

of National Defense. The Secretaries of War and the Navy will still be embarrassed by their double function of managing a supply as well as a fighting department, and they cannot give much time to strategic questions or approach such questions disinterestedly until they consent to the substitution of a munitions department for the existing Advisory War Industries Board. There is only one way to secure the volume of supplies needed by the military forces of America and the Allies, which is to place the responsibility for producing them in the hands of a general munitions department, the several bureaus of which will not compete against one another and will act upon a coördinated policy with respect to priority, prices and labor. There is only one way to assure the transportation of military supplies as well as those needed by the civil population, which is to appoint a national railroad administrator. If these new executive departments were created, and if they were given representation on the Strategy Board, together with those already mentioned, then the Board would require only one more addition to the membership to become the brains of an American war organization. All these executive chiefs would derive their powers chiefly from the President and they could not sit effectively in council except with his active consent and coöperation. The President himself should be present at their meetings in order to guide and coördinate their deliberations and endorse their decisions. By no other means can the war organization be properly linked up with the man in whom the whole war power of the government necessarily resides.

Aid and Comfort to the Enemy

THE political objects of the war can no longer remain forbidden ground for thought and discussion. The governments of the world are to be held answerable to their peoples for their political, as well as their military conduct of the war. These are some of the obvious implications of the reception of the Lansdowne letter, in England and America. At first, as was natural, the military extremists joined in a cry of betrayal of the Allied cause. Lord Lansdowne had stabbed the Allies in the back. He had brought confusion into the Allied plans for unity. He had created in Germany an impression that England was weakening. Above all, he had shaken the determination of America to throw her whole energies into the work of winning the war. As Lord Lansdowne could not be accused of pro-Germanism, attempts were made to explain away his action on grounds

of his Toryism, on grounds of age or physical infirmity.

Such was the immediate reaction. Very quickly, however, the bitter-enders and never-enders of the American press appear to have been struck by the fact that the French press was extremely guarded in its comment, and the Northcliffe papers were by no means having a monopoly of British opinion. It became clear that Lord Lansdowne spoke not for himself alone, but for a powerful body of public opinion, not in England alone. His proposals, it became evident, could not be ignored, nor disposed of by the cocksure methods of the editorial desk. They were recognized to be of weight enough to command consideration in the most authoritative quarter in the Allied world. If Lord Lansdowne was to be "answered," it was plain that the answer had to come from President Wilson. And whether President Wilson chose to answer or not, the question of Allied war aims had been thrown before the peoples for discussion.

And this is in itself an evil, according to the extremists. Grant that we have given up the idea of a knock-out blow, as practically everyone has done. Grant that we no longer hope to impose punitive indemnities, but merely insist upon reparation for such manifest wrongs as the invasion of Belgium. Grant that we have no intention of trying to degrade Germany from her position as a great Power, or to handicap her in her commercial life after peace has been restored. Grant that we are ready to abate many of the territorial pretensions upon which the Allied Chancelleries agreed at the outset of the war. Grant that the international order we mean to establish for our security will assure to Germany the same security that the other nations enjoy. Is it not dangerous to announce the moderation of our real aims to a Germany still undefeated? This is the concrete issue raised by the Lansdowne letter.

We take it for self-evident that in each of the major belligerent countries opinion tends toward two opposite poles. In every country there are those who would continue the struggle until the enemy was wholly broken, demoralized, ready to accept an abject peace. At the opposite extreme are those who would make peace immediately, with small regard to the nature of the terms. Between the two poles lies the great bulk of opinion, ready to endure such additional sacrifices as may be required to safeguard vital national and world interests, but anxious about the effects, domestic and international, of an indefinitely prolonged contest. There are indeed a few who assert that Germany is an exception to the rule: that all Germans, with practically no exceptions, are of the extreme, irreconcilable party of military adventure. This assertion, however, is scarcely worth taking seriously.

Even such meagre information as the various censorships allow to filter out of Germany establishes clearly the fact that German opinion, from the outset of the war, has been far from unanimous, and that at the present day differences in opinion as wide as those between La Follette and Roosevelt not only obtain, but find authoritative expression.

