

A dictated peace means once more a dualism in Europe, armaments and the trade boycott, and it means the working once again of the vicious circle of nationality. The formula of an intact Austria may be too absolute. Some cession of territory is needed to make a united Poland, but if that Poland were to be a genuinely independent state, its existence as a buffer would ease the fears and with them the armaments of the rival empires. The cession to Italy of the Trentino—but not of Trieste—must also be considered. Even so a big empire remains. A method of cessions carried out at the expense of the Central Empires would solve, or pretend to solve, only half the European problem of nationality. A league of peace would at least offer some promise of a solution of the whole problem. It would achieve this first of all by its moral effect. It would bring about, very slowly perhaps, the decay of the aggressive self-consciousness of national feeling. If Germans and Czechs cease to think of tomorrow's inevitable world-war between Slavs and Teutons, their relations within the Bohemian village will be insensibly eased. The Turk failed to live happily with the Bulgar in the Macedonian village, partly because of religious differences and still more because of opposed agrarian interests, but the fatal barrier between them was that Bulgar's habit of hanging a portrait of the Russian Czar on his wall. That was a daily reminder of wars past and wars to come. Diminish the expectation of war by substituting conferences for force, and the atmosphere in a thousand villages from Alsace to Macedonia will become sensibly less electrical.

Finally, even the most sober idealist may hope that our league of peace—if Mr. Wilson will pursue his great aim undaunted—will include in its constitution some simple and general maxim, by which all its members will proclaim an equality in civil, political, religious, linguistic and educational rights for all the races of their European territories. The Jewish community proposes to ask for such a guaranty from Russia on behalf of its own kinsmen. May it prosper in that demand, but its chance of success will be the greater if the demand is made general, and sunk deep in the foundations of the league. Such a charter would benefit Letts and Ukrainians as well as Jews, and it would assure the position of all the minorities in all the Ulsters. A partisan settlement by a dictated peace could at best solve, and solve very ill, only half of Europe's problem of nationality. A settlement by conference, with a league of peace as its culmination, might lay the foundations of a general solution.

H. N. BRAILSFORD.

London, August.

The Suffrage Convention

A SUFFRAGE convention in Atlantic City! As we walked under the yellow-lettered sign announcing the assembly of the National American Woman's Suffrage Association, among the blinking electric advertisements, we felt that as never before the suffrage cause had gone forth to face the world—the varied, real world of rag-time and political parties and boardwalks and jitneys.

Atlantic City might easily have thought it appropriate, however, that our first meeting was held in a church. The meeting was on the subject of method. In the effort to obtain suffrage were we to concentrate on work for a federal amendment, or on work for state legislation, or were we to follow both activities as at present? The meeting was on the subject of method: but those who looked at the faces of the oldest women who had grown gray in the service, and watched the enthusiasm of the youngest ushers, knew that whatever its method, the cause of suffrage had remained a faith.

It was a brilliant audience. One saw Mrs. Raymond Robbins and her sister Miss Mary Dreier, who had devoted their lives intensely to the great interests of organized working-women; women distinguished in educational circles—Miss M. Carey Thomas, the president of Bryn Mawr, Mrs. Ella Flagg Young, for years the center of the Chicago struggle for better public schools. One rejoiced in the exquisite, calm presence of Alice Stone Blackwell, in her spiritual and fiery glance. All around one observed American women recognizable as salient and admired figures. A story of the careers of these women of the suffrage convention would be a tale of some of the most striking and characteristic movements of the United States of our time.

Without acrimony, without personalities, the debate on method was conducted like some good-humored game. Miss Laura Clay, a veteran fighter for states' rights, supported the method of state legislation. The policy was hopelessly unpopular; but Miss Clay, her downrightness, her force, her clarity known to suffragists for twenty-five years, was irresistible to the convention. We gloried in her. We revelled in her, and when Mrs. Bass of Chicago said: "Madam Chairman, may I ask Miss Clay a question? Would she refuse suffrage if it were given to her through the federal amendment?" and Miss Clay replied in her deep voice, and with a humorous glance, "No," the whole assembly was fascinated by something much better than logic or consistency in the debate—fascinated by its truthfulness and commonsense.

