

be the one man who has provided the Republicans with a plan for the possible restoration of party vigor and has been communicating to them the spirit with which the restoration should be infused. The value of his services to the party is so unimpeachable and emphatic that if the quarrel of 1912 had been less recent and bitter, Mr. Roosevelt could hardly fail of the nomination. Any effective Republican candidate will be obliged to take over the campaign as Mr. Roosevelt has started and blocked it out. Thus even if he cannot be nominated the necessity of his leadership for a party with the traditions of Republicanism will have been vindicated. The politicians who rejected him in 1912 are being forced to come back to him in 1916, because without the spirit and the point of view embodied and represented in him their party is bankrupt in feeling and ideas. A successful Republican candidate must not only obtain Mr. Roosevelt's support; he must in certain essential matters accept Mr. Roosevelt's lead.

No candidate can escape this condition, not even Mr. Justice Hughes. Mr. Roosevelt has anticipated the only kind of a campaign which will revive Republicanism and distinguish it from Democracy. The Democratic party under President Wilson's leadership has taken on a positive character. Just as it represented in 1912 a lukewarm and safe progressivism, so it is coming to represent in 1916 a lukewarm and safe program of national organization. If the Republicans intend, as it would be fair to infer from their record in Congress, merely to stand for another lukewarm and safe version of "peace, prosperity and preparedness," there is no sufficient reason, as the *New York World* insists, why they should not express their patriotism by joining in Mr. Wilson's renomination. The only living alternative to the spirit of Democratic policy is that embodied by Mr. Roosevelt—the spirit of adding more horsepower to the engine, of keeping your eye on the road, and of planning more carefully and more comprehensively the best route to the desired goal. The only living alternative to the Democratic policy itself is that of converting preparedness into a general and thoroughgoing program of national reorganization. The plain fact is that in the past the American nation has been prepared for nothing—neither for prosperity nor adversity, neither for doing things well nor for not doing them at all, neither for peace at home and abroad nor for war at home and abroad. If it is to be better prepared in the future, it must begin by putting into the work of preparation some of the energy and determination and some of the disposition to pay the costs of preparation which have been characteristic of Mr. Roosevelt's propaganda.

The Republican undoubtedly ought to be the

party of energetic and forehanded national preparation. During its period of domination it did plan an economic and legal organization, which answered the prevailing and popular demand by accelerating enormously the production of wealth. But when it was asked to carry the job further and arrange that the wealth whose production and private appropriation had been so encouraged should be better distributed and should provide for the economic independence of the American citizens whose power to labor constituted their only asset, the Republican party faltered and divided. It looked as if an irreparable mistake had been committed when the Republican machine four years ago refused to remedy the prevailing economic and political evils and prepare to obtain for American citizens a higher general standard of living. But perhaps the mistake is not irreparable. The same goal may be reached by another road. The agitation for preparedness, military and naval, may help public opinion to understand that an efficient, wasteful, and socially callous nation cannot be prepared for fighting, because its whole organization will break down in the event of a war on the modern scale. Our American organization has actually been breaking down at the mere prospect of serious complications with a foreign country. If we are to prepare, consequently, we must prepare not merely to defend our house, but to put it in order—to put it much more completely in order than the Democrats have done or propose to do. This is the opportunity of the Republicans, as Mr. Roosevelt has so clearly pointed out. In order to seize it they do not necessarily have to nominate Mr. Roosevelt, although it is fair that they should; but if the man they do nominate fails to grasp the opportunity he will not only lose the election, but restore the Republican party as an ornamental façade rather than as an enduring structure.

