

he thinks about the question of armed merchantmen, what would constitute a proper exercise of visit and search, whether he would outlaw the submarine or merely try to limit it.

Behind these difficult points lie still greater matters. If we come to a rupture with Germany, what is to be our policy then? If we entered the war, on what terms should we enter it? What arrangements ought we to make with the Allies; ought we to sign their pact; what ought we to consider the object of our fighting to be? On none of these points have we been able to find a single ray of light from the President's critics. We have heard much about deeds, about honor, about patriotism, about preparedness, but no one seems to have stooped to define and explain, to translate into statesmanship the emotions which are so prevalent.

We have searched the Republican press almost in vain for a decisive commitment on any immediate issue. The more belligerent of them, for some reason or other, are exceedingly careful to avoid saying whether they want a rupture or a war with Germany. Look beneath the adjectives and the invectives, and you will look in vain for a policy. The editors desire preparedness, but they will not pause for one editorial to conform to that elementary view of statesmanship—a definition of what the preparedness is for. As a matter of fact, the Republican press and the Republican leaders are hopelessly at odds on the most crucial questions. As the *New York Evening Post* has said, "What the *New York Tribune* calls murder, the *Chicago Tribune* discusses in a tone which reminds one of a court of appeals obiter dictum on the right of factory owners to burn soft coal under certain circumstances."

It has been so from the beginning of the war. The critics of the President's foreign policy have consistently arrived after the shooting was over. Mr. Root and Mr. Lodge were in the Senate when Belgium was invaded—they discovered America's duty to Belgium more than a year later. Mr. Roosevelt discovered it publicly three months after the invasion. Mr. Root's attacks on the President have all referred to the past—they have told us what should have been done. Mr. Roosevelt's magazine articles are historical essays, not indications of policy for the future. Not one of them has defined the Monroe Doctrine, not one of them has discussed the future of Anglo-American relations, not one of them has explained to the American people its relation to the historic events occurring in China, or the sort of settlement after the war which America ought to desire.

Mr. Wilson has often been accused of a failure in leadership. There is, we believe, real justice in the accusation. But his opponents have no record

of leadership that they can be proud of. Except on the question of preparedness, they have been wise after the event, they have been the protagonists of ex post facto policies. They have been critics of history, critics of personality, not leaders of thought. They have stirred feeling, but they have not formulated opinion. If foreign policy is the failure of the Wilson administration, it is no less the failure of its critics. There is no Roosevelt-Root-Republican foreign policy at this moment. No man can say what they believe. We know their temper, we know their devotion to honor, to patriotism, to national self-assertion, but we do not know what they wish to see done, what concretely they believe is the policy America ought to pursue in the bewildering facts of the present moment.

No one would wish to see Mr. Roosevelt or Mr. Root standing beside the President or in front of him. What everyone has a right to wish is that Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Root would cash in on the legend of their knowledge of foreign affairs, that they would recognize that Mr. Wilson will be in office at least ten months more, that those ten months are likely to be as perilous as any in fifty years of our history, that the past is past, that spilled milk is spilled milk, and that the creating of a workable policy in the next ten months is the supreme duty of those who are proud to be patriots.

## Maternity Insurance

THE health insurance bill which recently had a hearing before the legislatures of New York and Massachusetts was a thorough-built scheme in most respects, but there was one extraordinary omission. It contained no provision for compulsory maternity insurance. This blind spot of the health scheme was all the more surprising, because none of the European countries in which sickness insurance is a well established institution has failed to include childbirth as an indisposition which is entitled to the regular sick-benefit. We hasten to concede that Europe is un-American, and to throw in for good measure the admission that America is un-European. Nevertheless, the precedent and experience of fourteen civilized countries in the matter of maternity insurance cannot be passed over by those who know how nearly parallel, after all, are the lives of the woman wage-earner of western Europe and eastern America.