The debate was superior in candor, in impersonality, in its vivid human references and ascertainties. Many of us who listened to it realized with a strange excitement that we were hearing a tone quite new in public counsel. But in all honesty it should I think be said that in one respect to be indicated later the debate revealed a grave weakness.

The pleasurable frankness of the speeches seemed to reach its height when Mrs. Harper of New York and Mrs. Glendower Evans of Boston announced that they had spoken for concentration on the federal amendment only because Mrs. Catt had urged them to this course, and with the understanding that they should afterwards express their own conviction. This was in favor of our old policy—that of maintaining the right of the National Association to work for both state legislation and federal amendment, the plan upheld by Miss Florence Allen of Ohio, and Mrs. Raymond Brown of New York. "Only both of these methods for suffrage," said Miss Allen, "will give us the democracy which has not yet been born."

"To reach New York voters suffrage had to be interpreted in no less than twenty-four different languages," said Mrs. Brown in presenting the educational value of the recent New York campaign. "I think," she added, "New York State has every kind of man the Lord ever made."

The convention voted in favor of continuing the National Association's present policy, at the close of a discussion of which Dr. Anna Shaw, surely an experienced listener to suffrage debates, said that it was the best she had ever heard.

But though the vote was taken, the question of the most effective working plan of the National Association was by no means closed. It came before us on the same day in a suggestion of Mrs. Catt's that we interpret our constitutional purpose of furthering appropriate federal and state legislation for suffrage, thus—"That the federal amendment be our immediate and principal aim, and that all state campaigns be preparatory to that end."

Miss Thomas offered this suggestion as a resolution. It was amended, withdrawn for the day of President Wilson's visit, when party feeling was at its height, and offered at last in another form.

Resolved that the 48th annual convention of the N. A. W. S. A. instruct its congressional committee to concentrate all its resources upon a determined effort to carry the Federal Amendment through the last session of the 64th Congress. It pledges the support of the State organization and authorizes the national board to take such direction of the work in the States as may be necessary in its judgment to accomplish this.

With this wording the resolution met with wide favor. It passed with a large majority on the last day of the convention.

We have decided to give our congressional committee which has always devoted its energies to federal amendment a stronger backing for a time. This is something. This is an improvement on our former planning. But how slight, how limited, how feeble an improvement! We are more than one congressional committee. We are a national organization. The right of each of the component states to work for her own enfranchisement by state legislation remained unquestioned; twelve southern states declared themselves for the federal amendment. But we were yet too fearful of the appearance of partisanship to decide on our next step, as an entire organization. If we believe that enfranchisement state by state be our wisest immediate course as a national society, then why did we not adopt the suggestion of a western delegate and throw all our national strength into the approaching campaign of that state among us whose enfranchisement would have most strategic value for us all—either the southern state most important for our great common cause, or New York, in the North?

Or if we believe that the passage of the federal amendment is our wisest immediate action, why do we not as a national organization immediately work together for the federal amendment? Many persons not of cynical cast of thought have accepted the Republican and the Democratic party's suffrage planks supporting our cause by both federal and state amendments, with some reservation as to their practical value. Why did the national suffrage convention give the cause a support of the same character? Why did it say, like the non-committal person of Mr. Galsworthy's commentary, that it would take a little of this and a little of that?

To me at least it seemed that the reason lay in that mental fallacy and weakness of the convention I have suggested before. It was a fallacy not peculiar to ourselves, or indeed to women, but characterizing great vistas of American endeavor especially in meliorative and liberal fields, and consists in an almost insane distrust of all clearly ordered efforts. Perhaps this distrust is our Anglo-Saxon heritage of that love of "muddling through" which Mr. H. G. Wells and Mr. Arnold Bennett have lately criticized so keenly in the social spirit of their own nation. The mental weakness of the suffrage convention was its obvious idealization of mere distraction. It was too easily contented with feeling that a great deal was going on for suffrage—too little concerned with the effectiveness of what was done. At times it almost seemed to believe in suffrage-work for the sake of

suffrage-work, instead of for suffrage. At no moment did the convention manifest the beautiful instinct of workmanship—the desire of determining on its nearest task, in the accomplishment of its purpose, and of doing that task well.