## The Need of a Positive Policy

**H**OWEVER one may approach the problem of American foreign policy and with whatever phase of it one may deal—whether the present submarine difficulty with Germany, the relations with the Allies, future sea law, an Anglo-American agreement, the Open Door—one obstinate fact persistently intrudes itself. That fact is the refusal of the American people to face squarely the necessary implications of their undoubted decision that German victory is undesirable and that they will approve no policy likely to promote it. Almost since the beginning of the war they have attempted to combine essential unneutrality with an avoidance of its necessary consequences—which need not of course include mili-

tary coöperation with Germany's enemies. While the country realizes that it is in opinion and act unneutral in the sense that it is not at all indifferent as to the outcome of the war and intends in no way to lose sight of its partiality in its policy, there is no general realization of the political implications of its decision; of the extent to which the government, in the attempt to be guided by that decision and yet to maintain a diplomatic, legalistic and technical neutrality, is paralyzed in its defense of American and neutral right. Still less is there any realization that the prolongation of this equivocal attitude may cause the national resources of America in the future to become an immense premium upon international anarchy and disorder. The fact of real unneutrality as distinct from the diplomatic fiction, American public opinion sufficiently realizes. What it does not understand is the actual relation of that fact to the country's foreign problems.

Let us see first how it has affected the conduct of the submarine affair.

As early as February, 1915, Germany said in effect that her submarine policy was in reprisal for the English violation of sea law as embodied in the Declaration of London, and that if America would secure from England the observance of that code Germany would abandon her submarine warfare against merchantmen. Now the Declaration of London corresponded broadly to the conception of sea law for which America has always stood. She had, as Professor Clapp and others have pointed out, an instrument ready to her hand—an embargo on munitions, justified by the clause of the 1907 Hague Convention which allows a change of rules as to the export of munitions during a war "in cases where experience shows the necessity of such action in order to safeguard the nation's rights"—for compelling English observance of the Declaration. Had America taken the course of threatening the use of that instrument she would have protected her rights not only as against Germany but as against England. She could have secured, as Professor Clapp points out, a great victory for neutral right, "recovered and established for all time."

And this, if America had been really indifferent as to which side won, is just the course that she would have taken. She did not take it because American public opinion would not have sanctioned a course of action that made for German victory. Once let the American people see that their action is leading in that direction and they would also see that to protect temporary trade rights at the cost of British defeat would be to sacrifice the lesser to the greater. Such was the real reason why proposals like that of Professor Clapp were not adopted.

But the American government in its dealing with

Germany was unable to avow the truth. If it had been able to disregard technical neutrality it would have said to Germany: "We are unable to take decisive action against England for the maintenance of the Declaration of London because to do so would be to aid your cause. And we fear that. We fear that its success might be a menace to us. While England's methods threaten neutral trade, yours threaten neutral existence, and we cannot act as though those things were of equal import to us and the world. Give us some assurance that your ultimate international policy does not involve menace and unrest; define, that is, the terms upon which you would be prepared to make peace and live your life in the community of nations in the future; and then, if those terms satisfy us that your cause is at bottom no more aggressive than that of the Allies, we shall return to real neutrality; we shall be in a position to enforce the Declaration of London, to resume normal relations with you, to withdraw our hostility."

But the old political fiction of neutrality has made that impossible. The submarine issue has not been settled, and until we get a more cohesive international order we can never know whether it has been settled or not, either in this or in future wars. America's international position remains at the mercy of accident—the nerves of a frightened or drunken submarine commander who, just at a moment when other issues embitter the situation, sinks an American ship and drowns a hundred or a thousand people. The psychological need for action would cause popular support to go to "the party of action"—bad action, railroading the country into war of unlimited liability and indefinite association with the varying territorial and political ambitions of the Allies.

And when the diplomatic fiction has been completed we get—what? A promise that it won't occur again. If we can hope that the demonstration of America's readiness to fight "at the drop of the hat," a readiness backed it may be in the future by a great American navy, will deter a hard-pressed combatant from using these methods of warfare, how comes it that the very belligerent now in question is unrestrained by the combined navies of Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Japan and Portugal? Is the American navy of the future to be successful where these have failed? In the meantime the American failure to take effective action with reference to the maintenance of the Declaration of London involves temporarily at least the sacrifice of rights which America has always in the past been ready to defend at the cost of war. American power stands effectively for neither the life nor property of non-combatants in war, for neither neutral right nor neutral existence.