The health insurance bill did not pass the legislature this term, but it will be up again another term and its final adoption can not be very remote. Industrial conditions are fast making the measure a necessity. It remains for the sponsors and sup-

porters of the health bill to remedy this serious omission in the first Albany version before the subject again comes up for discussion. There are certainly enough women's organizations in New York State to see that this is done, even without the aid of the vote. It is a measure on which the most womanly woman and the most radical feminist need not be divided, a cause for which the various women's camps might be expected to consolidate.

Very apropos, just now, is a recently published study by Alexandra Kollonthay, a Russian writer. Like ourselves, this author is at home in a country in which maternity insurance is a backward institution, though Russia has at least gone far enough to merit a place on the list of countries which have it in some degree. They are England, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Luxembourg, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Norway, Switzerland, Italy, Rumania, Australia, France, and Russia. Germany has had maternity insurance for more than thirty years, Norway for seven years, England for four years, Australia since 1912, and France since 1913. The experience of the countries which have had it longest goes to show that maternity insurance is the most effective method of reducing infant mortality.

In practically all these countries the payment of the maternity benefit is associated with a compulsory period of rest. Both Massachusetts and New York have laws which prohibit the employment of a woman in a factory for four weeks after confinement, but which provide no indemnity for her forfeited wages. Such a law is a dead letter in some cases and superfluous in others. As Yves Guyot said to the French Assembly when this subject was under discussion, "If you are going to forbid women to work for a month, you assume at the same time an obligation. You bind yourself by this very act to supply their needs."

In most of the European countries, maternity insurance is paid by the day. In Germany, half of the working woman's regular wages, which may be increased to three-fourths by the local administration committee, is paid her for two weeks before confinement and six weeks afterwards—eight weeks in all. In Austria she receives sixty per cent of her wages for six weeks after confinement. In Serbia she receives half her wages for twelve weeks, six weeks before and six weeks after the child's birth. This is the longest rest period required by any of the states granting maternity insurance. In Norway she receives sixty per cent of her wages for eight weeks. In France she receives a flat allowance of one franc fifty centimes daily. In England she receives thirty shillings if she is self-insured, and thirty shillings more if her husband is also insured. This is paid in a lump sum, though the law also requires four weeks' rest. In Australia she receives

five pounds, and the law makes no stipulation regarding rest. This method is obviously more effective than the New York method of prohibiting work and refusing aid.

In a number of the European countries women must themselves be wage-earners in order to be entitled to the maternity benefit, but in England, Norway, and one or two others, the wives of workingmen receive the maternity aid as well. On the Continent the nursing premium is a familiar institution. It is paid in addition to the confinement money and is reckoned at so much a day for three months. The state may expect every woman to do her duty in this respect, but the wise state is aware that the performance of a duty is often dependent on economic possibility. It has been demonstrated by municipal experiments in Germany, France, and England that the payment of a small cash allowance to nursing mothers helps to discourage bottle-feeding and correspondingly to diminish infant mortality.

One objection commonly heard from the opponents of maternity insurance was that the expectant mother would hire out for a nominal period so as to receive the benefit. The reply to that would be, why put her to the trouble? In the most progressive systems of social insurance, the English system, for instance, the wife of an insured wage-earner is entitled to the maternity benefit without being compelled herself to enter industry in order to be eligible. Besides, it is usual to safeguard the benefit by requiring a specified waiting period. This varies in foreign countries from three to ten months. In Germany, the woman must have been insured and have paid her dues for six months; in England, for twenty-six weeks. It has been proposed to adopt the twenty-six weeks' period here.

Another objection heard is that the unmarried girls and women will be required to pay the dues and help finance a contingency which concerns only the married women. This objection cannot carry much weight in a country which has believed in public schools for over two hundred years. The school tax is paid by the childless of both sexes, because the education of children is everybody's affair. We are at last beginning to see that the prevention of infant and maternal mortality is also everybody's affair. It is assumed in social insurance that all will not fall ill, or grow old, or bear children at the same time. The self-perpetuating habits of the human race justify us in this assumption. It is only because most of the beneficiaries of the insurance plan are able-bodied and healthy wage-earners that the system can be carried at all. Those who keep well will have no quarrel because they do not draw the sick-benefit. The childless man or woman can well afford to contribute a moiety to the woman who gives a healthy child to society.

