

it needed such information, has long been in possession thereof. On the other hand, the American public has not been very completely informed in relation to this particular condition, and the publication of the information has a clear public value. It will increase popular support for the concentration of sufficient energy early and adequate measures to meet the deficiency.

## Who Willed American Participation

**P**ACIFIST agitators who have been so courageously opposing, against such heavy odds, American participation in the war have been the victims of one natural but considerable mistake. They have insisted that the chief beneficiaries of American participation would be the munition-makers, bankers and in general the capitalist class, that the chief sufferers would be the petty business men and the wage-earners. They have consequently considered the former classes to be conspiring in favor of war, and now that war has come, they condemn it as the work of a small but powerful group of profiteers. Senator Norris had some such meaning in his head when he asserted that a declaration of war would be equivalent to stamping "the dollar mark on the American flag."

This explanation of the great decision is an absurd mistake, but the pacifists have had some excuses for making it. They have seen a great democratic nation gradually forced into war, in spite of the manifest indifference or reluctance of the majority of its population; and they have rightly attributed the successful pressure to the ability of a small but influential minority to impose its will on the rest of the country. But the numerically insignificant class whose influence has been successfully exerted in favor of American participation does not consist of the bankers and the capitalists. Neither will they be the chief beneficiaries of American participation. The bankers and the capitalists have favored war, but they have favored it without realizing the extent to which it would injure their own interests, and their support has been one of the most formidable political obstacles to American participation. The effective and decisive work on behalf of war has been accomplished by an entirely different class—a class which must be comprehensively but loosely described as the "intellectuals."

The American nation is entering this war under the influence of a moral verdict reached after the utmost deliberation by the more thoughtful members of the community. They gradually came to a decision that the attack made by Germany on the

international order was sufficiently flagrant and dangerous to justify this country in abandoning its cherished isolation and in using its resources to bring about German defeat. But these thoughtful people were always a small minority. They were able to impose their will upon a reluctant or indifferent majority partly because the increasingly offensive nature of German military and diplomatic policy made plausible opposition to American participation very difficult, but still more because of the overwhelming preponderance of pro-Allies conviction in the intellectual life of the country. If the several important professional and social groups could have voted separately on the question of war and peace, the list of college professors would probably have yielded the largest majority in favor of war, except perhaps that contained in the Social Register. A fighting anti-German spirit was more general among physicians, lawyers and clergymen than it was among business men—except those with Wall Street and banking connections. Finally, it was not less general among writers on magazines and in the newspapers. They popularized what the college professors had been thinking. Owing to this consensus of influences opposition to pro-Allies orthodoxy became intellectually somewhat disreputable, and when a final decision had to be made this factor counted with unprecedented and overwhelming force. College professors headed by a President who had himself been a college professor contributed more effectively to the decision in favor of war than did the farmers, the business men or the politicians.

When one considers the obstacles to American entrance into the war, the more remarkable and unprecedented does the final decision become. Every other belligerent had something immediate and tangible to gain by participating and to lose by not participating. Either they were invaded or were threatened with invasion. Either they dreaded the loss of prestige or territory or coveted some kind or degree of national aggrandizement. Even Australia and Canada, who had little or nothing to gain from fighting, could not have refused to fight without severing their connection with the British Empire, and behaving in a manner which would have been considered treacherous by their fellow Britons. But the American people were not forced into the war either by fears or hopes or previously recognized obligations. On the contrary, the ponderable and tangible realities of the immediate situation counseled neutrality. They were revolted by the hideous brutality of the war and its colossal waste. Participation must be purchased with a similarly colossal diversion of American energy from constructive to destructive work, the imposition of a similarly heavy burden upon

the future production of American labor. It implied the voluntary surrender of many of those advantages which had tempted our ancestors to cross the Atlantic and settle in the New World. As against these certain costs there were no equally tangible compensations. The legal rights of American citizens were, it is true, being violated, and the structure of international law with which American security was traditionally associated was being shivered, but the nation had weathered a similar storm during the Napoleonic Wars and at that time participation in the conflict had been wholly unprofitable. By spending a small portion of the money which will have to be spent in helping the Allies to beat Germany, upon preparations exclusively for defense, the American nation could have protected for the time being the inviolability of its own territory and its necessary communications with the Panama Canal. Many considerations of national egotism counselled such a policy. But although the Hearst newspapers argued most persuasively on behalf of this course, it did not prevail. The American nation allowed itself to be captured by those upon whom the more remote and less tangible reasons for participation acted with compelling authority. For the first time in history a wholly independent nation has entered a great and costly war under the influence of ideas rather than immediate interests and without any expectation of gains, except those which can be shared with all liberal and inoffensive nations.

The United States might have blundered into the war at any time during the past two years, but to have entered, as it is now doing, at the right time and in the clear interest of a purely international program required the exercise of an intellectualized and imaginative leadership. And in supplying the country with this leadership Mr. Wilson was interpreting the ideas of thoughtful Americans who wished their country to be fighting on the side of international right, but not until the righteousness of the Allied cause was unequivocally established. It has taken some time to reach this assurance. The war originated in conflicting national ambitions among European Powers for privileged economic and political positions in Africa and Asia, and if it had continued to be a war of this kind there never could have been a question of American intervention. Germany, however, had been dreaming of a more glorious goal than Bagdad and a mightier heritage than that of Turkey. She betrayed her dream by attacking France through Belgium and by threatening the foundations of European order. The crucifying of Belgium established a strong presumption against Germany, but the case was not complete. There still remained the dubious origin of the war. There still remained a doubt whether

