

cepted the inglorious rôle of the neutral spectator. Politically he had no preference about sides—he was of recent German origin—and fought with the French because he had lived in France, as he would doubtless have fought with the Germans had he been living in Germany. In a youthful poem he had selected his circumstances of death with an ear to alliteration as on a mountain in the Caspian Caucasus. His last letters, however, show that the glories of a great attack contented his poetic heart, and the stretcher-bearers who spoke with him from behind the shattered ramparts as he lay dying during that long day on the Somme confirmed in their rude idiom the impression that everyone who knew him had, that he died with a sense of a life which was sublimely finished. When he spoke of his death—for in talk he always as-

sumed that he would be killed before the end of the war—it was as of the least tragic episode of his later life.

He had a profound contempt for what he felt was the weakness of the American spirit in art. He could not quite exclude himself and his own works from this charge. He felt that he had not the force to create a new thing. He despised all that was not superlatively great, strong, and new. His grudge against America was that he felt that the accident of his birth and education there had stunted his creative power. In Europe he felt that he was a child. His noble contempt for success saved him from worldly despair. The intelligence with which he saw himself made of his life a supreme tragedy.

HARRISON REEVES.

CORRESPONDENCE

Does Not Favor Allies

SIR: Your article in the February 17th issue entitled *The Defense of the Atlantic World*, and others along the same line which have preceded it, are extremely useful in helping to make the issue clear on which war, if any, with Germany must be waged.

I am one of those Americans who are opposed to war with Germany even should an "overt act," so called, be committed. I believe that the principles laid down by Washington and Jefferson and Adams during the trying years from 1793 to 1800 were sound then and are just as sound now and just as applicable to the present crisis. If America is ever to enter a League of Nations to enforce peace, it must be along the lines laid down in President Wilson's splendid peace address to the Senate and after a "peace without victory." To follow the course which you advocate, and to abandon the position which we should occupy as the impartial upholder of neutral rights in order to align ourselves with one of the belligerent groups, would, in my judgment, be contrary not only to the tradition and spirit of our government, but would cause us to forfeit the great position of leadership along the lines of peace and humanity which it should be our sublime mission to assume.

Your articles are helpful, from my viewpoint, however, because I believe that if the American people understood that a war with Germany now would be a war not in defense of neutral rights—since those rights have been equally violated by both belligerents—but a war to assist the Entente powers to triumph over Germany, the sentiment of the country would not permit such a war to be fought. Do you believe for a single instant that the American people could be induced to fight with Germany if they understood, as you so clearly point out, that "We have clothed the most unneutral purposes in the language of neutrality. But we have never had any right to expect that we could go on forever without facing the consequences. Having started on the road of assistance to the Allies, we have to follow it through. . . . We have chosen to render the Allies definite assistance, negatively by allowing them to close the seas to Germany, posi-

tively by insisting that the seas be kept open to them"?

It is because persons believing as I do that this is not sound American policy, do not believe that the American people would support it if they understood the issue, that we look with the gravest concern on the fact that the United States is on the verge of war without the public as a whole understanding the issue. You are therefore rendering a great public service in assisting to make the issue plain. Up to that point your argument is sound and logical. But when you reach your conclusion that we ought not to be neutral, but that on the contrary our interests lie in assisting the cause of the Entente Allies, I cease to follow your argument.

You state that "The safety of the Atlantic highway is something for which America should fight." But who controls and has for years controlled the Atlantic highway with her two-Power naval standard, if not Great Britain? The principal aim which Germany is seeking in this war is the "freedom of the seas" and President Wilson has stated that "the freedom of the seas is the sine qua non of peace." Has Great Britain ever acquiesced in that view?

Lloyd George himself recognized before the outbreak of the present war that it was England's navalism, coupled with the alliance which she had made with Russia and France, which was responsible for Germany's militarism. He said in a speech in Queen's Hall, London, delivered on July 28th, 1908:

I want to put two considerations to you from the German point of view. Every misunderstanding and quarrel is largely a matter of lack of imagination. Men have not got the imagination to project themselves into the position of the other party.

Now just consider for a moment. You say, "Why should Germany be frightened of us? Why should she build because of us?" Let me put two considerations to you. We started; it is not they who have started. We had an overwhelming preponderance at sea which would have secured us against any conceivable enemy. We were not satisfied. We said, "Let there be Dreadnoughts." What for? We did not require them. Nobody was building them; and

if anybody had built them we could easily have out-built them.

