

the Rhine the national boundary, if she can, even though a Germany irredenta would be the result. Strategic boundaries do not insure peace, but nevertheless they handicap the enemy. They are better than nothing; and superior security is not to be had, unless America succeeds in proving herself powerful.

America has demanded a democratized Germany. By what right can we call upon the rulers of Germany to heed our demand? By no right, except the might we can apply. We know that there are democratic forces at work in Germany. We know that they encounter all but insuperable obstacles. Autocracy represents a minority interest, but an interest controlling the governmental machinery and the army. The rule of the autocrat will end only when formidable forces fighting for democracy appear over the horizon, in the van of still greater forces certain in the end to prove irresistible.

It is conceivable that our allies may win their national objects in the war, even if we prove too dilatory to be of material assistance to them. Germany is weary: she may become so weary before the end of another year that she will yield Alsace-Lorraine and compel Austria to yield the Trentino and Istria and even Bosnia Herzegovina. Our objects in the war, the demoralization of the Central Powers and the establishment of an international system of peace, can not be won through German weariness alone. They can be won only if we make haste. Our influence in the final settlement will be measured by the force we can apply, in time.

The Responsibility of Congress for Military Delay

AMERICAN politics have set the stage for many ironical performances but none more ironical than the spectacle of an investigation by Congressional committees of the reason for tardiness in the War Department's military preparations. It is precisely comparable to an exploration by Satan of the sources of sin. No matter what degree of responsibility may be fastened either on the general war administration or upon the bureau chiefs in the Department for failure to accelerate sufficiently the manufactures and delivery of supplies for the new American army, there can be no doubt where the ultimate responsibility lies for the apparent inability of the American nation to arm speedily and effectively. Congress itself always has been the insuperable obstacle to the making of those antecedent preparations during peace which are indispensable in the event of war to the quick

and thorough concentration of the national military resources.

For years military experts in the War Department have warned Congress of the need of preparing more adequately for a smooth and quick transition from peace to war. They did not ask until recently for a large standing army, or for a huge accumulation of military stores. They did ask for a regular military establishment which was flexible and capable of being rapidly enlarged. They did ask Congress to provide in advance for the special machinery with which large amounts of munitions and supplies could quickly be obtained. The plan most frequently recommended in the reports of the General Staff was that of forming the small regular army into the skeleton of a much larger force, which would in part consist of trained reservists and in part of wholly untrained men, but with every antecedent preparation made for incorporating the first group into existing units and training and equipping the second without delay. The plan required in particular the addition to the regular army of a number of commissioned and non-commissioned officers disproportionate to its size, and in addition a large officers' reserve. It also demanded sufficient appropriations by the government for machine equipment to enable the War Department as soon as war was imminent to begin immediately the manufacture of guns and supplies on a large scale. But Congress never paid the slightest attention to these recommendations. It persisted in regarding the regular army not as an organization which should be ready to fight an actual war, but as a police force for service at home and in the insular dependencies. It was a rigid and lifeless body, intended to function inoffensively to local political interests during peace rather than dangerously to America's enemies in the event of war.

Congress has been either the father or the protector of every abuse or defect in the methods and organization of the War Department, which is preventing America in the present crisis from being an immediately dangerous enemy to Germany. It spent money on maintaining useless army posts, which should have been used for training reserve officers or for providing for a reserve of equipment, supplies and machine tools. Its military committees have always been partial to the continuation of the independent Bureau system in the Department, which is responsible for so much of the existing inefficiency. It consented very reluctantly to the constitution of a General Staff, and has worked to prevent it from becoming more than the eyes of the army—the eyes, not the brain, and not too closely connected with the brain. It has always allowed its political interest in the state

national guard to stand in the way either of the efficient federalization of the militia or the substitution for them of a reserve army, subject to national authority, which could have been made quickly available either for domestic or foreign service. Prolonged and disheartening delays were the inevitable result of the way in which Congress, ever since the Spanish-American war exposed the defects in American military preparation, has deliberately treated the regular army. In order to complete the present revelations, there should be added to the investigation of the War Department by Congress an investigation of the record of Congress in military legislation by a select committee of American generals.

In proposing such a supplementary inquiry, *The New Republic* must not be understood as disparaging the value of the current hearings. They have already brought to light facts which the American public needed to know. They have already proved that even given the untoward conditions the War Department has not moved as quickly as it might in providing equipment for the new American army. They have already indicated the unwisdom of the discouragement by the military authorities of the publication of disagreeable facts, of which so many people were aware and which in the long run could not be concealed. They have already resulted in beneficial changes in organization and personnel. Nevertheless the inquiry will fail to enlighten American public opinion as to the ultimate cause of the tardy preparations unless it places the responsibility for the delay on Congress, and upon the past popular indifference to the American army, rather than on the War Department. Considering the nature of American military organization at the time of the American declaration of war against Germany, prolonged delays could have been avoided only by an exhibition of superhuman energy and organizing ability; and the supermen capable of saving some months in equipping an army could not be improvised any more than could the trained soldiers.