But the story does not end there. Official neutrality compels the American government to imply to Germany that the American government would be ready to sanction the sale of munitions to Germany if she could come and fetch them. This obvious falsehood deprives the just decision of the American people against Germany of any value as a deterrent of future aggression. After this war the Germans will say—and they will say it on the strength of the position now maintained by the American government—"If we could have commanded the sea we could have transferred the economic alliance of America from our enemies to ourselves. The important thing in the future therefore is not to be concerned about respecting international obligations like the Belgian treaty, but to command the sea. If you can do that the national resources of America are at your disposal whether your cause be good or bad, aggressive or defensive. We have the assurance of the American government on that point." The vast national resources of America are to act not as a silent pressure on the side of the good behavior of nations and the respect of treaty right, but on the side of naval rivalry irrespective of right or treaty obligation or the general interest of nations.

To be sure, it will always be open to America to refuse to supply a country in the position of Germany even if it did command the sea. But so long as the prospective combatants *do not know beforehand* what in America's view will constitute good or bad behavior, what she will regard as aggressive and menacing and what defensive, they will always assume that the chances are on the side of their being able to buy the munitions and supplies if they can fetch them. A nation's policy always looks defensive or defensible to itself. No people is able to make a very accurate estimate of foreign opinion of its own conduct. Seventy million Germans, including men of great intellectual equipment, are still marvelling because the world cannot see they are fighting a purely defensive war forced upon them by the unprovoked aggression of jealous and truculent neighbors. Unless there is some definite and unmistakable criterion of what constitutes an unjustifiable war, they or others will always count upon being able, once they command the sea, to command also that economic alliance of neutrals that at present goes with it.

Suppose that twenty years ago America, desiring to attach to international law some great interest which would tend to make its observance obviously to the interests of the nations, had said: "Any nation proceeding to hostilities against another without first having submitted its difference at least to inquiry, or any nation invading a neutralized state,

or any nation failing to put into operation in its protectorates the principle of the Open Door, will not be able to secure American supplies, munitions or credit for the purposes of its war, whether it obtains command of the sea or not."

If we could imagine such a policy adopted even by the United States alone, every prospective belligerent would desire to observe the rule and to put itself right with America by so doing, whether it expected to command the sea or not. If it expected to command the sea it would observe the rule in order to take full advantage of its power, and secure the economic alliance of America to its cause; and if it did not expect to command the sea, it would equally desire to observe the rule in order to deprive its enemy of most of the advantages of such command; in other words, to have America do what the Germans so keenly desire her now to do: embargo the export of supplies and munitions. Thus, to all belligerents—prospective commanders of the sea or not—would there be the strong motive to observe the rules laid down; a behavior which would prevent most wars and give international organization and machinery a chance. There would be set up a strong tendency to international arrangement; it would have behind it the push of a great material advantage: America's economic alliance, and its refusal to the enemy. Respect for the rights of others, and of some means of determining those rights, would for the first time in history be a definite and visible military asset. America's enormous resources would then be acting as a silent and potential power for international order.

## A Government Plea for Health Insurance

WHEN historians of the future come to examine the origins of the movement for social advance that gives the present its distinction, they doubtless will be impressed by the antithetical impulses that generated our enthusiasm for reform. They will find the passion of the humanitarian yoked with the zeal of the scientist; the sentimentalist and the rationalist fighting side by side against the established order. Rebellion born of pity joins hands with rebellion born of exact knowledge and clear analysis. It matters little that one sees the enemy as injustice and suffering, the other as stupidity and waste. Pseudo-science may bring down on its head the imprecations of the humanitarian; scientists may curse the "insane fringe" of the army of sentiment. But the two forces work together.

Just now the doctors are on the offensive against the present economic and industrial régime. Sur-