The military extremists of Germany can take no possible comfort from any published evidence that the designs of the Allies do not involve the dismemberment and humiliation of Germany. They believe that if Germany persists, she will win this war. They point to the collapse of Russia and the proof of Italian weakness. They still vastly underestimate the endurance of the French, the determination of the British, the efficiency of America. If they can induce the German people to endure through to the end, they believe that Allied resistance will collapse. In this event Germany would be left in a position of power such as no modern nation has ever held. Indeed, something like world empire would lie within their grasp. This is the stake for which they are playing. What the game will cost, they recognize, is many more years of war and the sacrifice of millions of German lives. What they conceive to stand between them and the realization of their glorious dream is the reluctance of the millions to pay the price in their lives. With regard to the Lansdowne letter they would agree perfectly with the reported sentiments of our own Dr. Hillis. "I abhor the letter because it lays too great stress on human life. What is human life? All the great things of the world have been done through martyrdom."

What gives aid and comfort to the most irreconcilable and ambitious of the enemy is not the expression of moderate views from beyond the hostile lines. Such views inevitably raise in the minds of those who must pay in their own lives or the lives of their sons, the question whether the objects to be attained by indefinite fighting are worth the cost. Such views tend to produce political indiscipline. They force the militarist to divide his energies between keeping up the political morale at home and the military morale on the fighting front. If the German militarists could have dictated Lord Lansdowne's letter, they would have substituted for its spirit of reconciliation such a spirit as animates Dr. Hillis and his kind. For, however weary of war the German people may be, they are not so weary that they will not continue to fight rather than yield ground to hostile armies bent on the destruction of Germany. All the militarists of Germany ask is that the people be induced to fight on. Their ultimate hope, they believe, will then be realized. Such a pronouncement as Clémenteau's, that his sole war aim is victory, served the

militarist's turn well. Here was concrete evidence that the German people could expect no mercy at their enemy's hands. The best that the militarists can do with the Lansdowne letter is to make a pretence that it indicates England's weakness, a pretence that will carry only to those whose will to continue the war to a military decision was already firmly established.

To the German military imperialists the Lansdowne letter is simply a "peace offensive," more dangerous by far to their cause than General Haig's military offensive at Cambrai. We know what our own militarists think of "peace offensives," launched from the German side. Authoritative statements of inordinate German ambitions, demands for indemnities, annexations, exclusive economic spheres, are eagerly welcomed by our own bitter-enders. They demonstrate to the masses who must pay that the overthrow of Germany is worth the price—whatever price. Statements exhibiting German tendencies toward moderation are received with disgust and rage. They impair our political morale, so it is constantly asserted, and increase the danger that peace, when it comes, will be a "German peace."

And in fact it must be admitted that the side which appears first in the field with counsels of moderation that must command the attention if not the assent of all intelligent persons within the opposing camp, does drive a wedge between people and government, does weaken the political morale of the opposing side. Lord Lansdowne's proposals, while safeguarding the essential aims of the Allies, strips them of all that made them utterly unacceptable to the German people. But for his timely intervention, we should almost certainly have had very shortly to meet a new German political offensive, presenting the essential German aims stripped of all that would compel their instant rejection by the Allied peoples.

Between the essential aims of Germany and those of the Allies lies the margin between a German peace and such a peace as the democratic nations are striving to establish. If the Allied aims are to prevail, something more than military efficiency is required. What is required above all from Allied statesmanship is a political efficiency that keeps before a world weary of war, not war aims vague and undefined and under suspicion of aggressive and revengeful purposes, but war aims of such manifest moderation and justice that the Allied peoples can cheerfully endure whatever their realization may cost, while the hostile peoples can not afford to resist them to the end. What the Allied cause most needs is "peace offensives," conducted with a boldness and skill that the enemy can not match.