The American nation and Congress cannot adopt a policy of starving the army and of confining the work of its officers to a deadening routine of petty detail, and then expect the War Department, whenever a crisis occurs, to cast aside its pedantry and red tape and jump to the level of great captains of military organization. Congress has had delivered to it for war purposes the kind of military organization which it had deliberately ordered. The upper officials of the American army consist for the most part of patriotic men and capable soldiers who have done their best to keep the regular army alive, but who have been thwarted by

public neglect and congressional opposition. They have never been allowed to organize a military machine which was capable of making war, and the machine has naturally broken down when war had to be made. The wonder is that they have succeeded in accomplishing so much as they have done.

The outbreak of war has converted the American army from a torpid into an enormously active and growing body. Its organization is trying to adjust itself to the size of its job. It is gradually doing so, but not as quickly as it should. It needs to be forced into even more radical changes in personnel and organization than those which have already been made. Congress is the best agency to exercise pressure, and it is of course the source from which any supplementary legislation which is needed must come. But in drawing this legislation Congress will fail unless it is guided by expert military opinion rather than by its traditional fear of an army which could not be allowed to be efficient because the price of efficiency was some independence of congressional control. Nothing but results count in war. The only justification for the investigation is the determination to secure improved results—that is to place more and better equipped and trained soldiers in France in a shorter time. The way in which Congress can best contribute to the results is to give the War Department what it demands in appropriations and legislation, to avoid interfering in the detail of the war administration, and then to serve notice that if the results are not forthcoming there will be trouble. It cannot in this way enable the country to escape from the penalty of its past mistakes in military policy, but it will at least be making an indispensable present contribution to American military success.

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Retarding the Allies

OUR persistent refusal to organize ourselves into a unity of command for the purchasing of munitions of war is very bad for the armies of the Allies, just as it is very bad for our own army.

All next spring, all next summer, the Allies will shelter us. We have done our best, as individuals. Not one man out of a hundred at Washington among our chief administrators but has given his work-time, his play-time, his sleep-time, his last of thought, his last of health, at demand, to any duty for this war. I have seen men come to Washington heavy with the personal ambitions of private life and I have seen them rise released to a selflessness, to a willingness to be subordinated, to be sacrificed, which makes them worthy, almost, to be where they are—standing behind our soldiers. They have labored, these men, these officials, old and new, usually with excellent minds, often with minds of positively splendid power, to their utmost. Nevertheless let us look at our case as clearly as the Germans look at it.

The Germans know that not for a moment in any month of next year shall we be able to be as much as ten per cent of the genuine fully-trained, fully-equipped, fighting-line effectiveness thrown up against them on the frontier of democratic civilization between the Adriatic and the English Channel. Not ten per cent of it, in the immediate military sense. The Germans know this. We really know it. Let us really admit it, and act on it.

We must make every effort to get supplies into the hands of the Allied armies as smoothly, as steadily, as flowingly, as possible. We shall not starve our own army, or even in any slightest way stint it. We cannot train enough men in two years to consume our industrial resources. We have a surplus. It is for us to see that the Allies get that surplus with the minimum of daily delay and with the maximum of daily rapidity. We must do it, and we want to do it.

But we cannot do it, we cannot conceivably do it, with our present organization. The minimum of delay, the maximum of rapidity, every twenty-four hours, means unity. And our present organization is an outrage against unity.

For look at it. In our War Department we have those well known separate purchasing divisions (Quartermaster, Ordnance, and so on) which, being separate, have to be "coördinated." Nobody at Washington denies the need of getting up early in the morning and "coördinating" all day long. George Porter, head of the Section on Coöperation

with States in the Council of National Defense, has offered a reward to anybody who can think up a word that will mean "coördinate" and that yet will not bore everybody sick. The first thing that "coördinates" the purchasing divisions in the War Department is the General Staff.

Well, the General Staff is indeed a "coördinating" body. It must "coördinate" the War Department for military purposes. The General Staff is a vital thing, an indispensable thing, in the matter of "coördinating" the War Department for military purposes, for fighting. But what sort of thing is it in the matter of "coördinating" the War Department for purchasing purposes, for industrial purposes, for purposes having to do with factories and the control of factories and the control of the capital and of the labor in factories? Who are on the General Staff? Soldiers. Soldiers taken from the "line." Rightly. They are to be the army's military brain. They have come from army-posts. They have studied troops. That is what they know. That is what they are for. Their knowledge of industry, their knowledge of the feelings of the people in industry, is, for the most part, nil.

One of our most famous generals opened an official conference last year on the subject of Labor on American Railways by remarking, most interestingly: "I am against trade-unions." It was really too bad that John Ruskin could not have materialized out of his grave at that moment to say: "And I wish to remind you that I am against all locomotives, steam, electric, internal-combustion, and other." One of the best ways to try to get a Bolshevik revolution in this country would be to allow our generals to become important in the control of industry. And the purchasing of munitions, in the end, here as in Britain and as in France, is nothing less than the control of industry, of all basic industry.

Therefore the General Staff, as constituted, being a military brain and not an industrial brain, is incapable of really "coördinating" and accelerating the War Department's purchasing divisions; and therefore, for this reason, as well as for other reasons, we now have a new "coördinating" body within the War Department—the "War Council"—consisting of certain bureau-chiefs and ex-bureau-chiefs among whom there are men, like General Sharpe and General Crozier, who have had recent purchasing experience.

It is too soon to be sure just what this new "War Council" can do. One thing, though, may