We have more shipbuilding resources than any country in the world, and more than every country in the world put together; so really there was no need for it. Well, let me put another consideration before you which I don't think is sufficiently pointed out. We always say we must have what we call a "two-Power standard." What does that mean? You must have a navy large enough to oppose a combination of any two naval Powers. So, if we had Russia and France, Germany and France, Germany and Italy, we should always have a fleet large enough to defend our shores against any combination of the two greatest naval Powers in Europe. This has been our standard.

Look at the position of Germany. Her army is to her what our navy is to us—her sole defense against invasion. She has not got a two-Power standard. She may have a stronger army than France, than Russia, than Italy, than Austria, but she is between two great Powers who in combination could pour in a vastly greater number of troops than she has.

Don't forget that when you wonder why Germany is frightened at alliances and understandings and some sort of mysterious workings which appear in the press, and hints in *The Times* and the *Daily Mail* (Lord Northcliffe's papers).

I remember motoring on a Sunday morning in Germany, and I picked up a German newspaper, and the only words I could read were *Observer* and *Daily Mail*; so I asked a friend what it meant, and he said it was an extract full of menaces to Germany, and the German paper had copied it. All that means something to Germany.

Here is Germany, in the middle of Europe, with France and Russia on either side, and with a combination of their armies greater than hers. Suppose we had here a possible combination which would lay us open to invasion—suppose Germany and France, or Germany and Russia or Germany and Austria, had fleets which in combination would be stronger than ours.

Would not we be frightened, would not we build, would not we arm? Of course we should. I want our friends, who think that because Germany is a little frightened she really means mischief to us, to remember that she is frightened for a reason which would frighten us under the same circumstances.

That was sound talk—much sounder than most of the British Premier's recent utterances.

But you would have us fight against Germany and on the side of Russia and Japan since at some time in the future forsooth Germany may be allied with Russia and Japan. You say, "A victory on the high seas would be a triumph of that class which aims to make Germany the leader of the East against the West, the leader ultimately of a German-Russian-Japanese coalition against the Atlantic World. It is no paradox and no sentimentality to say that we must fight Germany not to destroy her, but to force her and lure her back to the civilization in which she belongs. She is a rebel nation as long as she wages offensive war against the western world." Where now is your logic? Germany is the only one of the western belligerent Powers which is not a rebel nation in the sense which you indicate. It was Great Britain and France which became traitors to the western world

when they allied themselves with the great eastern Powers and it is primarily for the interests of those Powers that this war is now being fought. Japan is quietly being allowed to have her way in China, while Austria must be dismembered for the benefit of Russia, and Constantinople must be given to Russia. These latter are among the announced aims of the Entente Powers! It will be the continuance of this war and the real possibility of such a result being brought about, if anything, which will force Germany into an alliance with the eastern Powers which she has so far avoided. The most casual study of the diplomatic correspondence leading up to this war will convince the impartial reader that Germany wanted to avoid fighting the western Powers. She tried to induce England and France to keep out while she fought the seemingly inevitable war of western civilization against Russian absolutism and despotism. Russia had prepared for that war. Her troops were fully mobilized. Within three days after war was declared the Russian army had overrun East Prussia, although Russia cannot mobilize under three months. But England and France had become what you call "rebel nations" by an alliance with Russia which caused them to support her.

I abhor this whole war and the system which produced it, but I for one can see no sense or justice in our fighting with England and France on the side of Russia and Japan because at some future time Germany may be allied with Russia and Japan. Nor would the American people fight on such an issue if they understood the issue.

Therefore, in helping to make it clear, I repeat that I believe that you are rendering a great public service.

R. W. FRANCE.

New York City.

In Defense of Armed Neutrality

SIR: In his communication entitled *Democratic Control of History*, printed in *The New Republic's* issue of February 24th, Mr. Charles Downer Hazen scoffs, in a vein of jovian contempt, at the proposal of the Committee for Democratic Control that in case of further aggressions on Germany's part, the United States should adopt a policy of armed neutrality instead of going to war.