the defeat of German militarism might not mean a dangerous triumph of Russian autocracy. Above all there remained a more serious doubt whether the United States in aiding the Allies to beat Germany might not be contributing merely to the establishment of a new and equally unstable and demoralizing Balance of Power in Europe. It was well, consequently, to wait and see whether the development of the war would not do away with some of the ambiguities and misgivings, while at the same time to avoid doing anything to embarrass the Allies. The waiting policy has served. Germany was driven by the logic of her original aggression to threaten the security of all neutrals connected with the rest of the world by maritime communications. The Russian autocracy was overthrown, because it betrayed its furtive kinship with the German autocracy. Finally, President Wilson used the waiting period for the education of American public opinion. His campaign speeches prophesied the abandonment of American isolation in the interest of a League of Peace. His note of last December to the belligerents brought out the sinister secrecy of German peace terms and the comparative frankness of that of the Allies. His address to the Senate clearly enunciated the only program on behalf of which America could intervene in European affairs. Never was there a purer and more successful example of Fabian political strategy, for Fabianism consists not merely in waiting but in preparing during the meantime for the successful application of a plan to a confused and dangerous situation.

What Mr. Wilson did was to apply patience and brains to a complicated and difficult but developing political situation. He was distinguished from his morally indignant pro-Allies fellow countrymen, who a few months ago were abusing him for seeking to make a specifically American contribution to the issues of the war, just as Lincoln was distinguished from the abolitionists, not so much by difference in purposes as by greater political wisdom and intelligence. It is because of his Fabianism, because he insisted upon waiting until he had established a clear connection between American intervention and an attempt to create a community of nations, that he can command and secure for American intervention the full allegiance of the American national conscience. His achievement is a great personal triumph, but it is more than that. It is an illustration and a prophecy of the part which intelligence and in general the "intellectual" class have an opportunity of playing in shaping American policy and in moulding American life. The intimate association between action and ideas, characteristic of American political practice at its best has been vindicated once more. The associa-

tion was started at the foundation of the Republic and was embodied in the work of the Fathers, but particularly in that of Hamilton. It was carried on during the period of the Civil War and was embodied chiefly in the patient and penetrating intelligence which Abraham Lincoln brought to his task. It has just been established in the region of foreign policy by Mr. Wilson's discriminating effort to keep the United States out of the war until it could go in as the instrument of an exclusively international program and with a fair prospect of getting its program accepted. In holding to this policy Mr. Wilson was interpreting with fidelity and imagination the ideas and the aspirations of the more thoughtful Americans. His success should give them increasing confidence in the contribution which they as men of intelligence are capable of making to the fulfilment of the better American national purposes.

## White Race Solidarity

**I**T was the Germans who first cried out against the infamy of her enemies in setting colored troops to fight against her. To die is to die, but to die by white if murderous hands is a fate like any other. To die by hands overpigmented is a nameless horror. Did the Senegalese and Sikhs inflict a more cruel death than the British or French in whose ranks they were fighting, or than the Germans whom they were attempting to kill? Impossible—the world's most fiendish savagery never devised pains more exquisite than those of the wounded dying of thirst between the lines of trenches. Savagery, indeed, has not often endured the sight of such miseries. Could any man of color improve upon the agonies of the victims of gas bombs, their lungs dissolving in a slow fire? Impossible. No—it is monstrous to employ colored troops not because they are especially effective instruments of death and pain, but because the death they deal is unclean. Can one expect to find his soul moving in the same white heaven if it has been torn from his body by black or brown or yellow hands?

This is race prejudice in its ultimate sublimation. But there was also a rational ground for the German protest against the employment of colored troops. It offended against the principle of solidarity of the white race. Precious solidarity, that recurrently flares up into hatreds more savage and destructive than hatreds between rival breeds of men have ever been. But it is true, there was a solidarity of a sort, in our dealings with other races. Here in North America the British and French killed their own Indians without much

mutual interference. To the south of us the Spanish and Portuguese had working arrangements of slavery and extermination which the English and French did not try to thwart. French, English, Germans, Italians, Belgians, Portuguese have parceled out Africa for exploitation, and though hating one another managed down to this war to present a solidarity of oppressiveness to the people to whom the continent belonged. What happened in the East Indies from Aden to Formosa it would be revolting to recount, even if it might prove interesting. For centuries it was a view universally held among the legitimate dwellers by the Indian Ocean that a white man is a white man, and the very devil. To return to contemporary times, the Boxer expedition will prove that white race solidarity has remained a real thing, to cause other races to quake with terror. And this is the thing that the present war is destroying.

Formally, white race solidarity has been abolished. The European Entente Allies can not forget that they owe the tranquillity of their Asiatic possessions to the power and goodwill of Japan. We in the United States will presently realize how fortunate it is that Japan is on our side now, not ready to fall upon our defenseless flank. The friendly neutrality of China has given the Allied group a better understanding of China's national aspirations than could have been derived from the events of a generation of peace. India's desire for a fiscal policy that might foster her national interests now seems worth the British government's attention, though exporters protest the danger to their trade. And has not Germany herself yielded her passionate devotion to the ideal of a white man's world? What shades of color does she find revolting in her allies the Turks? And if red Mexicans and yellow Japanese were preparing to slay and lay waste on our soil, the German's sacred horror of excess pigment would hardly be invoked in our defense. The world is becoming dreadfully mixed. Soon we shall be distinguishing races by the color of their souls, instead of their skins.

And what shall we have lost with the solidarity of the white race? The worst scourge that has ever afflicted mankind. Out of this solidarity has arisen the doctrine that the colored races of the earth are as cattle, to be driven or exterminated as considerations of interest may decree. What the colored races have paid we may pass over in silence. What the white race has paid and still is paying is our immediate concern.

Why have we been fighting wars, in the last four hundred years, with a fury and persistence unexampled in earlier history? We have been dividing the spoils of the colored races. Hence the