The President's Commission at Bisbee

BISBEE, Arizona, is at the heart of one of the largest copper producing areas in the world. As the administrative headquarters of the Copper Queen branch of the Phelps Dodge corporation it is the virtual capital of the copper industry of the Southwest. In times of peace the Copper Queen is an important barometer of the nation's industrial prosperity; in times of war the administrative efficiency of the Phelps Dodge corporation in Bisbee is measurable in terms of life and death among our soldiers and the soldiers of our Allies at the front.

On June 27, 1917, the employees of the Copper Queen and of the neighboring properties, the Calumet and Arizona and the Shattuck, Arizona, went out on strike. On July 12, 1917, an armed mob under the nominal leadership of the county sheriff overwhelmed eleven hundred and eighty-six strikers and their alleged sympathizers, herded them aboard a train of cattle and box cars especially provided by the El Paso and Southwestern, a subsidiary of the copper companies, and under the muzzles of rifles, revolvers and machine guns deported them into the New Mexican desert. One man was killed while defending his home against illegal invasion. Others had their scalps and bones broken. Hundreds of homes were broken up. The ranking officer of the Phelps Dodge corporation in Bisbee had given out an interview in which he denounced the strikes in Bisbee and the other copper camps of Arizona as of pro-German origin and advocated deportations as the patriotic remedy.

After an interval of more than two months, President Wilson at the instance of Mr. Samuel Gompers appointed a commission headed by Secretary Wilson of the Federal Department of Labor to adjust the industrial disputes which continued seriously to restrict the output of the copper mines, and, incidentally, to make an investigation and report upon the Bisbee deportations and their effect upon our military preparations. The conclusions of the commission with respect to the industrial policy pursued by the managers of the great copper properties in Bisbee throw a flood of light upon the causes of the widespread industrial unrest that has held back our shipping, aeroplane and munitions program to the verge of a national scandal.

"The deportations of the 12th of July last from the Warren district of Arizona," begins the report, "as well as the practices that followed such deportations have deeply affected the opinions of laboring men as well as the general public throughout the country. They have been made the basis of an attempt to affect adversely public opinion among some of the people of the Allies. Their

memory still embarrasses the establishment of industrial peace throughout the country, which it is indispensable to obtain and maintain if the war is to be brought to the quickest possible conclusion."

The commission found that while the miners had grievances, which they sincerely felt called for rectification by the companies, these grievances were not of a nature to justify a strike, provided some rational machinery had existed for the peaceful adjustment of disputes. But the companies created no such machinery, neither did the government attempt to supply it until months after the most pressing need for it had passed. The strikers formulated their grievances and invited the managers to a conference for their adjustment. The managers in Bisbee explain their refusal to confer on the ground that the strike had been called by the I. W. W. In their opinion, which was without foundation in the statutes of Arizona or the United States, the I. W. W. in and of itself and irrespective of proscribed conduct by individual members was an outlaw organization. But in the course of their investigations the commission found that representatives of the Phelps Dodge corporation had taken the same "no conference no compromise" attitude toward the miners' union affiliated with the A. F. of L. on strike in other copper camps owned by the corporation. Rather than deal with their employees through trade union officials they preferred to see their mines crippled until they could settle on their own terms.

The overt reason for the Bisbee deportations, the President's commission found, was "the belief in the minds of those who engineered them that violence was contemplated by the strikers, that life and property would be unsafe unless the deportations were undertaken," but the commission could discover no justification for this belief. An experienced officer of the United States army, sent to Bisbee at the request of the governor of Arizona, reported that "everything was peaceful and that troops were neither needed nor warranted under existing conditions." To the same effect was the testimony of "reputable citizens as well as of officials of city and county who were in a position to report accurately and without bias."

It was because the deportations were without justification, either in fact or in law that, as the commission reports, "those who planned and directed them," including "managers and other officials of the Phelps Dodge corporation Copper Queen division and of the Calumet and Arizona Mining Company, purposely abstained from consulting about their plans either with the United States attorney in Arizona or the law officers of the state or county or their own legal advisers."

This brutal resort to the spirit of mob violence