

lapsed. But if he does not learn from this failure, authors and artists and publishers should be ready to keep him in his proper place, whatever the cost.

Republican Debt to Roosevelt

MR. George Wickersham's recently declared preference for Justice Hughes over Elihu Root as Republican candidate for President is based on sound reasons. Whatever Mr. Root's qualifications for the office itself he is not an available candidate. As much as any other man who could be named, his candidacy would revive the controversies of 1912 and decimate the Republican vote in those central western states which are already predisposed in Mr. Wilson's favor. Justice Hughes, as Mr. Wickersham says, would have a better chance of healing the divisions in the Republican party than any other candidate. He is not implicated in the quarrel of four years ago; he has no personal responsibility for the bankruptcy of Republican leadership during the Wilson administration; he enjoys the confidence of the great majority of the Republican conservatives and progressives. The momentum in favor of his nomination would be irresistible were it not for two obstacles. He is distrusted and feared by certain of the party politicians who remember what he did as governor to the Republican organization in the state of New York. His attitude towards the immediately important issues of foreign and domestic policy are unknown and will not be known until and unless he is nominated. The first of these obstacles would scarcely count were it not for the second, but the second is important because the election of the Republican nominee is a matter quite as much of his opinions as of his personality.

The effective reunion of the Republican party does not depend merely on the nomination of a candidate who is not tainted by the quarrels and the failures of the past six years. It depends still more on the ability of any candidate who is nominated to revive the Republican tradition, to give back to the party some of its former aggressive fighting spirit and moral self-assurance. The Republicans more than the Democrats need an underlying integrity of conviction and some positive vitality of impulse. They have always been a party of action which sought to promote the national welfare, not by leaving things alone, but by using the powers and resources of the national government to carry out an economic and political program. In the coming contest they are likely to be defeated unless they regain their old ability to force the fighting and to formulate a vigorous and comprehensive national policy. The country is passing through a grave physical and moral crisis. It is confronted

by dangers to which it is not accustomed and problems which elude the grasp of its older traditions. More than at any time since the Civil War the opportunity and necessity exists for courageous and far-sighted political initiative. The Republicans must supply it or become a party of negative and superseded ideas.

The need of Republican initiative is all the greater because of the course pursued by the Democrats. Under President Wilson's leadership they have reversed their party traditions and have replaced the policy of letting things alone with a policy at least of partly preparing in advance against future exigencies. The Democrats are putting in a better claim to be considered a party with a formative national policy than at any time in their history. Their policy of preparation does not, indeed, consist of anything more than a series of compromise half-measures, designed to allay a dangerous political agitation. It is as much as anything else an attempt to emasculate "preparedness" by concessions, just as so many progressive policies have been emasculated by laws which are not intended to be effectively administered. But by their course they have prevented the Republicans from appropriating any exclusive credit from a policy of preparation and they have imposed on their opponents the difficult task not merely of developing a more radical program of preparedness, but of getting into that program a lively and contagious enthusiasm for the national welfare. If the Republicans are to recover their ascendancy and to become once again the aggressive national party, it is up to them to fill the cup of American national aspiration with a larger and better contents—one which expressly associates the fulfilment of a high standard of domestic responsibility with the fulfilment of responsibilities to other countries. In no other way can they regain the moral self-assurance indispensable to a reunited and reinvigorated organization. In no other way can they fit themselves to be a desirable substitute for the Democrats instead of a more or less deplorable alternative.