Though Mr. Hazen's manner of treating the subject suggests that the objections to armed neutrality are so many and obvious as to make it unnecessary to mention them to intelligent persons, he does state two. His first is that there is no difference between armed neutrality and war. He maintains that, if the armed neutrality between the United States and France from 1798 to 1800 was not war, then, if we will allow him to select his dates and inferences, he "can assert with equal emphasis, for example, that Napoleon never took part in any war," and he backs this opinion up with the authority of John Bassett Moore, to the effect that a state of "limited war" did exist between this country and France during the period in question. I think this is a fair statement of Mr. Hazen's first objection.

To the writer it seems that the technical side of the question has obscured Mr. Hazen's vision of the practical side. If we have armed neutrality with Germany, it will mean that our sea forces will be used to convoy ships and generally take care of our interests affected by the German submarine campaign. If, as in the case of the United States and France, it goes no further than armed neutrality, neither nation will be dedicated to the

task of general and mutual destruction. Neither will necessarily be plunged into passion and hatred that may take years to obliterate. If, on the other hand, we have war, not only will it become the serious business of each nation to seek out the other for purposes of destruction; not only will the friendly relations between them be destroyed for years to come, but the whole psychology and organization of this country will, in all probability, undergo an immediate and sinister change. By this I mean that democracy here, as in all countries at war, will shrink into insignificance; and absolutism will largely take its place. Even before the mobilizations, censorship and abrogations of civil rights and liberties are complete, the United States will temporarily, at all events, be well back toward the middle ages.

Mr. Hazen's second point is that the armed neutrality of 1798 to 1800 was a fizzle. He says it did not prevent war. "But at the risk of being indelicate," says Mr. Hazen, "may I point out that the history of the United States did not stop at 1800, but went right on; also that terrific struggle continued, with one slight intermission, until the battle of Waterloo, fifteen years later; and that we did go to war, not with France—notice the unerring adroitness of the Committee in riveting the attention of the reader on France—but with England, and we went to war because of injuries done us which were incidental to the terrific struggle of Europe."

To the writer Mr. Hazen's criticism seems to be on a peculiar ground. If he reads it aright, Mr. Hazen denounces armed neutrality because our use of it in regard to France in 1798 did not keep us out of war with England in 1812, when we did not resort to this policy. It seems to the writer that this is a little hard on armed neutrality. The Committee does not make any claim that when a nation has once taken armed neutrality, a single bottle as it were, it will thenceforth be war-immune. Our more modest assertion is that, inasmuch as Washington and Adams averted war through a policy of armed neutrality, in a situation very similar to our own to-day, we might in case of need resort to the same policy rather than plunge the country into war.

AMOS PINCHOT.

New York City.

The Law and Benevolent Neutrality

SIR: It is refreshing to find at least one journal which frankly recognizes our "benevolent neutrality" toward the Allies and which does not endeavor to find its justification in breaches of international law by either belligerent or in respect by either for the rights of other nations. Those, however, who take their views on international law from the notes of the British Foreign Office seem somewhat astounded, and a little resentful, that The New Republic should receive its guidance from the legal position taken by our government.

In a letter by L. A. Crosby which appeared in your issue of February 17th, he claims that the writer of the article entitled Justification (in the issue of February 10th) "has twisted facts by presenting a picture of the naval war from August, 1914 to March, 1915, which is chronologically false." He states that the writer conveys to the reader two false impressions: "First, that the Declaration of London is part of international law binding on Great Britain." . . . "Second, that German submarine warfare was from the outset justified as a measure of reprisal or retaliation for Britain's illegal blockade."

As to the first, the writer merely said that this country might have insisted "upon a reading of sea-law such as the Declaration of London." Mr. Crosby points out that the Declaration of London was not ratified; but the claim is that the Declaration of London is binding, not through ratification, but because it was substantially a statement of the fundamentals of international law. It is true that on some matters nations had differed as to what the law actually was. On these questions some general agreement was necessary, but the agreement was as to what should be regarded as the better view.

In 1908 Sir Edward Grey instructed the British delegates to the London Conference to attempt to arrive "by common agreement at a uniform definition of the main principles of the *existing* law." In their report to Sir Edward Grey on the Declaration (March 1st, 1909) the British delegates stated: "As a body, those rules do amount practically to a statement of *what is the essence of the law of nations*. . . ."

