been only following in the footsteps of his party predecessors. Jefferson and Jackson were also great party leaders rather than great Presidents. Or, if you please, they were great party Presidents only in so far as they were great party leaders; and in this respect they offered a sharp contrast to the great Presidents belonging to

the opposite nationalist tradition, Washington, Lincoln and Roosevelt, who always appealed to something more than a partisan idea and aroused something larger than partisan support. Mr. Wilson assumed office at a critical moment in the life of Democracy. The progressive movement had caused a schism among the Republicans. Both the conservatives and the radicals in that party had become more attached to conservative or radical ideas than they were to partisan success. Mr. Wilson was resolved that under his leadership the fellowship of his party should never be similarly shattered, that no effort should be spared to preserve the unity and renew the vitality of the Democracy.

Never for one moment has he allowed this major purpose to be neglected or obscured. In the effort to accomplish it he has been, as he was obliged to be, a thoroughgoing opportunist. He has made many sacrifices and adopted many different and even contradictory expedients. He has at times flourished his convictions with reckless zeal and at others abandoned them in discreet silence; he has at times conciliated opposition at a very high price and at others ridden it down with ruthless determination; he has played painfully safe on some issues and taken long chances on others; he has posed both as the leader of his party and as its humble and faithful mouthpiece. His course has been a striking example of the agile and resourceful selection of the most available road to immediate success.

The most emphatic indication of his success consists in his ability to dispense with the services of William J. Bryan. Four years ago, Mr. Bryan had to be included in the Cabinet because as an outsider and a possible malcontent he was in a position to ruin the administration. To-day the Commoner is innocuous both as an outsider and as a malcontent. American politics has rarely staged a spectacle more ironic and more pathetic than that of Mr. Bryan at St. Louis. He was obliged to march to the beat of martial music behind the triumphal car of Wilson Preparedness, while at the same time continuing to intone in obedience to some inner rhythm his familiar personal pæans to the Prince of Peace.

In no region has Mr. Wilson been more successfully opportunist than in his selection and adaptation of political policies and convictions. He began with a philosophical interpretation of the progressive movement which transformed it into a revival of Jeffersonian Democracy. Back of the New Freedom was the traditional Democratic confidence in free competition among individuals as the most effective means of securing the public welfare—provided only the competition was automatically regulated in the interest of fair play. The prevailing political and economic abuses were traced to per-