Up to the present time the Republicans have utterly failed to develop the kind of leadership demanded by their own predicament and that of the country. Only one man has succeeded either in putting up an effective and significant opposition to the Democratic administration or in expressing anything of the spirit and the policy needed by an aggressively national party. That man is, of course, Theodore Roosevelt. It is a remarkable fact that the Progressive leader, around whose person the bitter controversies of 1912 chiefly centered, and whose candidacy would seem to bring with it the greatest possible provocation to discord, should also

be the one man who has provided the Republicans with a plan for the possible restoration of party vigor and has been communicating to them the spirit with which the restoration should be infused. The value of his services to the party is so unimpeachable and emphatic that if the quarrel of 1912 had been less recent and bitter, Mr. Roosevelt could hardly fail of the nomination. Any effective Republican candidate will be obliged to take over the campaign as Mr. Roosevelt has started and blocked it out. Thus even if he cannot be nominated the necessity of his leadership for a party with the traditions of Republicanism will have been vindicated. The politicians who rejected him in 1912 are being forced to come back to him in 1916, because without the spirit and the point of view embodied and represented in him their party is bankrupt in feeling and ideas. A successful Republican candidate must not only obtain Mr. Roosevelt's support; he must in certain essential matters accept Mr. Roosevelt's lead.

No candidate can escape this condition, not even Mr. Justice Hughes. Mr. Roosevelt has anticipated the only kind of a campaign which will revive Republicanism and distinguish it from Democracy. The Democratic party under President Wilson's leadership has taken on a positive character. Just as it represented in 1912 a lukewarm and safe progressivism, so it is coming to represent in 1916 a lukewarm and safe program of national organization. If the Republicans intend, as it would be fair to infer from their record in Congress, merely to stand for another lukewarm and safe version of "peace, prosperity and preparedness," there is no sufficient reason, as the *New York World* insists, why they should not express their patriotism by joining in Mr. Wilson's renomination. The only living alternative to the spirit of Democratic policy is that embodied by Mr. Roosevelt—the spirit of adding more horsepower to the engine, of keeping your eye on the road, and of planning more carefully and more comprehensively the best route to the desired goal. The only living alternative to the Democratic policy itself is that of converting preparedness into a general and thoroughgoing program of national reorganization. The plain fact is that in the past the American nation has been prepared for nothing—neither for prosperity nor adversity, neither for doing things well nor for not doing them at all, neither for peace at home and abroad nor for war at home and abroad. If it is to be better prepared in the future, it must begin by putting into the work of preparation some of the energy and determination and some of the disposition to pay the costs of preparation which have been characteristic of Mr. Roosevelt's propaganda.

The Republican undoubtedly ought to be the

party of energetic and forehanded national preparation. During its period of domination it did plan an economic and legal organization, which answered the prevailing and popular demand by accelerating enormously the production of wealth. But when it was asked to carry the job further and arrange that the wealth whose production and private appropriation had been so encouraged should be better distributed and should provide for the economic independence of the American citizens whose power to labor constituted their only asset, the Republican party faltered and divided. It looked as if an irreparable mistake had been committed when the Republican machine four years ago refused to remedy the prevailing economic and political evils and prepare to obtain for American citizens a higher general standard of living. But perhaps the mistake is not irreparable. The same goal may be reached by another road. The agitation for preparedness, military and naval, may help public opinion to understand that an efficient, wasteful, and socially callous nation cannot be prepared for fighting, because its whole organization will break down in the event of a war on the modern scale. Our American organization has actually been breaking down at the mere prospect of serious complications with a foreign country. If we are to prepare, consequently, we must prepare not merely to defend our house, but to put it in order—to put it much more completely in order than the Democrats have done or propose to do. This is the opportunity of the Republicans, as Mr. Roosevelt has so clearly pointed out. In order to seize it they do not necessarily have to nominate Mr. Roosevelt, although it is fair that they should; but if the man they do nominate fails to grasp the opportunity he will not only lose the election, but restore the Republican party as an ornamental façade rather than as an enduring structure.

The Need of a Positive Policy

HOWEVER one may approach the problem of American foreign policy and with whatever phase of it one may deal—whether the present submarine difficulty with Germany, the relations with the Allies, future sea law, an Anglo-American agreement, the Open Door—one obstinate fact persistently intrudes itself. That fact is the refusal of the American people to face squarely the necessary implications of their undoubted decision that German victory is undesirable and that they will approve no policy likely to promote it. Almost since the beginning of the war they have attempted to combine essential unneutrality with an avoidance of its necessary consequences—which need not of course include mili-