In a book by Earl Loreburn entitled Capture at Sea (published 1913) the following appears (page 86): "The British delegates, explaining the results of the Conference, congratulated themselves with justice upon having secured full recognition of the principles advocated by the British government." And Earl Loreburn stated that any "blockade" like the present one was preposterous, for it would "almost certainly" provoke neutrals to join the enemy.

If these views, expressed at a time when there was no reason to color the facts, are correct, then the Declaration of London was binding to the extent that it expressed the law, and this it did on practically every issue involved.

As to the second proposition, Mr. Crosby states that the British "blockade" did not go into effect until March, 1915; that it was a reprisal in answer to the German submarine campaign announced February 6th, and he proves this by naïvely stating that "it was *announced* expressly as a reprisal for the German submarine policy. . . ." It was so "announced" by the British.

The title to the note of February 6th of the German government on the submarine blockade reads: "Memorial of the Imperial German Government respecting the retaliatory measures rendered necessary by the means employed by England contrary to international law in intercepting neutral maritime trade with Germany."

If the question of whose act was a reprisal depends upon who called "names" first, the Germans would seem to have the better of the controversy, but, of course, the German position is also sustained by the American note of December, 1914, which pointed out that England was illegally interfering with shipments, not to Germany, but to neutrals. Prior to this war it has been established international law that shipments of conditional contraband, such as foodstuffs, on neutral vessels to neutral ports, were free from seizure whatever might be the ulterior destination. Undoubtedly, the British did seize foodstuffs bound for neutral countries on neutral vessels. These seizures antedated the German decrees of February, 1915.

In the note of December 26th, 1914, our government characterized the "course of action" of Great Britain as one "which denied to neutral commerce the freedom to which it was entitled by the law of nations." If this statement was true, the German claim of retaliation against England is not so surprising.

In the light of these views, it is very doubtful whether the article in The New Republic conveyed "to the reader two impressions quite false."

I might add that the German regulations did not hand over the control of all food supplies to the military authorities, as Mr. Crosby seems to think, but controlled the distribution of grain (not all food) by private corporate agencies. If the military authorities needed grain, they had to buy it from these agencies in the same way as the wholesaler who wished to sell to private individuals. While the difference is conventional, rather than logical, yet the same is true of the age-long distinction between food for civilians and for the army.

ARTHUR GARFIELD HAYS.

New York City.

An Absence of Law

SIR: Law and that part of reason which is accepted by man is the result of experience. No law which is not founded upon experience can stand. At the present time we know very little about submarine warfare, since only one nation has ever used it extensively, and only then for one war. If submarines are really found to be useful every nation in time of war will use them when in a tight place, no matter what the law may be. Our experience in regard to submarine warfare has been so very meagre up to date that we believe no one is qualified to make any very accurate statements about what the future law should be. It seems to us that the application of cruiser blockade laws to submarine blockades is about as nice an application as street car laws to automobiles.

O. T. HAMILTON.

M. L. THOMPSON.

New York City.

Still Unconvinced of Danger

SIR: It seems to me you are having a pretty uncomfortable time intellectually in seeking a justification for urging the entry of this country into the war without abandoning all of those reasonable habits of thought which your readers have come to expect of you. You are far too wise, of course, to adopt the President's absolutist position that since our right to use the seas is a peaceful and proper right therefore it must be defended at all cost. You are careful to point out that as far as "rights" are concerned, our case against England is as strong as it is against Germany, and that the only reason England's action has not resulted in loss of American life has been because our neutrality has been "benevolent" ("hypocritical" is the term you formerly employed, before you unhitched your wagon from Mr. Roosevelt and hitched it to Mr. Wilson). Having acquitted yourself of absolutism and of legalism by this argument, your reader is in a position to say, "Here is an argument for entering the war which is based on pragmatic grounds; I can now join the popular clamor without violence to my intellectual conscience and without swallowing the absurd talk about 'rights,' 'honor,' and the rest." He need not examine too closely the nature of your argument; it is not absolutist and it leads to a comfortable compliance with the prevailing clamor. Indeed, if he were to examine it, he would find great difficulty in ascertaining precisely what it is. At one time it takes the form of defending English "despotism" of the seas as against German "anarchy" with the purpose of modifying that "despotism"; but if the German contention should prevail, why would not the

Germans cease to be the "anarchists"? At another time it appears we must fight to send our mail to England; but by your own showing the same argument would require us to fight England as well as Germany. The latest argument is that it would be better for us if England were to seize the German colonies than if Germany were to take the British, because the British follow a free trade policy; we, a protectionist country, are to go to war to establish free trade in other countries!

