

enamoured lotus-flowers, of distressed maidens and moonlight aplenty; that land of professors and idealists, of wholehearted men and women; that Germany of Schumann, of the great poets and the great dreamers. For many of us, the memory that Miss Münsterberg has recalled will bring only recurrent sorrow over a country, once loved, that has reacted so perversely from a noble past but fifty years old. To others, the vision may bring faith once more. The singers who sang for Germany cannot have given themselves in vain. The people that bore them cannot long remain fixed in the error that greatness and beauty and life mean war. That old vanished Germany, so fresh, so good, so lovely, cannot have gone forever!

PAUL L. ROSENFELD.

The Persiflage of Politics

The New Europe, by Arnold Toynbee. New York: E. P. Dutton. \$1.00 net.

MR. TOYNBEE is well known as one of the most brilliant of that younger group of Oxford historians who, under the leadership of Mr. Zimmern, are rewriting for us the history of Greece and Rome so that it may be intelligible to the age in which we live. A keen student of geography, his "Nationality and the War" is probably among the very few volumes thus far produced in the conflict to which a really serious importance can be attached.

But the danger of war books is their fecundity. They tend to beget children as an attempt at mere justification of existence, and it is to this class of doubtful legitimacy that Mr. Toynbee's new volume belongs. Originally a series of papers written for the London *Nation*, it was admirable as a hasty summary of its subject. But as a book it is a thin and meagre production. It contains nothing at all novel, and it is not sufficiently argumentative to be really arresting. It can hardly be considered illuminating to write now that the English state stands for coöperation, and the German state for power. The definition of a nation as a group of men bound together by their will to coöperate probably raises as many issues as it solves. The assertion that nationality is as important as economics and that the mental outlook of Mr. Norman Angell is incomplete has grown a little tiresome with constant reiteration. The distinction between "natural frontiers" and "economic rights of way," while helpful, only begins to suggest the myriad questions it ought to answer. The book, in fact, simply skims a large number of surfaces without in any way suggesting their nature or extent. One cannot but think that, granted our previous knowledge of what Mr. Toynbee can accomplish, the publication of this work is peculiarly unfortunate.

Far more important than the volume proper is the introductory review of it by Lord Cromer. We have rarely been afforded so valuable an insight into the mind of a great pro-consul. When he begins to pick out the qualities in Mr. Toynbee's volume of which he approves, we begin to see exactly what appeals to the sternly imperialist temper. He begins with an expression of thankfulness that Mr. Toynbee "does not inveigh against the obstructiveness of officials . . . or the wickedness of imperialists who are at times credited with entertaining chauvinistic intentions and opinions of which they are generally quite guiltless." In other words—*experto crede* and give the freest hand possible for the exportation of capital. Mr. Shaw—divine amateur as he is—must not discuss the Denshawai incident, particularly in a book about Ireland; and we are not to approve of the attitude of journalists like Mr. Brailsford to the prob-

lems of Moroccan finance. Because Mr. Toynbee admits that only a few peoples are capable of self-government Lord Cromer attributes to him a belief in the tutelage of imperialism. He is glad that, "save to a limited extent," Mr. Toynbee is not guilty of the divorce of practice from theory—as though anyone who reads Kant can help finally going into Parliament.

But the most illuminating section of Lord Cromer's essay is the note of contempt for the way in which the philosophy of Hegel has bitten deep into the soul of Germany. He does not seem to be aware that Mr. L. T. Hobhouse in a very brilliant book has indicted the imperialism for which Lord Cromer stands on precisely these Hegelian charges; or that Mr. Cecil Rhodes's worship of an all-red Africa is in reality traceable to exactly similar beliefs. Some of us would even dare to wonder if Lord Cromer's own Egyptian administration was quite free from a profound confidence in the essential supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon mind. But these are questions which only the expert can solve. What it is worth while protesting against is the childish and easy philosophy which is satisfied with attributing the war to Nietzsche or Treitschke or Hegel or Bernhardi. We have reason to go deeper than this monotonous superficiality.

Mr. Toynbee has something really valuable to say about nationality if he will only take time and space to say it adequately. If he will give us the benefit of his able speculations into Greek history and the result, after the war, of his thought on that new cockpit of Europe which the Bagdad railway has made so painfully accessible, he will write a book worthy of the great tradition he has inherited.

H. J. L.

War Everlasting

The Things Men Fight For, with some application to present conditions in Europe, by H. H. Powers, Ph.D. New York: The Macmillan Co. \$1.50.