## Mexico for the Mexicans

THE prestige of the United States is now involved in the Mexican entanglement. We cannot withdraw in response to the demands of Carranza and Obregon without creating an impression throughout Mexico that we have become frightened by the threats of the First Chief and his spokesmen. That, indeed, is an impression that the Carranzistas would like to have created. When we withdrew from Vera Cruz, not knowing what else to do, the press of Mexico claimed credit to Carranza for driving us out and humiliating us. Our loss of prestige then was Carranza's gain. If we accept the greater loss of prestige that would follow retirement from northern Mexico before our ends have been achieved, the immediate gain to the *de facto* authorities would be even greater. In the case of the Vera Cruz affair it was not clear to the Mexicans or to anyone else just what we had expected to accomplish. Our failure to accomplish our end was therefore not demonstrable. What we expect to accomplish in northern Mexico, on the other hand, has been clearly stated. We intend to rid ourselves once for all from the menace of Villa and his marauding bandits. We intend to establish peace, if not in the whole of Mexico, at least in those states that most immediately concern us. If we withdraw before this is accomplished, our failure will be notorious. If we withdraw in response to Carranza's demand, we shall have suffered what European diplomacy describes as a serious moral check.

It is our prestige against Carranza's. If this were all, we might properly yield, even though it is upon our prestige that Americans in Mexico must depend for their safety and the security of their property. We should rather endure a temporary loss than to follow the European nations in their pursuit of prestige through the infinite miseries of war. But much more is involved than our national pride and advantage. The peace of Mexico and her chance to develop into a great and civilized nation are involved. Such prestige as Carranza might win through threatening the United States and apparently forcing the retirement of the American troops would not be sufficient to give him a durable hold upon the government. It would not remove the menace of counter-revolution. It would not free Mexico from the danger of foreign intervention.

What foreign intervention is possible, if the United States withdraws and refuses to intervene further? In a country like Mexico groups of private capitalists can intervene just as effectively as can official government. There are Mexican leaders to-day, opposed to the existing government, who

could secure unlimited funds for a new revolution if it were certain that the United States would maintain an attitude of indifference to what goes on beyond the border. Carranza holds the government, but his money is worth just one cent on the dollar, and his soldiers are underfed and discontented. What would happen if an attractive new leader appeared with a platform of peace and prosperity and the ability to pay real money for military service? There are hundreds of millions' worth of foreign properties, not now yielding anything, that would be eager to make up such a leader's war chest. There are new opportunities for investment, worth hundreds of millions, that could be parcelled out by such a leader among his foreign supporters.

Let Mexico alone, say Carranza apologists, and we will fight ourselves to an equilibrium, and establish the kind of government we need. Did it not take France twenty years to work her revolution through to its logical conclusion? And would it not have been a misfortune to the world if the intervention of the First Coalition had been successful in putting an end to the Revolution? Granted; but Mexico is in a very different condition from revolutionary France, and the environing world is very different now from what it was in 1793. There was nothing in France to correspond with the vast wealth of concessionary opportunities characterizing Mexico. There was nothing in the world of 1793 to correspond with the huge mass of capital now flowing irresistibly toward profitable investments. France could survive twenty years of domestic revolution and foreign wars. The reconstruction of property still left control purely French. If the Mexican revolution has effected a certain reconstitution of property, increasing the measure of Mexican control, there is no guaranty that the counter-revolution, always menacing, will not work to the extension of foreign control.

Mexico for the Mexicans is a principle that the great majority of Americans are willing to accept without qualification. Let Mexico set her great resources to work to lift the ban of poverty and ignorance and superstition that have rested upon her since prehistoric times. She must have capital to do this and she must draw this from abroad, but let her reserve for her own uses all surplus profit above a fair return, as other civilized states do. Giving only a fair return, she must give security, and there is no security without a government strong enough to maintain order. If the concession is handled in such a way that only a fair return goes to foreign capital, while the surplus profits go to the government, there will be left no vast possibilities of unearned increment to tempt foreign adventurers into private intervention. With the wealth of Mexico developing, opportunities will