Now I am far from denying that an Allied victory, even to the extent of dismembering the German and Austrian Empires and dividing the spoils, may conceivably benefit the world more than would a German victory which went to a similar extreme in dismembering the Allies. But that fact requires considerably more demonstration than a few words about despotism versus anarchy on the seas, or about England's liberal colonial policy. Meanwhile, the real evils of embarking on a war, with the attendant diversion of constructive reform efforts into destructive channels and with the dogmatic habit of thought engendered by war, require no demonstration. But it is pleasanter sometimes to float with the stream. You seem to have taken to heart the advice Morris R. Cohen puts into the mouth of Mark Twain in addressing Elihu Root in your last number: "Throw in something about evolutionary philosophy, social psychology, and social uplift and progress. Men of wealth and power can play the new tunes as well as the old, and have the additional comfort of not being laughed at by their own young fellows who have had a little more schooling."

ROBERT L. HALE.

New York City.

For the Disabled Soldiers of Belgium

SIR: Placed by chance in the path of aggression, mutilated in the defense of their country, invaded in flagrant violation of an international treaty, these Belgian soldiers have the clearest claim to our aid and sympathy. To them it is mainly due that a far larger part of France, with its supreme monuments of Gothic art, its towns, villages and fields, is not now in utter ruin.

All of these sufferers can and will be taught to do some useful work, but their pensions will be very small, and with their so terribly impaired efficiency they can never be wholly self-supporting. To house these maimed men after the war a society has been formed of well known Belgians, headed by Monsieur Henri de Schoonen, Honorary Vice-Consul of Belgium, which proposes to build homes and workshops, to be provided free of rent or sold on generous terms, and which will be, as far as possible, in the native villages of the invalidated men.

This work urgently calls for our support, and all gifts, however small, will be a real help and a proof of sympathy. To assist in the raising of funds a series of pictorial postal cards and letter paper with wood-cut designs, chiefly by Belgian artists, have been printed and will, it is hoped, be soon on sale throughout the United States. All contributions may be sent direct to Monsieur Henri de Schoonen, 79 Mark Lane, London, E. C., or to the Editor of The New Republic, 421 West Twenty-first Street, New York.

HENRY WINSLOW,

American Member of the Committee of Relief for
Belgian Artists.
London, England.

Back Your Train Up to My Pony

William S. Hart in Truthful Tulliver, Triangle-Kay Bee film. Thomas H. Ince producer. Scenario by J. G. Hawks.

J. G. HAWKS wrote the good scenario for *The Bride of Hate*, in which Frank Keenan and Margery Wilson have done such sound work of late. Every detail shows the distinction between the spirit and devices of this new form, the photoplay, and the makings of any similar stage drama. It is as wide as the difference between music and painting. The same may be said of Hawks's scenario for *Truthful Tulliver*. Hawks knows the technique. But that is about all on the aesthetic theme to-day. We have weightier matters to reveal.

When Tulliver, the bold man of letters, rode into Glory Hole, Arizona, adventuring from Texas, he knew his own. He would have been president of Princeton, with eastern opportunities. Here he took charge of the empty printing office. Silver Lode Thompson, his Secretary of State, had come with him from Texas. Thompson proceeded to set type at once. A little down Main Street (the only street) the Forty Rod pleasure hall shook and thundered. Men were dancing with bottles on their heads, or riding away with squalling Cleopatras across their saddle-bows. The Forty Rod had once been a decent livery stable. Note this.

The Glory Hole Nugget was soon on the street, with a little essay on *The New Freedom* on the inside page, no doubt. "Ain't she one stem-winder of a town?" said Truthful, as he looked out.

Two delicate ladies, that is, innocent young frumps, were sailing down Main Street as serenely as young ships on a calm sea, when they were annoyed, elaborately, by the manager of the Forty Rod, "Deacon" Doyle.