LET the pacifist beware of reading this book or at least pocket his optimism while reading. It is a shattering, disintegrating book, at once objective and depressing. All the hopes with which the nations entered the war it treats as illusions. The war is not waged for justice, humanity, the rights of small nations or the repression of militarism. The war is not an accident or a mistake or a crime, but a necessary consequence of a necessary cause, a thing inevitable, because with men as they are and boundaries and seas and mountains where they are, it was inevitable that men should will this war. It is not even a war that will end war but the precursor of more devastating conflicts to come. Whoever wins or loses, the war-breeding conditions will remain. They will even be magnified. After the treaty of peace is ratified, Austria and Italy will still be in deadly feud over the control of the Adriatic, and Germany and England over the control of the North Sea, while Russia and Japan, although bound by alliances, will strain every nerve for the inevitable war to decide the fate of Korea and Manchuria. Austria will remain a war center, since it will be either what it is today, an unstable combination of mutually hostile races, or something worse, a Balkan anarchy on a larger scale. Whichever nation gets Constantinople will leave either Austria or Russia frustrated and planning for the next war. Germany must continue to arm or die. In a few years or decades she will be unable to oppose both East and West. A little later she will be weaker than Russia alone. Then an offensive alliance against Russia of all the western

Powers, a war of diplomacy and finance, and then a real war, and after that more wars, and after that still more wars.

All these wars, according to Dr. Powers, find their root in certain race-psychological and geographical facts. Each nation or racial group prefers its own qualities, characteristics and *Kultur*; it fights for existence, independence and expansion. It insists upon its right of defense, even though it involves the seizing of outside territory for strategic purposes. On ethical grounds each nation demands the incorporation of its unredeemed brethren across the boundary while on strategical grounds it denies the same right to alien groups within its own borders. Access to the sea, being necessary to economic independence, is to be enforced even by war. The pacifist may ask why a nation may not use a harbor without owning it, as the Germans have used Antwerp, the Swiss, Genoa, and the Canadians, Portland. But the nation will answer that "there is an instinct, the outgrowth, it may be, of a troubled past rather than of a wiser present, which refuses to be satisfied with these alien facilities." Would a man build on a lot which had no access to a highway? . . . "The sense of security for national interests will not cease to urge the acquisition of whatever may be needful to the rounded equipment of national life."

Unfortunately there are not ports, harbors, seas and channels to go round. The Dardanelles, for instance, constitute the outlet for most of Bulgaria, all of Roumania, more than half of Austria-Hungary, an immense area in Russia and a part of Asia Minor. How can each of these nations possess Constantinople exclusively? Russia is shut off from access to the Pacific by Japan, from the Persian Gulf by Great Britain, from the Mediterranean and beyond by Turkey at Constantinople and England at Gibraltar, while her Baltic trade passes through the Danish straits, protected by Germany, and under the British guns at Dover. England lies directly on Germany's sea communications and at any moment may shut off German trade. For Germany to control this situation means the loss of British naval supremacy and the end of the British Empire. If Russia does not control the Yellow Sea, she has no outlet on the Pacific; if she does control it Japan's doom is sealed. Nature is niggardly in her trade routes; the traffic of the world is congested in certain seas and is forced to go through narrow straits, easily blocked. To all the evils brought upon Europe by a jumble of nations and petty racial groups, with hostile traditions, unreasoning and impossible desires for expansion, and with vital interests irreconcilable with the vital interests of other nations—to all this tragic confusion is added the last great calamity that no nation can be permitted peacefully to hold dominion over certain trade routes and no nation is satisfied with less.

Because of these facts wars to-day, according to Dr. Powers, are as necessary to the gradual, one might say the glacial movement toward an ever-changing settlement of the world as labor is to birth. He rather summarily dismisses various proposals for peace. Arbitration is good as far as it goes, but nations arbitrate only when the interests involved do not justify fighting. Compulsory arbitration, a league to enforce peace, are pathetically impracticable, a begging of the very question at issue. A United States of Europe is Utopian; if attained at all it could only be attained by war. The error of the pacifists, according to the author, is that they ignore the real factors leading to war. They prescribe as a doctor might prescribe for the symptoms of a disease, without recognizing how deeply ingrained is war, both in race heredity and in an

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unfavorable and practically unchangeable environment.

We may understand the author's method better by noting how he applies these rules governing national conduct to the present war. Though passionately pro-British and desirous of an Anglo-American *entente*, Dr. Powers believes that none of the nations could or should, have refused to enter into the war. "Who is responsible?" he asks himself. "Servia, says Austria, for if she had ceased her agitation we should have dwelt in peace; Austria, says Russia, for had she not demanded the impossible, Servia would have yielded all; Russia, says Germany, for had she not interfered in a quarrel that was none of her affair, Servia would have yielded; Germany, says Britain, for a word from her would have restrained Austria; Britain, says Germany, for Russia would not have interfered unless assured of British support. And all are true. There is not one of these, from the least unto the greatest, that could not have stopped war by refraining from the fatal step. And there is not one of them that could have refrained without sacrificing its vital interests. Servia, by ceasing its agitation, would have abandoned her hope of uniting her people and reaching the sea. Austria, by lessening her demands, would have risked the integrity of her empire. Russia, by holding aloof, would have lost to a rival the key to her own empire. Germany, by restraining Austria, would have closed up the only escape from her prison, and would have accepted for herself and her civilization the status of another Holland. Britain, if she had held aloof, would have ensured Germany's victory, would have lost her command of the sea, and would have ceased to be an empire."

The circle is complete. No nation could recede and no