There was a tone of poetry for us in our president's speech when she spoke of her life-long pilgrimage in the suffrage cause. As a young girl she had stood on a chair in a South Dakota political convention and heard the convincing and expressive voices of Susan Anthony and Anna Howard Shaw speak unregarded to an assembly which endorsed the enfranchisement of a group of Sioux Indians, mute and stoically profiled, upon either side of the politician who spoke their successful plea. Seated in polling places she had seen Russian and Polish and Rumanian voters who could not read casting their votes according to pictorial emblems at the head of their ticket—an

eagle, or a hammer, or a zodiacal sign, and receiving openly two dollars apiece from their paymaster of our American political tradition. Picturesque, unique, inspiring was her story of the past, the contemporary, the coming history of woman's suffrage in the United States, ending with its tale of our peculiar responsibility in the International Suffrage Alliance, in the stricken state of the European suffragists to-day.

Very deeply many of us thought as she spoke of what we ought to do for suffrage. Our convention in March, before the international meeting, will give us the next answer to that question. Whether our work be for a state of the South or the North, or in Washington for all the states, it is to be hoped that the work will be clearly identified, and undertaken in the spirit of one for all, and all for one.

EDITH WYATT.

Greece and Saloniki

THE sudden action of Rumania, after such a long delay, came as a surprise to many European capitals, but nowhere more so than in the city of Athens. It would be ludicrous, were it not tragic, to observe the present running about of certain Greek politicians, bleating resentfully that the Rumanians did not tell them what they meant to do. For eighteen months the Greeks have been asking Bratianu whether he, being in the same boat as themselves, meant to take action, to which question they have received only oracular replies. Bratianu said little until he was ready to act, and then, for better or for worse, he acted. Contrast Rumania's policy with that of Greece. Governed equally by the counsels of mere opportunity, Rumania at least now stands to win much if she wins at all while Greece, win or lose, stands to get nothing. Such is the contrast between the results of a settled policy and of mere drifting.

Yet in some ways the difficulties of Greece were greater than those of Rumania. Bratianu had no public opinion to consider, for there is none in Rumania, while Greece is a democracy, somewhat corrupt, but still a democracy. The fight in Greece was not wholly a fight between Venizelos and the king; it was just as much a fight between the islands and the seaports, pro-Ally for trade reasons, and the farmers of Thessaly and Macedonia, pro-German through fear of invasion.

Unfortunately for Greece the counsels of Constantine were the counsels of fear, for which the man chiefly responsible was the Greek chief of staff, General Dousmanis. He it was who first,

last and all the time possessed the king's ear. It was he, not Gounaris or Theotokis, who made it possible for the king to allow Venizelos to mobilize the army, and then, with the army mobilized, to dismiss Venizelos from power. It was he who encouraged successfully pro-German sentiments in the Greek nation, now become the Greek army, exaggerated the "insults" of the Allies to Greece, and thereby considerably undermined the power of Venizelos. It was he who was responsible for the troubles attending the Greek demobilization, in which scores of officers handed in their resignations "until the day"—I quote the accompanying manifesto—"when Greece shall have at her head a government prepared to defend the country against foreign violence."

Constantine is a soldier; Dousmanis is a soldier; and at the bottom of their attitude was at first merely the settled belief, common to the officers of almost all the neutral armies (and often in the nature of an obsession), that Germany could not be beaten. Originally their attitude was inspired by a patriotic desire to spare Greece the horrors of an invasion; but opposition confirmed in them both a strong pro-German sentiment. No doubt in the king's case the influence of the queen counted for much; but between them they backed the wrong horse and wrecked Venizelos's aspirations for a greater Greece. Now at last the situation is apparent in its true light; Dousmanis has been forced to resign; and the king "is not disinclined to reconsider his previous attitude." But it is too late; talk about the ancient Empire and of Greece's hour