Tulliver consulted his secretary. The two went out. Tulliver twisted up "Deacon" Doyle till he knelt to the ladies, while Silver Lode Thompson kept his eye on the growling crowd. It turned out that these two girls were gentle orphans, with a turn for writing "poetry." Tulliver soon posted his note, all along Main Street. "'Deacon' Doyle Must Go." Doyle tacked up an answer implying that Tulliver was a literary doctrinaire and a piffing idealist. He put it in this way: "Doyle will be in the Forty Rod To-morrow Morning at Ten o'clock, and There is Not a Pen Pusher in Arizona who Can Run Him out of Town."

Doyle was merely a rough-neck and shooter. Trust the bold note-writer to bring the secret powers to light. The real master of Glory Hole was York Cantrall. He had posed around Tulliver as a gentleman. He now entered the printing office in his true colors, and received proper defiance. In spite of him, Tulliver organized a League to Enforce Peace. Pious neutrals joined from all corners of the town. And there was talk, talk, talk; while, no doubt, pious jealous men of action sneered and foamed at Tulliver. But Truthful was patient.

At ten o'clock, while Deacon Doyle and an unwholesome half-breed were mobilized, with their guns pointing at the little front door of the Forty Rod that they expected Tulliver to open, Tulliver in masterful strategy, drove a-horseback through the double back door. Note that he had shot no man so far. Nor did he shoot. He lassoed those two while their backs were turned. As the

crowd blocked his retreat, he jumped his horse through the closed window with much crashing of glass. He dragged the pair after him, producing an acute example of the type of tableau I call *Sculpture-in-motion*.

Doyle and his half-breed could scarcely climb up on the stage coach of banishment after being dragged down the street to the feet of the League to Enforce Peace. The bad half of the town were forced to mount all the spare stage coaches. They were hauled to nowhere in particular. One thought of the Outcasts of Poker Flat.

Most of the cleaning up of Glory Hole was done at the point of the gun, with little shooting. And the Man Higher Up, always the last to take his medicine, was disciplined. York Cantrall, who had harbored Doyle, Tulliver ordered out of town. He went in a hurry. Glory Hole was as pure as Cromwell's Parliament after Pride's Purge, or Europe will be after Prussian Militarism is annihilated.

Just as I was on the point of nominating Tulliver for Editor and Mayor of the World, I discovered he had made a mistake. It is hard to believe this of a man who can speak the truth, write a note, and rope a villain too.

On the sly, York Cantrall had won the heart and shining body of one of those innocent dowdy little crafts whose passage Tulliver had cleared to the Nugget office. No secret alliances are to be tolerated in Arizona. It was the business of Tulliver, who ran this man out of town at the point of a gun, to bring him back by the same means, and, no matter what he deserved, marry him to this weeping orphan girl.

Our hero, his bosom torn with a tempest, made a race after the express train. The pony did not trip. Our hero jumped from his back to the rear platform of the observation Pullman. The pony now stood without hitching, nosing the track. I myself tried catching the rear end of a passing caboose once, when I was afoot, with no stirrup complications. I jerked my right shoulder well nigh out of joint, and was thrown skallyhooting into the ditch. So I admire Truthful for making that train. At his suggestion all the people in the car held up their hands. He told the conductor he did not want money. He was after a man. It was Truthful's luck that the man was right there, not four coaches ahead. And the conductor delivered the man unto him. Here comes the great photoplay episode. Our hero said, "Back your train up to my pony." And the conductor pulled the rope, and it was done, even as Truthful had commanded.

My friend Epes Winthrop Sargent of the Moving Picture World is puzzled by one of my pet phrases in the classification of the photoplay elements. The phrase is *Architecture-in-motion*. Most politely and fraternally I draw Mr. Sargent's attention to the statement that when this train backs up to this pony it is an example of *Architecture-in-motion*. When the pony is chasing the train, and the pony is nearest to the camera, it is, in a primitive way, *Sculpture-in-motion*. But when the end of the train fills the screen, we have architecture. It has a roof, walls, a floor, windows, door, chairs and inhabitants, and it is certainly in motion. Above all, it is the leading actor in this episode. We see the principle of *Architecture-in-motion* illustrated in a more epic way throughout *Intolerance*. For instance, when the great gates of Bel open, or when the titanic siege towers go forward or fall, these elements are the leading actors. And they are certainly architecture, in motion.

York Cantrall submitted to his stern providence, who bound his arms and took him home. Cantrall was not averse